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My dissertation argues that Shakespeare transforms Aristotelian epideixis (the 
rhetorical mode comprising praise and blame) into a skeptical mode by laying bare its 
embedded ethical and epistemological problems.  Shakespeare, that is, uses the evaluative 
procedures inherent within epideictic poetry to scrutinize its own principles of 
representation, transforming a poetics of praise into a poetics of appraisal.  His 
innovations in the Petrarchan sonnet form stand at the center of my project, but I also 
illuminate how Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism underlies his experimentation with 
tragedy and comedy.  In a broader perspective, my project shows how an intimacy 
between philosophical skepticism and the practice of praise had its roots in the cultural 
and religious upheavals of the sixteenth century. 
The cornerstone of my project is Shakespeare’s young-man sonnets, which 
provide a unique angle from which to understand the dark-lady poems and some key 
Shakespearean plays.  I show that while the first sequence (1-126) investigates the 
epistemology of praise, the second (127-52) describes the dramatic interactions between 
lovers who have advanced beyond epideictic poetry and its accompanying skepticim. 
Chapter 1, primarily an introduction to my study, considers the religious and 
cultural background for Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism, reviews classical and 
 
 
Renaissance theories of praise, and closely reads poems by Shakespeare and Petrarch.  
Chapter 2 explores the canker as the central symbol of Shakespeare’s epideictic 
skepticism and as a threat to the rose of beauty and praise.  Tracing the poet’s struggle 
with this persistent figure of satire and blame, I contend that the canker is inherent in the 
practice of praise.  My third chapter maps my interpretation of the canker ad the rose 
onto a new reading of Hamlet.  I argue that the young-man sonnets provide a paradigm 
for understanding Hamlet’s relationship with his two fathers, his misogyny and verbal 
abuse, and the tragic path to which he finally commits himself.  Chapter 4 offers a comic 
resolution to the rhetorical problems emphasized in the previous three chapters.  Her, 
finally, I turn to the sonnets devoted to the notoriously rebellious dark mistress, exploring 
their relationship to Shakespearean comedy generally and to The Taming of the Shrew 
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 The publication of Stanley Cavell’s Disowning Knowledge in 1987 has stimulated 
a steady interest in Shakespeare’s skepticism.1  It is not hard to see why.  Religious 
doubt, epistemological uncertainty, and subjective awareness and isolation rest at th  
heart of Shakespeare’s tragedies.2  Scholars studying King Lear and Macbeth have found 
that skepticism provides an analytical structure, a cultural context, even a vocabulary for 
dealing with Lear’s bewilderment on the heath and Macbeth’s confused sense of reality. 
In our own culture of doubt, studying Shakespeare’s curiosity and his moral ambivalence 
deepens our sense of his relevance, convincing us that he could just as easily have traded 
ideas with Friedrich Nietzsche as with Ben Jonson. 
 Indeed, an overwhelming interest in Shakespeare’s play of ideas has led scholars 
such as David Bevington and A.D. Nuttall to consider his skepticism more as intellectual 
recreation than epistemological doubt.3  Benjamin Bertram, in contrast, examines 
                                                      
1 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). 
2 For a discussion of how skepticism found an outlet in Renaissance tragedy generally, see William M. 
Hamlin, Tragedy and Scepticism in Shakespeare’s England (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
3 See David Bevington, Shakespeare’s Ideas (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) and A.D. Nuttall, 
Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).  Bevingto  explores the plays’ mixed 
attitudes toward classical philosophy, religion, and politics.  A.D. Nuttall devotes an entire book to 
Shakespeare’s intellections, covering everything from philosophical nominalism and ontology to stoicism 
and nihilism.  He contends that Shakespeare “shares with…[men like Hume] a knack for asking 
fundamental (sometimes very simple) questions” (378).  Although Nuttall studiously avoids calling such a 
process skepticism (he prefers to treat doubt locally in Troilus and Cressida), his book about Shakespeare 
the thinker-inquirer is really about Shakespeare the skeptic.  In many ways, Nuttall’s exploration of 
Shakespeare parallels the work of Harold Bloom, whoclaims that Shakespeare “invented the human” when 
he created characters that develop rather than unfold; that is, he gave us so authentic a “representatio  of 
character” that we are revealed in each one of them [Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 1998), 17].  In Bloom’s estimation, however, Hamlet and Falstaff tower over 
Shakespeare’s other characters because of their supior intelligence, their creative autonomy, and, in 
Hamlet’s case, his doubt.  Bloom remarks that Hamlet’s skepticism “does not merely exceed its possible 
origin in Montaigne but passes into something rich and strange in Act V, something for which we have no 
name” (391).     
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Shakespeare’s doubt in terms of specific political and social developments.4  Still other 
scholars turn to skeptical tenets to advance arguments about Shakespeare’s religion, his 
knowledge of Montaigne, his associations with contemporaries like Marlowe and Donne, 
his mixed allegiance to various classical and medieval sources, and his exper m ntation 
with literary forms.  Robert Brustein, responding to Stephen Greenblatt’s assertion that 
Shakespeare “seems at once Catholic, Protestant, and deeply skeptical of both,” argues 
that Shakespeare eventually ends up in a “very dark place [in his plays] characterized by 
dawning disbelief in all religions and driven by serious doubts about the existence of a 
benevolent God.”5  John D. Cox moves in the opposite direction from Brustein, 
maintaining that Shakespeare’s skepticism is underwritten by a deep-seatd faith in a 
divine power.6  The alliance between faith and doubt is the hallmark of sixteenth-century 
Catholic Pyrrhonism, but Cox refrains from calling Shakespeare either Catholic or 
Protestant since his plays are doctrinally equivocal.  These fundamental ambiguities, 
however, have not stopped other critics from testifying to Shakespeare’s recusancy.  
Richard Wilson, for instance, contends that Shakespeare’s skepticism, and his familiarity 
with Montaigne’s Essays, provides some evidence for his Catholicism.7 
In my view, however, the most valuable studies of Shakespeare’s skepticism also 
look at how his works deploy specific skeptical strategies.  Millicent Bell, for example, 
draws connections between Montaigne and Shakespeare, but her book is really about the 
                                                      
4 See Benjamin Bertram, The Time is Out of Joint: Skepticism in Shakespeare’s England (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 2005). 
5 See Stephen Greenblatt, Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 2004), 103; Robert Brustein, The Tainted Muse: Prejudice and Presumption in 
Shakespeare and his Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 204-05. 
6 John D. Cox, Seeming Knowledge: Shakespeare and Skeptical Faith(Waco, Texas: Baylor University 
Press, 2007). 
7 Richard Wilson, Secret Shakespeare: Studies in Theatre, Religion, and Resistance (Manchester, England: 
Manchester University Press, 2004).  
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problem of causality in Shakespeare’s tragedies – not his Montaignesque Catholicism.8  
As Bell maintains, Shakespeare’s tragedies “flout traditional ideas about human selfhood 
as a known and consistent quality by which a man or a woman is identified” (x) and so 
reflect a “potent philosophical skepticism verging on nihilism” (2). 9   The way 
Shakespeare’s “chief personages often seem to lack clearly defined and consistent 
characters and motives” shows evidence of this dark philosophy, as does the way in 
which the “sequence of events in the plays sometimes fails to compose a logical story in 
which one thing leads to another” (22).10  While Bell, then, roots her exploration of 
nihilism and causality in Montaigne, these philosophical dilemmas ultimately transcend 
him.  
Indeed, Cavell deliberately avoids Montaigne, staunchly declaring that he will not 
read Shakespeare’s plays as philosophy or even, really, in their historical context. “Th  
burden of my story,” he maintains, “in spinning the interplay of philosophy with 
literature is not that of applying philosophy to literature, where so-called literary works 
would become kinds of illustrations of matters already independently known.”11  Cavell 
argues that Shakespeare has more in common with the religious explorations of Descartes 
                                                      
8 Millicent Bell, Shakespeare’s Tragic Skepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
9 Bell, x.  I, along with Bell, am working from the assumption that Shakespeare had either read Montaigne 
in French before the Florio translation of The Essays in 1603 or at least read parts of it in manuscript (17-
18).  For a discussion corroborating this point of view, see James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of 
Shakespeare (New York: Harper Collins, 2005).  Shapiro reminds us that the “first two volumes of 
Montaigne’s Essays were published in France in 1580” and that Shakespeare’s French was “good enough 
to read Montaigne in the original” (293).   
10 Shakespeare’s skepticism about cause culminates, for Bell, in Macbeth, wherein “Shakespeare offers a 
version of the Macbeth story more disturbing to our deepest sense of the quality of being human by 
throwing out the logic that gives us assurance that we understand why we act as we do” (206).  Drawing o  
Montaigne’s disavowal of the “constancy of human character,” Bell goes on to say that in Macbeth, “the 
presence of witchcraft’s riddling prophesy – which seems to reveal the inaccessible truth but really 
misleads – is a way of exposing the human delusion that one can understand what will happen and who we 
are” (206-207).  Implied in this observation is also the question of whether we can ever truly understand 
why we do what we do.   
11 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 179. 
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than the secular pragmatism of Montaigne and Machiavelli.  Like Descartes, Shakespeare 
seems less interested in “how to conduct oneself best in an uncertain world” than “how to 
live at all in a groundless world” (3).  Unlike Descartes, however, who sees God as a 
substitute for that lost ground, Shakespeare is not so self-assured; thus, his plays seem to 
anticipate the cogito in order to explore what happens when it is challenged.12  In this 
respect, Cavell’s interpretation of Shakespeare seems depressingly nihilistic, but his 
reluctance to accept that Shakespeare wrote merely “secular scripture” mitigates some of 
the pessimism.  As Cavell affirms, applying the word secular often means omitting the 
“aspiration, and achievement, of some mode of transcendence” that characterizes th  
works of both Shakespeare and Thoreau (18).  Instead, Cavell, contending that the 
“Shakespearean corpus” vies with religion, seems as interested in the possibilities opened 
up by skepticism as by its dark, cramped corners. 13 
Similar to Cavell, Graham Bradshaw is concerned “not with a body of ideas 
which supposedly correspond with” Shakespeare’s skepticism but with the “processes of 
the plays’ poetic-dramatic thinking,” or how the works undertake a skeptical procedure 
                                                      
12 For example, Cavell argues that the “pivot of Othello’s interpretation of skepticism is Othello’s placing 
of a finite woman in the place made and left by Descartes for God” (35).  
13 Cavell explores how disowning knowledge in Shakespeare’s plays contributes to skepticism and helps 
give the works a common structure.  Hamlet, for example, shows how revenge demolishes “individual 
identity” because the prince is never allowed to mourn his father and let him pass (188).  The skeptical 
structure of this play is set in motion by Hamlet’s agreement to “wipe away all fond memories” and eras  
himself in the process.  King Lear reveals a similar dramatic shape when the king willfully and knowingly 
denies the truth of Cordelia’s love and, in so doing, avoids the revelatory self-knowledge that he fears will 
shame him (59).  Unlike Bell, Cavell maintains that Lear is well aware that Cordelia loves him best, bu  he 
is terrified of that love, “of being loved, of needing love” (62).  Cordelia is “alarming,” Cavell contends, 
“because he knows she is offering the real thing” and “putting a claim on him that he cannot face” (62).  On 
one level, then, Lear banishes Cordelia to conceal a p rt of himself from himself.  On a broader level, 
Lear’s banishment of Cordelia reflects “skepticism’ banishment of the world” (5).  Cavell takes an 
inductive approach, reading Shakespeare’s plays from the bottom up.  In keeping with the nature of 
skepticism, Cavell’s interpretations are nothing short of unorthodox.  Thus, even as he ties his 
interpretation to the so-called big picture, that pic ure of skepticism is unstable, always shifting, ever quite 
clarified.  Firmer than Cavell’s delineations of Shakespeare’s skepticism, therefore, are his interpretations 
of the plays themselves. 
5 
 
on their own. 14  Taking as his departure point Shakespeare’s “preoccupation with the act 
of valuing” (3), Bradshaw examines the plays’ tendencies to shift between (or in some 
cases to juxtapose) an inherent perspective and an imposed perspective of the world.  The 
inherent perspective corresponds with a “humanistic view of Nature” in which values 
arise from and so are ratified by the outside world (5).  The latter perspective, in contrast, 
can be construed in terms of an “under-nature” where values are imposed on the world 
and where a person, “exposed” to Nature’s “terrors,” is left decisively 
“unaccommodated.”  In a society of imposed standards, Nature does not reflect som 
consistent notion of value; it rather reveals the chaotic “clashing” of “opposed accounts 
of value” and multiple perspectives (4-5).  Bradshaw goes on to explore the relationship 
between these two views of nature in order to argue that Shakespeare was a radical 
skeptic, “weigh[ing] the human need to affirm values against the inherently problematic 
nature of all acts of valuing” (39). 
Continuing this attention to Shakespeare’s “skeptical procedures” is Anita’s 
Sherman’s rigorous examination of how the author’s “skeptical aesthetic” helps “forge a 
new and distinctive idiom for memory.”15  In her “literary study of skeptical tropes” 
(xiv), Sherman identifies “formal features” that induce skepticism about the past, 
including opposing points of view, frames of reference, countermonuments [or memorials 
“oppos[ing] conventional ideas of monumentality” (18)], and disnarration [accounts that 
“suppress information” and speculate about non-events (25)].16  Sherman also explores 
how features reflecting “collective memory” – such as pastoral and typology – work to 
                                                      
14 Graham Bradshaw, Shakespeare’s Scepticism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), xi. 
15 Anita Gilman Sherman, Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), xii, ix. 
16 Sherman explains that countermonuments tend to “eschew sentimentality” (20) and/or often dismiss the 
“fantasy of total knowledge” when they provide only partial or temporary revelation (76).   
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quell “anxieties” that some “rhetorical strategies, narrative techniques, and 
countermonumental iconography” coax “to the surface” (25).  
Taking my cue from scholars who have investigated a “skeptical aesthetic” but 
shown fidelity to the study of literature as literature, I argue that Skespeare transforms 
Aristotelian epideixis (the rhetorical mode comprising praise and blame) into a skeptical 
mode by laying bare its embedded ethical and epistemological problems.  Shakespeare, 
that is, uses the evaluative procedures inherent within epideictic poetry to scrutinize its 
own principles of representation, transforming a poetics of praise into a poetics of 
appraisal.  His innovations in the Petrarchan sonnet form stand at the center of my 
project, but I also illuminate how Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism underlies his 
experimentation with tragedy and comedy.  In a broader perspective, my project shows 
how an intimacy between philosophical skepticism and the practice of praise had its roots 
in the cultural and religious upheavals of the sixteenth century. 
Although a few scholars have acknowledged the epistemological dimensions of 
praise and recognized a connection between praise and doubt, a full-scale study of that 
relationship has not been done.17  More often than not, critics have treated praise as a 
rhetorical flourish, a bit of literary coloring that lightens or darkens a work or a praise 
object depending on the situation described and on the artist’s underlying motives.18  At 
best, praise has been appreciated for its connection to paradox and satire when the praise 
                                                      
17 Joel Fineman’s Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) of c urse touches on these issues.  Anita Sherman trets
praise (or exemplarity, as she puts it) as a form which inspires and consoles, but she also acknowledges that 
it is “in crisis during the late Renaissance” and suggests that sixteenth-century skepticism is one of the 
reasons (Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne, 38).  And David Schalkwyk, who builds a 
case for the performative dimension of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, argues against the epistemology of praise.  
See “What Words May Do? The Performative of Praise in Shakespeare’s Sonnets,” Shakespeare Quarterly 
49.3 (1998), 251-68.     
18 For a discussion of the classical praise tradition and its effect on Renaissance poetry and theory, see 
chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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object is mocked, or for its power to stimulate intimacy with, or admiration for, another 
person when the praise object is treated seriously.19  Scholars assessing the rhetorical 
features of praise have tended to limit their arguments to the sixteenth-century patronage 
system, hence to political and social advancement.20  No critic has yet explored how an 
author’s engagement with epideictic rhetoric formally generates skepticism about that 
very mode, nor have they considered the generic and ethical consequences of such an 
engagement.  To dwell as I do on epideictic skepticism is to emphasize Shakespeare’s 
skepticism about the tradition of praise and blame, as well as skepticism arising 
inevitably from within that tradition (ie. skeptical epideixis). 
 For skepticism does not simply require doubt or a suspension of judgment.  A 
skeptic is also “inquiring” and “reflective,” carefully “consider[ing]” nuances and 
problems, and weighing different points of view and multiple perspectives.21  A “look 
out” and a “watchman,” a skeptic may doubt the possibility of achieving full knowledge 
                                                      
19 See, for example, Timothy Hampton’s Writing from History: The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance 
Literature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).  Examining the “crisis in the representation 
of exemplarity in the late Renaissance,” Hampton argues that “ideological anxiety and epistemological 
scepticism [led] to an erosion of the authority of exemplary figures” (x) and thus to a new way of 
perceiving history and the self.  Although Hampton points to a connection between skepticism and praise 
(or in Hampton’s case exemplarity), his emphasis is historical and cultural.  Rather than consider the 
problems within epideixis, Hampton focuses on how “posthumanist” skepticism “toward the representation 
of antiquity in literature” (x) reflected a shift in how classical epideictic literature was received.  As 
Hampton contends, the Renaissance period grew skeptical about humanism and the “rhetoric of heroism” 
(7).  “Exemplary figures from antiquity,” he later asserts, began to be “seen as dangerously ambiguous” 
(28).  Like Hampton, I focus on how epideixis could be exploited to yield ambiguous results.  For another 
précis of Hampton’s argument, see Sherman, Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne, 28.     
20 For arguments emphasizing the relationship between po try and patronage, see Robert Matz, Defending 
Literature in Early Modern England: Renaissance Literary Theory in Social Context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); and David Bevingto  and Milla Riggio, “‘What Revels Are in Hand?’ 
Marriage Celebrations and Patronage of the Arts in Re aissance England,” in Shakespeare and Theatrical 
Patronage in Early Modern England, eds. Paul Whitfield White and Suzanne Westfall (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 125-49.  For books that touch on the patronage system with regard to 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets in particular, see Robert Matz, The World of Shakespeare’s Sonnets (New York: 
McFarland, 2007); Dympna Callaghan, Shakespeare’s Sonnets (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007); and 
Sasha Roberts, “Shakespeare Sonnets and English Sonnet Sequences,” in Early Modern English Poetry: A 
Critical Companion, ed. Patrick Cheney et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 172-83.         
21 “skepticism, n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  
6 September 2009  <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50215184>.  
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but remains intellectually active and engaged.22  Conceptually related to skepticism, the 
word praise easily surpasses its traditional association with extolling virtues and 
cataloguing good deeds.  From the Old French word proisier, praise means, among other 
things, “to make a valuation of,” “to attach importance to,” and “to prize.”23  Praise also 
derives from the Latin word pretiare, which means to “appraise” as well as to “value.”24  
Thus, praise both denotes and connotes evaluation of and inquiry into the praise object.  
 Although Joel Fineman does not explore the relationship between praise and 
skepticism per se, he rightly shows that epideixis is insistently self-conscious and so 
prone to speak about itself.  It is for this reason, he argues, that praise is the 
“paradigmatic genre of poetical or literary language.”25  Praise, in other words, focuses as 
much on itself as a method of representation as on the person or thing that it is praising.  
Why not, therefore, go further and say that if praise points to itself, then it also appraises 
itself – dwelling on value even as it evaluates how to represent those values?  Doing so 
shows praise to be the “paradigmatic genre” of literary skepticism and thus key to 
understanding an author’s expressions of doubt.  To focus, then, on Shakespeare’s 
epideictic skepticism is to insist not only that praise is inevitably – and not just 
occasionally – a skeptical exercise, but also that an author’s skepticism in some way 
relates to praise.  
 Of course, my claim for an intrinsic relationship between praise and doubt may 
seem to undermine the historical urgency of my project, but I should add that “intrinsic” 
by definition suggests that doubt was not always an explicit counterforce within praise.  
                                                      
22 Ibid. 
23 “praise, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  6 
September 2009 < http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50186112>.   
24 Ibid. 
25 Joel Fineman, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye, 6. 
9 
 
Indeed, this relationship takes on new significance in the Renaissance period for several
reasons.  Most obviously, classical (as in radical or Pyrrhonist) skepticism wa revived 
after Henri Estienne translated Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines in 1562.  Proponents of 
Pyrrhonism doubt every received truth.  In any debate, they are the consummate “devil’s 
advocates,” offering contrasting points of view but refusing to come to a consensus about 
anything.  Sextus defines and advocates the Pyrrhonist method in his Outlines, explaining 
that “‘opposed accounts’” are held in “‘equipollence,’” which “mean[s] equality wih
regard to being convincing or unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes 
precedence over any other as being more convincing.  Suspension of intellect is a 
standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything.”26  There is 
no third or middle solution in Pyrrhonism because, as Alan Levine explains, these 
skeptics believe that “we cannot know whether we can know anything or not.”27  Fulke 
Greville, Sir Walter Raleigh, and, Montaigne all wrote treatises or essays responding to 
this emergent philosophy; through Montaigne in particular, skepticism was absorbed into 
the literature of writers like Shakespeare and Donne.28   
Another development that points to an intimacy between praise and doubt is the 
expansion of Academic skepticism, which was already helping to mold the educational 
system in England prior to 1562.29  Indeed, Erasmus himself supported this philosophy 
                                                      
26 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), I.4.10. 
27 Alan Levine, “Introduction: The Prehistory of Toleration and Varieties of Skepticism,” in Early Modern 
Skepticism and the Origins of Toleration, ed. Alan Levine (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 1999), 
11. 
28 See Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Works, trans. Donald M. Frame (New York: Everyman’s 
Library, 2003); Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, Treatie of Humane Learning, in The Works in Verse and 
Prose Complete, 4 vols., ed. Alexander B. Grosart (St. George’s, Blackburn, Lancashire, 1870), vol. 2; and 
Sir Walter Raleigh, “The Sceptic,” in The Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, 8 vols., ed. William Oldys and 
Thomas Birch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1829), 8:548-56.   
29 Before Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism alighted on the intellectual scene in 1562, Academic skepticism 
had officially entered England by way of the moderat  thinker, Cicero, and indirectly through Platonism.  
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early in the sixteenth century, insisting in his playful satire, P aise of Folly, that 
“[h]uman affairs are so complex and obscure that nothing can be known of them for 
certain, as has been rightly stated by my Academicians [skeptics], the least assuming of 
the philosophers.”30  Rhetorical techniques honed during the early Tudor period involved 
learning to argue both sides of an issue, participating in Ciceronian debate, tracing the 
many permutations of a question, and testing hypotheses.31  The practice of “rul[ing] out 
the possibility of certain knowledge” and considering all sides of an issue in order to 
achieve a kind of “practical certainty” defined the period’s pedagogical methods.32  These 
techniques also reveal an incipient empiricism that later blossomed into seventeenth-
century Baconian science.   
Finally, epideictic skepticism was shaped and fueled by religious and intellectua  
changes.  Many scholars, including Stanley Cavell and Julie Solomon, have written about 
a shift during the Renaissance in the way people viewed themselves and the world, or, as 
Solomon puts it, the “new sensitivity to cognitive relativism.”33  This transformation in 
                                                                                                                                                              
For a discussion of the popularity of Cicero’s Academica and the mixed reaction in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries to Plato’s connection to Academic skepticism, see Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero 
Scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the Academia in the Renaissance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1972).  As Schmitt observes, not everybody felt thae “critical, quasi-sceptical, and probabilistic 
elements of the teachings of Socrates and Plato” were “integral to the tradition” (51).  Augustine rejected 
this side of Plato’s philosophies, Schmitt shows, in favor of “dogmatic Neoplatonism” (32). 
30 Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, trans. Betty Radice (1971; rpt. London, England: Penguin Books, 1993), 
70-71. 
31 For a discussion of the way these rhetorical techniques were brought to life in early Tudor drama, fiction, 
and poetry, see Joel B. Altman, The Tudor Play of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).  
William Hamlin acknowledges Altman’s insistence on the relationship between rhetoric and skepticism, 
but Hamlin favors “serious drama,” which offers a “perfect vehicle” for skepticism (Tragedy and 
Skepticism in Shakespeare’s England, 2-3).  
32 Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 241.  Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 20.  See also Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to 
Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979),18- 9. 
33 Julie Solomon, Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 38.  Cavell takes a similar approach in his interpretation of the 
anachronistically Christian play, Antony and Cleopatra, which asks us to consider “whether anything short 
of a new civilization will ‘satisfy’ our yet again i creased subjectivity” (Disowning Knowledge, 27).  For 
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worldview both influenced and was influenced by the Protestant Reformation.  For 
despite Martin Luther’s insistence on subjective truth – and his contention that a true 
Christian could not be a skeptic – he likely did as much to advance epistemological doubt 
as his opponents did.34  With his legacy of sola fide and sola scriptura, in which the 
individual had the obligation to interpret the Bible on her own and faithfully believe that 
her interpretation was correct, Luther made religious insecurity a very real possibility.  
As Richard Popkin writes, “the Reformers’ challenges of the accepted criteria of religious 
knowledge raised a most fundamental question: How does one justify the basis for one’s 
knowledge?”35  
The search not only for brave new worlds of thought but also for ways of 
justifying knowledge characterizes the sixteenth century.  Writers th mselves sought 
aesthetic justification in forms inherited from antiquity and the Middle Ages.  To this 
end, Joel Altman and Victoria Kahn discuss how the Renaissance is marked by a 
transition away from didactic writing toward a literature of inquiry, exploration, and 
wonder.36  While this change is arguably for the better, both scholars suggest that 
exploratory, skeptical writing often leads to confusion or failed consensus and that early 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cavell, this play reveals that “satisfaction is no longer imaginable within what we understand as religion, 
that the increasing velocity of the split between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the private nd the 
presentable, no longer permits the common imaginatio  of a significant conclusion” (27).  Cavell attributes 
sixteenth-century changes in perception and worldview to “the rise of Protestantism” particularly and to 
religion generally (27).   
34 See Luther, The Bondage of the Will, in Discourse on Free Will, ed. and trans. Ernst F. Winter (1961; rpt. 
New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2004).  Attacking Erasmus’s defense of 
free will, Luther famously contends that “the Holy Spirit is no skeptic, and what He has written into our
hearts are no doubts or opinions, but assertions, more certain and more firm than all human experience and 
life itself” (103). 
35 Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, 15-16. 
36 Joel B. Altman, The Tudor Play of Mind.  Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the 
Renaissance.  See also Chapter 1 of this dissertation, which explores Renaissance wonder in depth and 
considers such works as Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Peter Platt, Reason Diminished: Shakespeare and the 
Marvelous (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997); T.G. Bishop, Shakespeare and the Theatre of 
Wonder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, 
Wonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 2001).   
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modern literature betrays as many doubts and self-criticisms as universal truths.  With 
this rich context in mind, it is not difficult to imagine that epidexis grew to embrace – 
more fully than it had in previous centuries – a poetics of discovery and wonder, of 
skepticism and satire.  Transcending hackneyed exercises in lauding and criticizing, 
poetry of praise and poetry of blame developed into a poetics of appraisal, a poetics 
compelled to investigate the praiser, the praised, and the praise. 
*** 
With such a broadly constructed thesis, a project on Shakespeare hardly seems 
sufficient to clarify the nuances of a period’s epideictic skepticism.  Despite, however, 
what appears to be a deductive argument, I instead proceed inductively.  Thus, I test my 
thesis that skepticism is generated through the practice of praise by means of a 
comprehensive analysis of a single author’s works.  The cornerstone of my project is 
Shakespeare’s sonnets to the young man, which provide a unique angle from which to 
understand the dark-lady poems and some key Shakespearean plays.  I will show that 
while the first sequence (1-126) investigates the epistemology of praise, the second (127-
52) describes the dramatic interactions between lovers who have advanced beyond 
epideictic poetry and its accompanying skepticism.37  And so, while my first three 
chapters focus directly or indirectly on the rhetorical preoccupations in the young-man 
                                                      
37 Heather Dubrow objects to distinguishing the dark-l dy poems from the young-man poems in her essay, 
“Incertainties now crown themselves assur’d,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, ed. James 
Schiffer (New York: Routledge, 2000), 113-133.  However, Dubrow seems to be in the minority.  I, along 
with critics ranging from Joel Fineman and David Schalkwyk to Helen Vendler and Margreta de Grazia, 
interpret the poems according to the generally accepted division at sonnet 127, which provides a fairly 
explicit break.  Although some sonnets in the young-man sequence could well have been written to a 
woman, never once does any sonnet provide proof of that; the pronouns and explicitly gendered poems 
always match the putative addressee.   
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poems, my final chapter concentrates on the sonnets to the dark lady, reading them as a 
comic epilogue and a dramatic coda to a much longer first sequence.38   
Primarily an introduction to my study, Chapter 1 (“Shakespeare’s Epideictic 
Skepticism: Context and Features”) considers the religious and cultural background for 
Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism, exploring intersections between skeptici m and 
sixteenth-century religious reform, reviewing classical and Renaissance theories of 
praise, and closely reading poems by Shakespeare and Petrarch.  In this chapter, I 
describe Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism in terms of three interlocking 
characteristics: (1) the poet’s anxieties about authority (Shakespeare’s response to 
Petrarchan praise and his manipulation of one of its central components, the blazon); (2) 
the poet’s epistemological isolation (Shakespeare’s, as opposed to Petrarch’s, attitude 
toward the external world, his understanding of his beloved, and his perception of 
himself); and (3) the poet’s obligation to interpret (Shakespeare’s transformation of a 
poetics of wonder and praise into a poetics of wonder and doubt).  Putting these three 
features together, I argue that Shakespeare is not simply praising the young man; he is 
actively seeking answers, inquiring into the nature of his beloved and, more importantly, 
into the practice of praise.   
If the first chapter grounds Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism in a post-
Reformation, post-humanist, world, then the remaining chapters undertake specific 
readings of his poems and plays.  Chapter 2, “‘A Canker in the Fragrant Rose’: Satirical 
                                                      
38 While there is some evidence suggesting that the dark-lady sonnets were drafted before the young-man 
poems, this does not mean that they were completed first.  [See, for example, Colin Burrow, ed., Complete 
Sonnets and Poems, by Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 103-11.]  Even if the poems 
to the dark mistress were, as Burrow suggests, written first, theses and conclusions are often drafted before 
the body of an argument; Shakespeare’s concluding thoughts about praise (in the dark-lady poems), in 
other words, could precede his rhetorical exploratins in the young-man subsequence.  Thus I subscribe to 
the notion that the poems were not put together randomly; someone (perhaps Shakespeare himself) decided 
to place the dark-lady sonnets last, thus giving us an ordering in literary history that should not be ignored.   
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Inquiry and Tragic Form in Shakespeare’s Poems to the Young Man,” begins with a 
general discussion of the rose and the canker.  One of the central figures of Petrarchan 
praise, the rose was also for Dante a symbol of heaven and for medieval Catholicism in 
general an emblem for the Virgin Mary.  This hapless rose, however, found itself 
besieged during the sixteenth century – transformed in virtually every Elizabethan sonnet 
sequence from an image of divine perfection to a figure of lost or ephemeral beauty, of 
inferior physical splendor, and even of death.  That Shakespeare, however, is the only 
major Elizabethan or Jacobean sonneteer to write about a canker in Petrarch’s Catholic
rose demands the sort of attention that critics have not yet shown.  In tracking the 
recurring figure of the canker across Shakespeare’s first sequence, I show how it 
represents the hidden infection within beauty and virtue as well as the epistemological 
investigation of beauty.  As the central symbol of Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism, 
and a subverter of rhetoric and genre, the canker opens up a space in Shakespeare’s 
poetics capable of admitting questions about intrinsic value, slander, and empirical 
inquiry.  In the process of lauding and loathing his beloved, Shakespeare’s poet 
ultimately learns that the canker rests not only in his beloved and his poetics, but alo in 
himself.  The canker of doubt, the poet discovers, is inherent in the rose of praise. 
My third chapter, “The Wonder-Wounded Hearers in Hamlet,” maps my 
interpretation of the canker and the rose onto a new reading of one of Shakespeare’s most 
skeptical plays.  I argue that the young-man sonnets provide a paradigm for 
understanding Hamlet’s relationship with his two fathers, his misogyny and verbal abuse, 
and the tragic path to which he finally commits himself.  Common to both the Sonnets 
and this play are the ways in which the poet/protagonist comes to terms with himself, 
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negotiates the impulses to blame, redefines himself in relation to the past, and reforms 
praise in response to these recognitions.  In this chapter, I also show how the young-man 
poems illuminate the tragic development in Hamlet and how Hamlet helps to expose the 
young-man sequence’s intrinsically tragic shape.  In exploring the uncanny similarities 
between the poet’s ethical dilemma in the poems and Hamlet’s ethical predicamnt as a 
tragic hero, this chapter fills a critical gap in studies of both Hamlet and the Sonnets. 
Chapter 4, “Playing Shakespeare’s Will: Theater and Sexuality in the Dark-Lady 
Sonnets and The Taming of the Shrew,” offers a comic resolution to the rhetorical 
problems emphasized in the previous three chapters.  Here I turn to the sonnets devoted 
to the notoriously rebellious dark mistress, exploring their relationship to Shakesper an 
comedy generally and to The Taming of the Shrew particularly.  This means that instead 
of stressing only the mistress’s infidelity, dark deeds, and duplicity, I explore her 
dynamic power, her theatrical intractability, and the sexual energy ignited between her 
and her poet.  I look, in other words, beyond the qualities that inspired Joel Fineman to 
describe her in terms of “praise paradox” and beyond the epistemological concerns of the 
previous three chapters.  Tracing the poet’s obsession with representation and role-
playing – and his dramatic negotiations with the dark lady – I argue that Shakespe re is 
redefining the boundaries of a poet’s artistic power, privileging theater over hetoric, 
being over becoming, and action over knowledge.  At the conclusion of this chapter, I 
consider connections between the poet and Petruchio, and between the dark lady and 
Kate, arguing that our interpretation of Kate’s infamous submission speech must take into 
account the rhetorical stratagems that Petruchio uses to tame her.   
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Exploring Petruchio’s connection to the mock Petrarchan sonneteer, and Kate’s to 
the intractable mistress, paves the way for my afterword, where I briefly consider how 
Shakespeare’s most famous dark lady, Cleopatra, rewrites praise under the dominion f 
the female.  Antony and Cleopatra shows how Shakespeare discovers in his canker of 
























Shakespeare’s Epideictic Skepticism: Context and Featur s 
 
 The longstanding debate over the mysterious dedicatee, the “ONLIE BEGETTER 
OF THESE INSUING SONNETS. Mr. W.H.,” frequently and notoriously leads to 
questions about the young man’s identity.1  We may never know, however, whether 
Shakespeare even authorized the Sonnets for the 1609 printing; whether the dedicatee is 
Southampton, Pembroke, or someone else; and whether the young man (and, for that 
matter, dark lady) are inspired by real life or by Shakespeare’s imagination.  What we 
have is a collection of poems whose fictionality entails its own kind of power.  In my 
effort to make the most of that power, I focus in this chapter and the next on the lesser-
acknowledged poetic innovations in the young-man sonnets.  The male beloved’s gender 
has, of course, attracted notice.  Equally compelling, however, is the fact that this 
sequence undertakes what the sonnets to the dark lady do not: an epistemological 
investigation of epideictic poetry.  Confirming this differentiating feature is the fact that 
the words praise, praised, praising, or praises appear in 24 of the young-man sonnets – 
and never once in the dark-lady poems.2  Taken together, these 24 poems allow us to 
track the poet’s evolving perspective of praise – from celebratory to meditative – and thus 
to see evidence of what I call Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism.  By this, I mean to say 
                                                      
1 Katherine Duncan-Jones, Shakespeare’s Sonnets (1997; rpt. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 2003), 45-
69.  Duncan-Jones’ case for William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, rather than Henry Wriothsley, Earl of 
Southampton, encourages us not only to imagine Shakespeare’s relationships with potential patrons, but 
also to revise the way that we perceive and interpret the male addressee. 
2 See Herbert S. Donow, A Concordance to the Sonnet Sequences of Daniel, Drayton, Shakespeare, Sidney, 
and Spenser (Carnondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969).  Shakespeare names praise far 
more often than his contemporaries did.  According to Donow, Drayton makes references to praise in 17 
poems in his sequence; Sidney, 11 poems; Daniel, only 7 poems; and Spenser, 13 poems.  Although he is 
not included in this concordance, Greville refers di ectly to praise only about 7 times as well. 
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that the poet is not simply skeptical about praise; the practice of praise generates 
skepticism about a beloved who is supposed to be beautiful and virtuous, and about a 
poetics devoted to admiring and celebrating that beloved. 
 The first third of the sequence begins in a comparatively conventional way, with 
the poet clarifying that the “purpose” of his praise is “not to sell” but to “truly write” 
(21).3  For a while, the poet seems defensively sanguine about such abilities and about the 
young man’s worth, confidently insisting that while the beloved “dost breathe,” his 
“Muse” cannot “want subject to invent” (38).  In sonnet 55, the poet even affirms that the 
fair youth’s “praise shall still find room / Even in the eyes of all posterity.”  Still, one 
wonders if what we are hearing is the poet’s willed confidence, manufactured to drown 
out the doubt that has been humming since the sequence began.  For as early as sonnet 
59, the poet’s conception of epideixis has soured: “If there be nothing new, but that 
which is / Hath been before, how are our brains beguiled, / Which, laboring for invention, 
bear amiss / The second burden of a former child?”  Bemoaning his lack of inventiveness, 
the poet laments that “the wits of former days” “have [surely] given admiring praise” to 
objects inferior to his own.  Sonnet 60 finds the poet wishing rather than declaring that 
his praise has lasting authority: “And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand, / Praising 
thy worth, despite his [Time’s] cruel hand.”  And, only two poems later, the poet admits 
that the purpose of praise is not simply to publish the beloved’s virtues, but to eternize 
himself as poet: “‘Tis thee (myself) that for myself I praise, / Painting my age with 
beauty of thy days” (62).   
                                                      
3 All quotations are taken from Shakespeare’s Sonnets, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. 
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 When the poet next names praise in sonnet 69, he confronts both its superficiality 
and its skeptical potential.  Here the poet allows that praise may be spurious, even 
inciting the kind of curiosity that could lead to a negative depiction of the praise object: 
Those parts of thee that the world’s eye doth view 
Want nothing that the thought of hearts can mend; 
All tongues, the voice of souls, give thee that due, 
Utt’ring bare truth, even so as foes commend: 
Thy outward thus with outward praise is crowned. 
But those same tongues that give thee so thine own 
In other accents do this praise confound, 
By seeing further than the eye hath shown; 
They look into the beauty of thy mind, 
And that in guess they measure by thy deeds; 
Then churls their thoughts (although their eyes were kind) 
To thy fair flower add the rank smell of weeds. 
     But why thy odour matcheth not thy show, 
     The soil is this, that thou dost common grow.         
In this sonnet, the poet explores how the need for “bare truth” can result in inaccurate, 
even damaging, guesswork; “seeing further than the eye hath shown” can draw us into 
terrain that never could be seen because it never existed.  Articulating how easily the 
“rank smell of weeds” can emerge in a poem meant to celebrate a “fair flower,” the poet 
fears that he who bestows praise may create rather than uncover truths about his beloved,
and so shift from lauding to loathing. 
These potentially injurious evaluative procedures carry over into the next sonnet, 
where the poet explores the dangers of epideixis, noting that it not only threatens to undo 
itself by discovering too much or, alternately, by distorting the truth, but that it often 
provokes envy and slander: “Thou hast passed by the ambush of young days, / Either not 
assailed, or victor, being charged; / Yet this thy praise cannot be so thy praise, / To tie up 
envy, evermore enlarged” (70).  Responding, it seems, to his own impulse to question and 
assail, the poet subsequently entertains the possibility that the beloved could well deserve 
20 
 
these charges, equivocally maintaining in the couplet, “If some suspect of ill masked not 
thy show / Then thou alone kingdoms of hearts shouldst owe.”  On the one hand, the poet 
clings devotedly to a beloved who, merely “masked” by a “suspect of ill,” has already 
claimed the poet’s own heart.  On the other hand, that “suspect of ill” is suggestively a 
sign of some deeper flaw or indelible error, and a reminder to the poet that he has, as 
Helen Vendler observes, “a less-than-perfect knowledge of the young man’s past, and 
therefore an insecure base for his praise.”4  However we read this couplet, the poet has 
written his way far beyond the easy optimism of sonnets 38 and 55: still to insist on the 
beloved’s truth and to meditate on his interiority, all the while contemplating that 
“suspect of ill,” could spell the end of his poetry altogether. 
The poet tries various ways of diverting his (and our) attention from the beloved’s 
potentially corrupt interiority, which produces only mixed results.  In 72, for instance, he 
turns his gaze back on himself, telling the beloved to “forget me quite, / For you in me 
can nothing worthy prove; / Unless you would devise some virtuous lie / To do more for 
me than mine own desert, / And hang more praise upon deceased I / Than niggard truth 
would willingly impart.”  In this sonnet, the poet presumably blames himself for putting 
the young man in an unfavorable light, proclaiming in the couplet, “For I am shamed by 
that which I bring forth, / And so should you, to love things nothing worth.”  A closer 
look at this poem, however, makes one wonder whether the poet’s self-blame really 
succeeds in taking our eyes off the beloved.  On the one hand, the poet is merely 
demeaning his work, ashamed of what he has produced; on the other hand, the poet ties 
the beloved’s shame to his own, suggesting that the young man’s imperfections – his 
                                                      
4 Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belkap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 325. 
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infidelity, his conceit, his poor judgment – are sadly and undeniably true.  The beloved, 
for one, loves an unworthy poet.   
 The second and more prolonged diversion following sonnet 72 is the so-called 
rival poet sequence (sonnets 78-86), which may or may not indicate any actual 
experience of Shakespeare’s with a contemporary competitor.5  Whatever their 
biographical authenticity, these sonnets not only allow Shakespeare to revisit some of the 
problems he has already wrestled with concerning the poetics of praise, but to push, 
unwittingly perhaps, into territory that he had shunned only a dozen poems earlier.  The 
rival poet sequence comprises the largest cluster of poems explicitly about praise (as 
opposed to acts of praising) in the young man sequence: six of the nine poems mention 
praise directly.   
The first of these references appears in sonnet 79, where the poet casts a forlorn, 
skeptical shadow over 38’s celebration of the unity of beloved and poem.  In this later 
sonnet, the poet proclaims that “what of thee thy [rival] poet doth invent / He robs thee 
of, and pays it thee again; / He lends thee virtue, and he stole that word / From thy 
behavior; beauty doth he give, / And found it in thy cheek.”  The poet goes on to declare 
that his rival “can afford / No praise to thee, but what in thee doth live.”  To resolve the 
potential conflict between the words invent and found, one need only consider the fact 
that invent had two meanings in the sixteenth century, “to produce” as well as to 
                                                      
5 Critics have argued in favor of several of Shakespeare’s contemporaries.  For a discussion of why the 
rival poet could be Marlowe, see Richard Levin, “Another Possible Clue to the Identity of the Rival Poet,” 
in Shakespeare Quarterly 36.2 (1985), 213-4.  Jonathan Bate suggests that the rival is either Marlowe or 
Chapman (or both) in The Genius of Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 130-1.  In Such 
is My Love, Joseph Pequigney makes another case for Jonson but throws Donne into the mix as well; he 
also proposes more than one rival (123-4).  And E.A.J. Honigmann prefers Ben Jonson, making his case in 
“The First Performances of Shakespeare’s Sonnets,” in Shakespeare Performed: Essays in Honor of R.A. 
Foakes, ed. Grace Ioppolo (Newark: University of Delaware Pr ss, 2000), 139-40.    
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“discover.”6  The latter denotation is more evident in sonnet 79 than 38, where the 
beloved is depicted as “pour[ing]” himself willingly into the poet’s verse.  In 79, 
however, the poet suggests that if the rival wants to write a successful praise poem, he 
must “invent,” which is to say look for or find that evidence within the beloved.   
As becomes increasingly clear in subsequent poems in the rival sequence, 
although the poet views invention as a form of robbery, it also underlies his notion of 
authentic praise: real praise lovingly steals the truth from its object; real praise must 
embrace the fact that it “can afford” only evidence that “doth live” in the “behavior” and 
“cheek” of its beloved (79); and real praise derives from a close connection with the 
object of admiration.  As the poet suggests elsewhere in the sequence, the rival has 
produced praise that is simply too good to be true and so has failed to invent anything at 
all.  Thus, the poet, satisfied that his adversary does not understand and appreciate the 
beloved, can insist that he has the only legitimate contact, making a show of his 
limitations in order to distinguish his work as authentic and superior.  Conceding, 
furthermore, that the beloved is “past” even his own “praise” allows the poet to separate 
his work from his competitor’s “strained touches” of “rhetoric” and so declare, “Thou, 
truly fair, wert truly sympathized / In true plain words, by thy truth-telling friend” (82). 
 But what do those “true plain words” consist of?  Sonnet 84 provides two 
answers: 
Who is it that says most?  Which can say more, 
Than this rich praise: that you alone are you, 
In whose confine immured is the store 
Which should example where your equal grew? 
Lean penury within that pen doth dwell 
                                                      
6 “invent, v.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  19 
September 2009 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50120488>. See also Shakespeare, Complete Sonnets 
and Poems, ed. Colin Burrow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 538. 
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That to his subject lends not some small glory; 
But he that writes of you, if he can tell 
That you are you, so dignifies his story. 
Let him copy what in you is writ, 
Not making worse what nature made so clear, 
And such a counterpart shall fame his wit, 
Making his style admired everywhere. 
     You to your beauteous blessings add a curse, 
     Being fond on praise, which makes your praises worse.      
The poet moves in a surprising direction in the octave, defining “true plain words” not in 
terms of nuanced exploration and detailed character assessment but in terms of copying 
and tautology (“you alone are you”).  A few reasons for this clever maneuver present 
themselves.  Most obvious is the poet’s awareness of the limitations of Petrarchan p aise.  
More than once in the sequence the poet criticizes praise poetry’s epideictic conceits, 
suggesting that they are insufficient when it comes to representing virtue or lauding the 
beloved.  The poet’s tautological assertions speak to those problems, intimating that those 
who wish to praise the young man must accept the fact that he can be understood only on 
his own terms.  A real paragon – a real exemplar – simply cannot be represented.  
Through tautology, the poet seems to differentiate himself from his rival. 
 Nevertheless, just because a poet cannot recreate an exemplar in his text does no
preclude his exploration of the exemplar’s character, nor his hitting occasionally  n 
accurate description of that beloved.  Even though language is incapable of reproducing 
another person’s likeness exactly, language can bring us to a greater understanding of that 
person.  If these assumptions are at work in the Sonnets, then the deficiencies of praise 
only partially explain the poet’s reliance on tautology; the poet also resorts to circular 
logic because he has stripped his poetry and his beloved of rhetorical trappings and 
suddenly found himself uncomfortable with the possibility of imperfection.  For even as 
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tautology on one level seems to satisfy the poet’s need for a true representation of his 
beloved, on another level it shows the poet’s temporary ret eat from invention, from 
genuine discovery – from all the things that he claims distinguishes his poems frm his 
rivals’.   
Indeed, behind 84’s tautology – behind the poet’s self-righteous assertions that 
poetry cannot capture the beloved’s essence – are genuine concerns about whether the 
poet is a failure, whether his beloved is too flawed to be praised, and whether the poet 
himself simply lacks the empirical resources to tell the difference.  W are largely made 
aware of such concerns in the sestet, when the tautologies do not stick, when the poet’s 
desire for authentic poetry means doffing tautology’s defensive cloak.  Indeed, the 
poem’s sestet constitutes a complete revision of the octave when it exposes at once the 
limits of tautology and the natural drive within praise to appraise, to develop (however 
misguided) a fuller representation of its object.  As the poet discovers, insisting that “you 
alone are you” is not enough to “dignify” his lyric at all, for the poet must continue to 
write; his sonnet, quite literally, needs six more lines.  These lines at first glance suggest 
that the poet has found yet another way to avoid confronting the beloved, replacing a 
legitimate character description with ostensibly self-evident truths.  But these lines also 
show that the poet has moved beyond the protective realm of tautology.  The phrase, “Let 
him but copy what in you is writ,” is a call to discovery – to invention – reminiscent of 
sonnet 21’s “O let me true in love but truly write.”  Heeding his own plea to “copy” what
lies inside his beloved, the poet begins contemplating the “withinness” of things and so 




The fact that the couplet invites two different interpretations shows the poet’s 
contradictory impulse to insist on his beloved’s goodness and beauty and to commit 
himself to a poetics of brutal honesty.  From one perspective, the poet suggests that the 
young man’s fondness for praise attracts the wrong sort of poet (such as the rival) and 
thus elicits the wrong kind of poetry – poetry that cannot possibly provide “in true plain 
words” “what nature made so clear.”  Thus, the line constitutes a gentle warning: the poet 
wants his beloved to resist flowery praise and attach himself to a “truth-telling” artist 
capable of providing an accurate representation.  From another perspective, the poetis 
blaming (and not just warning) the young man, intimating that the beloved’s flaws – his 
vanity, his selfishness, his bad judgment – will reveal themselves in a poem designe  to 
praise, thereby corrupting that poem.  Although the content of the sonnet supports the 
first reading as much as the second, the organization of ideas within the poem 
overwhelmingly emphasizes the latter perspective.  As the sonnet itself actively 
demonstrates, praise itself will inevitably discover the “curse” no matter how assiduously 
it tries to obscure the beloved with tautology (“you alone are you”).   
One could argue, then, that the poem proceeds as it does not simply because 
tautology is insufficient, but because tautology points to and thus commands an 
articulation of what it does not say: namely, that the poet’s praise is ultimately inadequate 
(perhaps as inadequate as the rival’s) and that the beloved’s layered, complex interiority 
contains as many vices (in this case, vain fondness for praise) as virtues.  Whether, 
however, the poet’s specific discoveries about himself and his beloved in the act of 
praising are misguided and consequently misrepresented is not the point; the point is that 
the poet cannot prevent those questions and concerns from bleeding into his praise, and 
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the more he tries to conceal corruption – for example, to play tautological gamesto bury 
it – the more likely the “curse” will emerge with greater force than before.  When it 
comes to vanity, the poet is as culpable as the beloved. 
Sonnet 95 arguably marks the poet’s most searching exploration of epideixis.  
Surpassing even sonnets 69 and 70 in its darkness, 95 verges on sarcasm and satire, with 
the poet contemplating the beloved’s “enclose[d]” vices and his exposed “shame” and 
lamenting an artist’s inability to “dispraise” anyone so physically stunning: “That tongue 
that tells the story of thy days, / Making lascivious comments on thy sport, / Cannot 
dispraise; but in a kind of praise, / Naming thy name blesses an ill report.”  Cautioning 
the young man to “take heed” of beauty’s “privilege,” the poet reminds him in closing 
that the “hardest knife ill used doth lose his edge.”  Implicit in such a warning is not 
simply that the beloved’s keen beauty will dull, but that the beloved could become 
vulnerable to the poet’s razor-sharp pen, a pen that is already discovering how to 
dispraise.    
One expects that the poet could hardly recover his sequence after this point, but 
he does.  Perhaps it is sonnet 95’s cutting frankness that helps carve out a passageway to 
some of the most complex, introspective praise poems in the sequence, poems that 
reinforce the degree to which epideictic skepticism inevitably meditates on the praising 
self.  Thus, in sonnet 112, the final appearance of praise, the poet expresses his desire to 
“know” his “shames and praises” from the beloved’s “tongue.”  A more emphatic 
demonstration of the poet’s complicity and vulnerability does not exist in the sequence.  
For the poet to invite the beloved to take his place as praise poet – and offer himself as 
the new object to be scrutinized, celebrated, even disgraced – encourages us to ras ess 
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what the poet meant by his avowal in sonnet 21 to “truly write.”  Indeed, the poet’s 
commitment to true praise suggests that his ensuing skepticism about his project emerges 
ineluctably; and he learns to confront the fact that when he reflects honestly on his 
beloved’s humanity as well as his exemplarity, he will always discover dark spots – not 
simply within the beloved but also within himself. 
While the poet’s final reference to praise reveals a great deal about what he has
learned about himself, the penultimate praise poem foregrounds key aspects of 
Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism: 
When in the chronicle of wasted time  
I see descriptions of the fairest wights, 
And beauty making beautiful old rhyme, 
In praise of ladies dead, and lovely knights; 
Then in the blazon of sweet beauties best, 
Of hand, of foot, of lip, of eye, of brow, 
I see their antique pen would have expressed  
Even such a beauty as you master now: 
So all their praises are but prophecies 
Of this our time, all you prefiguring; 
And for they looked but with divining eyes 
They had not s[t]ill enough your worth to sing; 
   For we which now behold these present days 
   Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise. (106)       
Even though this sonnet contains little of the doubt directed at the young man in sonnet 
95 and elsewhere, it does something else: it roots Shakespeare’s epideictic sk pticism in a 
historical context and emphasizes that these “present days” have made it impossible t  
celebrate those “fairest wights” and “lovely knights,” even when we encounter a b loved 
who merits that celebration.  For the poet suggests that the degradation of praise has  
much to do with cultural changes – with the poets themselves – as with a young man who 
seems occasionally to show a few flaws.  After all, what do the sonnets teach us about the 
beloved youth?  Whether real or hypostasized, the beloved, we learn, is young, vain, 
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stubborn, unfaithful, and easily bored.  Hot and cold, he does not always keep his 
promises to the poet and is susceptible to flattery (as we see in the rival poet sequence).  
The beloved’s attempt to strike up a relationship (in sonnets 40-42) with the dark lady 
creates resentment in the poet but also reinforces his devotion and love.7  We also know 
that the beloved is mysterious and opaque, prompting questions and doubts about his 
character and inciting in the poet deep fears about whether he will discover the hidden 
kernel (which I will later identify as the canker) that destroys his praise.8  
 Still, the poet recognizes that this inherently imperfect beloved is also 
immortalized in an inherently imperfect poetics.  Forced to come to terms with these 
imperfections, the poet scrutinizes his own aesthetic principles and assumptions, and 
limitations in perception; and he explores the ethical and epistemological potential of 
praise.  To provide a more detailed account of these issues than I have provided so far, I 
divide Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism into three major features that I root in 
Protestant culture.  First, I take up his Petrarchism, a tradition that constrains and 
alienates, that invigorates and fatigues. 
 
Anxiety about Authority – Classical Praise and the Petrarchan Tradition   
Cultures are formed – and achieve their singularity – by rebelling against previous 
cultures.  In this respect, it would be a mistake for scholars to affirm that Shakespeare and 
his contemporaries were the first authors to challenge tradition; surely, Virgil and Ovid 
did the same thing.  Given, however, that the concept of the modern author was 
                                                      
7 Admittedly, my argument that sonnets 40-42 include the dark lady can only be determined 
retrospectively, after reading Shakespeare’s Sonnets i  full.  I will argue, however, that the integrity of the 
sequence hinges on our willingness to identify the woman in sonnets 40-42 as the dark lady.    
8 For a full discussion of this dualism, see chapter 2, which argues that this kernel – this canker – is 
embedded in the beloved himself as well as in the practice of praise.   
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developing in the sixteenth century, and given the enormous changes reflected in (and 
caused by) Luther’s insistence that the individual must become his own authority, we can 
indeed perceive something unique about the humanist revival of and skeptical struggle 
with classical and medieval texts.  Exploring the impact of the Reformation on 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets in particular, Sean Keilen contends that his poems “are the 
creation of a doubting age” – an age skeptical “about the traditions of the Roman 
Church.”9   
While Keilen, then, shares my general contention that Shakespeare’s Sonnets 
reflect a post-Reformation skepticism, David Quint – who does not have anything to say 
about the Sonnets – actually provides a better way of understanding Shakespeare’s 
challenge to Petrarchan praise.  Exploring the period’s “skeptical attitudes toward literary 
authority,” Quint shows how the humanist culture of translating and imitating classi al 
texts was met by a deeper need to transcend those classical origins and create origin l 
works of art.10  Paradoxically, however, Renaissance writers could only achieve 
individual greatness because their society “had gained a new historical awareness” (x).  
As Quint observes, innovation comes with a price: history must replace allegory.  Writers 
must forgo transcendent truth in favor of an “individuality that can only be fully defined 
in historical terms” (24).  This is because “allegory locates the text’s value in a source of 
truth and authority that lies outside the text itself – normally in an earlier text or series of 
texts that have been granted an authoritative or sacred status” (22).  A historically-
grounded text, however, is a uniquely “human counterfeit,” with no pretensions to 
hearkening back to some “divine original” (24) or “absolute standard” (4).  While one 
                                                      
9 Sean Keilen, “The Tradition of Shakespeare’s Sonnets,” Shakespeare 5.3 (2009), 237 and 242. 
10 David Quint, Origin and Originality in Renaissance Literature: Versions of the Source (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1983), 21. 
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could argue that authors like Shakespeare and Donne were effectively creating new 
standards in their poetry and plays, Quint also stipulates that the “originality of the
Renaissance artist was to be measured not only against the past but also the future” and 
that the “tradition’s historicity becomes its inimitability” (4).  “Originality,” Quint 
maintains, “becomes virtually identical to the intrinsic strengths of the work of art” – 
strengths that cannot be imitated (5).  Thus, Quint suggests that our sense of 
Shakespeare’s inventiveness depends on his ability to create works that succeeding 
generations cannot copy.   
Still, Quint suggests that no author can forget his origins.  Shakespeare himself
does not break altogether from the Petrarchan tradition but rather remains faithful to 
some of its basic tenets, thus exposing flaws within praise even as he uncovers his own 
originality.  In many ways, Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism provides a solution to the 
problems explored in sonnets 59 and 76, where he questions his inventiveness: 
If there be nothing new, but that which is 
Hath been before, how are our brains beguiled, 
Which, labouring for invention, bear amiss 
The second burden of a former child? 
O that record could with a backward look, 
Even of five hundred courses of the sun 
Show me your image in some antique book, 
Since mind at first in character was done, 
That I might see what the old world could say 
To this composed wonder of your frame; 
Whether we are mended, or whe’r better they, 
Or whether revolution be the same. 
     O sure I am, the wits of former days 
     To subjects worse have given admiring praise. (59) 
 
 
Why is my verse so barren of new pride, 
So far from variation or quick change? 
Why with the time do I not glance aside 
To new-found methods and to compounds strange? 
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Why write I still all one, ever the same, 
And keep invention in a noted weed, 
That every word doth almost tell my name, 
Showing their birth, and where they did proceed? 
O know, sweet love, I always write of you, 
And you and love are still my argument: 
So all my best is dressing old words new, 
Spending again what is already spent: 
     For as the sun is daily new and old, 
     So is my love still telling what is told.  (76)     
Stephen Booth observes that sonnet 76 shows only quirky, jerky ingenuity.11  Helen 
Vendler is a bit kinder about this sonnet, arguing that it is one of Shakespeare’s 
“astonishingly inventive poems” stylistically.12  Considering Quint’s general remarks 
about sixteenth-century literature, I will argue that these sonnets show a tension between 
the quotidian and the original.  On the one hand, the speaker blames the beloved for his 
failure to produce original work.  On the other hand, the poet’s personal lamentations 
seem very much grounded in a historical context – the end of a long tradition of 
sonneteering; thus, it is his story (and not the beloved) that exudes originality.   
The poet, however, actually capitalizes on this tension.  Even as the beloved 
represents an enduring monument and absolute standard, he occasions the poet’s 
meditations about historical time and fuels his present experiences; through the beloved, 
the poet can dream about travelling to the “antique” past and exploring an old society that 
is different from his own.  He can hope to discover how the “old world” illuminates or 
defamiliarizes the new.  In both of these sonnets, moreover, the poet manages to be 
inventive simply by complaining that he cannot invent.  Insistently metapoetical, the 
poems direct our gaze away from the supposedly transcendent young man toward an 
                                                      
11 Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets (1977; rpt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).  “Although 
the speaker protests,” Booth explains, “that his ver e lacks the virtues of witty substantive variation, his 
verse…is capable of the vices of one kind of quick change”: “syntax” that “glances aside spastically” (265).  
12 Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 344. 
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historically grounded act: the poet at his desk, quill in hand perhaps, fashioning sonnets. 
 Even though the poet, then, seems to overcome his anxieties about authority, 
these sonnets reveal in miniature what pervades the entire sequence and lies behind 
Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism.  After all, how many times can a poet ign re his 
praise object or insist on his transcendence and superiority?  How many times can a poem 
which laments a poet’s lack of invention be considered original?  And how can a poet 
compose a collection of sonnets that do not eventually (and despite his best efforts) grow 
small under the “authority” of the Petrarchan praise tradition – a tradition already 
populated by Wyatt, Surrey, Sidney, Spenser, Daniel, Donne, and Greville?  But the 
problem goes deeper than Shakespeare’s “anxiety of influence.”  In the above sonnets, 
the poet is not bothered by the Petrarchan tradition per se but rather by the conventional 
language of praise.  As a rhetorical form, praise militates against orginality because it 
traditionally involved using stock attributes and persuading others to right action, 
inspiring an audience to emulate the esteemed object.  If such a person seemed superior, 
he was not inimitable, for that would undermine the purpose of praise.  
 The problem actually begins in ancient Greece.  Praise (along with blame) 
belongs to Aristotle’s third rhetorical category, “epideictic oratory.”  From the Greek 
word meaning “to show” or “display,” epideixis is distinguishable from political and 
legal persuasion because it is first and foremost demonstrative and “ceremonial,” 
concerned with the amplified display of virtues or vices (I.3.25).13  As Aristotle 
maintained, Cicero and Horace demonstrated, and Renaissance theorists confirmed, 
                                                      
13 The Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (1954; rpt. New York: Random House, 
Inc., 1984), I.3.25. 
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“virtually all poetry was regarded as a subdivision of epideictic.”14  This is perhaps 
because praise and blame comprise the rawest and simplest of human emotions found in 
all literature – love and hate.  O.B. Hardison accordingly observes that “the first 
poetry…was encomium and vituperation, from which arose the two basic ‘genres’ of 
poetry” and that the “truest poetry is the poetry of praise.”15   
That praise has always been associated with “truth” reflects its long-sta ding 
alliance with ethics.  Aristotle accordingly argues in his Rhetoric that epideixis frequently 
comprises persuasion and deliberation, ranging beyond demonstrative rhetoric when it 
“urge[s] a course of action” (I.9.1).  Inherently didactic, praise does not simply display 
virtue; it can also teach others about it or encourage ethical behavior.16  “The epideictic 
oration based on praise,” Hardison maintains, “selects an inherently noble man” and 
“creates a pattern of virtue made particularly attractive through the use of th  [amplified] 
ceremonial style” (52).   
                                                      
14 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 153.  
See also Brian Vickers, “Epideictic and Epic in theR naissance,” New Literary History 14.3 (1983), 501.  
15 O.B. Hardison, Jr., The Enduring Monument: A Study of the Idea of Praise in Renaissance Theory and 
Practice (1962; rpt. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), 37-38. 
16 See Averroes, The Middle Commentary of Aristotle’s Poetics, in Classical and Medieval Literary 
Criticism, eds. Alex Preminger, Leon Golden, O.B. Hardison, and Kevin Kerrane (New York: Frederick 
Ungar Publishing Co., 1974), 341-82.  Aristotle was originally transmitted into medieval and Renaissance 
culture via the Islamic philosopher known as Averros, who in the tenth century translated and commented 
on Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric, applying to his loose interpretation a wider knowledge of the rhetorical 
tradition set firmly in place by Cicero and others.  This rhetorical tradition had already bonded rather 
quickly and easily with ethics – since praise and blame, and virtue and vice, became the backbone of 
classical literature.  From ode to tragedy on the on  hand and from satire to comedy on the other, all literary 
forms fit within the praise/blame configuration.  Averroes, then, could easily reaffirm all that he knw 
about poetry’s moral function and exaggerate, perhaps, the ethical dimension of Aristotle’s Poetics.  Thus 
when sixteenth-century Italian and English poets and theorists like Torquato Tasso, John Harington, 
George Puttenham, and Robert Gascoigne read Hermannus Alemannus’ thirteenth-century Latin translation 
of the Arabic commentaries, they read not only that“every poem and all poetry are either praise and 
blame” (349) and “all action and character are concer ed with…virtue and vice” (351), but also that “good 
and virtuous men represented only virtues and virtuous men” and that representation itself “aims at nothi g 
but the encouragement of what is proper and the rejection of what is base” (351).  And where Aristotle 
argues that demonstrative rhetoric was often tantamount to “urging a course of action,” Averroes intensifies 
the ethical dimension: “‘deliberation’ is the demonstration of the rightness of the belief which makes a man 
praiseworthy” (355).    
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Hardison’s observation, however, is not entirely accurate.  Although an orator 
traditionally fashioned his praise object into a “pattern of virtue,” he did not always have 
to choose “an inherently noble man.”  Aristotle is quite clear about this when he suggest  
that an orator could laud or excoriate any object and that he need only “know on what 
grounds to argue” (Rhetoric I.8.30).  Aristotle proceeds to lay down those “grounds,” 
which are the same virtues listed in the Nicomachean Ethics – justice, courage, 
temperance, magnanimity, liberality, magnificence, and prudence (I.8.1-20).  How we 
deploy these virtues depends more on “the nature of our particular audience” (I.9.5) than 
on the character of the praise object.  Preferring true virtues to the true person, Ari totle’s 
epideictic procedure presupposes a sound, unwavering knowledge of ethical behavior and 
how to demonstrate it persuasively; it suggests that the stock virtues comprise all that is 
laudable in men and women, and that the orator does not even have to know that much 
about the person whom he praises or excoriates. 
Aristotle’s account of epideictic oratory – from amplification to the stock 
attributes – suggests that he was responding to, among other sources, Isocrates’ major 
works of praise: Evagoras, Helen, and Busiris.17  In Evagoras, Isocrates praises the 
Cyprian king’s “beauty, bodily strength, and modesty” (3.15) before celebrating his 
valor, great deeds, piety, and justice (21-24).  Having proceeded methodically through 
Evagoras’ praiseworthy qualities, Isocrates declares at the end of his oratory that “while 
no one can make the bodily nature resemble moulded statues and portraits in painting, 
yet…it is easy to imitate the character of their fellow-men and their thoughts and 
                                                      
17 Aristotle also relied on the panegyric displays in P dar’s Odes and the Homeric Hymns.  For a full 
discussion of Aristotle’s influences, see George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, and Classical 
and Medieval Literary Criticism, eds. Alex Preminger, O.B. Hardison, and Kevin Kerrane (New York: 
Ungar Publishing Company, 1974).   
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purposes – those, I mean, that are embodied in the spoken word” (47).  Thus, although 
Isocrates claims that the “spoken word should immortalize the virtues” (7), those words 
of praise should also “teach others to adopt the same pursuits” (47).18  And because a 
poet is “duty bound to praise men,” any attempt to immortalize another person is entirely 
subsumed by the poet’s didactic and ethical preoccupations, his moral obligation to teach 
others about virtue.   
Such obligations easily accommodate the rhetorical device of amplification, in 
which a poet has freedom to embellish on virtues that the praise object might lack.  
Celebrating that which is missing in a praise object betrays the fine line betw en 
amplified praise and parody, between serious encomium and mock encomium (which 
Aristotle alludes to in his Rhetoric).  Isocrates’ own works cross that line, revealing how 
amplification can be used in the service of illegitimate (H len and Busiris) as well as 
legitimate (Evagoras) praise.  In his attempt humorously to exculpate Helen, for instance, 
Isocates amplifies her beauty in order to obscure or palliate her vices.  In Busiris, 
Isocrates explains that “everyone knows that those who wish to praise a person must 
attribute to him a larger number of good qualities than he really possesses” (3.105).  
Isocrates therefore explores in parody what he and other poets also found useful in 
serious praise: how amplification helps a poet meet his ethical obligations to be faithful to 
virtue and write effective panegyric thanks, in part, to the ready-made repository of stock 
attributes at the poet’s disposal.  Praise, then, is true only insofar as it teaches others 
about the universal virtues, not about particular people.   
Praise poetry’s power to edify is precisely what inspired Plato to retain pr se 
                                                      
18 See Evagoras, Helen, and Busiris, in Isocrates: Works, trans. Larue Van Hook, 3 vols. [Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1945). 
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poets in his commonwealth even though he banished all other lyricists.19  In Book X of 
The Republic, for example, Plato dismisses artists in general as mere “imitators of images 
of goodness and the other things they create, without having any grasp of the truth” and 
so argues that “imitative poetry is the last thing we should allow.”20  But at the end of The 
Republic, Plato makes an exception for those poets who write “hymns to the gods and 
verses in praise of good men,” arguably because their language tends to be so formulaic 
toward their object of praise (607a).  Moreover, a praise poet, inspired or not, can 
typically distinguish a virtue from a vice.  Even in the Laws, when the Athenian stranger 
worries about a poet’s moral knowledge – wondering whether “the race of poets is no  
entirely capable of understanding well what things are good and what things not?” – he 
quickly emends this problem, declaring that “the poet is to create nothing that differs
from the city’s conventional and just version of the beautiful or good things; he may 
show none of his creations to any of the nonexperts before he has shown them to the 
judges appointed in these matters….”21  The fact that praise poetry is regulated in Plato’s 
imaginary commonwealths makes the problem of divine inspiration (discussed in Ion)
irrelevant and ensures that there will be no ironic or misdirected praise (discussed in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric).  According to Plato, praise poets need only know ideas of the good; 
their praise objects are presumably selected for them before they begin, and their own 
                                                      
19 See Gordon Teskey, “The Ethics of Inspiration,” in Reading Renaissance Ethics.  Plumbing some of the 
deeper reasons for their banishment from the commonwealth, Teskey suggests that poets (as Plato imagines 
them) may promulgate ethical behavior, but they quite literally lack the “ethical integrity” necessary for 
assimilation into the new society (194-202).  Beyond a general lack of knowledge, the poet – “possessed” 
by the Muses – is never quite himself and never fully whole.   As Teskey explains, ethics suggests literally 
a “binding of the self from within” (194).  Thus the poet, physiologically speaking, does not possess ethical 
integrity.              
20 Plato, The Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
595b, 601.  
21 Plato, The Laws, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), 801c-d. 
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words must pass close scrutiny before they may publicize their poems.22         
By distinguishing praise poets for their ethical function – and not for their moral 
knowledge or their ability to dazzle audiences and stimulate the emotions – Plato exploits 
the weakness at the heart of praise.  Formulaic, easily controlled, and prone to bland 
didacticism, praise discourages innovation.  The fact that demonstrative oratory w s 
further codified by Cicero and Quintilian – and then adopted wholesale by English 
theorists like Thomas Wilson and George Puttenham – underscores how easily praise can 
become perfunctory and predictable.  Cicero, for instance, claims that laudatory rhet ric 
is the least essential of the three types, for “even if there is no one to teach them, surely 
everybody knows what qualities are praiseworthy in a human being.”23  Cicero saw the 
pedagogical potential in demonstrative oratory but no real practical value, contnding 
somewhat reluctantly that laudatory speeches “belong to the orator’s dutie ” (2.238, my 
emphasis).  Quintilian is a bit more generous than Cicero and insists on demonstrative 
oratory’s “function in practical business,” but he, too, argues that the “proper function of 
the Encomium is [ultimately] to amplify and embellish.”24  Establishing strict guidelines 
for such praise, Quintilian divides the encomium into three major topics: praise of 
ancestry and parents; “praise of the man himself…based on mind, body, and external 
circumstances”; and, if available, “report” of “divine honours, decrees, and sttue  
erected at public expense” (3.7.107-111).  While Quintilian argues that the “praise of the 
                                                      
22 So why, then, does Plato even bother with poets at all?  Presumably, he believes that, if they cannot 
legitimately teach others about virtue, then their poems can inspire moral behavior.  The question of 
whether one can even educate others in virtue is tackled in another dialogue, Protagoras, and Plato seems 
to be ambiguous about it.  In a series of tentative att mpts by Socrates to contend with the sophist 
Protagoras that virtue is not teachable, Socrates finally entertains the idea that because virtue, lik other 
things, is knowledge, one might be able to teach it. 
23 Cicero, On the Ideal Orator, trans. James M. May and Jakob Wisse (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 2.45.  
24 Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 3.7.103-5. 
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mind is always real praise,” his direction for “handling” this topic is mechanial and 
impersonal: cataloguing the praise object’s “education,” “natural abilities,” and “good 
deeds” or “splitting up the encomium into the various [stock] virtues” hardly helps us 
understand the person himself (3.7.109).  Cicero and Quintilian make clear that 
demonstrative orators typically did not acquaint audiences with the praise object; if 
anything, the topics were designed to inspire audiences by creating distance betwe n 
them and the person praised.  Theodore Burgess rightly argues that “the ideal for the 
encomium of a person, both in theory and practice, was remarkably uniform.”25   
The need to treat praise so uniformly explains how classical guidelines, along 
with the stock attributes, could so easily pass into Renaissance culture.  As Brian Vickers 
points out, when poetry “had aligned itself with philosophy, especially with ethics,” the 
poet became just like the orator: “the propagator of accepted moral systems.”26  Thus 
Thomas Wilson’s Arte of Rhetorique, the most popular manual in the mid- to late-
sixteenth century, follows Quintilian’s rubric rather precisely, emphasizing the 
importance of amplification.27  Somewhat akin to a grammar school primer, Wilson’s 
book provides a “rehersall of vertues” as well as examples of various demonstrative 
oratories.28  Some of this information also appears in Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy.  
Although Puttenham has an entertaining style; offers a diverting, aphoristic “h ory” of 
poetry and poets; and explores poetics in a way markedly different from Wilson, he also 
                                                      
25 Theodore C. Burgess, Epideictic Literature (1902; rpt. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1987), 119.  
26 Brian Vickers, “Epideictic and Epic in the Renaissnce,” 502, my emphasis. 
27 See Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  Mack points out 
that Wilson’s Art of Rhetoric “was printed eight times between 1553 and 1585,” while Puttenham’s Art of 
English Poesy, “upon which so many theories of Elizabethan culture have been erected, was printed only 
once in 1589” (76).  Of course, Puttenham may in some ways be just as appropriate to the poetry of the 
1590s or more so, given that Wilson’s book saw no more printings beyond 1585.  




divides poetry into the “praise of virtue” and the “reproof of vice.”29  As if to emphasize 
the artificial character of praise, Puttenham reminds us how social status determines the 
degree to which a virtuous person is publicly recognized.  Superior men, Puttenham 
explains, have always merited ostentatious praise poems while “inferior pers ns with 
their inferior virtues have a certain inferior praise to guerdon their good with and to 
comfort them to continue a laudable course in the modest and honest life and behavior.  
But this lieth not in written lauds…” (132).  In the end, the regulatory stipulations 
mentioned in many of these Greek, Roman, and English treatises have portrayed praise 
poetry more as the stuff of the Platonic commonwealth than the ethical investigations 
undertaken by the most sophisticated sixteenth-century praise poets. 
Small wonder, then, that some of the earliest encomia – such as Isocrates’ Helen 
and Busiris – parodied demonstrative oratory by embellishing the virtues of praise objects 
that deserve no commendation at all.  Indeed, that Isocrates’ mock panegyrics precede 
most of the codified studies of praise indicates that poets were always uncomfortable 
relying on stock attributes, always suspicious of amplification, and always inclined to 
balk at imposed ethical standards and moral expectations.  Writers of the sixteenth 
century certainly did.  From Erasmus’ Praise of Folly and Sir John Davies’ Gulling 
Sonnets to Thomas Nashe’s Lenten Stuffe and some of Donne’s playful anti-Petrarchan 
love lyrics, the period is filled with a rich collection of mock encomia.  Puttenham 
himself seems torn between disparaging and enjoying this derisive practice.  On the one 
hand, he warns that “poesy ought not to be abashed and employed upon unworthy matter 
and subject, nor used to vain purposes, which is nevertheless daily seen” (113).  On the 
                                                      
29 George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy: A Critical Edition, eds. Frank Whigham and Wayne A. 
Rebhorn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 114. 
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other hand, Puttenham admits that such poetry “may be well allowed” in “merry matters” 
or for “man’s solace and recreation,” which shows a need to add some flexibility to such 
a stilted form.  Indeed, the effort to codify praise in the first place arguably stemmed from 
an awareness that praise often leads to misrepresentation and hyperbole.  Protecting the 
form from imploding, theorists turned its greatest weakness – its superficiality – into its 
defining feature, for if praise is controlled to the point of being merely didactic, one can 
overlook the fact that the praise object might contain unflattering characteristi s poised to 
undermine the poet’s work; and one can ignore how praise itself is ultimately deficient in 
capturing real virtue.      
While it seems, then, that doubt always in some form governed the practice and 
even theory of praise, “epideictic cynicism” is actually better suited to the traditional 
mock encomium, which does not accommodate the empirically-driven skepticism that 
blossomed in the sixteenth century.30  The mock encomium merely bestows praise on 
objects more worthy of invective than admiration; even if a poet misapplies or 
exaggerates attributes and provokes our inquiry in the process, investigation is still ot 
part of the artistic machinery of the poem.  The sonnet sequence, however, does possess 
that machinery.  Intense, probing, single-focused, personal, and long, the sonnet sequence 
is not a strict encomium, but it derives its life from a certain kind of praise object: usually 
a beautiful, virtuous woman.  Typically, the woman’s only flaws are vanity and pride, 
although usually the poet’s idolatrous obsession with the mistress leads him to project 
those negative attributes on to her.   As in most panegyrics, however, the poet tends to 
place less emphasis on the praise object than on universal virtues and himself.  In these
                                                      
30 Here I mean to emphasize Isocrates, Nashe, and Davies.  Erasmus’ Praise of Folly possesses such 
epistemological depth that Erasmus may even be considered the father of epideictic skepticism and Donne, 
along with Shakespeare, among his “children.” 
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sonnets, we are made privy to the praise poet’s inner experiences as he contemplates his 
object of praise from a distance but the art of praise itself up close. 
Petrarch was not the first poet to write lyrics about unrequited love, but he 
developed and perfected the form, planting the seeds from which would later spring the 
sonnet sequences of England’s “golden age.”  Many Renaissance poets responded to 
Petrarch – mocking him, imitating him, corrupting him, improving on him, and in 
Shakespeare’s case, investigating the epistemological implications of the frm.  Although 
Petrarch was the original source for sixteenth-century poets, he was not immune to 
authority struggles himself.  Petrarch, for one, had to contend with predecessors from the 
13th-century Dolce Stil Novo – Guido Guinizelli, Guido Cavalcanti, and, of course, Dante 
– whose works had already set a new standard for Italian vernacular poetry focused on 
the “angelic lady,” on “spiritual values,” and on the “psychology of love.”31  Indeed, 
Petrarch must have known that his Laura would forever be measured against the famous 
Beatrice, who appears in Dante’s La Vita Nuova and his Divine Comedy.32  Years before 
Petrarch commenced what would be a forty-year literary project devoted to Laura, Dante 
had already (to borrow Horace) decided to “look to human life and character for his 
models, and from them derive a language that is true to life.”33  Dante, in De Vulgari 
Eloquentia, calls this true-to-life language the “illustrious vernacular,” which is at once 
                                                      
31 See The Poetry of Guido Guinizelli, ed. and trans. Robert Edwards (New York: Garland Publishing, 
1987), xxi.  Edwards argues, however, that “Guinizelli stands at the head of a school of poets who redefine 
the rhetoric and thematic emphases in the medieval Italian,” which is to say that Guinizelli is modifyng a 
still older form adapted from the French troubadours and Sicilian poets (xxiii).  For a discussion of h w 
Cavalcanti differs slightly from his contemporaries and predecessors, see Guido Cavalcanti: The Complete 
Poems, trans.Marc A. Cirigliano (New York: Italica Press, 1992).  According to Cirigliano, Cavalcanti’s 
poetry reflects the rationalist, secular philosophy of Averroes and Aristotle and not the Platonic, 
transcendent philosophy perpetuated by Thomas Aquinas.  Thus, Cavalcanti’s love, unlike Dante’s, does 
not “end in spiritual fulfillment” but rather in the “‘death’ of reason” (xxv).      
32 See The Portable Dante, ed. and trans. Mark Musa (1995; rpt. New York: Penguin Books, 2003).   
33 Horace, On the Art of Poetry, in Classical Literary Criticism, trans. T.S. Dorsch (London: Penguin 
Books, 1965), 90.  
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more “natural” than “artificial” Latin and yet flexible enough to accommodate poetic 
“embellish[ments]” and “splendid … ornament[ation].”34       
Written after such a powerful tradition was well underway, Petrarch’s Il  
Canzoniere shows discomfort with the conventions of praise poetry.  For Petrarch, 
knowing that his work was ineluctably subject to the tension between “origin” and 
“originality,” often strives to formulate a new mode of expression answerable to his inner 
turmoil, but the language of praise and worship binds him to convention.  One poem in 
particular reveals how the sources of tension within his sequence include not only the 
beloved’s coy cruelty, but the poet’s bondage to praise: 
 Ahi bella libertà, come tua m'ài, 
            partendoti da me, mostrato quale 
 era 'l mio stato quando il primo strale 
            fece la piaga ond' io non guerrò mai! 
 
            …………………………………………  
 
            Amor in altra parte non mi sprona, 
            né i pie' sanno altra via, né le man come, 
            lodar si possa in carte altra persona. (97)  
  
 [Ah, liberty, sweet freedom, how you’ve shown, 
            by leaving me, my former situation 
            when that fell arrow made the first great wound  
            from which I cannot ever hope to heal! 
                        ………………………………………………. 
                        Love doesn’t send me elsewhere, and my feet 
            do not know any other road; my hands 
            can use a paper only for her praise.35]        
Petrarch’s compulsion to praise might be viewed in a positive light and reflect a natur l 
                                                      
34 Dante, De Vulgari Eloquentia, ed. and trans. Steven Botterill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 3, 47. 
35 The Italian version of these poems is from Petrarch’s Lyric Poems, ed. and trans. Robert M. Durling 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).  The English translation is from The Poetry of Petrarch, 
trans. David Young (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004).  I use this translation, as opposed to 
Durling’s now standard prose translation, because Young preserves the original line breaks (making it 
easier to compare the translation and the original) and emphasizes in his translation the connections 
between Petrarch and the Elizabethan and Jacobean sonneteers.  
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spontaneity, a reflex action akin to how Milton describes the pre-lapsarian Adam an  
Eve, praising God with “prompt eloquence.”36  Nevertheless, the obligation to admire 
could easily and quickly squelch ingenuity.  This anxiety about inventiveness is 
articulated fairly early in his sequence, when Petrarch writes, “Io son già stanco di pensar 
sì come / i miei pensier in voi stanchi non sono” [“I’m weary now of thinking how my 
thoughts / of you are always weariless” (74)].  To those who might wonder “et onde vie 
l'enchiostro” [“where the ink comes from”], Petrarch explains in this same poem that “la 
carte / ch' i' vo empiendo di voi (se 'n ciò fallassi, / colpa d'Amor, non già defetto d'arte)” 
[“the pages / I fill with words of you (if I offend, / the blame is Love’s, not a defect of 
art)”.]  Shakespeare, like Petrarch, moves in a similar direction after his own response to 
the imagined question, “Why write I still all one, ever the same”: “O know, sweet love, I 
always write of you, / And you and love are still my argument” (76).  Reading th s sonnet 
against the backdrop of Petrarchan poetry reinforces how the problems that Shakespeare 
encounters have less to do with the Petrarchan tradition than with praise itself.  For both 
Petrarch and Shakespeare had difficulty keeping their poems original, or as Horace
maintains, turning a “familiar” “theme” into “your own property as long as you d  not 
waste your time on a hackneyed treatment.”37   
Despite their similar challenges, Petrarch and Shakespeare ultimately respond 
differently to praise’s ethical and aesthetic impositions.  Petrarch explors the self.  He 
does not attempt to investigate praise, or scrutinize Laura’s virtues or other nuances of 
her character.  Scholars have widely acknowledged that Petrarch’s presence in the poems 
frequently eclipses Laura’s.  Sara Sturm-Maddox, for example, argues that “while later 
                                                      
36 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. John Leonard (London: Penguin Books, 2000), V.149. 
37 Horace, On the Art of Poetry, 83. 
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generations were to read the Rime [Canzoniere] for the story of Petrarch’s love for Laura, 
the poet who records that love is less elusive than the lady celebrated in his verse.”38  
Also remarking on Petrarch’s disregard of Laura in favor of his own laurels is Giuseppe 
Mazzotta, who accepts the common belief that the “poetic text is the ground for the 
constitution of the self” (though he does question the “centrality” of that “self”).39   
When Petrarch does turn his attentions to Laura, he most often employs the 
blazon, which came to be associated with the practice of applying flattering comparisons 
(such as roses, cream, flaxen, and gold) to each part of a woman’s body.  The method can 
be traced back to Ovid and the The Song of Solomon, but it originally did not have a 
formal name.  While Petrarch was blazoning Laura in the fourteenth century, he and is 
contemporaries understood blazon only as the French word for “shield.”  Gradually, the 
word came to signify the coat-of-arms “blazed” across that shield, or the description of 
that coat-of-arms.40  It was not until the sixteenth century that blazon referred to the 
rhetorical practice of praising women.41  The name actually fits well.  Associated with 
chivalry, honor, and personal fame, blazon perfectly complements a poetics aimed at 
publicizing a woman across a series of poems.   
For a woman, though, publicity exacts a price.  The blazon reinforces feminine 
stereotypes, making this epideictic method no different from that explored in Aristotle 
and Quintilian, who similarly promoted the use of stock attributes.  For Petrarch o persist 
in using this rhetorical method despite his misgivings about praise suggests other 
motives.  Here is just one of many examples in the Canzoniere: 
                                                      
38 Sara Sturm-Maddox, Petrarch’s Laurels (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992), 280. 
39 Giuseppe Mazzotta, The Worlds of Petrarch (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993), 59. 
40 “blazon, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  14 




Erano i capei d'oro a l'aura sparsi 
che 'n mille dolci nodi gli avolgea, 
e 'l vago lume oltra misura ardea 
di quei begli occhi, ch' or ne son sì scarsi; 
 
e 'l viso di pietosi color farsi 
(non so se vero o falso) mi parea: 
i' che l'esca amorosa al petto avea, 
qual meraviglia se di subito arsi? 
 
Non era l'andar suo cosa mortale 
ma d'angelica forma, et le parole 
sonavan altro che pur voce umana: 
 
uno spirto celeste, un vivo sole 
fu quel ch' i' vidi, et se non fosse or tale, 
piaga per allenter d'arco non sana. (90) 
 
[Her golden hair was loosened to the breeze 
that twined it in a thousand lovely knots; 
a bright light burned unmeasured in her eyes 
that are so sparse and grudging of it now; 
 
it seemed to me (I’m not sure if she meant it) 
her face showed pity, coloring a bit; 
and I, who had love’s tinder in my breast, 
is it surprising I went up in flames? 
 
Her walk was not a mortal being’s walk, 
it had an angel’s form, and her words too 
were different from a merely human voice: 
 
a spirit all celestial, a living sun 
was what I saw; and if she’s not so now, 
a wound’s not healed because a bowstring’s loosened.]    
This sonnet is consistent with the Platonic emphasis on beauty as a reflection of virtue.  
Here and elsewhere in the sequence, the poet delights in praising the lady’s bright face 
(18), or her “begli occhi” [“fair eyes”], which seem to offer a glimpse of her “mente 
altera” [“elevated mind”] (21).  Petrarch’s style is undoubtedly sophisticated, but he 
remains married to conventional praise.  While the blazon is full and beautiful and 
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stylistically complex, the praise object herself is small and one-dimensonal.42   
Nancy Vickers, writing on the tension embedded in Petrarch’s “particularizing 
descriptive strategy,” argues that the blazon does not merely reflect the poe’s def nse 
(and validation) of convention; it reflects his defense against the woman herself, a 
“forbidden, distant goddess” (the etymological connection between blazon and shield is 
especially significant to her argument).43  As Vickers explains, the blazon is the poet’s 
only form of protection against becoming another Actaeon, whose myth is mentioned 
explicitly in many Petrarchan sequences, including the Canzoniere.  In the Ovidian story, 
the huntsman Actaeon discovers Diana, the virgin goddess, bathing; startled and enrage 
that a man has seen her naked, Diana transforms Actaeon into a stag.  Acteon is pursued 
by his own hounds and torn to pieces.  According to Vickers, the Petrarchan poet “is 
Actaeon, but, more important, he is a self-conscious Actaeon: he knows his own story; he 
has read his own text; he is defined by it and even echoes it in articulating his suffering.  
What awaits him is annihilation through dismemberment” – unless of course he manages 
to dismember his beloved goddess, his chaste Diana, before she discovers him (99).  
Scattering the woman across and within his poems is the only way for Petrarch to remain
whole, in control, and dominant over his praise object. 
                                                      
42 The fact that Petrarch uses the same language to describe Charles of Luxembourg and to describe Laura 
reinforces the stock quality of the blazon:  
  
Real natura, angelico intelletto, 
chiara alma, pronte vista, occhio cerviero, 
providenzia veloce, alto pensero 
et veramente degno di quel petto! (238) 
 
[A royal nature, intellect angelic, 
bright soul, a ready gaze, eyes of a lynx, 
a rapid foresight, elevated thoughts 
well worth of their dwelling in his breast.] 
 
43 Nancy J. Vickers, “Diana Described: Scattered Woman and Scattered Rhyme,” in Writing and Sexual 
Difference, ed. Elizabeth Abel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 102, 104.  
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 Shakespeare dramatizes (in order to mock) the tension between the beloved as 
hart/heart and the poet as hart/stag in his Petrarchan comedy, Twelfth Night.44  In the 
opening scene, Orsino emerges lovesick for his mistress Olivia.  When the gentleman 
Curio teases Orsino, asking him if he plans to “hunt” his “hart,” Orsino replies, “Why, so 
I do, the noblest that I have. / O, when mine eyes did see Olivia first, / Methought she 
purged the air of pestilence, / That instant was I turned into a hart, / And my desires, like 
fell and cruel hounds, / E’er since pursue me” (1.1.16-24).45  In addition to reinforcing 
the ensuing gender confusion, Orsino’s comparison of himself to the hunted hart paves 
the way for Shakespeare’s creative use of the blazon within the action of the story (and 
not just in Orsino’s poetry, of which we know little).  Orsino, for example, responds to 
the threat of emotional dismemberment by sending the disguised Viola to spy on Olivia 
and to be, in short, the embodiment of Orsino’s love poems.  That Viola ends up 
wreaking such havoc in Olivia’s household dramatizes the psychological impact of the 
blazon in Petrarchan poetry: unsettling Olivia and her servants perversely ben fits 
Orsino, who, though moved to hunt down Olivia in the last act of the play, is undoubtedly 
relieved to discover that she is betrothed.  Ironically, Orsino’s betrothal to Viola stays 
faithful to Petrarchan practice as well: instead of wedding the remote, “f rbidden 
goddess” Olivia, Orsino promises to marry the orator of his love poetry; that Viola stays 
clothed in her male garb at the end of the play emphasizes their intimate connection.  
From one perspective, therefore, the narcissistic Orsino marries himself, ju t as a 
Petrarchan lover finds solace only in his verse and his own suffering. 
                                                      
44 Other plays, including The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Love’s Labour’s Lost, As You Like It, and Romeo 
and Juliet (especially the first act), explore Petrarchan conventions. 




 It is a truism that Petrarchan poets are happiest when melancholy.  As Petrarch 
himself articulates at the end of his poems, “io il nido di penseri eletti, / posi in quell'alma 
pianta, e 'n foco e 'n gielo / tremando, ardendo, assai felice fui” [“I made a nest of all my 
truest thoughts / in that rich [laurel] tree, and though in ice and fire, / freezing and 
burning, I was truly happy”] (337).  Sidney’s Astrophil, too, in the final couplet of his 
sonnet sequence affirms, “That in my woes for thee thou art my joy, / And in my joys for 
thee my only annoy.”46  But such sentiments have an epistemological dimension that goes 
deeper than the emotional satisfaction experienced in their melancholy.  Astrophil and 
Petrarch find joy contemplating their mistresses precisely because they may do so from a 
distance and so preserve their ideal image of her.  Although some critics might argue that 
the blazon’s “particularizing” dimension undermines such a fantasy, this practice ually 
feeds the poet’s imagination.  Shielding the poet from what he would rather not see, the 
blazon protects him from discovering what the speaker of Shakespeare’s Sonnets will 
discover – a canker in the rose – and what Jonathan Swift’s Strephon finds out: that 
“Celia, Celia, Celia shits.”  Instead of confronting the woman’s humanity, the Petrarchan 
poet creates the illusion of proximity by dividing up his mistress and juxtaposing each 
part with another metaphor. 
Paradoxically, then, even as the blazon shows Petrarch capitulating to convention 
– to the impositions of the classical praise tradition – it also provides a strategy by which 
he can subdue his mistress, elevate himself and his work, and steer clear of 
epistemological doubt.  Recalling Quint’s discussion, one could argue that the blazon 
(and Laura herself) is allegorical, reaching back to a priori truths instead of dwelling in 
                                                      
46 All quotations are taken from Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones (1989; rpt. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
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history.  And yet (as we saw in Shakespeare’s sonnets 59 and even 76), allegory can 
occasion history or self-history.  Petrarch, that is, uses the blazon to build private, 
historically-inflected meditations about himself – his work’s “intrinsic strengths”47 lying 
less in the praise object herself than in the poet’s exploitation of stock attributes designed 
to enhance his experience with that praise object. 
 Bridging Petrarch’s blazons and Shakespeare’s eventual repudiation of them is 
Sidney’s ambiguous methodology: 
Those looks, whose beams be joy, whose motion is delight; 
That face, whose lecture shows what perfect beauty is; 
That presence, which doth give dark hearts a living light; 
That grace, which Venus weeps that she herself doth miss; 
 
That hand, which without touch holds more than Atlas’ might; 
Those lips, which make death’s pay a mean price for a kiss; 
That skin, whose pass-praise hue scorns this poor term of ‘white’; 
Those words, which do sublime the quintessence of bliss; 
 
That voice, which makes the soul plant himself in the ears; 
That conversation sweet, where such high comforts be, 
As construed in true speech, the name of heaven it bears, 
Makes me in my best thoughts and quiet’st judgment see 
   That in no more but these I might be fully blessed: 
   Yet ah, my maiden muse doth blush to tell the rest.   (77)     
More formulaic than Petrarch’s sonnet 90, Sidney’s poem makes use of the Alexandrine 
sonnet’s strict line divisions and meter: after every twelve syllables, th  poet meditates on 
another feature, proceeding with discipline and confidence across Stella’s body.  Hence, 
in addition to its structural rigidity, Sidney’s sonnet evinces a level of urgency rflected 
in the poem’s insistently regular rhythms; and, despite the poet’s continued attempts to 
connect Stella’s physical body with the ethereal beyond, the poem seems remarkably 
grounded in reality.  This is in part owing to the fact that Stella exudes virtue and 
                                                      
47 Quint, Origin and Originality, 5.   
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goodness but is not pure.  Intimations of her sexuality and infidelity, in addition to her 
pride and vanity, add color and character to Sidney’s sequence; the implicit humor in 
sonnet 77 makes this poem no exception.  For while Petrarch meditates in sonnet 90 on 
Laura’s hair, eyes, and face before contemplating her immortal walk and her “spirto 
celeste,” Sidney’s poet seems interested more in providing as meticulous a rendering as 
possible, and in competing with Petrarch, than in truly worshipping his ambiguous 
mistress.  Thus, even though Sir Walter Raleigh for good reason considered Sidney to be 
“the English Petrarch,” Sidney, unlike his predecessor, exploits the blazon’s natural 
voyeurism, inviting readers to complete in their heads what his muse “blush[es] to t ll.” 
 But what is Sidney’s muse really concealing?  The reference to the blush on one 
level points to something serious rather than humorous, to the poet’s feeling of forbidden 
sexual desire, perhaps, that pervades Sidney’s entire sequence and awakens, Lisa Klein 
maintains, remorse in the concluding poems.  Attributing Sidney’s equivocal Petrarchan 
attitude to his Protestantism and his belief in the “depravity of the human mind and will,” 
Klein argues that “while the skill of his sonnets testifies to Sidney’s erected wit, on a 
metapoetic level, Astrophil’s failure to love Stella virtuously manifests Sidney’s belief in 
man’s infected nature.” 48  A closer look at sonnet 77, however, suggests that Sidney’s 
“Protestant poetics” does not merely reveal sin and criticize sexual desire.  His work 
disparages Petrarchan idolatry, embracing a post-Reformation poetics that is sensitive to 
authority and skeptical about praise.  For Sidney, this skepticism is manifested n th  way 
he recoils from knowledge.  The muse/poet, that is, blushes to go further with the blazon 
for fear that the poet will start meditating on features that would undermine his praise (or, 
                                                      
48 Lisa M. Klein, The Exemplary Sidney and the Elizabethan Sonneteer (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1998), 30, 96. 
51 
 
as Shakespeare has it, on the canker in the rose).  Sidney’s readers would have known 
that Stella (or Penelope Rich) was no Petrarchan goddess.  Whether in seriousness r in 
jest, Sidney concludes his blazon at the moment he feels he has taken in too much of his 
beloved.       
 If Sidney’s poet stops short of turning the blazon into a mode of discovery, 
Shakespeare’s poet seems to feel that it does not discover enough and so repudiates it 
altogether in sonnets 21 and 130.  But first we encounter the astonishing blazon of sonnet 
20: 
A woman’s face with nature’s own hand painted 
Hast thou, the master mistress of my passion; 
A woman’s gentle heart, but not acquainted  
With shifting change, as is false women’s fashion; 
An eye more bright than theirs, less false in rolling, 
Gilding the object whereupon it gazeth; 
A man in hue, all hues in his controlling, 
Which steals men’s eyes and women’s souls amazeth; 
And for a woman wert thou first created, 
Till nature as she wrought thee fell a-doting, 
And by addition me of thee defeated, 
By adding one thing to my purpose nothing: 
     But since she pricked thee out for women’s pleasure, 
     Mine be thy love, and thy love’s use their treasure.   (20)       
This sonnet boldly uses Petrarchan form to blazon a male beloved.  In doing so, the poet 
tries paradoxically to convince us that his sexual desire should not be a problem, for 
Mother Nature, having fallen in love with the beloved’s feminine praise object and then 
provided her with a “prick,” puts in place an insurmountable obstacle.  Perhaps the poet’s 
disclosure, then, is intended to preserve the physical distance between the poet and his 
object of praise and justify his peculiar choice for a beloved, who apparently still looks a 
bit like a Petrarchan mistress.  Nevertheless, the poet’s remarkably personal couplet also 
means that even if we accept that the poet has the beloved’s love but not his “love’s use,” 
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the poet still points (literally and figuratively) to a level of intimacy unheard of in 
Petrarch’s Il Canzoniere.49  Moreover, if we convert “love’s use” to a noun and a verb, 
then the poet is not resigning his beloved to other women at all; he remains among the 
lovers who use the beloved’s treasure.   
As critics have frequently acknowledged, this challenging sonnet is illuminated 
by Twelfth Night, where the bond between Orsino and Viola/Cesario parallels that 
between the poet and young man.50  Evidence of Orsino’s regard emerges as early as the 
first act when he with loving mockery describes Viola/Cesario as possessing a “ mooth 
and rubious” lip and a “small pipe” just like a “maiden’s organ, shrill and sound” (1.4.33-
6).  Orsino notices right away that Viola is a kind of master mistress in whom “all is 
semblative a woman’s part” but whom nature undoubtedly became enamoured of and 
pricked out for her pleasure (1.4.37).  At the same time that Orsino’s blazon is a 
revelation of his sexual interest in Viola/Cesario, it functions as a form of evasion (much 
as Vickers describes the blazon in Petrarch’s Canzoniere).  By “dismembering” Viola, 
Orsino can control her and ensure that she does his bidding.  By sending her away to woo 
Olivia, moreover, Orsino protects himself from his homoerotic passion – a passion 
explored only implicitly in Shakespeare’s works, never explicitly. 
                                                      
49 Sonnet 20 has accordingly been interpreted as a poem that either reinforces or obviates illicit sexuality.  
For a discussion of homoerotic passion in this sonnet a d elsewhere in the young man sequence, see Josph 
Pequigney, Such is My Love: A Study of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, esp. 30-41.  For a counter-argument, see 
Martin B. Friedman, “Shakespeare’s ‘Master Mistris’: Imagine and Tone in Sonnet 20, in Shakespeare 
Quarterly 22.2 (1971), 189-91.  According to Friedman, the “word-play” used at the end of the poem is 
“nearer to being a metaphysical compliment than a confession of sexual frustration.  Indignant and 
apologetic commentators have both missed the point because they have falsified the tone” (191).  For 
Friedman, the tone is merely “‘sportive’” and not sexual (191).   
50 See, for example, David Schalkwyk, “‘She Never Told Her Love’: Embodiment, Textuality, and Silence 
in Shakespeare’s Plays,” Shakespeare Quarterly 45.4 (1994), 381-407.  As Schalkwyk observes, “the
particular performing practice of the Elizabethan stage [cross-dressing] allows the androgynous beauty of 
sonnet 20 to be embodied in the doubly crossdressed figured of a boy actor playing Viola playing the boy 
Cesario” (399).  Schalkwyk then proceeds to examine any of the same lines that I do here (400).  For 
another discussion of the relationship between sonnet 20 and Twelfth Night, see Jonathan Sawday, The 
Body Emblazoned (1995: rpt. London: Routledge, 1996), 201-2.  
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In contrast, sonnet 20 intimates what Orsino must have felt about Viola when she 
first arrived but what he managed through manipulation to overcome.  As the sonnet 
reveals, the poet does not “dismember” the young man’s body to gain authority and 
control over his praise object (as Orsino does Viola); the poet instead breaks apart his 
androgynous beloved only to establish his complex androgyny before “re-membering” 
him as a man.  Rather than gain power through the blazon, the poet seems (like Actaeon) 
weakened by it.  Instead of mastering his mistress, the poet has found a master mistress 
capable of holding her/his own.  Unfortunately for the poet, the young man’s origin does 
not prove a mere fantasy, as it happily does for Orsino; while Cesario eventually 
transforms from a master mistress to her “master’s mistress” (5.1.343, my emphasis), no 
such possibility emerges for the poet of the Sonnets.         
 But the poet’s loss is also his poetry’s gain.  For while Petrarch uses the blazon to 
empower himself and his poetry and Sidney exploits its bawdy potential to point to more 
body (perhaps) than decorum will allow, Shakespeare gains authority by praising a male 
object who cannot physiologically hide anything at all.  Ultimately, Shakespeare’s 
extraordinary blazon opens up a space for a raw, honest, skeptically-inflected poetics
that, with Sidney, no longer imagines the beloved as some ethereal embodiment.  Having 
transformed the blazon, Shakespeare can subsequently reject it – once in his poems to the 
young man and then again in his sonnets to the dark lady: 
So is it not with me as with that Muse, 
Stirred by a painted beauty to his verse, 
Who heaven itself for ornament doth use, 
And every fair with his fair doth rehearse, 
Making a couplement of proud compare 
With sun and moon, with earth and sea’s rich gems; 
With April’s first-born flowers and all things rare 
That heaven’s air in this huge rondure hems; 
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O let me true in love but truly write, 
And then believe me: my love is as fair 
As any mother’s child, thought not so bright  
As those gold candles fixed in heaven’s air: 
     Let them say more that like of hearsay well, 
     I will not praise, that purpose not to sell.  (21)  
 
My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun; 
Coral is far more red than her lips’ red; 
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun; 
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head; 
I have seen roses damasked, red and white, 
But no such roses see I in her cheeks; 
And in some perfumes is there more delight 
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks. 
I love to hear her speak, yet well I know  
That music hath a far more pleasing sound; 
I grant I never saw a goddess go; 
My mistress when she walks treads on the ground. 
     And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare  
     As any she belied with false compare.  (130)         
If we set aside the first 17 “procreation” poems in the young man sequence and begin 
counting up from 18, sonnets 21 and 130 are the fourth poem of each subsequence; no 
surprise, then, that they have more in common with each other than with any other sonnet 
in the collection.  Although the poet does not always avoid “making couplement of proud 
compare,” sonnets 21 and 130 give the reader some sense of Shakespeare’s artistic 
project and the method underlying his epideictic skepticism: “true in love” but ever 
skeptical of praise, the poet wants (as Sidney does) to “truly write.”   
*** 
 In sum, Shakespeare evaluates, criticizes, challenges, reforms, but does not 
altogether repudiate Petrarchan praise.  Even in Twelfth Night, when Viola undermines 
(as many critics have pointed out) Petrarchan conventions by discovering subtle ways of 
literally breaking from the “text” nestled in “Orsino’s bosom,” she also refrms in order 
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to reinforce some of those same conventions (such as unrequited love, holy adoration, 
obsessive desire) when she converts Petrarch’s laurel into a weeping “willow”: 
Make me a willow cabin at your gate 
And call upon my soul within the house, 
Write loyal cantons of contemnèd love 
And sing them loud even in the dead of night, 
Hallow your name to the reverberate hills 
And make the babbling gossip of the air 
Cry out “Olivia!” O, you should not rest 
Between the elements of air and earth 
But you should pity me.  (1.5.271-79)            
Satisfying Olivia’s desire to hear a hypothetical description of her lovesickness, Viola’s 
praise is at once playfully self-mocking and aesthetically serious.  For her poetry is and is 
not Petrarchan.  As Jami Ake observes, even though Viola’s language suggests the 
convention of unrequited love, she also transforms the silent, text-bound, male-dominant 
Petrarchan poetry into a social, feminine love song whose words eventually find their 
way to the beloved’s ears.51  Viola’s attempt to invent a poetics in which the beloved 
remains “whole, identified, and present” suggests that while she does not truly love 
Olivia, she seems to respect the poetry, even getting caught up in the romantic language 
herself – and such language ends up intensifying Olivia’s love for Cesario.52 
 Olivia’s attitude toward Petrarchan poetics is also ambiguous, for in this same 
scene she plays the combined role of beloved, critic, and female love poet.  We saw 
                                                      
51 See Jami Ake, “Glimpsing a ‘Lesbian’ Poetics in Twelfth Night,” Studies in English Literature 43.2 
(2003), 384.  As her title suggests, Ake looks at how the dialogue between Cesario and Olivia “offers an 
often overlooked opportunity to witness the dynamics by which a language of female-female desire 
emerges from the materials of conventional heteroerotic discourses already in circulation” (375).  
Nonetheless, Ake’s discussion of the willow in the context of her central argument seems a bit strained.  
Although in a footnote she explicitly ties the “willow” to “unrequited love” (392), in her main argument 
she suggests that Viola’s “pastoral poetics [her reference to the willow]…evokes a realm where neither 
Petrarchan conventions nor their social objectives m an much at all” (381).  Inasmuch, however, as Viola is 
using Petrarchan conventions partly to challenge, partly to reform, and partly to reinforce, it is hardly true 
that such conventions become entirely meaningless.  Indeed, even Ake’s thesis suggests that “female-
female desire emerges from” and thus is tied to “conventional” heterosexual “discourses.”   
52 Ibid., 381. 
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earlier the partial blazon that Orsino delivers to Viola/Cesario in 1.3, but Olivia speaks 
two of her own in 1.5.  The first one is in prose and aims to stop Viola from proceeding 
with her own blazon: 
O, sir, I will not be so hard-hearted!  I will give out divers schedules of my 
beauty.  It shall be inventoried and every particle and utensil labeled to my 
will: as item, two lips indifferent red; item, two gray eyes, with lids to 
them; item, one neck, one chin, and so forth.  Were you sent hither to 
praise me?  (243-49)           
 
Presenting herself as a commodity, Olivia reinforces the stale, prosaic blandness of the 
conventional blazon, which is so impersonal, she suggests, that it does little more than 
inventory body parts.  Interestingly, her criticism of this epideictic form is followed by 
the question, “Were you sent hither to praise me?”  In her mockery of the blazon, Olivia 
seems suddenly aware of the fact that Viola, too, may be using praise as a method of 
appraisal, composing spontaneous love poems in order to gather information for Orsino 
(and not simply to woo).53 
After Cesario exits the scene, however, Olivia delivers a second (partial) blazon – 
this time in earnest.  Contemplating her new love object, Olivia remarks, “Thy tongue, 
thy face, thy limbs, actions, and spirit / Do give thee five-fold blazon” (297-8).  Olivia 
goes no further, which could lend support to her earlier criticism that the form cannot 
                                                      
53 Commenting on Olivia’s mock blazon, Ake argues that Olivia “defies the fragmentation of female speech 
and bodies upon which such Petrarchan poetic subjectivity relies” and “dismembers the Petrarchan rhetoric 
in prose before it can dismember her in verse” (379).  Ake relies on Schalkwyk for support.  See 
Schalkwyk, “‘She Never Told Her Love’: Embodiment, Textuality, and Silence in Shakespeare’s Plays,” 
389.  Sawday, too, argues that Olivia, “[r]ather than submit to the rich adjectival partitioning of her 
body…counter-attacks by reducing the blazon to its essential components” (The Body Emblazoned, 202).  
The observations made by Ake, Schalkwyk, and Sawday are certainly accurate, but I am also suggesting 
that this passage emphasizes not only the psychologica  impact of Petrarchan praise on its listener but also 
the epistemological dimension of epideixis; Olivia feels threatened because Viola’s language does not 
simply disempower and dismember her; it could also potentially cull information from Olivia (about her 
emotional state, about her private self) that she would rather conceal.   
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capture a person’s character.54      
The fact that she mentions the rhetorical method at all, however, signals a 
departure from convention, not only because the blazon is directed toward a “man,” but 
because it is delivered by a woman.  Emphasizing this entire scene’s mixed attitude 
toward Petrarchan convention is the fact that Olivia, the love poet, ends up marrying 
Sebastian, the man she thinks is her praise object.  In reality, however, Olivia remains 
forever divided from her true love “Cesario,” just as Orsino remains eternally separated 
from his.  In the end, Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night shows us how the preservation of 
Petrarchan tenets enables their manipulation, as well as an exploration and evaluation of 
praise.  Thus, Shakespeare’s response to the “authority” of the Petrarchan praise tradition 
– and to praise generally – is not combative but rather rationally inquisitive: a studied 
reflection on the form by working within the tradition itself.   
       
 Epistemological Isolation – The Praising Subject and his Object of Praise 
 Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism involves more than a defensive reaction 
against the Petrarchan tradition.  In the Sonnets, Shakespeare is trying to coax origin lity 
out of a rhetorical form that undermines innovation.  He succeeds because he learns to 
exploit the formulaic character of classical epideixis, exposing its latent sk pticism.  
Shakespeare shows how, in the hands of a capable, innovative writer, praise can evolve 
into appraisal.  His appraisal, however, includes not simply his manipulation of formal 
principles but his epistemological exploration of poet and beloved.  In my discussion of 
                                                      
54 Ake argues that this passage is indeed complete and simply shows Olivia “refus[ing] to enact poetically 
the ritual dismemberment of the beloved’s body in verse, attempting instead to encompass the very aspects 
of Viola/Cesario’s identity that elude the most conve tional Petrarchan prescriptions” on the grounds that 
Olivia focuses on the “beloved’s speech” before considering her “‘actions’ and ‘spirit’” (385).  Howevr, 
Petrarch himself considers these aspects, as do the Elizabethan sonneteers. 
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this feature, I shall focus on the praise poet’s psychological isolation and his anxieties 
about how to understand and represent his object of praise.  As we will see, 
Shakespeare’s beloved youth is inspected for his specific qualities, not merely admired 
for his general virtues.  By becoming more particular than his predecessors with his 
praise, or lamenting his failure to do so, Shakespeare spurns a tradition aimed at showing 
how any object can be admired or criticized.  And yet, from a cultural perspective the 
direction that Shakespeare’s poems have taken is hardly remarkable at all.  He was, after 
all, writing in an environment which privileged the individual as a seeker of truth, 
showed respect for different points of view, and valued empirical inquiry. 
 To date, the most nuanced exploration of the poetic subject and his object of 
praise is Fineman’s Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye: The Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in 
the Sonnets, which traces the changing relationship between poet and beloved across the 
sonnets tradition in order to emphasize that Shakespeare’s poems mark a dramatic shift in 
the way the poet represents himself, his praise, and his beloved.  Fineman contends tha 
praise poetry prior to Shakespeare was rooted in a Platonic tradition that insists o  the 
visibility of goodness and truth.  According to Fineman, conventional praise has always 
been a “visionary praise” (135) that “simulates the ideal such language speaks about” and 
that effectively “becom[es] the demonstration” – or picture – “of the thing it speaks” (13, 
my emphasis).  In this visually-dominant poetry, the poet embraces a language of 
homogeneity, “light and likeness” (145); he typically discovers and celebrates visual 
signifiers of the ideal beloved, avows the truth of those images, and so displays his work 
as the mirror reflection of the thing it praises.  It is no coincidence, Fineman affirms, that 
the etymology of ideal/idea is idein, “to see” (12).   
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Inherently tautological, traditional praise poems are ideal because they mak  
themselves so.  Petrarch, for example, praises a woman whose name means “praise”; thus 
to praise Laura is to also to praise praise.  Still, one might argue that the emphasis of the 
sonnets tradition on unrequited love tempers, if not undermines, its celebratory 
tautologies.  No matter how satisfying Petrarch’s praise of Laura, he cannot have her and 
he suffers in her absence.  How can his experience be ideal?  Fineman responds that 
while the poet longs for his beloved, his desire is largely satisfied through the act of 
writing praise poems that typically embody both the beloved and the poet.  “As a medium 
of admiration,” Fineman explains, “praise is both the mirror and the lamp of both its 
object and itself” and so “reciprocally defines the poet’s object and his subject” (168).  
Through praise poetry, poet and beloved can achieve the unity that they cannot enjoy in 
life.   
 According to Fineman, the real enemies of this ideal praise – and thus the major 
threat to the happy union of poet and beloved – are time and literary repetition, not 
unrequited love.  He persuasively argues that participation in any long-established genre 
will inevitably discover differences among the accumulating exemplars, producing 
noticeable problems with the form.  The problem becomes especially visible in 
Shakespeare’s poems, which appear at the end of a “belated,” “exhausted,” or “bankrupt” 
tradition of sonneteering.55  Fineman cleverly uses the word re-vision to describe the 
                                                      
55 Fineman argues that “Shakespeare’s sonnets understand themselves to inherit the debts of a bankrupt 
poetic tradition…” (42) and builds his argument around the “burden of a belated literariness” (48).  See 
also Richard Helgerson, Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton, and the Literary System 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).  Helgerson contends that the depletion of the forms 
happens over the course of only a couple decades during the Renaissance: “Where Sidney and Spenser had 
begun in a near void, at least so far as English models of a laureate career were concerned, men born tw  
decades later discovered a surplus.  The pastoral, he sonnet sequence, the chivalric, Arcadian, and amorous 
romance, the long nationalistic poem, perhaps even th  epic had been exhausted, and with them the 
mellifluous, ornamented style and the aureate attitudes that had been their body and soul” (104-5).  See also 
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internal changes that occur in Shakespeare’s sonnets when the poet’s epideictic 
experiment leads him to discover that the “old gold of poetic admiration has lost its 
glister from being rubbed too often by the tradition of Petrarchan praise” (145) and th t 
Shakespeare’s poet has become a kind of “bleached Dante” (149).  Instead of perceiving 
the beloved as his ideal exemplar, the poet begins to see “the object of his admiration 
only very indirectly, by looking backward to and through a literary image of what is 
retrospective and past” (146).  The poet’s desire to particularize his praise, in other 
words, is undermined by his constant need to dwell not on what is but on what has been.  
The cornerstone of Fineman’s study is thus Shakespeare’s awareness of his belatedness 
and the consequences of his failure to perceive and present the beloved as he really is. 
Fineman goes on to observe that Shakespeare’s sonnets become increasingly artificia  
and self-conscious, and increasingly prone to speak about and, ultimately, against 
themselves.  In the dark lady poems, especially, the poet not only affirms “that vision is 
false,” but he connects “that [false] vision with false language” (163).  Finema  has in 
mind passages such as: 
When my love swears that she is made of truth, 
I do believe her, though I know she lies, 
That she might think me some untutored youth 
Unlearned in the world’s false subtleties. (138) 
 
In faith, I do not love thee with mine eyes, 
For they in thee a thousand errors note; 
But ‘tis my heart that loves what they despise, 
Who in despite of view is pleased to dote. (141) 
 
For I have sworn thee fair, and thought thee bright, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Duncan-Jones, Shakespeare’s Sonnets.  Duncan-Jones argues that Shakespeare’s sequence was “in part 
written after 1600” (52).  Indeed, even if the poems were all written in the 1590s, Shakespeare could we l 
have revised them in the first decade of the sevententh century.  The fact that the 1609 Quarto and The 
Passionate Pilgrim (1599) contain different versions of the same poems suggests that Shakespeare’s 
sonnet-writing was a protracted process.           
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Who art as black as hell, as dark as night. (147) 
 
O me! What eyes hath love put in my head, 
Which have no correspondence with true sight? (148) 
 
For I have sworn deep oaths of thy deep kindness, 
Oaths of thy love, thy truth, thy constancy, 
And to enlighten thee gave eyes to blindness, 
Or made them swear against the thing they see: 
     For I have sworn thee fair: more perjured eye, 
     To swear against the truth so foul a lie. (152)        
Instead of embracing a poetics of visual truth, the poet of the dark lady sequence focuses 
on verbal duplicity, and on words that have failed to capture a beloved who has long 
since receded from his frame of reference.  
  Fineman goes on to show how two things happen in Shakespeare’s sequence that 
distinguish his work from that of his contemporaries: praise migrates into praise p radox; 
and the poetic subject, no longer capable of satisfying his desire through idealizing verse, 
invents a new kind of subjectivity capable of accommodating the internal division 
between the praising poet and his literary self.  Fineman calls this invention poetic
subjectivity.  Putting these two components together, he maintains that “Shakespeare 
rewrites praise through the medium of epideictic paradox and in this way invents, which 
is to say comes upon, the only kind of subjectivity that survives in the literature 
successive to the poetry of praise” (2).    
Both praise paradox and poetic subjectivity are embedded in the practice of 
praise.  As we know, praise paradox traditionally bestows ironic and excessive adulation 
on a person who really deserves censure; thus the method deliberately separate a pr ise 
object and his praise.  Fineman suggests that Shakespeare makes use of this renegade
sub-genre for a couple reasons.  The most obvious is that praise paradox presents 
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aesthetic challenges which Shakespeare and his contemporaries enjoyed tackling.  As 
Rosalie Colie succinctly puts it, the “paradoxical encomium raises a question in logic 
which is of the most profound importance: can a thing unpraisable in fact be praised?”56  
Shakespeare’s occasional employment of the mock encomium in his sonnet sequence 
represents such an attempt to defy logical impossibility and to add sparkle to the form.  
Fineman argues, however, that Shakespeare must contend not only with the sonneteering 
tradition of which he is a part, but also with the poetics of metaphor distinguishing that 
tradition.  For Shakespeare to compare his beloved to a rose, in other words, is for him to 
compare his beloved to Sidney’s Stella, Dante’s Beatrice, and Petrarch’s Laura.  Praise 
paradox is thus a generic mutation, an inevitable consequence for a poet weighed down 
by the burden of literary history.  After all, praise paradox is not always a matter of 
appending flattering language to a random, inferior praise object; it can arise when a 
poet’s amplified language becomes so excessive that it turns into hyperbole, mock ry, 
and artificial encomium.  And Fineman suggests that by the time Shakespeare began 
composing his poems, to praise at all was already to praise too much. 
 Embedded within epideixis, praise paradox is what happens when a poet starts 
noticing his own praise.  Similarly, poetic subjectivity happens when the poet starts 
noticing himself as he is praising the beloved – to the point where he starts to see his 
praising self as distinct from the poet-character embedded in his verse.  Despite insisting 
on Shakespeare’s uniqueness, Fineman shows how this self-consciousness is inherent in 
the form.  Rooting his observations in the etymology of epideixis, Fineman suggests that 
                                                      
56 Rosalie Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966), 5.  Colie goes on cheekily to respond, “If it can, then it is not unpraisable; if it 
cannot, then a vast number of pieces of paradoxical prose do not exist” (5).  Colie’s argument here has
precedent in Shakespeare’s sonnet 116, which famously concludes: “If this be error, and upon me proved, / 




the excessive (“epi”) pointing (“deixis”) built into the word reflects a predisposition 
within the genre to undermine itself, to point to the description and the describer more 
than the described. 57  In conventional praise, however, the problems of epideixis do not 
reveal themselves and so remain undetected.  If the beloved and the poet are a 
homogeneous unit, then it does not matter at whom the poet points: if he points to himself 
and his poetry, then he is also pointing to his beloved, for poet and praise object are 
inseparable and indistinct.  However, once the poet begins to doubt his object of praise, 
his poetry, or himself – and once his poetry becomes increasingly artificial or se f-
consciously literary – then the problem cannot be concealed and the poet’s distinct 
presence will threaten to eclipse the ideal copy.  That is, the praising poet will inevitably 
be drawn into a sea of artificiality only to surface as a “poetic persona” exiled not only 
from his object of praise, but also from himself (218).58 
 But what of the sonnets in and of themselves?  What of the fair male and the 
                                                      
57 Fineman seizes upon the idea of excess suggested in the “epi” to argue that this “prepositionally diffuse” 
prefix “is precisely the rhetorical surplus that praise as a rhetorical practice adds to ordinary verbal 
indication” (5).  He then ties this idea of “surplus” into his thesis that Shakespeare, coming at the end of a 
long and exhausted praise tradition, deviates from a tradition that was inherently prone to this deviation. 
58 For Fineman, the two poems in which Shakespeare refers to himself as Will (sonnets 135 and 136) are 
important in the history of the sonnet sequence because they mark the first time a poet names himself in his 
verse at almost the same moment he declares language to be artificial – a lie.  However, just as praise 
paradox can arise from repetitive, amplified praise, so subjectivity, Fineman argues, is “immanent in the 
poetry of praise” (215).  The poems of Sidney, Petrarch, and Dante, which to some degree already exhibit 
the poet at the expense of the idealized beloved, have embedded in the lines of their verse the seed of 
division and the potential for poetic subjectivity, but they manage to subjugate those aspects.  Critics such 
as Gordon Braden who have criticized Fineman for failing to read Petrarchan verse closely enough miss 
Fineman’s point: the dark lady sonnets merely invent, that is to say “they come upon” or “discover,” poetic 
subjectivity; they make explicit what was always implicit in the poetics of praise.  See also Gordon Braden, 
“Shakespeare’s Petrarchism,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, 163-84.  In this essay, Braden 
acknowledges the distinctions Fineman makes between implicit and explicit difference, and he seems to 
agree on the whole with Fineman’s reading of the poms in themselves, but he grows critical when 
Fineman tries to situate Shakespeare’s Sonnets in a Petr rchan context.  Maintaining that the 
“‘languageness of language’…category…does not inspire confidence” and that “the last several decades of 
critical practice have shown that pretty much any textual specimen can be so characterized,” Braden dos
not acknowledge how Fineman is aligning this point with three others: (1) Fineman is looking at the 
contrast in emphasis between visual language and linguistically-focused language, not at two mutually 
exclusive categories; (2) Shakespeare’s poet explicitly declares that his poem “lies” and says that he has 
perjured himself; he does not simply suggest it; and (3) the poet of the dark lady sequence names himself 
(and his authorial self), “Will,” at a critical juncture in the poems. 
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notoriously crafty dark lady?  While Shakespeare’s two beloveds are absolutely essential 
to Fineman’s argument, they are more expressions of what is happening to praise poetry 
than actual people.  A reflection of conventional epideixis, the young man is a figure of 
sameness and homogeneity; fair and bright and true, he elicits from the poet a visually-
oriented, Platonic praise.  Although Shakespeare’s male beloved noticeably diverges 
from a tradition that idealizes women, Fineman argues that this male is “[p]resented…as 
though homosexuality were the secret truth of all ideal and idealizing desire from Dante 
onwards” (256); the young man underscores the praise poet’s natural impulses to identify 
with his beloved, to see himself in his other.  Unlike Pequigney, Fineman insists on the 
non-erotic quality of the young-man sequence, thus preserving the sexual purity essential 
to idealizing praise.59  If the young man is the “picture of his poet’s admiration,” then the 
dark lady is the “discourse of her poet’s lust” (160).  Seductive, dark, and cunning, the 
black mistress is the figure of praise paradox, heterogeneity, difference, sexual d sire, 
and misogyny.  In the poems addressed to her, the poet hardly praises at all, instead 
lamenting that he has been blind, that his language is false, and that his dark lady is not 
true.  It is in the dark-lady sonnets that the poet names himself, explicitly art culating the 
separation he feels between himself and his beloved as well as within himself.   
Although Fineman’s formalist argument is rigid and intentionally repetitiv , he 
does build into his interpretation three major sources of flexibility that accommodate my 
own reading.  He argues, for example, that while the “young man’s golden praise 
                                                      
59 On the first page of Such is My Love, Pequigney suggests that the poet and young man have a sexual 
relationship, though he admits that the “stand” he “take[s] on the question of eroticism is hardly one of 
conformity” (1).  And, unlike Fineman, Pequigney later argues that the dark lady and the young man “do 
not have carnal relations” (147).  Both of these arguments seem to undermine Fineman’s interpretation, 
although Pequigney’s claims are far from irrefutable.  As far as the poet’s physical relationship with the 
young man, the poems contain some sexual innuendo, but there is no way to prove more than sexual desire; 
as for the young man’s sexual relationship with the dark lady, sonnet 144 overwhelmingly substantiates  
physical connection – as do sonnets 40-42.   
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presents itself as that which it admires,” these same sonnets also implicitly point to a 
crisis of epideixis by complaining how repetitive such praise has become (177-88).  
Fineman, who makes much ado of two of the sonnets I discuss in the previous section (59 
and 76), asserts that in the young man sequence, the poet “introduces a new kind of 
literary self-consciousness into the already highly self-conscious tradition of the 
Renaissance sonnet” and that he “identifies himself with his own literariness,” both of 
which feed into the sequence’s “invention” of poetic subjectivity (149).  As I have 
already mentioned in my “Quintian” interpretation of these poems, sonnets 59 and 76 are 
original in the way they historically ground the poet’s experiences with the beloved.  
Similarly, Fineman contends that these two poems “work practically to make a personal 
issue out of their self-remarked literary belatedness, regularly associting what they 
themselves characterize as their old-fashioned matter and manner with their poet’s sense 
of senescence” (148).   
In addition to highlighting the poet’s literary self-consciousness in a sequence that 
is supposed to be idealizing the beloved, Fineman suggests that the poet is divided from 
the beloved as early as the procreation sonnets, where the poet sometimes identifies 
himself and his work with the young man’s progeny instead of with the young man 
himself (211).  Thus, on the one hand, the young-man sonnets insist on the ideal 
identification among poet, poem, and beloved, asserting, for example, “‘Tis thee (mys lf) 
that for myself I praise / Painting my age with beauty of thy days” (62).  On the other 
hand, several of the young man “sonnets seem repeatedly to dwell on…the difference 
between a subject and his object, between the real and the ideal, or between the original 
and its copy” (216). 
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The third source of flexibility involves Fineman’s treatment of the mock 
encomium.  He claims that while the young man sonnets exhibit conventional praise, the 
dark-lady poems emphasize praise paradox.  But, other than sonnets 130, 131, and (to 
some extent) 138, the second sequence hardly praises at all; most of the time, the poet is 
cajoling, lamenting, or blaming the dark lady.  Fineman explains that though these 
sonnets constitute a praise of paradox and embrace a paradoxical reality, they surpass 
even the mock encomium.  Quoting sonnet 147, he builds his interpretation upon the fact 
that the poet has “sworn” the dark lady “fair” but has since discovered that she is a 
“black as hell, as dark as night.”  As Fineman argues, this second sequence is “written as 
though by a poet who has already essayed the paradox of praise, who has tried it out in 
misplaced earnest” (29).  Where, then, are the paradoxical poems that the poet has 
“tried…out in misplaced earnest” (29)?  Where are the mock encomia?  If we read 
Shakespeare’s sequence in the order of the 1609 printing and take seriously Fineman’s 
insistence on the intimate connection between the two subsequences, one senses that 
what the poet is complaining about in the dark-lady sonnets is what he has already 
demonstrated in the young-man poems: amplified praise directed at a dubious beloved.   
If Fineman’s investigation of the young-man poems produces a complex, but 
ultimately loosely woven pattern, I intend to tug on those threads a bit more than most 
critics have done in the last twenty years.  Common to both of our arguments, after all, 
are some general observations regarding the status of sixteenth-century praise poetry and 
the fact that changes within epideixis are inherent in the practice.  Moreover, ven though 
Fineman similarly claims that Shakespeare’s poems have characteristics tha  make them 
exemplary, he also rightly notices a large-scale darkening of epideixis acro s the 
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Renaissance literary spectrum (156).  Perhaps what is most significant, though, for my 
own study is Fineman’s analysis of poetic subjectivity – as much for what he leaves out 
as for what he discusses.  Fineman, for example, maintains that “as the sonnet ev lves 
from Dante to Shakespeare” and becomes increasingly self-conscious and artificial, 
“there is a transition from an epideictic ontology to an epideictic psychology…” (217).  
As he affirms elsewhere, “poetic introspection” – and emphasis on being in the present – 
gives way to an obsession with the “retrospective” and the obsolete (149).  While 
compelling, his argument leaves gaps in the story of how Shakespeare’s poems evolved.  
We can address one of those gaps by acknowledging that an introspective poetics that 
suddenly starts meditating on its beloved in relation to past praise objects is not justbeing 
“retrospective” but also inspective.  Another (related) elephant in the room is the 
epistemological dimension of praise, which could help account for the shift from 
ontology to psychology.  Taking up these and other issues produces another question that 
this chapter seeks to answer: How might we extend Fineman’s assertion that poetic 
subjectivity arises from literary repetition to include cultural markers such as the 
Reformation, the rise of scientific empiricism, and the revival of skeptical texts? 
Fineman’s argument, after all, is directly relevant to a post-Reformation society 
ready to assert the primacy of the Word (sola scriptura) but prone to doubt whether 
language can convey truth.  His discussion of the praising subject and his object of praise, 
moreover, relates to a general shift in the Renaissance in the way people viewed 
themselves and the world – to a marked transformation, that is, away from medieval 
ontology (focused on essence as knowledge) to Renaissance epistemology (focused on 
experiment and observation).  Scholars like Julie Solomon, Walter Ong, and Ernst 
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Cassirer agree that prior to Shakespeare, individuals could psychologically integrate 
themselves into their world; their natural setting, though often strange and unfamiliar, 
was still a projection of the self; and reality involved subjugating the world of things to a 
world of ideas and essences.  In the epistemologically-driven Renaissance, however, 
people began to dwell on the implications of their separateness from the world and from 
each other.60   
Solomon and Ong, exploring the relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity, therefore offer a way to widen Fineman’s emphasis on ontology and 
psychology to incorporate issues related to Shakespeare’s epideictic skepti m – from 
the poet’s isolation and self-doubt to his impulse to inquire into the nature of his beloved 
and his poetics.  Solomon begins by insisting that “we would have no new…rise of the 
early modern subject without the capacity to view the subject in contradistinction to an 
external world of objects, considered objectively.”61  She explains that the birth of 
scientific empiricism and disinterestedness, the increased appreciation for subjective 
                                                      
60 To explain this growing emphasis on epistemology and, in many cases, to account for the rise of 
skepticism, other scholars cite the Reformation.  Popkin, for example, reminds us that the religious 
“[r]eformers were continually occupied with trying to justify their own type of subjective, individual 
criterion, and at the same time were using this criterion as an objective measure by means of which they 
condemned as heresies their opponents’ appeals to conscience” (The History of Scepticism, 5).  Similarly, 
Katharine Maus explores the influence of “Renaissance religious culture” on subjectivity and skepticism in 
theater [(Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
11].  Focused on theater’s response to the “anxiety about the epistemology of inwardness,” Maus argues 
that “the English Renaissance stage seems deliberately to foster theatergoers’ capacity to use partial and 
limited presentations as a basis for conjecture about what is undisplayed or undisplayable.  Its spectacles 
are understood to depend upon and indicate the shape  of things unseen” (31-32).  For Maus, these 
innovations in theater are made possible, in part, by an increasingly self-conscious religious culture that 
habitually reflected on the “disparity between what a limited, fallible human observer can see and what is 
available” to God, “the hypostasized observer” (11).  In both of their studies, Fineman and Maus observe 
how our experience of subjectivity (in literature or real life) is predicated as much on what we cannot k w 
– on our limited perspectives – as what we can; thus both scholars implicitly tie subjectivity to the 
emergence of skepticism.  Maus, by exploring the boundaries within and between people, emphasizes the 
fact that every individual emanates a mysterious interiority – a subjective, private self – that will a ways 
elude and thus divide us.   
61 Julie Solomon, Objectivity in the Making: Francis Bacon and the Politics of Inquiry (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2002), xiii. 
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points of view, and the emergence of skepticism about the observable world all arose 
from the “dissolution of an ontologistic episteme,” or, more simply, from a 
transformation in subject and object (38).62   Rooting these changes in shifting economic 
and political power structures, Solomon explores how alterations in sixteenth-century 
cognition led to the drive to uncover empirical evidence that would assuage a person’s 
skepticism and lead to a consensus of interpretation.   
Solomon elaborates on many of the observations made by Ong, who claims that 
the period’s major changes – epistemological, religious, and scientific – were subordinate 
to a shift from an oral-aural culture to a culture of the written word. 63  As Ong argues, the 
printing press transformed the use of language and thus the individual’s conception of the 
world.  While words known only for their “native sound…retain a permanent 
inwardness,” “writing,” Ong explains, “externalizes words themselves, giving them a 
curious thing-like permanence as marks on a surface” (229).  Ong argues that literate 
societies therefore tend to be epistemological – interested in a world of things where 
“[p]ersons and the consciousness they exhibit are unaccountable intrusions, foreign to 
                                                      
62 Solomon’s discussion of the subject/object split does come with a caveat.  In her prologue and elsewhere, 
she admits to the anachronistic use of the word “objectivity” (xix).  To clarify what she means by this split, 
Solomon argues that prior to the early modern period, human beings did not distinguish ontology from 
epistemology, and that to know was also to be (28-29).  That is, the external world in medieval philosophy 
was subordinate to the “knowing subject” (xii) and her world of objective essences (like Plato’s forms); 
although human beings used their senses to observe the world, those details did not constitute “objects” of 
knowledge.  As Solomon explains, “once the mind abstr cts a thing’s subjective essence from sense-data, 
the subjective essence attains objective mental existence” (29).  Subjectivity and objectivity became two 
separate entities only after the medieval object was, according to Solomon, “‘thrown from the mind,’” or
perceived as having an existence independent of human thinking (37). 
63 Walter J. Ong, S.J., The Presence of the Word (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 231.  As Ong 
suggests, Luther himself would not have succeeded in convincing people that they had the power of 
religious interpretation were it not for the printing press, which not only allowed Luther to publicize his 
ideas but made reading the Bible a viable option for anyone who was literate.  According to Ong, in 
preliterate cultures, the world was not perceived as objective and “indifferent” (223).  “So long as culture 
was dominantly oral-aural,” he goes on to say, “attempts at neutral objectivity would be under constant 
danger of distortion” (225).  He explains that “in such a society, knowledge is a tribal possession” and a 
product of “what others say” – “not a matter of indivi ual speculation” (231).  Preliterate cultures were also 
marked by “authoritarian structures” in which the “objective world” was “still…relatively inaccessible to
the world” and where “observation,” though not “eliminated,” was nonetheless “minimized” (232-4). 
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objective reality, which is voiceless and normally passive” (228).  Thus, the modern 
individual will typically find his environment at once more knowable and less knowable, 
and himself bound to observe a world from which he is eternally isolated.   
Ong’s argument that people were consequently starting “to be thought of 
somehow as objects” in a universe filled with a “mass of things” (228) is especially 
pertinent to Shakespeare’s Sonnets: just as inquiring into a person’s nature and 
speculating about her interiority turns her into an object of inspection, so the poet’s 
insistent questioning and doubt reflects the fact that the beloved is no longer a static ideal 
paragon yoked to the poet but a shifting, unknowable object inviting speculation.  
Cassirer, along these lines, eloquently writes that “[t]he true independence of the world of 
experience was really first won by the Renaissance…. The empirical is no longer to be 
resolved in the ideal, therewith to be stripped of its specific character.  On the contrary, 
the ideal can only be genuinely fulfilled in the empirical, where it is tested and 
justified.”64  Cassirer’s observations resonate powerfully in the Sonnets, where the poet 
meditates on his isolation, on the idiosyncrasies of eye and mind, on the practice of 
interpretation and evaluation, and on the limitations of human knowledge. 
Sonnet 24 exemplifies the poet’s psychological isolation from the beloved, 
despite their physical proximity: 
Mine eye hath played the painter, and hath steeled 
Thy beauty’s form in table of my heart; 
My body is the frame wherein ‘tis held, 
And perspective it is best painter’s art; 
For through the painter must you see his skill, 
To find where your true image pictured lies, 
Which in my bosom’s shop is hanging still, 
That hath his windows glazed with thine eyes: 
                                                      
64 Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), 172. 
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Now see what good turns eyes for eyes have done: 
Mine eyes have drawn thy shape, and thine for me 
Are windows to my breast, wherethrough the sun 
Delights to peep, to gaze therein on thee; 
     Yet eyes this cunning want to grace their art: 
     They draw but what they see, know not the heart.       
Notwithstanding the poet’s description of a shared experience with the beloved, Vendler 
maintains that it “is one of the many sonnets of asymmetry” in the sequence and is 
unusual for a praise sequence that is supposed to celebrate unity.65  This is because the 
beloved looks into the poet’s eyes to see himself “steeled” in the “table” of his “heart,” 
while the young man does not offer his poet the same privilege.  The poet is not engraved 
in the young man’s heart; he merely watches the youth, whose own eyes become 
windows through which the poet may see the youth’s image inside himself.  Effectively 
peering in the same direction (the beloved at the poet, the poet through the youth at the 
youth within himself), they seem to share the same perspective. 
But the problems with this poem have to do not only with a general lack of 
symmetry, but also with a failure in perception.66  Ultimately, neither the beloved nor the 
poet can fully perceive the other person.  The poet knows that eyes are not really 
windows and so do not allow a person to penetrate the heart of another.  Thus, the poem 
culminates in the poet’s revelation that artists “draw but what they see, know not the 
heart.”  The structure of sonnet 24 accordingly traces the way the beloved gradually 
recedes from the poet’s understanding.  Promising at the start, the first quatrain embraces 
Plato’s essences, insisting that “beauty’s form” – and thus the young man’sessential 
being – is carved into the poet’s heart.  Soon giving up this ideal world of Platonic forms, 
                                                      
65 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 142. 
66 See, for example, Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 143; Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets (1977; rpt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 172-4; and Colin Burrow, The Complete 
Sonnets and Poems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 428.  
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however, the poet by the second quatrain affirms merely that the beloved’s “true imag ” 
exists within the poet.  By the third quatrain, the poet employs neither form nor true 
image to describe the beloved’s picture, but rather the prosaic and indistinct word shape.  
Having lost hope of capturing the beloved’s essence, the poet realizes that all he has is a
nebulous outline that he cannot claim is complete and that is sure to change depending on 
the poet’s perspective – on his frame of reference.   
If, then, we agree that “perspective” is indeed “best painter’s art” in that it seems 
to ensure accuracy of representation, one should also remember that an object’s 
representation depends on the angle from which it is viewed.  In the sixteenth century, 
writers already understood that the word perspective could, on the one hand, mean 
“vision and light” and “optical instrument for looking through” and, on the other hand, 
refer to an anamorphic picture “designed to appear distorted and confused” – like 
Cleopatra’s reflection of Antony “painted one way like a Gorgon, / The other way[] a 
Mars.”67  Skeptics such as Montaigne, Greville, and Sir Walter Raleigh all cite problems 
of perspective to justify their philosophy.  Reinforcing this dimension of skepticism, 
Shakespeare not only affirms in sonnet 24 that people and things look different 
depending on their frame of reference, but he also implies that idiosyncrasies and flaws in 
human physiology (such as near-sightedness) can distort just about any image.  
The poet’s skepticism regarding the beloved’s representability is matched by 
growing concern about his own self-knowledge.  As the sonnet reveals, the poet wants 
the beloved to look into his eyes to see his own picture of that beloved, but the image is 
imperfect, incomplete, superficial, and even, perhaps, false.  Similarly, the poet gazes 
                                                      
67 “perspective, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  
25 September 2009 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50176270>.  See also Antony and Cleopatra, in 
Shakespeare’s Tragedies, Ed. David Bevington (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007), 2.5.118-19.  
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into the beloved’s eyes only to see himself looking back at himself.  Not just alienated 
from the world, the poet is also alienated from himself.  If the poet can only see his 
beloved perspectively, then the same goes for his attempt to see his own image.  In  way, 
then, this poem can be read as a metaphor for how people but slenderly know themselves. 
Thus, sonnet 24 represents one of the sequence’s first efforts to unite the poet’s 
epistemological limitations and self-doubt with anxieties about his isolation.  Sonnet 113, 
one of the last of such poems in the young-man sequence, deepens the eye/mind 
questions broached in 24: 
Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind, 
And that which governs me to go about 
Doth part his function, and is partly blind; 
Seems seeing, but effectually is out: 
For it no form delivers to the heart 
Of bird, of flower, or shape which it doth lack; 
Of his quick objects hath the mind no part, 
Nor his own vision holds what it doth catch: 
For if it see the rud’st or gentlest sight, 
The most sweet-favoured or deformed’st creature, 
The mountain, or the sea, the day, or night, 
The crow, or dove, it shapes them to your feature. 
     Incapable of more, replete with you, 
     My most true mind thus maketh mine [eye]68 untrue.        
Readers will notice how words in this poem morph into other words: I becomes eye; mine 
turns into eye and mind; part transmutes into partly; seems changes into seeing and then 
see; form finds its way to deformed’st; and shape later reappears as shapes.  These subtle 
and not-so-subtle linguistic adjustments reflect the fact that the poet, separated from the 
beloved, discovers that every “form” he sees is “shape[d]” into his “feature.”  Everything 
                                                      
68 Stephen Orgel, Helen Vendler, Colin Burrow have added the word eye to the final line.  Stephen Booth 
makes explicit the implicit pun in the word mine by emending “mine” to “m’eyne” (Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 
99).  Duncan-Jones defends her decision to follow Malone and the 1609 Quarto and thus to leave the poem 
alone, arguing that “Malone is surely correct in saying ‘Untrue is used as a substantive.  The sincerity of my 
affection is the cause of my untruth; i.e. of my not seeing objects truly, such as they appear to the rest of 
mankind’” (336).  See also Stephen Orgel, The Sonnets (New York: Penguin Books, 2001).     
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real or essentially and Platonically true, in other words, becomes “untrue” in the poet’s 
mind and, as in sonnet 24, degenerates into mere “shapes.”   
Sonnet 113, which directly follows the poet’s request to “know” his “shames and 
praises” from the beloved’s “tongue” (112), is not a classic love poem; the poet is not 
celebrating the fact that he perceives the beloved everywhere he looks, nor is he spending 
the whole time bewailing the young man’s absence (remember, the poet has temporarily 
deserted his artistic post in 112 and here reasserts that he has left the young man).  
Rather, the poet laments the fact that his mind is playing tricks on him, proving his eye 
“untrue” or, depending on which edition of the Sonnets we use, threatening to undercut 
the poet’s powers of perception.69  Sonnet 113 digs deeper than 24 into what Solomon 
considers to be the “underlying crisis” feeding sixteenth-century skepticism.70  Solomon 
contends that “skepticism arose in response to a new social sensitivity to cognitive 
relativism and a new awareness of contending epistemologies” (38).  Nonetheless, these 
“cognitive” differences could no longer be ascribed merely to “sensory abnormality,” but 
also to an “intellect” that is “susceptible to idiosyncrasy” (38).  In sonnet 113, the poet 
knows that his eye is seeing birds, flowers, mountains, and ocean, but his mind (which is 
“most true” to his beloved’s memory) is converting these accurate images into something 
false. 
 “Replete” with that absent beloved, the poet insists that his mind has betrayed 
him, creating illusory images that are too perplexing and too consuming to offer comfort.  
This skeptical perspective, I argue, distinctly contrasts the optimism expressed by 
Petrarch, who in his Canzoniere celebrates the capacity to find solace in an environment 
                                                      
69 See previous note. 
70 Solomon, Objectivity in the Making, 38. 
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that he can actively shape to his liking: 
   Ove porge ombra un pino alto od un colle 
                        talor m'arresto, et pur nel primo sasso  
  disegno co la mente il suo bel viso. 
   Poi ch' a me torno, trovo il pette molle 
  de la pietate, et alor dico: “Ahi lasso, 
  dove se' guinto? et onde se' diviso?” 
   Ma mentre tener fiso 
  posso al primo pensier la mente vaga, 
  et mirar lei et obliar me stesso, 
  sento Amor sì da presso 
  che del suo proprio error l'alma s'appaga; 
  in tante parti et sì bella la veggio 
  che se l'error durasse, altro non cheggio. (129)  
 
 [Where some tall pine or hillside makes for shade 
I often stop, and staring at a stone 
I try to call her lovely face to mind. 
 Then coming to my senses once again 
I find my breast awash with pity, saying: 
“Alas, how came you here?  How far she is!” 
 But while I can stay fixed, 
my yearning mind on that first thought, and gaze 
at her, and let myself forget myself, 
I feel Love close at hand 
and do not mind the error of my soul; 
she’s all around me, she’s everything, 
and all I ask is that illusion last.]   
 
In Shakespeare’s poem, the poet’s eye resides in a mind that severs and isolates him from
an alienating world.  In Petrarch’s sonnet, the poet’s longing only intensifies his intimacy 
with his surroundings.  Rather than indiscriminately converting even “deformed’st” and 
“rud’st” things into images of Laura, Petrarch shows choice and control.  Not mastered 
by his environment, he learns how to embrace illusion and manipulate the natural world. 
This freedom to transform one’s surroundings, Cassirer suggests, precedes what 
happens in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, in which the “task” involved “making the 
concept of nature independent and securing for it a strong, strictly ‘objective’ character” 
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(145).  To illuminate what he means by an “independent” and “objective” nature, 
Cassirer observes of Petrarch’s poetry:   
The lyrical mood does not see in nature the opposite of psychical reality; 
rather it feels everywhere in nature the traces and the echo of the soul.  For 
Petrarch, landscape becomes the living mirror of the Ego.  To be sure, we 
have here not only a liberation but, at the same time, a limitation to the 
feeling for nature; for precisely in this function of reflecting the soul, 
nature itself possesses only a mediate and, as it were, reflected reality.  
Nature is not sought and represented for its own sake; rather, its value lies 
in its service to modern man as a new means of expression for himself, for 
the liveliness and the infinite polymorphism of his inner life….Petrarch 
feels about nature the same way he feels about worldly life and fame, 
which for him is the essence of all worldly life; although he feels 
passionately and irresistibly drawn to them, he is unable to devote himself 
to them easily and with good conscience.  This is not a ‘naïve’, but a 
completely ‘sentimental’ relationship to nature.  Nature cannot be 
understood, felt, and enjoyed per se, but only as a dark or light 
background for the Ego.  (143-5)      
 
If, for Petrarch, nature is at once a willed illusion and a “living mirror of the Ego” and the 
“soul,” then it is also functions as heaven’s handmaiden.  In sonnet 159 of the 
Canzoniere, for example, we find a marked contrast to sonnet 20’s jealous, lusty Nature, 
which “fell a-doting” and “pricked” the poet’s beloved out for female – and thus her own 
– “pleasure.”  Petrarch, on the contrary, asks, “In qual parte del Ciel, in quale Ide / era 
l'esempio onde Natura tolse / quell bel viso leggiadro in ch' ella volse / mostrar qua già 
quanto lassù potea?” [“What part of Heaven was it, what Idea, / where Nature found the 
pattern of that face, / that lovely visage that she brought down here / to show the 
capabilities up there?”].  For Petrarch, Nature has a holy, selfless purpose, producing a 
pattern (Laura) intended to teach the world about the beauty of heaven.   
Despite having such an important function, Nature is sometimes personified 
independently of heaven in order to reinforce its psychological connection to Petrarch.  
For example, he affirms early in his sequence, “Sì ch' io mi credo omai che monti et 
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piagge / et fiumi et selve sappian di che tempre / sia la mia vita, ch' è celata altrui” (35) 
[“So I believe the mountains and the shores, / rivers and forests too, all know by now / 
the sort of life I lead, concealed from people”].  Later in his poems, Petrarch builds more 
than merely a sympathetic connection between himself and the outside world; he invests 
Nature with the same romantic enthusiasm that he feels for Laura: 
 Lieti fiori et felici, et ben nate erbe 
 che Madonna pensando premer sòle, 
 piaggia ch' ascolti sue dolci parole 
 et del bel piede alcun vestigio serbe, 
 
 schietti arboscelli et verdi frondi acerbe, 
 amorosette et pallide viole, 
 ombrose selve ove percote il sole 
 che vi fa co' suoi raggi alte et superbe, 
 
 o suave contrada, o puro fiume 
 che bagni il suo bel viso et gli occhi chiari 
 et prendi qualità dal vivo lume: 
 
 quanto v'invidio gli atti onesti et cari! 
 Non fia in voi scoglio omai che per costume 
 d'arder co la mia fiamma non impari. (162)  
 
[Lucky, happy flowers, and well-born grass 
whereon my lady’s apt to walk in thought, 
and shore, that listens to her sweet words spoken 
and keeps some imprint of her lovely foot, 
 
and slender trees, green leaves on unripe branches,  
delicate violets, pale in forest light, 
the shady woods where sunlight filters through 
and helps the sapling grow into tall trees, 
 
oh, gentle countryside, and river pure, 
bathing her lovely face and brilliant eyes, 
taking your worth from their illumination; 
 
how much I envy you your dear, chaste contact! 
By now there’s probably no stone among you 
that hasn’t learned to burn with my same passion.]      
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 Although Petrarch seems to be competing with Nature, in reality he is imagining an 
external world that reflects his inner turmoil.  In another poem, Petrarch even enjoi s the 
sun to provide a longer day so he can continue “mirarla” [“to gaze”] on his Laura (188).  
As he apostrophizes, “Almo sol, quella fronde ch' io sola amo / tu prima amasti” [“Life-
giving sun, you loved that branch [the laurel] at first / which I love now”]. 
 The fact that Laura’s name is associated with both praise (l us) and nature 
(laurel) creates the sort of organic union among beloved, poem, and poet that is absent in 
Shakespeare’s sequence.  Indeed, in the Sonnets, the poet discovers that his beloved 
reflects darker aspects of human nature that elude him, that he cannot control; he 
discovers flaws and limitations in the practice of praise that threaten to derail his purpose; 
and he recognizes that the natural world is not a mirror for the Ego but a reminder of all 
that is alien and unfamiliar to him, all that he cannot possibly understand.  In the 
Canzoniere, Petrarch is not consumed by what he cannot understand, nor does he feel 
driven to ask questions about his beloved.  Laura is instead the sorcerer’s stone in his 
poetic alchemy, a beloved who can transform the unfamiliar into the familiar.  Though 
purportedly “past nature,” Laura has power to “renew” and naturalize her surroundings: 
  Come 'l candido pie' per l'erba fresca 
  i dolci passi onestamente move, 
  vertù che 'ntorno i fiori apra et rinove 
  de le tenere piante sue par ch' esca. (165)   
 
[As her white foot moves forward through the cool grass, 
her sweet and quiet walking starts to spread 
a power, emanating from her soles, 
that acts to open and renew the flowers.] 
 
Stiamo, Amor, a veder la gloria nostra, 
cose sopra Natura altere et nove. 
Vedi ben quanta in lei dolcezza piove, 




vedi quant'arte dora e 'mperla e 'nostra 
l'abito eletto et mai non visto altrove, 
che dolcemente i piedi et gli occhi move 
per questa di bei colli ombrosa chiostra! 
 
L'erbetta verde e i fior di color mille 
sparsi sotto quell'elce antiqua et negra 
pregan pur che 'l bel pe' li prema o tocchi, 
 
e 'l ciel di vaghe et lucide faville 
s'accende intorno e 'n vista si rallegra 
d'esser fatto seren da sì belli occhi. (192) 
 
[Love, let us pause to contemplate our glory 
and see things high and strange, past Nature. 
See sweetness that rains down upon her here, 
see light that shows us Heaven come to earth; 
 
see how much skill has gilded and made pearly 
and ruddy-hued that body, surely matchless, 
which moves sweet feet and lively eyes throughout 
the shady cloister of these lovely hills! 
 
Green grass and flowers of a thousand colors 
scattered beneath that black and ancient oak 
entreat her lovely foot to step on them; 
 
the sky’s aswarm with sparks, with shining fire, 
and seems to be rejoicing everywhere 
at being made so clear by eyes so fair.]           
One is reminded of Cassirer’s observation that nature in Petrarch “is not sought and 
represented for its own sake; rather, its value lies in its service to modern man as a new 
means of expression for himself, for the liveliness and the infinite polymorphism of his 
inner life.”  In all of these excerpts from the Canzoniere, we are privy to a private, 
subjective view of the natural world – a world that Petrarch himself can creatively shape, 
not a world (as in Shakespeare’s sonnet 113) replete with elusive, diaphanous shape 
ready to destroy the speaker’s equanimity.   
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Despite this power to refashion the environment, Petrarch actually represents a 
halfway point in the march toward empiricism.  As Solomon observes, the emerging 
appreciation for objectivity partly involves the “Neoplatonic construct of mental 
making,” or the idea that knowledge constitutes the “product of mental operations.”71  In 
a way, Petrarch’s subjective perspective on the world comprises a degree of objectivity, 
inasmuch as the natural world becomes for him an “object” of knowledge that he can 
manipulate.  But Solomon also points out that this epistemological self-fashioning 
developed alongside the “empirical pursuit” of objects (37).  “We attain knowledge,” she 
argues, “when the mind, in various combinations, seeks after” as well as “produces, or 
disciplines,” “material appearances.”  Like Montaigne, the poet of Shakespeare’s Sonnets 
recognizes that the mind naturally “seeks after” truth, but he is suspicious of intellectual 
manipulations, wondering whether the mind produces real knowledge or wildly spurious 
residue.  He also doubts the Neoplatonic optimism expressed in Petrarch, which insists on 
one’s ability to apprehend forms and essences, and so he suffers alone for feeling such 
uncertainty.   
 And yet, because the speaker insists on writing poetry devoted to the beloved’s 
humanness, he cannot prevent himself from searching for what makes him 
uncomfortable, from occasionally uncovering imperfections.  The poet, in short, cannot 
help but convert his praise poetics into a poetics of appraisal centered, in part, on the 
question articulated in sonnet 53: “What is your substance, whereof are you made, / That 
millions of strange shadows on you tend?”  In the next section, I elaborate on the 
emotional significance of these impulses within the poet and develop Cassirer’s insight 
that in Renaissance lyric poetry, the “empirical is no longer to be resolved in the ideal, 
                                                      
71 Julie Solomon, Objectivity in the Making, 37. 
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therewith to be stripped of its specific character.  On the contrary, the ideal can only be 
genuinely fulfilled in the empirical, where it is tested and justified.” 
 
The Obligation to Interpret: Wonder and Empirical Inquiry in the Renai ssance 
Sonnet 
 A third feature of Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism – the obligation to interpret 
– is intimately tied to the poet’s epistemological isolation and leads Shakespeare to 
transform a poetics of praise and wonder into a poetics of wonder and doubt.  In this 
respect, Petrarch and Shakespeare approach the concept of wonder in two distinct, but 
interrelated, ways.  If Petrarch sees wonder as purely emotional trasport, admiration, and 
awe, Shakespeare exploits the potential for these experiences to give way to skeptical 
wonderment, thus demonstrating the tendency for praise to become appraisal and – as I 
will explore in my next chapter – for a rose to contain a canker.  
From its very beginning, Petrarchan praise poetry has relied on the multifaceted 
character of wonder to generate its most powerful effects.  For Dante, Beatrice is 
described as a wonder in which the poet himself lies “wrapt.”72  Petrarch, similarly, refers 
to Laura as a “de le donne altero er raro mostro” [“wonder among ladies, high and rare”] 
(347), while Henry Constable calls his Diana the “fair wonder of our time’s admiring 
eye.”73  Samuel Daniel’s perspective is no different, describing Delia as the “wonder f 
all eyes that look upon her.”74  Like their Italian predecessors, Renaissance poets 
recognized the close relationship between the act of wondering and the practice of 
                                                      
72 Dante, La Vita Nuova, in The Portable Dante, 44. 
73 Henry Constable, Diana, in Elizabethan Sonnet Cycles, ed. Martha Foote Crow (London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner and Co., 1896), 8:2.  
74 Daniel, Delia, in Sixteenth-Century Poetry: An Annotated Anthology, ed. Gordon Braden (New York: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 6. 
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lauding; indeed, as a verb form, wonder is interchangeable with “admire” and “praise.”75  
Wonder thus sits at the core of epideixis, characterizing not only the quality of the 
beloved, but also the experience of the praise poet (who is filled with “wonder”).     
 Beyond reflecting admiration or praise, however, wonder evokes a spectrum of 
literary prototypes, from the curious but fearless Odyssean adventurer, uncoveri g rich 
and strange lands on his journey homeward, to the quiet scholar feeling wonder during 
one of his spiritual musings in a shady glen.  The setting within which wonder is evoked 
in the reader or experienced by the protagonist is as varied as literature itself.  Thus to 
talk about wonder is to discuss one’s curiosity, surprise, and amazement as well as 
admiration and praise; wonder describes the visceral reaction to something unique or 
unknown, or the spiritual elation that attends prayer.  Embracing the active and the 
contemplative, the poetic and the prosaic, the sacred and the secular, wonder could be 
said to underlie most works of art, for wonder is not only the mechanism that sets a piece
of literature moving but it is also its chief goal.     
 Because wonder represents an emotional experience as well as an intellectual 
condition, it possesses two, potentially conflicting characteristics: not just an affect, 
wonder is also an impulse to inquire and often a drive to possess.  This means that even 
the most welcome feelings of wonder shuttle uncomfortably between the desire to feel 
that wonder and the need to satisfy those feelings with knowledge and reason, thereby 
dissipating it.  Plato and Aristotle regard wonder as a prelude to knowledge.  In 
Theatetus, Socrates affirms that “wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy 
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begins in wonder.”76  The association of wonder and philosophy reappears in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics: “It is from a feeling of wonder that men start now, and did start in earliest 
times, to practice philosophy.”77  In his Rhetoric, however, Aristotle addresses wonder’s 
emotional complexities, dividing it between a yearning for knowledge and a longing for 
the object evoking wonder: “wonder implies the desire of learning, so that the object of 
wonder is an object of desire.”78  This view anticipates the direction wonder will take in 
Petrarchan love poetry, which is driven by the speaker’s desire for his praise object.   
 Aristotle’s discussion also gestures toward a valence of wonder and desire 
explored in Stephen Greenblatt’s Marvelous Possessions, o named for its study of 
Renaissance colonial practices in the New World.  Greenblatt sees “Renaissance wonder 
as an agent of appropriation,” or feeling of “astonishment” at an object that is eventually 
“touched, catalogued, inventoried, possessed.”79  For Greenblatt, Europeans’ literary 
records of their experiences in America typify (even helped mold) the Renaissa ce 
understanding of the word.  A “central figure in the European response to the New 
World,” wonder, he argues, is the “decisive emotional and intellectual experience in the 
presence of radical difference” and the “quintessential human response to what Desc rtes 
calls a ‘first encounter’” (14-20).  Greenblatt claims that this “first encounter” typically 
occurs within the observing subject (much as Kant describes the experience of the 
sublime), but the experience is hardly private.  He suggests how quickly such 
                                                      
76 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Rockville, Maryland: Serenity Publishers, 2009), 104.  The 
Greek word for “wonder” is thauma, which suggests magic as well as marvel.  See “thaumaturgy, n.”  The 
Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  24 April 2010 
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77 The Philosophy of Aristotle, ed. Renford Bambrough, trans. J.L. Creed and A.E.Wardman (New York: 
Signet, 2003), 19. 
78 Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics, I.11.1. 
79 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 22-24. 
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wonderment can transform into a violent rapacity in the face of the observed object.  
Through Greenblatt, we come to appreciate the emotional upheavals induced by wonder.  
 While Greenblatt largely balances the intellectual and emotional components of 
wonder, he still emphasizes its emotional force.  As Greenblatt explains, the “overriding 
interest” of the Europeans with regard to the American natives was not “knowledge of the 
other but practice on the other,” and the “principal faculty involved in generating these 
representations [in writing about the natives] was not reason but imagination” (12-13).  
For T.G. Bishop and Peter Platt as well, demonstrating how wonder is preserved, even 
celebrated, in Shakespearean drama also means distinguishing Renaissance wonder from 
the knowledge-driven wonder in classical philosophy.80  Bishop, for example, highlights 
the way that “Shakespeare’s dramas of wonder evoke … a therapeutic magic against the 
freezing of the world” (16) and Platt’s anti-Aristotelian exploration begins with the 
assertion that “wonder can diminish reason” rather than increase it.81  Ul imately, 
however, Bishop and Platt, in their effort to reclaim the emotional experience of wonder, 
move beyond the boundaries established at the beginning of their books to consider 
                                                      
80 For an example of an attempt to unify Aristotle with wonder’s antirational character, see J.V. 
Cunningham’s Woe or Wonder (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver Press, 1951).  Cunningham sets 
wonder alongside the experience of pity and fear, arguing that these emotions must be purged in order to 
achieve catharsis.  Focusing on Renaissance tragedy, Cunningham argues that the “emotional effect of the 
tragic catastrophe” in Hamlet – “fear, sorrow, and wonder” (14) – was introduced by Aristotle himself (61).  
By marshalling evidence from the rubric set down in the Poetics, Cunningham can uphold the less rational 
aspects of Aristotle’s theories.  Cunningham finds enough evidence in the Poetics to argue that Aristotle 
sought to identify wonder (or admiratio) as an emotional, and not logical or epistemological, end of 
tragedy.  Cunningham implies, then, that Aristotle differentiates the type of wonder produced by poetry 
from that which induces philosophical inquiry.  In poetry, wonder is an end, in philosophy, a beginning.  
While Cunningham turns to Aristotle’s Poetics to show how drama preserves the emotional quality of 
wonder, Bishop argues that wonder even in the Po tics is a mere vehicle for knowledge and tries to 
distance himself further from Aristotle in his book, Shakespeare and the Theatre of Wonder (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).  As Bishop observes, for all his mention of wonder as a tragic effect, 
Aristotle still makes theater a “species of knowledg ” or “branch of logic” (40).  Unlike Cunningham, 
Bishop sees in Aristotle’s Poetics a conflict between “wonder as a force and wonder as thought” and argues 
that Aristotle ultimately (and even in his discussion of tragedy) expects his audience to suppress wonder 
when it achieves “rational” understanding (20).  




connections between wonder and rational inquiry.  They discover that for all its 
association with emotion, wonder in Shakespeare (and in the period generally) is not just 
about feelings.82     
 Platt, however, comes nearer than Bishop or Greenblatt to forging a link between 
wonder (admiratio) and skepticism.  By arguing that wonder can trump logical thought, 
Platt suggests that the failure to achieve adequate knowledge also means that wonder 
never disappears.  Platt examines the tendency during the Renaissance period for science 
and wonder to intermix, arguably because people became increasingly aware of scientific 
possibilities before they acquired the means of testing their theories.  Exploring Bacon’s 
works, Platt shows that even though wonder is an indication of doubt, such doubt can be 
indispensible to empirical science.  In The Advancement of Learning, for example, Bacon 
famously calls wonder “broken knowledge” to distinguish our limited understanding of 
the marvelous divinity from “knowledge” that arises from the “contemplation of God’s 
                                                      
82 As Bishop admits, it is “hardly true of his [Shakesp are’s] work to say that it is uninterested in drama as 
a species of knowledge, or that it neglects question  of cognition for those of emotion” (41).  “On the 
contrary,” he adds, “the complex and manifold interrelations between knowledge and feeling are his 
chiefest subjects.”  Such an observation, I think, captures the main point of Bishop’s argument, which 
resides in his definition of wonder’s “between-ness”: “Wonder peculiarly raises the question of the 
theatre’s interest in the emotions it generates through its characteristic creation of a dynamic space of flux 
and intermediacy – between stage and audience, between the real and the impossible, between belief and 
skepticism, between reason and feeling” (3).  To this list of wonder’s “between” qualities, Bishop later 
appends the “complex modulation of identification and detachment” (41), an experience that takes into 
account both the feeling of wonder and the recognition of that feeling.  Indeed, Bishop’s juxtaposition f 
the emotional experience (through “identification”) with our analysis of emotion as an experience (through 
“detachment”) attests to the exploratory, reflective, and “cognitive” qualities of wonder (19).  What Bishop 
alights on in his study, I feel, is how wonder in Shakespeare modulates into skepticism.  Never in 
Shakespeare’s plays, Bishop ultimately affirms, does th  emotional experience outstrip the boundless, 
inquiring intellect (177).  According to Bishop, Shakespeare’s “aim is not rebuke, instruction, and redress” 
– the likes of which we see in morality and mystery plays as well as in court masques – but rather 
“interrogation and, perhaps, recompense” (177).  Interrogation and inquiry approach the Aristotelian and 
Platonic conceptions of wonder, certainly, but include a skeptical, early modern spin.  And Greenblatt, too, 
despite assiduously dividing wonder from skepticism by saying that such feelings of doubt must be 
“suspended” (21), ends up admitting – when he outlines his plan for the book – that he will “try to 
show…[how] the experience of wonder continually reminds us that our grasp of the world is incomplete” 




creatures and works.”83  However, in the New Organon, Bacon explores wonder’s place 
in science: “by rare and extraordinary works of nature the understanding is excited and 
raised to investigation and discovery of Forms capable of including them.”84  As Platt 
shows, “wonder takes an important central position in the [Bacon’s] intellectual attempt 
to come to terms with the increasing complexity of the world” and helps to “push back 
the boundaries of knowledge.”85 
 Platt shows convincingly how Montaigne shares Bacon’s view.  Drawing on an 
argument by Françoise Charpentier, Platt observes that Montaigne “seems to reject the 
marvelous tradition in order eventually to perform a revaluation and redefinition of 
wonder,” replacing the dubious cult of miracles with the pragmatic state of “curiosity” 
(36-37).86  For Platt, Montaigne’s “Of Cripples” – centered on the apocryphal story of a 
cripple who “by the power of his imagination persuaded his legs and put them to sleep for 
a few hours” so he could travel to a priest capable of performing “marvelous operati ns” 
– contains the best expression of this attempt to “rehabilitate curiosity.”87  In this essay, 
Montaigne uses the example of this false miracle as a means of exploring credible 
wonders, thus identifying a middle ground between those philosophers or miracle-
mongers who “attributed to the human mind a capacity for all things” and those who, 
affected by “spite and emulation,” formed the “opinion that it [the mind] is capable of 
nothing” (964).  By calling himself a “sluggish” creature who “tend[s] to the solid and the 
                                                      
83 Francis Bacon, The Major Works, ed. Brian Vickers (1996; rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
125.  
84 Francis Bacon, The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (New York: The Liberal 
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85 Ibid., 37-9. 
86 Platt cites Charpentier’s “Les Essais de Montaigne,” 37. 
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probable,” Montaigne can sustain his sense of wonder without entirely suspending his 
disbelief (960).  He can discredit the miracle of the disabled traveler while advoc ting a 
kind of wonder or “marvel” that confesses “ignorance its end” and makes “inquiry its 
progress” (959).  
 Most important for Montaigne, however, is how wonder is tied to explorations of 
(and skepticism about) the self.  In “Of Cripples,” Montaigne confesses that even hough 
“[we] become more habituated to anything strange by use and time…the more I frequent 
myself and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes me, and the less I understa  
myself” (958).  For Montaigne, wonder is less about universal attributes than concrete 
particulars, less about “supercelestial thoughts” than human experiences (1043).  
Montaigne thus points to an inextricable bond between the questing intellect full of 
wonder and the needs of the body.  Insisting that we can find wonders enough “without 
miracle and without eccentricity,” Montaigne, in “Of Experience,” compares real wonder 
to the “food” which nourishes us on our “hunt for knowledge” (996-1044).  For 
Montaigne, wonder is like food because it not only fuels the search but demands that we 
taste it as well.88 
 Exploring how “wonder and curiosity interlocked” during the Renaissance, 
Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park consider “wonder” a “cognitive passion, as much 
about knowing as about feeling.” 89  However, they also stress that wonder incited 
curiosity about unique “particulars” more than universal ideas – not just in natural 
philosophy, but also in “Renaissance poetry,” which “aimed to evoke the same gasp of 
                                                      
88 For more on Montaigne, see Platt, who looks at these particular essays (especially pp. 36-39)  Althoug  
Platt considers Montaigne a forerunner of the shift away from the marvelous toward the scientific (see also 
p. 49), he does not spend as much time considering xplicitly how Montaigne indeed addresses the 
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89 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 
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admiration and surprise by enlisting the rare, the singular, and the richly various” (311-
314).  Indirectly, Daston and Park are also talking about the sonnet tradition, which 
favored a “rare” and “singular” love object and whose writers by the time of Shakespeare 
began blending claims of universality with concrete, historically-grounded particul s.  
By arguing that wonder unites a love of the “rare” with empirical science, moreover, 
Daston and Park help us appreciate how the skeptical dimension in Petrarchan praise is
wedded to strong emotion.   As they argue, the sixteenth century “privileged certain 
things above others as objects of scientific investigation” not simply because those things 
were “new, rare, unusual, or secret,” but also because they ignited the “passions of 
wonder” (315).  We have already begun to see that in Shakespeare’s Sonnets, to wonder 
at his beloved is to feel obligated to interpret him.  In other words, because the poet feels 
such passion for his beloved and his art, he is moved to inquire, to fret that he has 
inquired, and then to inquire again.  As long as the poet loves an object that he insists is 
“unusual” and “rare,” he cannot help himself.  Thus, Shakespeare’s poems do not let us 
distinguish between emotion and cognition just as they do not always allow us to separate 
the wonder of praise from the wonder of appraisal.   
Shakespeare’s first reference to w nder appears in sonnet 59, which I have 
already mentioned marks a turning point in the poet’s exploration of praise.  Lamenting 
in this poem that “nothing” is “new,” the poet also refers to the beloved’s “frame” s a 
“composed wonder.”  Although this sonnet defines wonder in terms of admiration, the 
sequence as a whole shows this beloved “wonder” prompting skepticism as well.  As we 
have seen, the practice of praise naturally induces questions about the beloved’s 
interiority and substance (sonnet 53), evaluations of his own procedures in ascertaining 
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that “truth” (sonnets 69 and 70), and complicated assessments on the nature of 
perspective (sonnets 24 and 113).  These and many other sonnets in Shakespeare’s 
sequence show the poet wondering about his beloved – negotiating, that is, the impulses 
to admire and the impulses to appraise. 
Set in context, then, 59 is a fine prelude to what happens next in the sequence, 
when the bleakness and skepticism of sonnets such as 69, 70, and 95 initiate not only a 
flurry of conventional (and therefore self-protective) praise poems, but also poems
evaluating the relationship between wonder and praise.  In sonnet 106, for example, 
which contains the penultimate references to both of these terms, the poet suggests that if 
wonder and praise complemented one another in the old days, it is no longer the case in 
his own time: “For we which now behold these present days / Have eyes to wonder [at 
the young man] but lack tongues to praise.”  Elsewhere in the poem, the poet says that his 
literary coevals do not have the skill to praise, only to admire and wonder.  On another 
level, however – and as several of the previous sonnets reveal – the poet intimates that 
skeptical wondering can frequently obviate or demolish the will to admire.  Does the poet 
himself also lack a tongue to praise because he has wondered?  Is the beloved, too, 
merely a product of “these present days?” 
We can read the poet’s final reference to wonder in terms of sonnets 59 and 106: 
No! Time, thou shalt not boast that I do change; 
Thy pyramids, built up with newer might, 
To me are nothing novel, nothing strange; 
They are but dressings of a former sight: 
Our dates are brief, and therefore we admire 
What thou dost foist upon us that is old, 
And rather make them born to our desire 
Than think that we before have heard them told: 
Thy registers and thee I both defy, 
Not wond’ring at the present, nor the past, 
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For thy records, and what we see doth lie, 
Made more or less by thy continual haste: 
     This I do vow, and this shall ever be, 
     I will be true despite thy scythe and thee. (123)          
Deceptively straightforward, the sonnet opposes the mutability of the physical world to 
the permanence of the poet’s love and commitment.  Vendler observes that the “poem is a 
contest to decide which speech-act will win – Time’s boast that the speaker, like 
everything else in Time’s registers, undergoes change” or the poet’s “performative vow, 
which as a speech-act and promise, inhabits that virtual realm where the scythe of 
material ruin has no power.”90  The poet avers that he will remain “true” despite Time’s 
scythe – but true to whom?  To the beloved? To his poetic project?  To himself?  The 
beloved’s conspicuous absence is joined by other nagging ambiguities and unsettling 
features, including the poet’s arch dismissal of a past that previously enthralled him (in 
sonnets 59 and 106), his insistence that innovation is merely illusion, his skepticism 
about the visible world, and his assessment of perspectivism.  By emphasizing the 
poem’s ethical “claim that time distorts relative value,” Colin Burrow alsocalls our 
attention to the way the poet seems to be scrutinizing his own evaluative procedures as 
much as criticizing the material world.91  The poet accordingly dismisses (only three 
poems before the end of the young-man sequence) his own epideictic project.  For even 
though the poet vows to be true, he also refuses to wonder at the “present, nor the past” 
and scoffs at those who admire what Time “foist[s] upon us” and what is “born to our 
desire.”  A profound revelation of his epideictic skepticism, this poem shows how praise 
and wonder are bound up with doubt and inquiry, time and decay.  
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 If, for Shakespeare, wonder and praise give rise to wonder and doubt, then his 
sequence distinctly contrasts Petrarch’s Canzoniere, in which poet’s admiration does not 
fall prey to curiosity and skepticism.  Indeed, Daston and Park’s description of wonder 
prior and subsequent to the Renaissance period explains Petrarch’s reluctance to explore 
Laura’s character. “Wonder,” they affirm, was not a “goad to curiosity, but to praise, for 
its ultimate object was in principle not a concrete individual in all its particular ty but 
mind-numbing God in all his perfections” (322-2).  Considered a “de le donne altero et 
raro mostro” [“wonder among ladies, high and rare”] (347), Laura is Petrarch’s passage 
to Heaven (72) and his inspiration to climb “al sommo ben” [“toward the highest good”] 
(13).  Early in his sequence, he compares God’s gift of Christ to Nature’s bequest to “al 
mondo” [“the world”] of his “bella donna” (4).  Exploring this analogy again later in his 
poems, Petrarch affirms that “Sì come eterna vita è veder Dio / né più si brama né brama 
più lice, / così me, Donna, il voi veder felice / fa in questo breve et fraile viver mio” 
[“Just as eternal life means seeing God / and wanting nothing else (nor could one want 
to), / so, Lady, seeing you can make me happy / in this my very brief and happy life”] 
(191).  Petrarch’s praise is not simply idolatrous love; his poetry reaffirms his religion, 
simulating praise so as to enhance his relationship with God.  Why, then, would he 
tamper with his experience by investigating his mistress’ character?  In Dante’s La Vita 
Nuova, too, the poet does not question his choice for a praise object; he seeks solace in 
the language of praise: “‘Since there is so much bliss in words that praise my lady, why 
have I written in any other way?’”92   
 Dante’s and Petrarch’s poems about goodness and virtue are rooted in The Song 
of Solomon and especially the Psalms.  For David, the Psalms’ legendary author, praising 
                                                      
92 Dante, La Vita Nuova, in The Portable Dante, 610. 
92 
 
God meant emotional celebration and guileless, unquestioning wonder – clapping hands, 
shouting with a loud voice, making a joyful noise – which the poet commingles with 
numerous poems of supplication and penitence.  Like Petrarch, David seems more 
interested in declaring how and where he would praise than what precisely he would say; 
indeed, the content of his praise is simple and tautological: God receives praise for being 
wholly good, just as Petrarch’s Laura inspires praise partly because she embodi s the 
word.   
In addition to writing praise poems to Laura, Petrarch (not surprisingly) composed 
Latin versions of psalms that were later translated into English.  And Petrarch w s not 
alone.  Hannibal Hamlin argues that Petrarch is one among a host of Renaissance writers 
(including the Elizabethan sonneteers) steeped in “psalm culture” – whether it was 
singing, memorizing, translating, paraphrasing, reciting, or imitating the sacr d songs.93  
As Hamlin contends, authors especially revered the Psalms because “they were the oldest 
poetry known at the time,” “were written under direct inspiration from God,” and 
“included poems in an almost exhaustive variety of lyric modes and – so it was supposed 
– meters” (85).  Accordingly, Michael Drayton’s Poly-Olbion contains echoes of psalm 
104 (257), and even Shakespeare’s works occasionally allude to some of the holy songs 
as well.  Sidney, however, was probably the most committed of all the sonneteers, 
translating some 43 psalms in the 1580s (119).  Even though Sidney’s sequence does not 
possess the psalm-like quality of Petrarch’s Canzoniere, at least one of his poems 
inspired his sister Mary (Sidney) Herbert’s paraphrase of Psalm 73 (126). 
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Despite this enthusiasm for the Psalms, the Protestant Reformation divides 
Petrarch from the English sonneteers, helping to pave the way for Shakespeare’s 
development of a language of wonder and doubt.  Emphasizing this disjuncture between 
Petrarch and his successors is the fact that the first sonnet sequence in English was not 
Sidney’s Petrarchan poems to Stella but Anne Locke’s Calvinist paraphrase of P alm 51, 
which she gathered into a collection of poems entitled, A Meditation of a Penitent 
Sinner.94  Published in 1560, Locke’s sequence is composed of 26 “Shakespearean” 
sonnets.95  The first five are prefatory meditations, where Locke records her personal 
experiences; the remaining 21 poems are an expanded paraphrase of Psalm 51.  Although 
Locke’s sonnets lift several lines almost verbatim from the psalm, her embellishments 
reinforce the non-skeptical quality of conventional praise.  Sonnet 16 in her sequence, for 
example, stresses that praise arises from God’s willingness to forgive and forget the 
speaker’s sins: “Upon my bloud and soule extende not, Lorde, / Vengeance for bloud, but 
mercy let me finde, / And strike me not with thy revengyng sworde. / So, Lord, my 
joying tong shall talke thy praise, / Thy name my mouth shall utter in delight….”96  As 
Locke emphasizes, praising God is not appraising God; moreover, holy praise depends on 
God’s willingness to disown knowledge (to borrow Cavell’s phrase) of her sins.  While
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Petrarch’s Il Canzoniere does not correspond precisely to this logic, a love based on 
repudiated or unobserved knowledge of the other characterizes both types of works.97   
Hence, while Petrarch – like David and any poet working within the psalm 
tradition – wonders at his praise object’s goodness and beauty, Shakespeare’s poet 
spends as much time wondering about his beloved.  This is in part owing to that fact that, 
in Shakespeare’s Protestant world, Petrarchan poets became increasingly uncomfortable 
with the idea that secular love could migrate up the Platonic ladder to holy adoration.  As 
we will see, Spenser, Sidney, and Greville all register skepticism about this po entially 
unholy alliance between the sacred and the secular by directly or indirectly attacking one 
of the central symbols of Petrarchan praise: the rose.  For Shakespeare escially, 
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“A Canker in the Fragrant Rose”: Satirical Inquiry and Tragic Form in 
Shakespeare’s Poems to the Young Man 
 
O Rose, thou art sick!  
The invisible worm  
That flies in the night,  
In the howling storm, 
Has found out thy bed  
Of crimson joy:  
And his dark secret love  
Does thy life destroy. 
    
William Blake 
  
All of the features of Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism – his struggles with 
innovation, his isolating doubt, and his impulse to inquire – meet in the dual figures of 
the rose and the canker.  The rose has long been a symbol of eternal beauty, love, praise, 
and divine perfection.  Despite its prominence in western literature, however, the rose 
appears only twice in the Bible.  In The Song of Solomon, when the beloved compares 
herself to a mere “rose of the field” and “lily of the valley,” the speaker assures her, 
saying, “Like a lily among the thorns, so is my love among the daughters” (2:1-2).1  The 
second reference is found in Isaiah, where the personified landscape praises the return of 
the Lord: “The desert and the wilderness shall rejoice: and the waste ground shall be glad 
and flourish as the rose” (35:1).2  Although these passages are consistent with how the 
rose’s symbolism developed in the medieval and Renaissance periods, they do not fully 
account for the flower’s popularity among everyone from sonneteers to Christian mystics, 
nor for its subsequent decline into cliché.  The rose surely had something to do with its 
                                                      




own fame and, as it were, deterioration.  Beautiful, aromatic, hardy, and astonishing in its 
symmetry, the rose was Dante’s choice for representing his Empyrean, the fi al vision on 
his ascent from hell to heaven.  In the concluding cantos of the Paradiso, Beatrice leads 
the pilgrim “[i]nto the gold” of that “Eternal Rose, / whose ranks of petals fragrantly 
unfold / praise to the Sun of everlasting spring.”3  Transfixed by this enormous flower, 
the pilgrim does not even notice that his beloved Beatrice has taken her seat amid the 
petals and been replaced by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, who begins the final canto singi g 
praise to the Virgin Mary, his “passion’s passion” (XXXI.140).  Bernard, along with 
other Catholic saints, compared Mary to a white rose; and, of course, the string of prayer 
beads known as the rosary means “coronet,” or crown of roses, as well as “rose-bush” or 
“rose-tree.”4  Interestingly, however, because the rosary was originally associated not 
with Mary but with the recitation of the Psalms, it characterizes both the Petrarchan 
adoration of the virginal beloved and the psalm-like devotionals written in her honor.5     
 An important figure in Petrarch’s Il Canzoniere, the rose emerges in intimate 
blazons, in the poet’s introspective meditations about himself, and in metaphors elevating 
Laura as a rose.  In sonnet 146, for example, Petrarch compares his beloved to “rose 
sparse in dolce falda / di viva neve in ch' io mi specchio et tergo, / o piacer onde l'ali bel
viso ergo / che luce sovra quanti il sol ne scalda” [“roses spread on a sweet drift / of 
living snow, whose mirror makes me better, / whose pleasure makes me raise my wings 
to fly / up to that lovely face, brighter than sunlight”].  The rose also assists Petrarch in 
painting elaborate descriptions of Laura’s appearance: “Purpurea vesta d'un ceruleo 
                                                      
3 Dante, Paradiso, in The Portable Dante, XXX.124-6. 
4 “rosary, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  30 
October 2009 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50208854 >. 
5 For one discussion on the history of this connection, see Gary Wills, The Rosary (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005).  
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lembo / sparso di rose i belli omeri vela, / novo abito et bellezza unica et sola!” [“A 
scarlet dress, hemmed with cerulean / and scattered roses, veils her lovely shoulder : / 
new garment for a beauty without equal!”] (185).  One is reminded in this poem of the 
innocent Perdita, covered in flowers like “Flora / Peering in April’s front.”6   
Laura, however, is not always disembodied or, like Perdita, obscured.  Sonnet 199 
is remarkably intimate and sensual, with Petrarch attempting to remove Laura’s 
“[c]andido leggiadretto et caro guanto” [“[w]hite, delicate, and precious little glove”] in 
order to expose to the world her “spoglie” [“spoils”]: “che copria netto avorio et fresche 
rose” [the “flawless ivory and fresh roses”].  Although Laura’s subsequent 
embarrassment compels Petrarch to shift his gaze, he maintains the same lvel of 
intimacy when he focuses his attention on a “bocca…di perle / piena et di rose, et di dolci 
parole / che fanno altrui tremar di meraviglia” [“mouth that’s full of pearls / a  well as 
blooming roses and sweet words / that make one shake with wonder, marveling”] (200).  
Emphasizing the connection between roses and divine wonder, Petrarch also (here and in 
sonnet 157) finds a way to tie the rose’s aesthetic beauty to Laura’s virtue: 
 La testa or fino, et calda neve il volto, 
 ebeno i cigli, et gli occhi eran due stelle 
 onde Amor l'arco non tendeva in fallo; 
 
 perle et rose vermiglie ove l'accolto 
 dolor formava ardenti voci et belle, 
 fiamma i sospir, le lagrime cristallo. (157)   
 
[Her head was finest gold, her face warm snow, 
her eyebrows ebony, her eyes two stars 
where Love has never bent his bow in vain; 
 
pearls and crimson roses formed the words 
that gathered her exquisite sorrow up, 
                                                      




her sighs were flames, her tears were precious crystal.]       
Not merely some decorative feature, Laura’s rosy mouth releases the sorrowful words 
“gathered” up from her inner self.  Here we see Petrarch giving shape, texture, and depth 
to a rose that begins to mirror Dante’s Rose at the end of the Paradiso.  The development 
is complete in the last third of the Canzoniere when the rose no longer symbolizes 
Laura’s mouth or clothing, but her entire being: “Candida rosa nata in dure spine, / 
quando fia chi sua pari al mondo trove? / Gloria di nostrea etate!” [“A white rose among 
cruel thorns; / who could discover here on earth her equal? / The glory of our time!”] 
(246).  And, only a few sonnets later, Petrarch declares, “I' la riveggio starsi umilemente / 
tra belle donne, a guisa d'una rosa / tra minor fior” [“Again, I see her, standing humbly 
there / among the lovely ladies, like a rose / among some lesser blooms”] (249).  A 
woman of unparalleled beauty, Laura’s identity as a white rose starts to blend with the 
Virgin Mary’s until Petrarch, at the very end of the Canzoniere, composes a sonnet to his 
“Ciel regina” [“queen of Heaven”] (366), a farewell praise poem reminiscent of S . 
Bernard’s hymn to the “Virgin Mother” at the end of the Paradiso (XXXIII.1).  Despite 
the fact that Dante’s and Petrarch’s beloveds find themselves eclipsed by the Virgin 
Mary, one wonders if there was really much of a difference among these wom n – these 
three blooming roses – after all.  For the poets seem at times to suggest that their 
beloveds, like Mary, were immaculately conceived and so born without the stain of 
original sin.   
 This confusion posed a problem to post-Reformation poets, who responded with 
some hesitation and circumspection to Petrarch’s Catholic rose and his adoration f 
another Mary.  Samuel Daniel, less creative in some respects than the other Elizabethan 
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sonneteers, warns his beloved Delia how roses “decline” and “fade” almost the mom nt 
they bloom (36), remarking later that “[s]hort is the glory of the blushing rose” (47).7  In 
Idea, Michael Drayton expands on this notion of the fading rose – with laughable results:    
There’s nothing grieves me, but that Age should haste, 
That in my dayes I may not see thee old,  
That where those two cleare sparkling Eyes are plac’d, 
Onely two Loope-holes, then I might behold. 
That lovely, arched, yvorie, pollish’d Brow, 
Defac’d with Wrinkles, that I might but see; 
Thy daintie Hayre, so curl’d, and crisped now, 
Like grizzled Mosse upon some aged Tree; 
Thy Cheeke, now flush with Roses, sunke, and leane, 
Thy Lips, with age, as any Wafer thinne, 
Thy Pearly Teeth out of thy Head so cleane, 
That when thou feed’st, thy Nose shall touch thy Chinne: 
These Lines that now thou scorn’st, which should delight thee, 
Then would I make thee read, but to despight thee.  (8)8 
The sonnet’s mock blazon promotes its central message of carpe diem, but the poet also 
contemplates using this poem later in life to punish his mistress for refusing (among other 
things) a “Cheeke” that was once “flush with Roses” but is now “sunke” and “leane.”  
Callous, unforgiving, and admittedly spiteful, the poet turns his beloved into a veritable 
Duessa, the Catholic femme fatale exposed in all her ugliness at the end of Book 1 of 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene.  
 The sequences of Sidney and Spenser show a more thoughtful and complex 
response to the rose than Delia and Idea.  Early in Astrophil and Stella, Sidney imagines 
Stella blazed on Cupid’s shield, her rosy cheeks set against a “silver field” (13).  By the 
end of the sequence and in his last reference to the rose, however, Sidney’s perspectiv  
has darkened: 
                                                      
7 Samuel Daniel, Delia, in Sixteenth-Century Poetry: An Annotated Anthology, ed. Gordon Braden (New 
York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). 




Where be those roses gone, which sweetened so our eyes? 
     Where those red cheeks, which oft with fair increase did frame 
     The height of honour in the kindly badge of shame? 
Who hath the crimson weeds stolen from my morning skies? 
How doth the colour vade of those vermilion dyes, 
     Which nature’s self did make, and self engrained the same? 
     I would know by what right this paleness overcame 
That hue, whose force my heart still unto thraldom ties? 
     Galen’s adoptive sons, who by a beaten way 
     Their judgments hackney on, the fault on sickness lay; 
But feeling proof makes me say they mistake it far: 
     It is but love, which makes his paper perfect white 
     To write therein more fresh the story of delight, 
While beauty’s reddest ink Venus for him doth stir. (102)     
The roses evoked at the beginning of the poem constitute a ghost image, a vivid picture 
recalled only to highlight what is really present: a beloved, pale and febrile, and the 
blazoned shield, empty of all its honors.  But the poem is equally macabre in the way it 
shifts from red roses in the octave to red ink in the sestet, thus giving the impression of 
color bleeding or draining from the poem’s core and pooling at its base.  Even though the 
poet tries to imagine in this moment of sickly whiteness a “fresh” start – arguing that 
“love…makes his paper perfect white” in order to coax superior poetry out of “beauty’s 
reddest ink” – the remaining six poems are remarkably claustrophobic and dark.  Hardly
refreshed at all, the rest of the sequence reenacts sonnet 102’s withering engy and 
imminent collapse.  Rather than rejuvenate his poetry – or reinvent his project as Petrarch 
does – Sidney’s poet retreats further into himself until the blood-red ink of sonnet 102 
becomes in his final poem liquefied “sorrow” coursing through the “dark furnace” of his 
“boiling breast” (108).   
Commenting on the pervasive darkness in these final poems, Klein compares 
them to the penitential psalms of David, whose “alienation,” “imprisonment,” and 
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“captivity” characterizes Astrophil’s plight as well.9  Klein, however, also stipulates that 
David is only like Astrophil, who also “remains in the prisonhouse of Petrarchan 
language,” writing an “amorous sonnet sequence, not divine poetry” (101).  Even in his 
final poems, Astrophil continues to meditate on his self-absorption and pain, to declare 
his undying devotion to the beloved, and to rely on paradox (“That in my woes for thee 
thou art my joy, / And in my joys for thee my only annoy” (108)).  At the same time, 
however, Astrophil and Stella is strikingly different from the Canzoniere.  Petrarch finds 
solace in the Virgin Mary, his beloved rose having helped him finally to celebrate the 
Rose of all roses.  Sidney, in contrast, loses his roses in sonnet 102 and never recovers 
them.  Deeply conflicted and incapable of achieving closure, Astrophil is at a crossroads 
but refuses to take the next step – neither repudiating his “idol,” merging her with the 
mother of God, nor finding a new object of devotion.  
Spenser, Greville, and, of course, Shakespeare do take the next step.  While 
Sidney transforms the rose into a figure of confusion and pain, Spenser condescends to 
include the rose in his sequence in order to highlight its deficiencies and then subtly leave 
it behind.  In his Amoretti, Spenser begins rather tamely, using the rose in a blazon 
praising his beloved Elizabeth, whose “lips…smell lyke Gillyflowers” and whose “ruddy 
cheekes [are] lyke unto Roses red” (LXIIII).10  While in his last reference to the rose, 
Spenser still acknowledges the rose’s beauty, he also emphasizes its insufficiency in 
representing inner virtue: 
Fayre is my love, when her fayre golden heares, 
     with the loose wynd ye waving chance to marke: 
     fayre when the rose in her red cheekes appeares, 
                                                      
9 Lisa Klein, The Exemplary Sidney and the Elizabethan Sonneteer, 98-102. 
10 Edmund Spenser, The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems, eds. William A. Oram et al (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). 
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     or in her eyes the fyre of love does sparke. 
Fayre when her brest lyke a rich laden barke, 
     with pretious merchandize she forth doth lay: 
     fayre when that cloud of pryde, which oft doth dark 
     her goodly light with smiles she drives away. 
But fayrest she, when so she doth display 
     the gate with pearles and rubyes richly dight: 
     throgh which her words so wise do make their way 
     to beare the message of her gentle spright. 
The rest be works of natures wonderment, 
     but this the worke of harts astonishment. (LXXXI)                        
Reading this ingeniously understated poem, one is reminded of Petrarch’s sonnet 157, 
which describes how Laura’s “perle et rose vermiglie ove l'accolto / dolor formava ardent 
voci et belle” [“pearls and crimson roses formed the words / that gathered her exquisit  
sorrow up”].  Here Spenser’s poet conveys virtually the same idea but replaces “crimson 
roses” with “rubyes richly dight,” relegating the rose to an earlier part of the poem where 
he focuses merely on his beloved’s physical “wonderment.”  Distinguishing his poem 
from Petrarch’s, Spenser refuses to let his rose grow, or allow it eventually to transcend 
the blazon as it does in the Canzoniere.  Spenser could hardly elevate a rhetorical symbol 
whose connection to Petrarch, the Virgin Mary, and Catholicism undermines his own 
poetic project, which looks forward to requited – and consummated – married love. 
 If Spenser plants the rose of virginal perfection in the back corner of a sequenc  
that anticipates Protestant marital bliss, Greville’s rose is eventually buried beneath his 
misogyny, cynicism, and dissatisfaction with the world.  Called Caelica, Greville’s 
highly unorthodox sonnet cycle contains only one reference to the rose – in a poem about 
youth and love:      
The nurse-life wheat within his green husk growing, 
Flatters our hope and tickles our desire, 
Nature’s true riches in sweet beauties showing, 




No less fair is the wheat when golden ear 
Shows unto hope the joys of near enjoying: 
Fair and sweet is the bud, more sweet and fair 
The rose, which proves that time is not destroying. 
 
Caelica, your youth, the morning of delight, 
Enamel’d o’er with beauties white and red, 
All sense and thoughts did to belief invite, 
That love and glory there are brought to bed; 
     And your ripe year’s love-noon (he goes no higher) 
     Turns all the spirits of man into desire. (XL)11         
The speaker seems to celebrate beauty and a perpetual harvest, but the final lin s suggest 
sexual fulfillment and subsequent decline, beauty’s wax and beauty’s wane.  And indeed 
in the sequence, the celebration does not last.  Greville’s dogmatic, Calvinistic emphasis 
in the second half of his sequence eclipses all beauty.  Caelica, and women in general, are 
eventually demoted to whores of Babylon when the poet meditates on “man’s 
degeneration” and his own soul’s “dark desolation” (XCVIII).  Greville presents “female 
power as a sexual threat” and Caelica herself as a “false heaven.”12  Transforming 
Petrarchan desire and “exile” into the “torment of a sinner separated from God,” Greville 
makes his sequence utterly inhospitable to the rose.13 
 Shakespeare, too, casts doubt on the immaculate rose of praise, but his skepticism 
is nuanced and exploratory.  Appearing in the very first sonnet of his sequence, the rose is 
also the first metaphor mentioned: 
From fairest creatures we desire increase, 
That thereby beauty’s rose might never die, 
But as the riper should by time decease 
His tender heir might bear his memory: 
But thou, contracted to thine own bright eyes, 
                                                      
11 Quotations are taken from Fulke Greville, Selected Poems, ed. Thom Gunn (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968). 
12 Klein, The Exemplary Sidney and the Elizabethan Sonneteer, 129. 
13 Ibid., 132. 
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Feed’st thy light’s flame with self-substantial fuel, 
Making a famine where abundance lies, 
Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel. 
Thou that art now the world’s fresh ornament, 
And only herald to the gaudy spring, 
Within thine own bud buriest thy content, 
And, tender churl, mak’st waste in niggarding. 
     Pity the world, or else this glutton be, 
     To eat the world’s due, by the grave and thee. (1)       
The poet starts by comparing the young man to a rose, but we soon learn that the beloved 
is dangerously close to destroying that connection because he wants to keep his “content” 
buried within his own bud, a bud that left to its own devices will inevitably decay.  As if 
assenting to this possibility, the poem shows beauty’s rose beginning to die, along with 
its unqualified praise, after the second quatrain’s “but” – “But thou, contracted to thine 
own bright eyes” – since the poet orients us away from the beloved’s present beauty 
toward a future unable to sustain it.  The poet presents a very clear picture of this future: 
wasteful niggarding and gluttony will lead to famine, and self-substantiality wi l produce 
only self-consumption.  Implicitly, the poet suggests that the rose of praise and beauty 
will fall prey to the cankerworm.14   
 For Shakespeare to discover even one canker in the rose of Petrarch and Dante is 
enough to distinguish him from the other major sonneteers of the period.15  Shakespeare’s 
poems contain five, each of which reflects a moment of significant ethical and artistic 
                                                      
14 To my knowledge, the only other full-length discussion of the rose and the canker in Shakespeare is Lisa 
Freinkel’s important book, Reading Shakespeare’s Will (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).  In 
her analysis of sonnet 1, Freinkel argues that “this Rose of beauty had for all intents and purposes already 
died….No vivifying content can bring this dead letter back to life.  And so, paradoxically, the Rose 
awakens our desire: the Rose is dead, long live the rose” (196). 
15 The canker is not mentioned at all in Spenser’s Amoretti, Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, Daniel’s Delia, 
or Greville’s Caelica – though they all refer to the rose.  The canker does emerge at least once in Drayton’s 
Idea; Gascoigne’s A Hundred Sundry Flowers; Henry Constable’s Diana; Barnaby Googe’s Eclogue, 
Epitaphs, and Sonnets; Henry Lok’s collections of sonnets inspired by Ecclesiastes; John Davies’ (of 
Hereford) Wit’s Pilgrimage; and George Turberville’s Epitaphs, Epigrams, Songs, and Sonnets.  However, 
none of these authors uses the canker together with the rose.  For them, the canker is used as a general 
figure of decay (canker of envy, canker of woe, etc.) or in reference to the well-known biblical passage 
from the Geneva version of Matthew (6:19).      
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crisis.  In sonnet 35, for example, the poet vents his feelings of betrayal by contemplating 
the “loathsome canker” in the beloved’s “sweetest bud”; sonnet 70 sustains an equivocal 
perspective of the youth by asserting that “canker vice the sweetest buds doth love”; and, 
in 95, the most caustic of all the young-man sonnets, the poet meditates on the 
cankerworm that “doth spot the beauty” of the beloved’s “budding name.”  The canker 
first surfaces even before the poet specifically addresses the problem of praise (beginning 
with sonnet 59) only eventually to merge with that cluster of poems in 70 and 95. 
 In this chapter, I explore the canker as the controlling metaphor of Shakespeare’  
Sonnets and the central symbol of his epideictic skepticism.  By controlling, I do not 
intend to suggest that the canker is the most common trope in the sequence: alchemy, 
painting, grafting, writing, and usury also pervade the poems.  The canker is, however, 
more significant than these other rhetorical figures because it is positioned al gside, 
opposite, and within the rose of praise.  In the Sonnets, the canker is understood in two 
ways.  In sonnets 35, 70, 95, and 99, it signifies the “cankerworm,” “caterpillar,” or 
“insect larva” that “attacks” the buds of a hapless plant, making its way into the interior 
and eating the buds from the inside out.16  In sonnets 54 and 99, canker is used 
synonymously with the wild canker rose, or “dog rose,” an inferior type of flower that 
was understood by Shakespeare to suggest a counterfeit rose.17  Regardless of how we 
dissect the nuances of this word, however, its longstanding affiliation with satire and 
blame remains one of its chief characteristics.  Joined with the rose, the canker presents a 
complete, yet disturbing, picture of Renaissance epideictic poetry.  Their union may seem 
                                                      
16 “canker, n.”  Entry 3.  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University 
Press.  4 February 2010  <http://dictionary.oed.com/ gi/entry/50032440>.   
17 Ibid., entry 8b. 
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entirely natural, but the canker’s appearance in Shakespeare’s sequence signals a marked 
departure from Petrarchan praise.   
Calling this departure satire establishes in generic terms what I explore in the 
previous chapter: how praise is inevitably transformed into a poetics of appraisal.  While 
labels in general cannot tell us much, satire does.  A renegade mode that was gaining 
popularity in the 1590s, satire reinforces the fact that we are dealing with more than how 
the poet reinterprets and performs praise, or how praise is inextricably linked to doubt.   
We are also looking at how the very bedrock of the genre begins to change, or erode – 
how the sequence as a whole reinvents itself as the poet moves from sonnet to sonnet.  In 
short, to notice the canker eating through the rose is to see the satiric mode impinging 
upon – and so transforming – the poetics of praise.   
 
The Canker, Satire, and Ethical Investigation 
 If satire is traditionally considered an unsophisticated literary mode, its 
association with the canker produces at least one level of complexity.  On the one hand, 
the canker denotes the inherent infection that satire seeks and destroys with its “invective 
against vice and vicious men.”18  On the other hand, the canker reinforces the 
“destructive” potential of satire, which often succeeds not only in eradicating evil but also 
in annihilating everything else along with it, including itself.19  This is because most 
satirists are complicit in the very sins that they denounce; seeking the canker, they 
uncover it within themselves.  Alvin Kernan supports this idea in his description of a 
                                                      
18 Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, 120. 
19 “canker, n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  4 
February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50032440>. 
107 
 
“form distinguished for its viciousness of attack and spoken by rough satyrs.”20  A 
satirist’s cruel language bespeaks his own morally dubious character (58). 
 Of course, “rough” and “vicious” hardly apply to Shakespeare’s Sonnets, with or 
without the canker.  And if one accepts Kernan’s notion that the “viciousness” of “poetic 
satire” “was the basis for nearly all Elizabethan theories of satire,” th n the case seems 
rather closed (84).  Modern scholars, however, have widened our understanding of satire 
by insisting that it does more than moralize and condemn vice.  Bryan Herek, for 
example, observes that Puttenham’s attempt to associate satire with “Chrstian moral 
exempla” largely misses the mark when it comes to 1590s satirical writing.21  Herek 
maintains that because Elizabethan satirists were influenced by secular Rom n satire, 
their work posed a threat to the “Bishops in their roles as authorized arbiters of moral 
behavior” (15).  This motivated the church leaders to ban poetic satire in 1599.  As Herek 
notes, the Bishops were offended not simply by the “matter,” but also by the “manner” 
and the context (14).  Herek relies on the fact that “satire was in its generic infancy in the 
late sixteenth-century” to advance his argument that satire “explor[es] morality in a way 
that is distinct from and resistant to moral exempla.”22  In rethinking the motives behind 
the Bishops’ Order of 1599, Herek is also suggesting that we need to rethink satire in 
terms of a secular ethics. 
 Hence some scholars have considered John Donne – rather than Ben Jonson, John 
Marston, and Thomas Dekker – to be the principle satirist of the 1590s.  As Dustin 
Griffin suggests, the ideal satire is much more equivocal, even exploratory, than Kernan 
                                                      
20 Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse: Satire of the English Renaissance (Yale: Yale University Press, 
1962), 55. 
21 Bryan Thomas Herek, “Early Modern Satire and the Bishops’ Order of 1599: Manuscript, Print, and 
Stage” (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 2005), 30. 
22 Ibid., 22, 54-55. 
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would have it.  Griffin remarks that the “effect of the best satire is likely not to reaffirm 
conventional moral wisdom but to conduct an open-ended moral inquiry.”23  Similarly, 
Charles K. Knight argues that satire is “independent of moral purpose,” and that its elos 
is “perception rather than changed behavior,” but he allows that the former can induce the 
latter.24  Although Howard Weinbrot attempts to delimit a sub-genre, Menippean satire, 
he effectively broadens our conception of satire by suggesting that the Menippean vari ty 
can operate by “incursion,” a “brief guerilla attack that emphasizes the danger to the text 
and then departs.”25  This notion of violent incursion leads us back to Shakespeare’s 
canker, which surfaces intermittently throughout the sequence and reflects more than the 
infection within beauty and virtue; it also represents the skeptical, investigatory, even 
flexible nature of the satiric mode.   
In many respects, then, the canker (and by extension satire) incorporates all of the 
features of Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism: the poet’s anxiety about authority and 
willingness to chart new territory; his inclination to weigh universal truths against 
historical particulars, to confront the beloved’s humanity in addition to his exemplarity; 
and, most significantly, the poet’s ethical examination of the eternal rose of beauty and 
praise.  Two tropes intimately related to the canker – usury and grafting – are introduced 
in the procreation poems (1-17) and define the nature of this inquiry.  The graft is 
especially significant because it establishes a horticultural framework for understanding 
the origin of the canker and its relationship to the rose.  As we will see, the poet imagines 
his poetry as the rootstock and the young man as the scion “engraft[ed]” “new” (15) into 
                                                      
23 Dustin Griffin, Satire: A Critical Reintroduction, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 
45. 
24 Charles K. Knight, The Literature of Satire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5. 
25 Howard D. Weinbrot, Menippean Satire Reconsidered: From Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 7. 
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the pages of his sequence.  This intimacy leads the poet to explore a particular set of 
questions about inherent and contiguous infection and so come to a tragic recognition 
about the canker in the practice of praise.  Thus, Shakespeare’s engagement with the
satiric mode (via the canker), I will argue, gives his sequence a tragic one and structure.        
 
Procreating the Canker of Satirical Inquiry    
The so-called “procreation sonnets” are based in good part on Erasmus’ An 
Epistle to Persuade Young Gentlemen to Marriage.26  That said, the poems are unusual 
for at least two reasons: the beloved is male, and the poet urges him to preserve his ideal 
essence by literally breeding “another self” (10).  Seeming to give his poetry a subsidiary 
role, the poet argues that begetting children offers a “mightier” and “more blessed” 
means of achieving immortality than his “barren rhyme” (16) and that poetry merely 
supports or reflects physical regeneration: “How much more praise deserved thy beauty’s 
use / If thou couldst answer, ‘This fair child of mine / Shall sum my count, and make my 
old excuse’” (2).  In some poems, the poet even despairs, averring that “nothing ‘gainst 
time’s scythe can make defence / Save breed to brave him, when he takes thee hence” 
(12).  Only rarely does the poet confidently assert that his poetry is sufficient in itself: 
“And all in war with time for love of you / As he takes from you, I engraft you new” (15).   
In offering an alternative to poetic immortality, the poet exhibits conventional 
self-abasement.  But he implies (in sonnet 17, the last of the procreation poems) that 
audiences may no longer be interested in reading about disembodied exemplars in the 
                                                      
26 See Thomas Wilson, The Art of Rhetorique (1560), ed. Thomas J. Derrick (New York and London: 
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 95-140.  Erasmus writes about many of the issues Shakespeare touches on 
in sonnets 1-17 – from the naturalness of marriage to the way progeny compensates for time and decay.   
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tradition of Laura and Beatrice; indeed, the sixteenth-century tradition of mocking 
Petrarchan conventions suggests that modern readers expect something else:   
            Who will believe my verse in time to come,  
            If it were filled with your most high deserts?   
Though yet, heaven knows, it is but as a tomb, 
Which hides your life, and shows not half your parts: 
If I could write the beauty of your eyes, 
And in fresh numbers number all your graces, 
The age to come would say, ‘This poet lies;  
Such heavenly touches ne’er touched earthly faces.’ 
So should my papers (yellowed with their age) 
Be scorned, like old men of less truth than tongue, 
And your true rights be termed a poet’s rage, 
And stretched metre of an antique song; 
     But were some child of yours alive that time, 
     You should live twice: in it, and in my rhyme.          
The poet ostensibly argues that his sonnets are disingenuous only insofar as the beloved’s 
merit exceeds his ability to express it.  However, while the beloved seems central to the 
poem, the poet is overwhelmingly focused on himself and concerned that future readers 
will doubt effusive praise and distrust his authority, calling him a liar.  Although the poet 
suggests that his work can be ratified only by the beloved’s offspring, the anemic way he 
makes that point evokes other possibilities, other ways of reading the poet’s 
motivations.27  It is clear by sonnet 17 that the young man will not in fact beget children 
and that the poet knows it.  Keeping the beloved for himself, the poet has instead 
enclosed him within his poetry not as a disembodied ideal, but as an embodied man who 
refuses to act on his potential to breed. 
                                                      
27 Although Joseph Pequigney does not spend much time discussing this poem, and although he is more 
generous than I am in his assertions about the poet’s self-confidence, he did select the opening line of this 
poem for the epigraph of his book, Such is My Love.  Thus Pequigney may not have overtly suggested that 
Shakespeare is, in sonnet 17, anxious about a future readership – an anxiety that goes beyond what 
biological procreation may or may not help the poet achieve – but Pequigney implies it.  Like Shakespeare 
and his poetic anxieties, Pequigney recognizes the endlessly evolving world of literary criticism.  What 
critic, his epigraph suggests, will believe my interpretation in times to come?  For his discussion of sonnet 
17, see pp. 25-26. 
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In many ways, the beloved’s refusal to breed allows the poet to explore a new 
version of an old story and so, like Petrarch, to put unrequited love to productive use.  
Just as Laura’s aloofness and coy cruelty gave birth to an extraordinary collection of 
poems, so the young man’s repudiation of natural reproduction ends up doing the 
unthinkable: impregnating the poet himself, inspiring him to write poetry centered on this 
refusal.  Nevertheless, Shakespeare’s method diverges from Petrarch not only because his 
beloved is male, but also because he is committed to writing praise poetry that no longer 
“hides” the beloved’s “life,” but “shows” perhaps the other “half” of his “parts.”28  The 
young man’s “parts” may or may not be praiseworthy; indeed, as the first sonnet 
suggests, one of the hidden qualities that the poet already confronts is the beloved rose’s 
decaying “content,” which he will later identify as the canker.      
Scholars and critics have noted that sonnet 1 serves as an umbrella for the 
sequence as a whole and so have used this poem to introduce their arguments about the 
Sonnets.29  I will do the same, pointing out that sonnet 1’s couplet, “Pity the world, or 
else this glutton be, / To eat the world’s due, by the grave and thee,” presages 99’s 
canker, which maliciously eats up the proud rose in the last poem that refers explicitly to 
the canker.  More immediately, though, the canker of sonnet 1 “infects” the next poem:  
When forty winters shall besiege thy brow, 
And dig deep trenches in thy beauty’s field, 
                                                      
28 Colin Burrow, The Oxford Shakespeare: Complete Sonnets and Poems (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 414.  Burrow is citing other, more varied and ambiguous, definitions of parts in the OED. 
29 Vendler remarks that the opening poem “brings intoplay…a plethora of conceptual material” and seems 
a “self-conscious groundwork laid for the rest of the sequence” (The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 47).  
Pequigney, too, argues that the first sonnet “does…serve an introductory function after all, at least for Part I 
[the procreation poems], and, if it does so unconventionally, it might on that very account be seen as a 
befitting way to begin the least conventional of Renaissance love-sonnet sequences” (Such is My Love, 9).  
See also Lisa Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will.  Freinkel’s entire argument, which I will explore later 
in this chapter, begins with the very first sonnet, which “links the collapse of ideals to a world in which 
flesh is no longer reconciled to spirit and time is no longer full” (165).  It is important to Freinkel’s 
argument that Shakespeare, who in the first sonnet i troduces the need to reproduce the rose of beauty, is 
also suggesting that the rose has already passed away.   
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Thy youth’s proud livery, so gazed on now, 
Will be a tattered weed of small worth held: 
Then being asked, where all thy beauty lies, 
Where all the treasure of thy lusty days, 
To say, within thine own deep-sunken eyes, 
Were an all-eating shame and thriftless praise. 
How much more praise deserved thy beauty’s use 
If thou couldst answer, ‘This fair child of mine 
Shall sum my count, and make my old excuse,’ 
Proving his beauty by succession thine: 
     This were to be new make when thou are old, 
     And see thy blood warm when thou feel’st it cold.     
Taking up the idea of eating and gluttony explored in the first poem, sonnet 2 turns the 
buried content into an “all-eating shame and thriftless praise.”  The poet’s refrence to 
the “treasure” of the beloved’s “lusty days” couples the affirming words of praise and 
validation (treasure, content as child, repository of beauty) to the pejorative description of 
consuming humiliation and blame.  Here again, the poet calls attention to the beloved’s 
self-consumption, an idea best expressed, in terms of an assault on the poetics of praise, 
in the image of the canker in the rose. 
 For the poet to acknowledge the decaying content at all cuts against any promises 
of renewal.  Emphasizing the consequences of time’s scythe if the beloved chooses not to 
breed, the poet unequivocally marks time and inscribes words on a page that can never be 
wiped away.  Thus, the poet willy-nilly prepares a landscape that accommodates the 
canker, which is then nurtured through the beloved’s and young man’s mutual 
dependency.  The two reproductive tropes of usury and grafting reflect this dependency.  
The former was denigrated by religious and secular law even as it was sloly embraced 
as a necessary economic practice; and writers frequently employed the canker to 
emphasize usury’s ill effects.  As Jonathan Gil Harris observes, “the association of usury 
with ‘canker’ is so commonplace in early modern English writing that it can be found 
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even in defenses of usury” and is a “recurrent feature of mercantilist discourse.”30  In the 
Sonnets, usury (and so the canker) can be construed in both a positive and negative way.  
On the one hand, the beloved is a “[p]rofitless usurer” (4) whose decision to hoard his 
treasure will (to follow the Geneva version of Matthew 6:19) leave him vulnerable to the 
“moth” and the “canker.”31  On the other hand, this vulnerability is precisely what drives 
the poet’s satirical inquiry in which he becomes a usurer himself, one committed to 
understanding and so writing about the canker. 
 Critics have argued that the early sonnets mingle biological and economic 
language in disturbing ways, but they do not often consider how such mingling helps the 
poet manipulate – or at least interrogate – the praise genre.  Peter C. Herman, fo  
instance, argues that “usury destabilizes the subject of the Petrarchan sonnet equence 
itself by introducing overtones of unauthorized sexualities.” 32  Although he contends that 
“Shakespeare’s sequence include[s] elements defeating the generic expectations of 
Petrarchan verse,” and that “commodification infects the poetry of praise,” Herman 
mostly explores consequences, not generic possibilities.33  For Herman, “the failures of 
exchange and problematizations of economy” are thus an analogy for failed procreation 
                                                      
30 Jonathan Gil Harris, Sick Economies: Drama, Mercantilism, and Disease in Shakespeare’s England 
(Philadelphia: University of Penn Press, 2003), 83. Phillip Stubbes celebrates Aristotle, Plato, and 
Pythagoras because he claims they have “sharply inveighed against this devouring canker of usury” [The 
Anatomy of the Abuses of England in Shakspere’s Youth, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall (London: N. Trubner & 
Co.), 1:128.].  See also Theodore B. Leinwand, Theatre, Finance, and Society in Early Modern Englad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  Leinward argues that “biting usury was a hot button topic 
in early modern London,” adding that such a practice “victimizes,” “suggests predation,” and “has an 
ominous ethical tenor” – descriptions that evoke the canker (5-6).   
31 The Geneva Bible, 1562.  The fact that the King James edition (1611) replaces canker with one of its 
synonyms, rust, emphasizes the canker’s association with physical corrosion as well as with moral 
corruption. 
32 Peter C. Herman, “What’s the Use?  Or, the Problematic of Economy in Shakespeare’s Procreation 
Sonnets,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, ed. James Schiffer (New York: Garland, 2000), 270.  
33 Ibid., 278-79. 
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and failed relationships in general.34  Vendler, too, ignores how the Sonnets’ economic 
language actually serves the poet’s purposes and observes of sonnet 4, for instance, that 
“the speaker’s innocent introduction of legal and banking language … suggests that he 
can appeal to the young man only in the contaminated language the young man 
understands – the language of social, not natural, exchange.”35   
One could argue, however, that the poet, rather than innocently appealing to the 
weaknesses he perceives in the beloved, stakes a claim in this reproductive exercis .  
Consider sonnet 6, in which the poet’s attempt to distinguish between the “use” of sexual 
regeneration and the non-regenerating (and self-abusing) “forbidden usury” leads him to 
parody the procreative process: 
That use is not forbidden usury 
Which happies those that pay the willing loan; 
That’s for thyself to breed another thee, 
Or ten times happier, be it ten for one: 
Ten times thyself were happier than thou art, 
If ten of thine ten times refigured thee; 
Then what could death do if thou shouldst depart, 
Leaving thee living in posterity?        
The poem gains manic energy from its linguistic profusion.  Each repetition of te  and 
happier spurs the poet on to the next line, the sonnet mimicking the reproductive process 
that the beloved ideally should have undertaken on his own.  Even as the beloved engages 
in “forbidden usury” by keeping his content buried within his own bud (1), the poet 
involves himself in the same practice, cunningly exploiting the beloved to breed lines of 
poetry (16). 
 Still, artistic usury does have its liabilities.  Thomas M. Greene considers this 
problem of exploitation and loss in his eloquent discussion of “rhetorical economics” in 
                                                      
34 Ibid., 278. 
35 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 62. 
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the Sonnets.36  Focused on the darker implications of the poems’ economic tropes, 
Greene claims that the sequence demonstrates “very little by way of stable exchange 
systems” (231) between speaker and beloved (and between a poet’s efforts and his 
creative output) until the penultimate poem to the young man; instead, the sonnets exhibi 
a poet’s work at his own “expense” (244).  In the process of clawing and plodding and 
fretting its way toward a final affirmation of “mutual render” in 125, Shakespeare’s 
sequence, Greene argues, betrays a “terrible fear of cosmic destitution” hat only 
intensifies after the procreation sonnets, whose “failed husbandry” simply calls attention 
to the poems’ paucity of riches (231-32).  For Greene, the imputed depletion of 
Petrarchan praise, the poet’s own misgivings about his poetry, and the distance betwe n 
speaker and beloved have transformed the poet’s art.  Instead of being “allowed to 
envision unambiguously the poet in the presence of his friend, as we are in love poems by 
Wyatt, Sidney, Spenser, and Donne,” we see in Shakespeare’s sequence a lonely poet at 
war with himself and his work, constantly negotiating the contrary forces of remuneration 
and reckless spending, restoration and failure, extravagant praise and necessary 
“deterioration” (235-36).  At the “‘poet’s’ expense and Shakespeare’s expense,” Gre ne 
contends, we have poems that keep exhibiting their “verbal enrichment” and artistic
superfluity even as they “demonstrate instability” and “vulnerability” (236, 244).  The 
more powerful and numerous the metaphors and the more hyperbolic the comparisons, he 
suggests, the larger the holes appear beneath them and the more fatigued and haggard the 
poet seems to us.  Greene argues that the poet and his subject, “pitiful thrivers both” in
sonnet 125, become mutually “devalued, the one by the vulgarity of his praise and the 
                                                      
36 Thomas M. Greene, “Pitiful Thrivers: Failed Husbandry in the Sonnets,” in Shakespeare and the 
Question of Theory, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Methuen, Inc., 1985), 235. 
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other by the vulgarity of the pleasure he takes in” (237).  In the world of Shakespeare’  
Sonnets as Greene sees it, there is small compensation for energy and effort, slim 
possibility of paying off one’s ever-increasing debt, and only the faintest hope tat the 
poet will achieve “mutual render” (to quote again sonnet 125) with the young man and 
with his art. 
Essentially, Greene explores the “economics of copying” (238).  He explains th t 
because “pure representation in language is not of this world” and because “precise 
figural adequation is unattainable,” a poet must embrace the “real failure” of “accepting 
[often hyperbolic] addition” that will always miss the mark – “as all poetry does” (238).  
“Poetry as representation,” he continues, “will always be vulnerable, because in its 
shifting mass of meanings it can never copy with absolute precision and because that 
which is copied changes, gains, and loses value” (238).37  Indeed, if we return to sonnet 
6’s ironic couplet, we see the poet contemplating not only the consequences of the 
beloved’s refusal but also the kind of poetry that is intended to compensate for that 
refusal: “Be not self-willed, for thou art much too fair, / To be death’s conquest and make 
worms thine heir.”  By referring to worms, these lines make explicit what remains 
implicit in sonnet 1’s couplet.  Not just the post-mortem larvae that consume the 
deceased body, worms also signal a changing tradition of praise that has now made the 
cankerworm – satire – its heir.  The compound adjective, “self-willed,” almost surely a 
pun on Shakespeare’s name, intensifies the irony.  Even though the poet begs the speaker 
                                                      
37 Greene’s argument about failed representation crosses paths with Fineman’s contention that the dark-
lady poems embrace praise paradox; however, Greene is not interested in the poet’s subjectivity or even in 
emphasizing to any great extent what distinguishes Shakespeare’s poems from other praise poems.  Still,
Greene flirts with what I have called epideictic skepticism when he suggests that the poems reflect a 
“pathology of praise” and that the friend and the po try leave us with “two distinct sources of alleged 
value,” “each the basis for a rudimentary economic system, each vulnerable to skepticism” (238, 234).  For
Greene, value, of course, has a double meaning.  In contemplating the questionable value of the young man 
and the poetry, he avers that “the worth of the frind may reside…in the poet’s own fancy” (233). 
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to “be not self-willed” (or not willed by Will), this is exactly what is happening in the 
sequence.  The poet “wills” the beloved into existence as much as the beloved occasions 
the writing of the poems.38  But as the couplet’s mournful tone suggests, the poet 
recognizes that his power to use or manipulate the beloved (and thus the poetics of 
praise) – along with his satirical examination of the young man’s inner, not-yet-released 
content – has come, or will  come, at the expense of the young man’s beauty and praise 
poetry’s “beauty’s rose.”39   
Another trope in the procreation sonnets – grafting – also reinforces this notion of 
mutual dependency as well as underlies the poet’s exploration of the canker and the rose.  
Grafting, which involves inserting a scion, or stem, of one plant into the rootstock of 
another, at first glance describes a rather simple conception of artistic immortality: a 
beloved becomes immortal when a poet grafts him onto the pages of his poetry.40  In the 
first seventeen poems, the poet’s fir t and only reference to the unequivocal power of 
verse does not occur until sonnet 15 and is introduced in terms of grafting: 
When I consider everything that grows 
Holds in perfection but a little moment, 
                                                      
38 For a discussion of the Will poems (sonnets 135 and 136) and the way they embrace this curious power 
dynamic of surrender and victory, loss and gain, see chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
39 Theodore Leinwand offers an analogous reading of usury’s double nature in his interpretation of The 
Merchant of Venice.  The first of his interpretations argues that Antonio enters into the bond with Shylock 
because of a “death-wish and a desire to secure after death a reputation (credit) that is commensurate with 
the resumptive self that has been overtaken” [Theatre, Finance, and Society in Early Modern Englad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 14]. Leinwand suggests that Antonio’s failed sacrifice is 
a metaphor for his failure to escape the economic exchange system that marks his whole outlook, and that 
characterizes, in particular, the way he expresses his love for Bassanio (23).  On the other side of the 
interpretive coin, Leinwand shows, is a competing reading of Antonio that sets aside the merchant’s 
“commitment to extricating himself” from his “generalized merchant function” (113) in favor of one whose 
“sadness may also be productive” (115).  Rather than pursue death for the purposes of escaping the 
commercial world, Antonio uses his sadness, Leinwand argues, to manipulate Bassanio and create a 
“carefully scripted self-martyrdom” (115).  To bring these two interpretations together: if the Antonio of 
this second reading wants to escape the world of exchange, he operates from a position not of loss and 
dismay but of power by imposing a debt that cannot be repaid.  Again, one notices something of this 
dynamic within the Sonnets themselves, which the theme of usury helps to articulate.            
40 “grafting, vbl. n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  
20 February 2010 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/500975347>.  
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That this huge stage presenteth naught but shows 
Whereon the stars in secret influence comment; 
When I perceive that men as plants increase, 
Cheered and checked even by the self-same sky, 
Vaunt in their youthful sap, at height decrease, 
And wear their brave state out of memory: 
Then the conceit of this inconstant stay 
Sets you, most rich in youth, before my sight, 
Where wasteful time debateth with decay 
To change your day of youth to sullied night: 
     And all in war with time for love of you 
     As he takes from you, I engraft you new.        
In this poem, the poet does not simply promise to capture the young man in his poetry at 
the peak of his development, gathering into the work of his artist’s quill the “little 
moment” marking the beloved’s “perfection.”  The poet is actively creating that moment 
now, the moment he writes, and the moment that will forever repeat itself every tim  we 
read the final line: “I engraft you new,” he says, and I engraft you now, he implies, as 
time and decay fight over a now empty coffin.  The graft, so the poet expresses here, will 
destroy the canker of wasteful niggarding, of corrosion, of self-consumption.  Sonnet 
15’s couplet offers one of those rare instances in the sonnets that turns on a strange pause, 
that isolates the point of conversion from an ebb to a flow.  As the canker of time and 
decay work to deface the young man’s beauty, the poet’s utterance, “I engraft you new,” 
supersedes the worm of time.  Thus, the poet seems to have written out Time and Decay 
only to ensure that the graft destroy them. 
 But what happens if the root stock itself is rotting, or if the scion seeking life has 
already begun to decay?  The graft implies shared disease as well as shared health.  
Competing perspectives on the sources of the nutrients and on the relationship between 
the scion and the rootstock abound in the Renaissance, from horticultural books, sermons, 
and the Bible to Shakespeare’s plays and even within the sonnets themselves.  In Romans 
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11, Paul argues that the Gentiles are like the branches of the wild olive tree who must 
through faith be grafted on to the natural, Jewish olive tree: “And though some of the 
branches be broken off, and thou being a wild Olive tree, wast graft in for them, and 
made partaker of the roote and the fatnesse of the Olive tree.”41  At one point, Paul even 
suggests that the branches do nothing for the root while the root does everything for the 
branches: “Boast not thy selfe against the branches,” he says, “thou bearestnot the roote, 
but the roote thee.”42 
 The idea that the rootstock nourishes a dying or helpless scion is consistent with 
what Shakespeare writes in sonnet 15, but not with how he and other writers present the 
relationship elsewhere.  Polixenes in The Winter’s Tale makes a compelling case for 
another way of perceiving hybridization.  Debating with Perdita the perennial question of 
nature and art, the uncertainties of hybridity, and the ethics of the graft, Polixenes 
contends, “we marry / A gentler scion to the wildest stock, / And make conceive a bark of
baser kind / By bud of nobler race” (4.4.92-95).43  “This,” he continues, “is an art / Which 
does mend Nature – change it, rather; but / The art itself is Nature” (95-97).  The art of 
grafting is virtuous and natural because “Nature makes that mean,” he says tautologically 
(89).  Here the source of sustenance lies in the “gentler scion,” which is married to th  
“wildest stock.”  Similarly, the archbishop of York, Edwin Sandys, urges in one of his 
sermons that the word of God “would root out vice and ingraft virtue.”44  Sandys takes 
the relationship presented by Polixenes to an extreme when he suggests that the scion is 
“virtue” and the root, “vice.”   
                                                      
41 The Geneva Bible, Romans 11:17, 1562. 
42 Ibid., Romans 11:18. 
43 These references to Shakespeare’s plays are taken from The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd ed., eds. G. 
Blakemore Evans and J.J.M. Tobin (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997). 
44 Edwin Sandys, Sermons (London: Henry Middleton, 1585), sig. G. 
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 Of course, from a horticultural standpoint, the body of the plant rejuvenates the 
scion and the grafted stem energizes the body of the plant to produce more buds of its 
own.  One of the most popular and detailed treatises on grafting in the sixteenth century
is Leonard Mascall’s A Booke of the Arte and maner how to Plant and Graffe, which 
went through several editions around the time Shakespeare was writing his poems and 
plays.  In his dedicatory epistle, Mascall praises “graffyng” in the conventionally 
excessive way, suggesting that such a practice allows us to “feele with our hands in the 
secrete woorkes of Nature” and even come close to discovering “unto us the greate and 
incomprehensible woorke of God.”45  Amid the dozens of descriptions of trees, the 
procedures for planting, the minute details about the placement of the scion and the 
techniques for digging holes and choosing branches, Mascall emphasizes the mutuality of 
the scion and the root stock.  He warns against choosing small branches, noting that the 
“the bigge Cions are best to graffe” (16), but he also suggests that careful pruning and 
preparation will ensure that the weaker scions survive, nourished by a new and healthier 
root stock (32).  Mascall also provides a technique for grafting a rose onto a holly: “F r 
to graffe the Holly, that his leaves shall keepe all the yeare greene: Some doe take and 
cleave the Holly, and so graffes in a white or red Rose budde...” (70).  Here we seean 
example of a scion, a rose, nourishing its holly stock. 
 Despite the many examples throughout his treatise of a mutually beneficial 
relationship between root and scion, Mascall also laces his discussion with referenc s to 
worms and diseases, reminding us that the canker can emerge through and because of the 
graft.  His treatise includes warnings against choosing weak branches, and against
                                                      
45 Leonard Mascall, A Booke of the Arte and maner how to Plant and Graffe, etc. (London: John Wight, 
1575), A.ii.  Other editions appeared in 1569, 1572, 1582, and 1596.   
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grafting shoots onto unhealthy “wilde stockes.”  As Mascall explains, when a wild stock 
“hath not substaunce in himself,” it has “much lesse to give unto the other graffes” (23).  
He seizes an opportunity at this point to moralize, writing that “when a man thinkes 
sometimes to forward hym self, he doeth hinder himself ” (23).  Comparing grafting and 
poetry, Mascall suggests that the graft does not merely carry metaphoric weight, but that 
working with shoots and scions provides the same sort of artistic satisfaction as writing 
poetry.46  Indeed, one senses that Mascall has taken to heart the metaphorical 
implications of the graft, the way it can symbolize both a strengthened relationship with 
nature and God and a failed bond.  Mascall recognizes that if either of the grafted parts is 
diseased – or truly beyond the aid offered by the horticultural process – then the whole 
plant can die.  Paul makes a similar point when he argues, “For if the first fruits be holie, 
so is the whole lompe: and if the roote be holie, so are the branches.”47  Paul implies that 
the reverse is also true. 
 In Shakespeare’s Sonnets, we also see that engrafting, like usury, is a process of 
“mutual render” in which the stem (young man) and the rootstock (the poet/poems) by 
turns nourish or injure one another.  For despite the poet’s insistence that his work will 
“engraft” the beloved “new” (15), his subsequent reference to his “barren rhyme” (16) 
suggests that the beloved has power to transform the Sonnets for better or for worse.  In a 
broader perspective, the mutually sustaining and mutually undermining relationship 
between a beloved and his poetry opens up an ethical problem pulling in two directions.  
The model represented by sonnet 15, in which the poems rejuvenate the young man, 
                                                      
46 Responding to the humanist tradition that idealizes manual labor and practical endeavors, Mascall writes, 
“Wherefore the Poet saieth: Let us praise the true labouryng hower of the true labourer.  Thereupon may 
greate Lordes and noble personages, have left their T aters, pleasant stages, goodly pastimes: forsaking 
and despising their pleasures, not much regardyng riche Diademes, and costly parfumes, but have given 
themselves to Plantyng and Graffyng, and suche like” (A.ii).  
47 The Geneva Bible, Romans 11:16, 1562. 
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raises ethical questions about accurate representation.  To what extent does “I engraft you 
new” mean “I transform you utterly?”  To what extent does the scion become more like 
the rootstock to which it binds than the plant from which it derives?  The second model, 
which suggests that the poems are nourished by the young man, frames the problem 
differently.  Does not the poet now have an ethical obligation to focus less on himself and 
more on the source of his inspiration?  Can he help but look carefully at the scion – with 
all its beauty and all its flaws?   
 
Satirical Inquiry in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Inherency or Contiguity?   
The interdependence of the two parts of the graft helps to frame and in the end to 
resolve the questions that the poet keeps returning to every time he contemplates the 
canker, which enters beauty’s rose in sonnet 1: Where does the infection come from?  
What is the relationship between the canker and the rose?  To what extent is the canker 
intrinsic to the rose sitting on the stem of the scion, and to what extent is the canker
extrinsic, having emerged from within the poems themselves and thus from within the 
root stock?  Restating these questions rhetorically in terms of metonymy and s necdoche, 
we can reduce the issue down to this point: how we understand the me aphor of the 
canker and the rose, and thus how we interpret the poet’s copy (his sonnets) of the young 
man, depends on whether the poet presents the canker synecdochically (which would 
make the canker inherent in the scion, the young man) or metonymically (which would 
make it contiguous, something the scion picks up from the rootstock – the poet’s 
copies).48 
                                                      
48 I am treating my reading of the sonnets as an exercise in the essay, which means that I am using an 
inductive approach and following the problem as the po t follows it.  Intending to investigate a question 
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Metonymy, according to Puttenham, is the “misnamer,” or the figure that takes the 
“name of the author for the thing itself, or the thing containing for that which is 
contained,” or a practice that involves “wrong nam[ing] the person or the thing.”49  
Metonymy defines relationships between objects that are contiguous, and often only 
loosely associated, with one another, objects that are sometimes linked merely by chance.  
Puttenham’s use of the word misnamer emphasizes the degree to which metonymic 
connections depend not only on chance meetings between things (between, for example, 
a canker and a rose) but also on the observer or interpreter to articulate those connections, 
and to see relationships that may or may not exist.  For my purposes, metonymy thus 
characterizes the ethical problem of poetic representation – of an author’s nourishing and 
transforming the scion through speech and perhaps “misnaming” it.  In this respect, the 
logic of metonymy is a bit like usury; the poet exploits its object of praise for artistic 
profit.  One could therefore assess the extent to which the poet’s discovery of the canker 
is accidental and the extent to which the poet actively seeks it out, even creatig it 
himself.  Indeed, the canker is on one level useful to the poet; however, on another level, 
it is dangerous and destructive, potentially undermining his efforts. 
From the Latin word subintellectio, meaning “understanding a little,” synecdoche 
is, by contrast, the “figure of quick conceit…by which we drive the hearer to conceive 
more, or less, or beyond, or otherwise than the letter expresseth.”50  Synecdoche thus 
goes beyond suggesting an observable relationship between part and whole.  As 
                                                                                                                                                              
that is not answered until the end of the sequence, I will avoid disclosing all my conclusions here.  I will, 
though, say that the poet comes to understand that the canker inescapably inheres in the practice of praise.  
This means that the poet gradually sees a close conne tion between the logic of inherency and that of 
contiguity.  While the distinctions between metonymy and synecdoche must of necessity break down, I will
be focusing on the important distinctions between them for the better part of this chapter.    
49 George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, 265. 
50 Puttenham, 270. 
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Puttenham describes it and as Shakespeare explores it, interpreting inherent valu  and 
understanding the essence of things involve taking inductive leaps, making imaginative 
connections, and testing hypotheses based on small details.  In short, Puttenham’s 
definition of the two rhetorical figures suggests a deep-seated connection between them: 
sometimes the drive to “conceive more” can lead to one’s misunderstanding the part and 
misnaming the whole; sometimes the contained becomes an extricable part of its 
container.  In the sonnets, the ambiguous relationship between the canker and the rose – 
reflected in the interplay of these rhetorical devices – in turn affects how we understand 
the metaphor of the canker and the metaphor of the rose. 
At bottom (and as the canker/rose duality suggests), Shakespeare’s poems 
scrutinize the underlying principles of a Petrarchan poetics steeped in the conventions of 
comparison: My love is like a rose; my beloved’s voice is music; my object of praise 
possesses hair like silk and eyes like sapphires.  My love is like a canker?  Turning praise 
into a form of appraisal, Shakespeare’s poetics directly or indirectly takes to h art 
Puttenham’s assertion that metaphor is the “figure of transport” involving a “kind of 
wresting of a single word from its own right signification to another not so natural” (262-
3).  The problem begins, as Puttenham suggests and Shakespeare puts to the test, with the 
copy in the first place.  Immortalizing the likeness of the young man in verse, the poems 
suggest, is an unnatural wresting, and the canker reflects this truth.  Thus, we find that the 
canker leads to questions about authorization and authorship (35); it arises once the poet 
begins to wonder about the beloved’s “substance” and his origin (53) and when the 
speaker explores the young man’s “truth” (54).  The canker also emerges in the poe ’s 
exploration of counterfeit copies (54) and in his philosophical musings about the nature 
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of knowledge and the ethics of character assessment (69-70).  The canker also appears in 
sonnet 95, soon after the poet renews his anxieties about “infection” (67), “festering 
lilies,” and “base” contagion (94). 
Sonnet 35, the first poem explicitly to explore the “loathsome canker” in the 
“sweetest bud,” is ambiguous about the nature of that connection: 
No more be grieved at that which thou hast done, 
Roses have thorns, and silver fountains mud; 
Clouds and eclipses stain both moon and sun, 
And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.     
While the proverbial quality of the quatrain seems to mitigate Shakespeare’s personal 
complaint about the beloved, the way he configures these pithy aphorisms makes his 
poem altogether unique and the proverbs themselves anything but banal.  John Kerrigan, 
for example, encourages a nuanced reading of these so-called proverbs and especially of 
the phrase, “roses have thorns,” which he compares to a line from Lyly’s Euphues: “The 
sweetest rose hath his prickle.”51  This word prickle unites the pricked (thorny) satyr and 
the canker-ulcer that needs pricking.   
But how should we interpret this canker?  At first glance, the metaphor-
metonymy dialectic introduced by Roman Jakobson and then elaborated on by Paul 
Ricoeur is decisively at work.  While Jakobson defines metonymy as a random 
concurrence of two things or ideas (a chance meeting), Ricoeur explores the way in 
which the interactive components of metonymy transform the way we perceive a 
metaphor. 52  Metaphorically, then, the canker in the bud refers to the vice in the beloved; 
metonymically, the chance meeting between the canker and rose (or the vice and the 
                                                      
51 Kerrigan, The Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, 218. 
52 See Roman Jakobson, Fundamentals of Language (N.P.: Mouton and Co., 1956), 81-82, and Paul 
Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” in On Metaphor, ed. Sheldon 
Sacks (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 141-45. 
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beloved) leads the rose to appropriate the canker.  However, this dialectic does not satisfy 
the problem posed by the line, “And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.”  For what 
happens to the metaphor when the relationship between the canker and the rose is not 
metonymic but rather synecdochal – dealing in parts and wholes and not simply container 
and contained?  Whether the canker is indeed part of the rose’s essence (as in emerges 
naturally from within it) or merely contiguous with the rose is not answered by the 
sonnet.  The canker “lives” in the rose, but the poet does not specify how it got there or 
even why it appears. 
This last point leads the poet to begin questioning his own responsibility for the 
canker’s appearance:   
All men make faults, and even I, in this, 
Authorizing thy trespass with compare, 
Myself corrupting, salving thy amiss, 
Excusing these sins more than these sins are: 
For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense;  
Thy adverse party is thy advocate,  
And ’gainst myself a lawful plea commence: 
Such civil war is in my love and hate 
     That I an accessory needs must be 
                                 To that sweet thief which sourly robs from me.  
The poet has moved from addressing the beloved’s faults to considering all men’s faults, 
which include his own.  He realizes that he is not just undertaking an objective 
investigation of the beloved’s vices; he has complicated the problem considerably by 
“authorizing” the beloved’s “trespass with compare” – using the canker in his description 
of the young man, literally writing canker into his poetry.  Thus, the poet acknowledges 
his complicity in the beloved’s faults because he has, in part, authorized them through the 
rhetorical device of comparison.  At the same time, he has potentially trivialized the 
beloved’s faults by “salving” (or unfairly palliating) the beloved’s “amiss.”  The poet is 
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therefore doubly guilty, guilty because he mentions the canker in the first place and guilty 
because he minimizes the presence of that canker.  Ultimately, the poet ex l res whether 
one can talk about corruption without saying more or less than what is really there.  He 
explores whether a poet can mention a canker without considering the canker’s effect on 
himself and his work. 
 If, then, the canker reflects the poet’s drive to understand the young man’s hidden 
interior – his “content” – its presence also reinforces how little he knows aboutthe 
beloved and even about himself.  This point is picked up again in sonnets 53 (which 
explores the beloved’s substance) and 54 (which uses the canker rose to meditate on the 
young man’s truth and its relation to his poetry).  The opening of 53 can be read as an 
introduction to both of these sonnets: “What is your substance, whereof are you made, /
That millions of strange shadows on you tend?”  This query should be read in two 
different ways: What type of substance is yours that would attract so many sh dows?  
How can I possibly know your substance if you are surrounded by shades?  As a pair, the
questions speak to the poet’s desire for knowledge and reflect the fact that the visible 
world and its literary analogues might very well distract him from the truth.  Even though 
the second half of the opening quatrain declares that the young man uniquely can be seen 
everywhere and in everything (“Since every one hath every one one shade, / And you, but 
one, can every shadow lend”), his substance remains obscure.  The shadows, which range 
from figures in Greek mythology to the natural growth cycles, conceal even as they 
reveal: 
Describe Adonis, and the counterfeit 
Is poorly imitated after you; 
On Helen’s cheek all art of beauty set 
And you in Grecian tires are painted new; 
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Speak of the spring, and foison of the year: 
The one doth shadow of your beauty show, 
The other as your bounty doth appear, 
And you in every blessed shape we know. 
When Vendler argues that the “poem is about the speaker more than about the beloved,” 
perhaps she means to suggest that the speaker, as skeptic and observer, is watching 
himself watching the beloved in his multiple manifestations.53  These manifestations 
crowd the poem and overshadow the beloved’s substance; because they are inferior 
representations of the young man, the shadows do little to help the poet understand him.  
For every new example that he introduces as touchstone, he moves farther and farther 
from the beloved himself; indeed, most of the poem shows a poet essaying examples and 
then rejecting them as insufficient.   
While the poet therefore seems intent on assessing the beloved’s substance 
favorably, neither he nor his beloved can escape the shadows.  Even in the sestet, the poet 
observes the beloved “in every blessed shape we know,” thus emphasizing the shadows 
tending on the beloved rather than the beloved himself.  In the final couplet, when the 
poet allows us at last to gaze upon the young man, all we see of him is at best a 
decoupage, at worst an image in a shattered mirror, each shard a shadow: “In all externa
grace you have some part, / But you like none, none you, for constant heart.”  While 
“every literary representation,” according to Vendler, “has [in this poem] ended up, 
willy-nilly, representing the beloved,” we cannot forget that this truth does not atall 
satisfy the poet’s epistemological project and the question that began the sonnet:“What is 
your substance, whereof are you made…?”54  The last line of the poem does not assure 
us, either.  The poet tries quite literally to get to the heart of the matter, but the line is 
                                                      
53 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 259. 
54 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 259. 
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ambiguous.  One interpretation suggests that no one is as constant as the beloved, while 
another reading implies that no one esteems the beloved for his constancy.55  And if we 
are, as Stephen Booth suggests, to read “constant heart” as “constant art,” then the poet is 
saying that none esteems the beloved for (or because of) the poet’s constant 
representation of him.56  We know that Shakespeare’s poetics is anything but constant 
and static. 
Indeed, it is precisely this sense of obliquity, obscurity, and inconstancy which the 
poem is criticizing.  From a philosophical point of view, the sonnet is condemning the 
world of seeming, the shadow-land of Plato’s cave that we are urged to escape; at the 
same time, the poet cannot offer another way of taking in or conveying knowledge.  The 
poet’s question about the beloved’s substance sends him to a place where shadows breed 
shadows, and where every attempt to leave the cave fails.57  For the poet learns that if the 
“millions of strange shadows” suggest the many angles from which to observe the 
beloved, then the poet is one of those shadows himself – as is his poetry.58  Thus, 
                                                      
55 Colin Burrow, Complete Sonnets and Poems, 486. 
56 Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 226. 
57 As discussed in my previous chapter, this dilemma is consistent with a period that felt that the world of 
shadows may be all that we can know.  These multiple shadows, accordingly, conjure up not only the 
inferior visible world, but also the newly recognized subjective point of view undermining ontological 
certainty.  For a psychoanalytic exploration of how “the fall from metaphysical ontology into critical 
epistemology” gave birth to a modern, divided subject, see Marshall Grossman, The Story of All Things: 
Writing the Self in English Renaissance Narrative Poetry (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
1998), 266.  For Grossman, the “shadows,” or what he calls the “wan ghosts,” refer to a “lost object” 
underlying the modern self.  I have been emphasizing the development not of subjectivity but of skepticism 
and epideictic skepticism, how people began to reassess the way they comprehend the world, the way they 
evaluate character, and how they represent that chara ter in literature.    
58 Shakespeare’s plays also demonstrate the power of the shadow world in all its insubstantial 
emphemerality.  Hamlet, conversing with Rosencrantz d Guildenstern about his “ambition,” argues that
the “dream itself is but a shadow” and criticizes Rosencrantz’s suggestion that “ambition…is but a 
shadow’s shadow” (2.2.260-262).  While Hamlet rejects the idea that shadows pervade the waking world, 
we can guess from Ophelia’s famous speech in 3.1, along with other references to Hamlet’s past, that he is 
but a shadow of his former self and knows it.  If Hamlet sees mankind as “noble in reason,” “infinite in 
faculties,” “the paragon of animals,” and the “beauty of the world” – if he can see the way out of Plato’s 
shadowy cave charted by such Neoplatonists as Pico della Miradola and Marsilio Ficino – then he doubts 
(at least before the play-changing fifth act) that e can reach the exit himself.  Haunted by the play’s 
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alongside the counterfeit Adonis, the shadowy spring, and Helen’s painted cheek, we 
might append the language of praise, for this, too, has traditionally catered to, even 
helped to create, the world of shades and counterfeits.  In fact, this sonnet reminds us of 
the rhetorical dilemma that led the poet in sonnet 16 to prefer a biological copy to his 
own “barren rhyme” or “painted counterfeit” and then, in sonnet 21, to dismiss rhetorical 
comparison in order to let him “be true in love but truly write.”  But by sonnet 53, can the 
poet “truly write” in the way he professes in sonnet 21 when he has considered many 
perplexing features of his beloved?      
These perplexities establish the context for sonnet 54, where the canker surfaces 
as a canker rose rather than a cankerworm (or ulcer) in the rose.  Here we might say that 
the canker has led the poet to see how his own work may assume an identity contrary to 
the eternal rose of beauty: 
           O how much more doth beauty beauteous seem 
By that sweet ornament which truth doth give! 
The rose looks fair, but fairer we it deem 
For that sweet odor which doth in it live; 
The canker blooms have full as deep a dye 
As the perfumed tincture of the roses, 
Hang on such thorns, and play as wantonly, 
When summer’s breath their masked buds discloses; 
But for their virtue only is their show 
They live unwooed, and unrespected fade, 
Die to themselves.  Sweet roses do not so; 
Of their sweet deaths are sweetest odors made; 
     And so of you, beauteous and lovely youth; 
     When that shall vade, by verse distils your truth.        
                                                                                                                                                              
ultimate shadow, the ghost of his father, Hamlet adds, “and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?” 
(2.2.304-308).  The world of shadows is indeed threatening; it can, as Puck says, offend.  In A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, Oberon, the “King the Shadows,” presides over a fairy world that wreaks havoc with 
humans who are half shadowlike themselves.  While te emotionally overwrought Mercutio, in Romeo and 
Juliet, completes a speech on Queen Mab that he claims is “[b]egot of nothing but vain fantasy,” we are 
privy to the powerful hold that this fantasy has over Mercutio – how shadows can inspire, instigate, ev n 
destroy (1.4.98).  Quotations are taken from Shakespeare’s Tragedies and Comedies, 2 vols., ed. David 
Bevington (New York: Pearson, Inc., 2007). 
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As with sonnets 17 and 53, truthful representation is paramount.  What will the 
poet’s copies look like?  How does a poet depict truth?  What is this truth?  In addressing 
these questions, the poet is not simply examining differences in perception, but the 
relationship between the young man’s truth and that which his poetic copy has distilled.  
On first reading, it appears that if the poet writes sonnets at all, they will contain nothing 
but the substance of a distilled rose.  Truth refers to the virtues capable of being 
imprinted in a book of poems; the young man himself is like the true rose (“And so of 
you, beauteous and lovely youth”) and therefore contains distillable truth.  The poet 
accordingly begins his sonnet by ostensibly idealizing the relationship between h  
ornament (the copy) and the substance behind the sign: “O how much more doth beauty 
beauteous seem / By that sweet ornament which truth doth give!”  Indeed, the way the 
poet juxtaposes the young man’s truth and the poet’s true copy suggests little difference 
between them.  The distinction between the canker and the rose, too, seems as clear-cut 
as the beloved’s pure truth.  As the poet affirms, the young man is the true rose deemed 
“fairer… / For that sweet odor which doth in it live.”   
All of these distinctions and comparisons, however, break down in the final 
couplet when the poet builds a linguistic tie between the canker blooms that “unrespected 
fade” and the beloved, whose beauty and youth “shall vade.”  Thus, the poet gives voice 
to his implicit suspicions about the young man when he remarks on “beauty” that 
“seem[s]” and when he compares “truth” to a mere “ornament.”  Notice, too, that 
although the rose’s depiction accords with epideictic excess and amplification, its beauty 
made beauteous by the ornament truth and its fair qualities made fairer by its lovely 
odor, no such poetic excess is used to describe the young man.  However, before we 
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dismiss the beloved as irredeemably cankered, we should keep in mind that the young 
man has no telltale odor which allows us positively to decide whether the rose or the 
canker bloom is the apt comparison.  As Vendler argues, “no such anterior scientific 
knowledge or immediate sense-perception warns those who approach a beautiful (but 
faithless) human being.”59    
If, then, the young man’s personality, his virtues, his behavior, and his foibles can 
all be recorded in the poet’s verse – are already being recorded – the poem asks us to 
redefine what we mean by the beloved’s truth.  For, in the beloved’s case, truth may 
signify a whole range of characteristics, good and bad, cankered and rosy.  This 
alternative reading of the word changes the way that we understand the couplet, for th  
poet could be suggesting that he will distil the young man’s content (his truth) no matter 
what.  Whether beauteous like the deep-dyed canker or sweet like the rose, the young 
man has power to change the nature of the poet’s verse.  Ultimately, then, the poet 
wonders whether the beloved’s truth will expose the canker that will inevitably tr nsform 
a pure poetics into a counterfeit one (canker rose). 
In considering how the beloved’s distilled truth shapes the poems, sonnet 54 
shows how a beloved stem can transform the poetry stock.  Leading into the next 
appearance of the canker in sonnet 70, 69 explores how a poet/observer can shape our 
perception of the young man60: 
Those parts of thee that the world’s eye doth view 
Want nothing that the thought of hearts can mend; 
All tongues, the voice of souls, give thee that due, 
Utt’ring bare truth, even so as foes commend: 
Thy outward thus with outward praise is crowned. 
                                                      
59 Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 263. 
60 Although I have already discussed this sonnet in the previous chapter, I quote it again here to show 
it, too, debates the question of inherency and contiguity. 
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But those same tongues that give thee so thine own 
In other accents do this praise confound, 
By seeing further than the eye hath shown; 
They look into the beauty of thy mind, 
And that in guess they measure by thy deeds; 
Then churls their thoughts (although eyes were kind) 
To thy fair flower add the rank smell of weeds. 
     But why thy odor matcheth not thy show, 
                                    The soil is this, that thou dost common grow. 
The poem – from the world’s eye to the thought of hearts to the praising and 
condemning tongues – is filled with examples of synecdoche, which Puttenham, we 
remember, describes as the “figure of quick conceit…by which we drive the hearer to 
conceive more, or less, or beyond, or otherwise than the letter expresseth.”61  In this 
sonnet, the same people who praise the outward parts of the beloved also strive to see 
“further than the eye hath shown” and “drive…to conceive more…than the letter 
expresseth.”  They strive, in other words, to learn whole from part. 
Although the word farther appears in the 1609 Quarto, Duncan-Jones prefers 
further, which suggests intellectual inquiry – the practice of making inferences – and not 
simply physical observation.62  However, even as the sonnet reflects a form of inductive 
reasoning supported by scientific thinkers like Francis Bacon, it hesitates to endors  this 
process fully.  The sonnet also draws on the writings of Montaigne, who emphasizes the 
need to doubt the things we see and to second-guess our inferences.63  Writing just before 
                                                      
61 Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy, 158. 
62 For an example of the use of further to mean “goin beyond what exists or has been dealt with,” see 
“further, a.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  22 
February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50091152>.  
63 See Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century Engla d (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983).  Shapiro explores the “changing conceptions of truth or knowledge,” arguing that 
“natural philosophers and natural scientists” began emphasizing the merits of collecting empirical data nd 
of “conceiving knowledge probabilistically” in order to defend themselves from continental skeptics who
affirmed that nothing could be known (267).  “Scient fic instruments such as the telescope and the 
microscope,” she explains, were found to “compensate for the frailty of human sense organs” (22).  Shapiro 
shows how Bacon initiated a movement that made several revisions to his own practices; thus she 
emphasizes how, in the history of intellectual thought, developments came rather quickly in the seventeenth 
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the development of an empirical science founded on hypothesis and probability, 
Montaigne insists that we must acknowledge differences in perspective and that othing 
can be known with certainty; in so many words, he suggests that it is the logic of 
metonymy that underlies the way that we perceive the world.  As he affirms in hi  
Apology for Raymond Sebond, “external objects surrender to our mercy; they dwell in us 
as they please.”64  “All that is known,” he adds, “is doubtless known through the faculty 
of the knower.”65  Sir Walter Raleigh, too, argues for a similar epistemological outlook in 
his essay, “The Sceptic,” when he writes on the “confused controversy about the essence 
of nature” due to the various ways people apprehend the attributes of things.66  Fulke 
Greville’s poetic exploration of skepticism and knowledge is more comprehensive than 
Raleigh’s, although he writes of many of the same issues.  In his Treatie of Humane 
Learning, Greville begins by discussing the unreliability of the senses.67  He subsequently 
challenges not only the “faculties of apprehension,” but also human “comprehension,” 
the conclusions we draw from our observations.  He suggests that the more we observe 
the world, the less we understand: “our capacity / How much more sharpe, the more it 
apprehends, / Still to distract, and less Truthe comprehends.”68  Greville thus stands on 
the other side of the emerging science of probability, a mode of thinking that brings 
Puttenham’s description of synecdoche and metonymy into the arena of modern 
                                                                                                                                                              
century.  The 1609 Quarto stands at a pivotal place in intellectual history – at the beginning of a century 
when things were about to explode scientifically.      
64 Montaigne, Apology, in Essays, trans. Donald Frame (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2003), 513. 
65 Ibid., 539.   
66 Sir Walter Raleigh, The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh, 8 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1829), 
8:556.  
67 Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, A Treatie of Humane Learning, in The Works in Verse and Prose 
Complete, Vol. 2, ed. Rev. Alexander B. Grosart, 4 vols. (Lancashire: C. Tiplady and son, 1870), 2:5-63.  
68 Ibid., 12-13.   
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science.69     
Even, however, as Shakespeare’s Sonnets cannot wholeheartedly embrace what 
Bacon and his followers could embrace, the sequence does not deny it, either.  Like 
Montaigne and Raleigh and Greville, the poet continues to wonder whether knowledge 
can be anything other than a product of the individual observer and whether the observer 
indeed “an accessory needs must be,” to quote again the crux of sonnet 35.  However, in 
sonnet 69, Shakespeare doubts the practice of making inferences even as he employs it 
himself.  Eager to continue searching but fearful of what he might find, the poet teeters 
between probing the rose further and holding it at arm’s length.  He simply cannot be 
sure whether a person’s discoveries and inferences truly come from the object scrutinized 
or from her subjective interpretation of that object.  As the poet finally laments, 
spectators “look into the beauty of thy mind, / And that in guess they measure by thy 
deeds.”  While the poet tries to extenuate the viewers’ guesses, he fears that they are 
adding the “rank smell of weeds” (and “misnaming”) rather than finding that odor within 
the beloved.  The couplet continues this skeptical inquiry, showing that the poet still 
cannot decide why the beloved’s odor does not match his show.  Is it because the beloved 
flower possesses some ineradicable flaw which the poet elsewhere calls the canker 
(synecdoche)?  Or is it because his soil is corrupted by those common eyes appraising 
him even as they praise him (metonymy)?  Or, is it a combination of the two?  Is the
beloved inherently corrupt and so easily corrupted by others?  Even worse, has the 
beloved grown common?   
                                                      
69 Ibid., 22, 42.  A fideist, Greville believes that we are blinded by various idols – sin, physical defici ncies, 
vanity, public opinion.  While Bacon argues that the idols blind us from all forms of truth, Greville 
dismisses earthly knowledge, claiming that such inquiry could threaten our relationship with God and, i  
short, our moral knowledge. 
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Sonnet 70 reiterates many of the themes and questions introduced in 69, but it 
places them explicitly in the context of the canker.  While this time the poet invesigat  
his rose in a more public space than in sonnet 35, he arrives at the same ambiguous 
conclusion as before:   
That thou art blamed shall not be thy defect, 
For slander’s mark was ever yet the fair; 
The ornament of beauty is suspect, 
A crow that flies in heaven’s sweetest air.    
So thou be good, slander doth but approve 
Thy worth the greater, being wooed of time; 
For canker vice the sweetest buds doth love, 
And thou present’st a pure unstained prime.      
   
On one level, the poet implies that slander will only make the beloved look better 
if he is good (“So thou be good, slander doth but approve / Thy worth the greater”).  The 
beloved’s goodness, however, is not positively confirmed, for the line – “For canker vice 
the sweetest buds doth love” – could be read in two ways: the canker loves the buds and 
so will naturally attack them, or the buds love the canker and so will naturally let it 
invade.70  If read the first way, the connection is poetically metonymic; if read the second 
way, the connection is synecdochic, since the sweetest buds are probably predisposed to 
succumb to the canker.  Furthermore, just because the beloved “present’st a pure 
unstained prime” does not mean he is pure and unstained within. 
 
The Reformation of Praise 
Before showing how the poet resolves the debate over inherency and contiguity, I 
want to spend some time considering where Lisa Freinkel’s full-length investigation of 
                                                      
70 See also Coriolanus: “Pray you, who does the wolf love?” (2.1.7).  We ar  told that the wolf loves the 




the Sonnets’ canker and the rose stands in relation to my own study.71  While she, too, 
roots these tropes in post-Reformation culture, she interprets them in terms of catachresis, 
the “abuse of figure” that she contends defines Luther’s worldview.  She argues that 
whether or not Shakespeare read Luther or was a Lutheran, he was writing in a “Lutheran 
universe.”72  By this she means that “the theological tradition” central to her study is not 
that “creed to which individual authors subscribe so much as it is that doctrinal tradition 
that makes the concept of authorship itself available to Western culture” (xx).  What 
Freinkel brings to the foreground is Luther’s legacy of authorial ambivalence.  For even 
as Luther argued that individuals have power to interpret the Bible on their own and 
become authorities of scriptural truth, he also suggested that people who assert such 
authority and knowledge are susceptible to distortion, smear, and self-doubt.73      
For Freinkel, catachresis not only symbolizes Luther’s authorial ambivalence but 
also clarifies the relationship between the canker and the rose.  Although Freinkel, too, 
ties these tropes to engrafting, she thinks through the process in purely theological terms.  
As she explains, the graft signifies the wild (Christian) olives tamed by the cultivated 
(Jewish) olive tree, which Paul outlines in Romans 11.  Tracing the changing perspective 
on this olive tree from Paul to Augustine to Luther, Freinkel first demonstrates how 
Paul’s “hybrid logic” of the graft suggests Christian figura.  As Paul stresses, the New 
Testament fulfills the promises of the Old Testament, the spirit of the law transcends the 
                                                      
71 As I mentioned in a previous note, Freinkel (to my knowledge) is the only scholar to offer a full-length 
study of the canker. 
72 Lisa Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 164. 
73 Ibid., 126-31.  Showing how Luther found his “words turned against him” and his “authority 
countermanded,” Freinkel quotes the following passage from Luther’s Works: “Under my name, this 
blasphemous, shameful teaching has been spread and disseminated more widely, perhaps, than by all your 
[the devil’s?] books….The devil saw clearly that hisbook was being disseminated everywhere.  Therefore 
he seized it, and loaded and smeared it with his dung.  So I, an innocent man, must now be the wagon 
driver of the devil’s manure, whether I will or not” (qtd. in Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 124).  
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letter of the law, and the spirit eventually supersedes the claims of the fles  (11-15).  
Thus the olive tree – healthy, cultivated, reinforced by a Jewish root – becomes “an 
image of Christian revisionism, of the retrospective ‘insertion’ of Christian ends into 
Jewish beginnings” (13).  Significantly, Freinkel describes this renewed tre  using a 
rhetorical term that I have already introduced: “Paul’s figure…resembles nothing so 
much as the structure of synecdoche, where the substitution of parts finds its rationale in 
the spatial integrity of the whole” (22, my emphasis).  This powerful, yet fixed, image of 
the graft, Freinkel contends, shows how Paul “understands time as space” (33). 
Several hundred years later, Augustine re-fashions Paul’s figure of synecdochal 
stillness into a dynamic entity.  Freinkel argues that the key piece of evidence here 
derives from a statement written in De Catachizandis Rudibus: “In the Old Testament the 
New is concealed, and in the New the Old is revealed.”74  Freinkel sees Augustine’s 
emphasis on mutuality between the Old and New Testaments as evidence of a more 
complex conception of temporality than Paul’s ostensibly linear perspective, in which the 
New simply replaces the Old.  For Augustine, the grafted tree is “recursive” and 
chiasmic: just as concealment sends us to revelation and revelation back to concealme t, 
so “the chiasmus keeps turning upon itself, unfixing reference and sending us from one 
pole of the sentence to the next.”75  “Thus,” she continues, “where Paul’s image of the 
hybrid transformed temporal difference into spatial unity [(synecdoche)], Augustine’s 
chiasmus turns temporal difference back upon itself.  Repetition becomes inversio  and 
inversion takes us back to where we started” (22-23).  To put it another way, a reader can 
                                                      
74 Augustine, The First Catechetical Instruction (De Catachizandis Rudibus), ed. Johannes Quasten, trans. 
Joseph P. Christopher (New York: The Newman Press, 1946), 23.  See also Freinkel, Reading 
Shakespeare’s Will, 22. 
75 Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 22. 
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only interpret an allegory by keeping symbols and substance, signifiers and signifieds, 
and in this case flesh and the spirit, proximate to one another.  Of course, much of this is 
fundamental to Joel Fineman’s exploration of the dark lady’s paradoxical identity.  For 
Fineman, the differences concealed in the sonnets to the young man are revealed in the 
dark-lady poems; the relationship between the two parts of Shakespeare’s sequence is 
thus represented poetically as the chiasmus.  Indeed, Freinkel could have given his 
argument a religious tincture if she had stayed with the chiasmus.  But she pushes on. 
Freinkel shows how grafting became a major source of debate and contention in 
the hands of Luther, who “devastates the Christian notion of succession” and with it the 
chiastic structure in which “any loose ends are tucked up in the scheme’s beginning while 
any stray beginnings are enfolded in its end.”76  “He devastates, that is to say, the 
‘hybrid’ logic of inheritance and fulfillment according to which the spirit is heir to the 
flesh, and the flesh is prefiguration of the spirit.”77  For Luther, the “strife between flesh 
and spirit knows no end in this life.  As long as there is flesh, there will be sin” (120).   
For a graft that had formerly embodied the reconciliation of flesh and spirit, this 
means quite a lot.  Indeed, Luther’s writings about Paul’s olive tree are the cornerstone of 
Freinkel’s study.  Two lines in particular are key to her discussion: “from the tam olive 
nothing is produced by nature except the wild olive”; and “the branch of the wild olive 
through grafting becomes the branch of the tame olive, which the tame could not have 
done by nature.”78  Freinkel does not mention this, but Luther’s view that the “the tree of 
Romans 11 is split from the start” and that the art of “‘ingrafting grace’” tames the plant 
recalls Polixenes’ argument to Perdita: Grafting, to quote him again, “is an art / Which 
                                                      
76 Ibid., 22, 119. 
77 Ibid., 119. 
78 Qtd. in Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 122. 
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does mend nature – change it, rather – but / The art itself is nature (4.4.95-97).79  In both 
cases, the grafted branch tames the wild or splintered root; and in both examples, author  
yielding greater power to the horticultural method itself than to the original tree challenge 
Paul’s conception of the graft.80   
Ultimately, then, Freinkel presents us with two Lutheran grafts – the abstract 
image of the olive tree made perfect and tame by the art of “ingrafting faith,” nd the 
imperfect graft that will always fail to reconcile the branches and the roots (spirit and 
flesh), and will always imperfectly represent Christian conversion and redemption.  If we 
focus, however, not on Luther’s idealized graft that seems irrevocably out of reach but 
rather on the original graft severely weakened under his theological reforms, we also 
confront what Freinkel calls “catachresis” – the ultimate rhetorical critique of Christian 
figura particularly and figural reading generally. 
The graft is, for Freinkel, one of the most powerful metaphors in Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets, both because he refers explicitly to engrafting at a key point in the sequence (in 
sonnet 15) and because he is writing in the shadow of Luther.  Considering Luther’s 
catachrestic worldview in terms of Shakespeare’s poetry, Freinkel argues that just as “the 
flesh is no figure of [the] spirit” and just as the relationship between flesh and spirit is 
interminably “irreconcilable,” so the “difference between the rose and canker, between a 
true beauty and a dog [rose], is undecidable.”81  As Freinkel contends, Luther’s insistence 
that the flesh can only be superseded by the spirit after death explains the poet’s 
uncertainty about the rose and the canker; one simply cannot distinguish one from the 
                                                      
79 Ibid., 122-23.  
80 As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, Paul writes, “Boast not thy selfe against the branches, thou 
bearest not the roote, but the roote thee” (The Geneva Bible, Romans 11:17, 1562). 
81 Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 160, 166. 
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other until the rose wilts and its essence is distilled.82  Thus, poetry intending to idealize 
the perfectly grafted olive tree in the name of a pure and changeless beauty will fail; and 
those who knowingly promulgate beauty’s immortality, Freinkel argues, cannot but 
invoke catachresis, an empty figure: “there is no proper name for the young man’s be uty 
because, like all beauty,” she contends, “it fails to remain like itself” (205).  This 
assertion is reminiscent of Thomas M. Greene’s argument that we cannot keep urs lves 
from writing insufficient metaphors and making waste.  Committed to the notion of 
catachresis, Freinkel takes the next step when she argues that Shakespeare’s po ms reveal 
that “we cannot stop (re)producing figures – even if our reproductions only amount to 
figures of abuse.”83  If, for Freinkel, the rose is a “figure of abuse,” then the canker 
emerges as a reminder of this reality – and a symbol of our own failure to conduct an 
adequate figural interpretation of the Sonnets.   
In many ways, then, Freinkel shares some of the same ideas about the Sonnets as 
Joel Fineman: they both explore the way the poems keep pointing to what has been lost 
(Fineman, we recall, makes much of the etymology of epideixis), and their arguments 
depend to different degrees on the poems’ belatedness.84  However, Freinkel argues that 
Shakespeare’s sonnets cannot but undercut Fineman’s logic of “necessary and consequent 
conclusions” when they announce the end of literary succession and thus the end of pure 
beauty.  Instead of arguing that repetition eventually creates or reveals hitherto concealed 
difference, Freinkel suggests that Shakespeare’s poet fails to repeat and retain anything at 
all.  For Freinkel, belatedness describes the way Shakespeare’s Sonnets “sum up an entire 
                                                      
82 Ibid., 210.  This catachrestic worldview means accepting the fact that there is no way of experiencing 
spiritual fulfillment on earth.   
83 See again Thomas M. Greene, “Pitiful Thrivers,” 237-238.  Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 203. 
84 Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 164. 
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poetic tradition” and not with the way they continue what has passed (in the young-man 
poems), only to reveal an embedded truth (in the dark-lady poems).85  Thus, in Freinkel’s 
argument, the poet cannot idealize the young man without immediately articulating the 
impossibility of speaking the truth; for Freinkel, the “lie” emerges in the first seventeen 
poems of Shakespeare’s Sonnets when the speaker recognizes that the young man will 
decline no matter what he writes but vows to immortalize him in verse anyway (201-03).  
Unlike Fineman, Freinkel argues that the poet of the young-man sequence is already 
working against time even as he watches the way time works his scythe over the b loved.   
Thus, Freinkel’s observation that the canker is the “cancerous shame that, hidden 
within, secretly corrupts essence” reflects a deep appreciation of the central conundrum 
in the Sonnets (211).  Indeed, she confidently claims that “Shakespeare’s response [to the 
ecclesiastical situation redefined by Luther] is more historically specific, more exacting 
in its terms, and more far-reaching in its consequences, than Fineman suggests” (208).  
Shakespeare, she says, “uncovers the very roots of idealism, exposing and questioning 
the temporal structure that sustains it” (208).  True enough, but is catachresis the key o 
understanding the canker and the rose?  Does catachresis go far enough?  Doesn’t the 
next step after saying that “beauty’s name equivocates between rose and canker” require 
pinpointing the rhetorical figures underlying that equivocal relationship (211)?   
Reading the canker/rose relationship in terms of metonymy and synecdoche 
allows us bring another theological figure back into the argument: Paul’s synecdochic 
olive tree, which Freinkel imagines as an idealized correspondence of part and whole. 
Luther’s criticism of this olive tree, as Freinkel presents it, has to do not only with the 
relationship between flesh and spirit, and Old Testament and New, but also with the 
                                                      
85 Ibid., 164. 
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difficulty of naming and evaluating the branches and roots.  She does not mention this, 
but what Luther introduces into the problem when he questions part and whole is the 
underlying logic of metonymy.  Luther’s notion that Jews and Christians must be grafted 
onto the same olive branch also suggests a powerful awareness that the parts might easily 
be misnamed, misunderstood, misconstrued.  One could also say that Luther, in 
challenging Augustinian allegory, draws attention – as we shuttle back and forth between 
the Jewish olive tree of the Old Testament and the Christian/Jewish tree of the New 
Testament – to the contiguous branches that were supposedly cut off.  Freinkel suggests 
that, for Luther, those branches represent all of humanity; a postlapsarian wo ld will 
never see the ideal graft fully realized, and we are all cut off. 
But Lutheran theology takes us only so far.  It takes Freinkel as far as the 
procreation poems, where she argues that the “difference between the canker and the 
rose…is undecidable” and demonstrates how the poet comes to this conclusion almost as 
early as sonnet 1 (166).  We can, however, frame the problem differently if we insist that 
the question of undecidability is for the poet only the beginning of a quest that propels 
him to conduct a satirical inquiry of praise poetics itself.  After all, why would an author 
bother to write a collection of sonnets whose answer to the problem (of Luther’s graft, of 
the canker and the rose, of the ethics of praise) exists in the opening 17 poems?  Can he 
even do so?   
My interpretation of sonnet 54 illuminates the differences between Freinkel’s 
study and my own.  The poet, if we remember, begins by clearly distinguishing a rose 
from a canker rose, emphasizing that the beloved, like the rose, has “truth” that the poet 
can distil.  I have suggested, however, that we attend to the ambiguous nature of truth,
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watch where the distinctions between the beloved and the canker rose begin to break 
down (particularly through vade/fade), and so accept that the poet is anything but 
confident about his own poetry.  The question remains whether his poems will resemble a 
rose or a canker rose and whether that resemblance is tru to his object of praise.  For 
Freinkel, however, the meaning of truth is not the problem because truth is only 
connected to the rose.  As she argues, “truth” in sonnet 54 “is compromised” because the 
“difference between the rose and the canker…can only emerge after death” (211).  The 
fact that the beloved “vades” at all reflects, for Freinkel, the poet’s criticism of Christian 
figura – and not a sequence-long investigation of a central question about corruption or 
praise poetics generally.     
The graft, too, can be interpreted in at least two different ways.  While Freinkel is 
right to show how the graft is intimately tied to the canker and the rose, I argue that the 
graft allows the poet to move beyond the trappings of Lutheran theology and beyond 
merely affirming that he cannot help but falsify beauty and mark time (203).  The graft 
initiates a poetic essay – vis-a-vis Montaigne – into praise poetics itself, which includes 
the beloved and its poet.  In other words, the Sonnets take us beyond Luther’s worldview 
to a skeptical one that in its own way is no less Protestant – and no less steeped in post-
Reformation anxieties about knowledge – than Freinkel’s catachresis.  The canker and 
the rose of course sit at the center of this poetic essay.    
The poet’s most sustained exploration of the canker/rose problem transpires in 
sonnets 91-99, the very section that John Kerrigan cites as evidence that Shakespeare 
authorized the ordering of the 1609 Quarto.86  Sonnet 91 begins by exaggerating the 
beloved’s superior qualities only to reveal by the end that the beloved “has it in his power 
                                                      
86 John Kerrigan, The Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, 290. 
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utterly to deprive” the poet of the “happiness” he has just celebrated.87  Although by 
sonnet 92, the poet assures himself that he “need…not…fear the worst of wrongs, / When 
in the least of them my life hath end,” he is most concerned that the beloved is abusing or 
will abuse the poet without his receiving the mercy-killing knowledge: “But what’s so 
blessed fair that fears no blot? / Thou mayst be false, and yet I know it not.”  The 
beloved’s hidden canker haunts the poet through sonnet 93, where he vows to “live, 
supposing thou art true, / Like a deceived husband.”  By the couplet, however, the poet’s 
anxieties return and we find him complaining, “How like Eve’s apple doth thy beauty 
grow, / If thy sweet virtue answer not thy show.”  As this cluster of poems r veals, the 
poet moves through three phases: assuming that the beloved’s corruption would be fatal 
to him; seeking refuge in self-denial and self-deception; and, finally, fearing the 
unknown.  While the poet seems once again to worry whether he is authorizing the 
beloved’s trespass with rhetorical comparison (sonnet 35), these later poems suggest that 
the poet’s skepticism has by this point led him close to despair.   
Sonnet 94 in many ways attempts to control this despair by calmly meditating on 
the nature of power and the virtues of self-restraint.  In other ways, the sonnet develops 
the poet’s epideictic inquiry and so prepares us for 95, one of the most skeptical poems in 
the sequence:  
They that have power to hurt, and will do none, 
That do not do the thing they most do show, 
Who, moving others, are themselves as stone, 
Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow: 
They rightly do inherit heaven’s graces, 
And husband nature’s riches from expense; 
They are the lords and owners of their faces, 
Others, but stewards of their excellence. 
The summer’s flower is to the summer sweet, 
                                                      
87 Katherine Duncan-Jones, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 292. 
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Though to itself it only live and die, 
But if that flower with base infection meet, 
The basest weed outbraves his dignity: 
     For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds; 
     Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.       
Typical of just about all of Shakespeare’s works – including Measure for 
Measure, Macbeth, The Tempest, and the Henriad – this sonnet is acutely skeptical of 
power.  Here the poet avers that those people who exercise self-restraint “rightly do 
inherit heaven’s graces” and protect and preserve “nature’s riches.”  Given the beloved’s 
predilection for “niggarding” and “hoarding,” however, the poet seems to promulgate an 
ideal that the beloved has not yet measured up to. 
Still, this ideal is undercut by the poem’s “imputation of hypocrisy” and the poet’s 
genuine fear that power will burst the dam of self-restraint.88  John Kerrigan’s gloss on 
line 7 illuminates my point.  One interpretation, he argues, “makes the faces seem a 
synecdoche for the lords and owners who bear them” (292).  For the poet to insist that 
“they that have power to hurt” essentially “are…their faces” implies that those people 
may not only do but also become the thing they most do show.  In an alternative reading 
of line 7, Kerrigan suggests that “they that have power to hurt” merely control their 
features and lord it over their countenance (292).  Twisting their faces into submis ion, 
such people end up revealing a battle between will do and will not.  From this 
perspective, the visible power to hurt somehow competes with an external demeanor set 
on stoically reining in the defects, inheriting heaven’s graces, and husbanding nature’s 
riches from expense.  An “imputation of hypocrisy” or merely the reflection of an 
ongoing need to control what cannot be obliterated, this latter interpretation reflects the 
logic of metonymy; the container will contain the damage but not succumb to it. 
                                                      
88 Kerrigan, The Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, 291. 
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The identity of “they that have power to hurt” is also open to question.  Although 
the poet is presumably trying to persuade the beloved to “husband nature’s riches from 
expense,” the poet in the previous sonnet had vowed to live like a “deceived husband” 
himself.  This connection reminds us that the poet could also be writing about himself, 
who in his own way has power to hurt by writing the beloved’s flaws into his verse.  The 
fact that poet and beloved could both be husbanding “lords and owners,” moreover, 
harkens back to the truth of the graft, the sequence’s most limpid manifestation of their
mutual complicity.  In 94, if the poet is the “lord,” then the beloved becomes a “steward” 
who merely inhabits the poet’s excellent verse; if the young man is the “lord” or “owner,” 
then the poet is the steward, copying the beloved’s virtues into his poems.89  This 
relationship remains intimately intertwined even if goodness and virtue were to succumb 
to vice, and even if they that have power to hurt find that they can no longer hold their 
controlled pose. 
 Even so, none of these ambiguities prepares us for the sestet, which focuses on 
the agricultural riches husbanded in the first eight lines: the “summer’s flower” that is “to 
the summer sweet, / Though to itself it only live and die.”  For my purposes, the crux of 
this sonnet is the second half of its third quatrain: “But if that flower with base infection 
meet, / The basest weed outbraves his dignity.”  While these lines suggest the truism that 
the greater or more virtuous a person, the harder he falls, they also explore the same 
question about inherency and contiguity that the sequence has been revisiting since 
sonnet 35 (here the problem of the rose is identical to that of the lily).  Philip Martin, 
tying “base infection” to “basest weed,” suggests that the weed can corrupt the summer 
                                                      
89 For a discussion of the ambiguity of line 8, see Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 307; and Kerrigan, The 
Sonnets and A Lover’s Complaint, 292. 
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flower.90  Of course, a weed can accomplish this any number of ways, from cross 
pollination to grafting.  Perhaps, however, the weed exists merely to highlight the 
corruption already within the “summer flower” that lives and dies by itself like the canker 
rose of sonnet 54; perhaps the weed’s baseness helps expose the base canker in that 
summer flower.   
Helping to set these issues within the context of the most powerful association of 
all – that between the beloved and the poet’s art – Kerrigan observes that weed lso 
denotes “costume,” which could signify the beloved’s poetic costume: the poems 
themselves.  Thus, the beloved’s “shows” refer not only to that which is discovered or 
seen as true (the canker as corruption) but also that which is recorded and represented in 
the poet’s verse (the canker rose as copy).  Inextricably dependent on one another, the 
beloved and the poet are both potentially guilty weeds – one for turning an art form int  
something base and the other for converting a praise object into an image of base 
infection.                       
Shakespeare wrestles with these problems one last time in sonnet 95, the most 
classically satirical poem in the entire sequence.  Appropriately, the poem also shows 
signs that the poet’s inquiry has come to an end:   
How sweet and lovely dost thou make the shame 
Which, like a canker in the fragrant rose, 
Doth spot the beauty of thy budding name! 
O in what sweets doest thou thy sins inclose! 
That tongue that tells the story of thy days 
(Making lascivious comments on thy sport) 
Cannot dispraise but in a kind of praise; 
Naming thy name blesses an ill report. 
O what a mansion have those vices got 
Which for their habitation chose out thee, 
                                                      




Where beauty’s veil doth cover every blot, 
And all things turns to fair that eyes can see! 
      Take heed (dear heart) of this large privilege: 
      The hardest knife ill used doth lose his edge.91 
 
This sonnet makes two overarching, yet contradictory claims: first, the canker – th  vice, 
or evil – that exists within the subject and is noticeable on the outside only as a spot, will 
eventually work its way to the surface, perhaps corrupting the beloved on the outside as 
he is already corrupted on the inside; second, because “beauty’s veil doth cover every 
blot,” beauty might not only be capable of concealing vice but also of making the vice 
seem beautiful and good, converting “all things…to fair.” 
These claims together challenge the integrity of praise by suggesting compli ity 
between the subject’s celebrated beauty and his internal moral corruption.  Even here we 
see beauty mimicking the properties associated with infection (i.e., by a canker) when the 
poet describes “beauty’s veil” covering “every blot” and effectively transforming foul 
into fair.  Blame, however, feigns the qualities of admiration, for any attempt to 
“dispraise” the subject is rendered paradoxically into a “kind of praise,” a predicament 
that makes it difficult to distinguish between merited and unmerited praise, or rose and 
canker, and that, the poet realizes, ultimately cheapens the panegyric form.  We can read 
this confusion poetically through the logic of synecdoche and metonymy.  From the 
standpoint of metonymy, the vice attacks the hapless and unsuspecting beloved, finding 
“habitation” in a beautiful “mansion.”  Synecdochically, the beloved’s virtues 
comfortably assimilate the vices, perhaps because he has been susceptible to corrupti n 
all along but still able to make his “shame” and “sins” seem “sweet.” 
With such a complex expression of the satiric mode, it should come as no surprise 
                                                      
91 For the purposes of this particular analysis, I am using Vendler’s edition.  Duncan-Jones, along with 
several other editors, removes what I think is crucial to the poem: the parentheses in lines 6 and 13. 
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that this disruption is also reflected in structural and metrical oddities.  Indeed, almost 
every line in this poem contains an evil textually counterbalanced against some go d: 
sweet/lovely and shame in line 1, canker and rose in line 2, spot and beauty in line 3, 
sweets and sins in line 4, a pattern that continues almost without exception to the very 
end.  This disturbing collusion between good and evil, and praise and blame, correlates 
with a strain in the poem’s form, a strain that threatens to rob the sonnet of its distinction 
as a sonnet, as a poem of admiration and praise.  Indeed, 95 is one of the few poems in 
the sequence in which the speaker’s first idea concludes by the third line of quatrain one 
and disrupts the traditional, four-line thought pattern (although the poet usually breaks
quatrains into two, two-line thoughts, he typically retains each poem’s symmetry). 
What results is a disturbingly asymmetrical poem that reflects the poet’s 
conflicted emotions.  The fourth line can offer only an abrupt conclusion to the first 
quatrain, a disturbance repeated in the second quatrain, where the speaker’s thought ends 
with line 7.  Thus, he is forced to tack on a shorter statement in line 8 that stands rather 
awkwardly in the poem like an insecure, obtruding appendage: “Naming thy name 
blesses an ill report.”  Adding to this structural awkwardness is the fact that sonnet 95 is 
among the few sonnets in the sequence that contains an entire line in parentheses, a 
rhetorical device that Puttenham calls the “inserter” since it destabilizes the ideas around 
it.  The parenthetical remark, “(Making lascivious comments on thy sport),” conjures an 
image of a rude satirist making “comments” on the beloved’s exploits.  And the fac that 
the line is nestled in parentheses only emphasizes further its subversiveness, indeed, the 
subversiveness of satire in the poetics of praise, which works like a canker from within 
the sonnet, eating its way through to the surface to unsettle it, even deform it.  Perhaps it 
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is this threat of deformity that leads the poet to stop his inquiry and move to the 
resolution of 99.  Perhaps he discovers, in the process of uncovering the truth of the rose, 
that he runs the risk of destroying the apparatus that got him there and even of losi g 
himself along the way. 
The resolution offered by 99 is quite unexpected.  Like sonnet 95, whose altered 
form provokes speculation about why the poem defies the sonnet structure, 99 is unique 
and “rebellious” in another way, for it is the only sonnet with fifteen lines, the first of 
which serves as an introduction: 
The forward violet thus did I chide: 
‘Sweet thief, whence didst thou steal thy sweet that smells, 
If not from my loves breath?  The purple pride 
Which on thy soft cheek for complexion dwells 
In my love’s veins thou hast too grossly dyed.’ 
The lily I condemned for thy hand, 
And buds of marjoram had stolen thy hair; 
The roses fearfully on thorns did stand, 
Our blushing shame, another white despair; 
A third, nor red, nor white, had stol’n of both, 
And to his robb’ry had annexed thy breath; 
But for his theft, in pride of all his growth 
A vengeful canker ate him up to death. 
     More flowers I noted, yet I none could see, 
                             But sweet, or colour, it had stol’n from thee.  
Burrow considers 99 to be among the earliest-composed sonnets because it is structurally 
ungainly (it contains two sentence fragments) and metrically awkward, p ticularly in 
line 4, where the internal trochee on “cheek for” breaks up the line flow.92  The meter, 
nevertheless, seems appropriate to the poem’s development, for the rougher rhythm 
creates an aural discomfort that prepares the reader for the harsher satiric language that 
builds with each quatrain and culminates with the canker in line 13.  Thus, the first five 
lines contain gentle reproofs and descriptions like “sweet thief,” “forward,” nd “steal,” 
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while the last phrase of the quatrain, “grossly dyed,” reflects an aptly elevatd level of 
blame.  This subtle shift leads us into the second quatrain, where the poet vows to 
condemn the offending lily for the beloved’s sake.  The poet then proceeds to survey the 
abject roses, who “fearfully on thorns did stand, / One blushing shame, another white 
despair,” as if they, too, have been condemned and are awaiting sentence.  The poet’s 
gentle tone in quatrain 1 becomes caustic by the second quatrain, where shame and 
despair lead directly to death in quatrain 3: the vengeful canker finally destroys the 
dishonorable and meretricious unnamed “third” flower as punishment for its theft.  If, 
then, the poet has satirically projected his irritation and doubt about the young man’s 
praiseworthiness onto the flowers, he also shows frustration with the poetics of praise,
which offers nothing more than stolen, unmerited beauty.  That is, once the poet writes 
about the beloved – establishing his identity within a system of comparison – the young 
man no longer looks beautiful and neither does the poetry.   
Regardless of whether Shakespeare wrote sonnet 99 before he composed many of 
the others, this poem is remarkable for its ambiguous resolution to the problem of the 
canker.  Presented here as a punitive force devouring what appears to be an overweening 
rose, the canker seems to have won, symbolically emptying the panegyric of its symbol 
of praise and thus of its very form and substance.  But has the canker eaten the real ros ?  
That third unnamed flower is arguably a canker rose, an imitation.  It is, after all, neither 
red nor white (pink is a common color for the dog rose), and it sits proudly among the 
other roses as if it were a rose.  Interpreted in this way, the poem reveals that the real 
threat in this sequence has not, in fact, been the cankerworm at all but rather the canker 
rose (the counterfeit).  For even as the cankerworm suggests erosion and satire, vice and 
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decay, it remains the sequence’s most distinguishing feature, the figure that differentiates 
Shakespeare’s poems from those of Petrarch, Dante, Sidney, and Spenser.  The canker 
rose, in contrast, reflects the very counterfeit poetics that Shakespeare has studiously tried 
to avoid.  In this respect, 99 shows the poet revising his perspective, revealing that t is 
not the cankerworm that has produced this false flower but rather the sequence’s attempt 
to preserve (and so imitate) the real rose. 
After this point, Shakespeare’s sequence moves in two directions simultaneously: 
(1) the poet with renewed force acknowledges the liabilities of his epideictic inquiry and 
takes leave of his skeptical exercise, and (2) the poet finds it possible to celebrate his 
beloved rose from a new perspective.  Helping to elaborate on this first point, Vendler 
argues that after sonnet 100, the poet commences “a narrative of self-blame rather than 
blame of the beloved.”93  While this reversal certainly describes the satirist – who 
typically grows as corrupt as that which he satirizes – it also defines the tragic hero, 
whose skepticism and destructive energies inevitably force him to look inward and to 
acknowledge what he sees there.94  The poet, in his own protracted recognition scene, 
                                                      
93 Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 424. 
94 While I want to emphasize here the tragic dimension of the young-man sonnets, its satirical structure 
should also be noted.  Kernan argues that a “darker sid ” exists in the satirist’s “nature,” for “as a result of 
his violent attacks on vice he acquires a number of unpleasant characteristics” of his own (The Cankered 
Muse, 22).  Kernan remarks that the satirist “denounces” his victims for “being intemperate and 
unreasonable, and the very violence of his denunciations proclaims him equally unreasonable and 
intemperate” (25).  Shakespeare’s exploration of the dark satirist pervades his plays as well as his poems.  
Burrow dates the last twenty-three sonnets to the mal  beloved – 104-126 – to the turn of the seventeenth 
century, maintaining that the final poems in the young-man sequence were written approximately between 
1598 and 1604, about the same years as the so-called Poets’ War and thus around the time that Shakespeare 
wrote As You Like It and Troilus and Cressida.  The key moments in the development of Thersites’ and 
Jaques’ characters happen at the end of the dramas.  In the last scene of Troilus and Cressida, when the 
volatile satirist Thersites, who has railed against almost everyone in the play, finally meets a fellow bastard, 
he hesitates to denounce or engage in battle, instead telling him, “One bear will not bite another, and 
wherefore should one bastard?” (V.7.18-20).  The morose Jaques goes further than refusing to ply his 
satirical art.  When Duke Senior urges him to join the wedding festivities, he quietly declines and takes his 
leave, saying, “To see no pastime I.  What you would have / I’ll stay to know at your abandon’d cave” 
(V.4.195-6).  These two characters cut a fitting image alongside Shakespeare’s late sonnets, in which the 
poet’s examination of the ethics of praise through his engagement with the satiric mode has forced him to 
154 
 
accordingly admits to the same vices that the beloved hitherto possessed – willful 
absence and a recognizable “stain” that can only be cleansed through repentance and 
forgiveness (109).  Significantly, this is the same poem in which the poet manages to 
ignore the canker in the rose: “For nothing this wide universe I call / Save thou, my rose; 
in it thou art my all.”  And by sonnet 110, a poem as much about infidelity to the genre as 
about infidelity to the beloved, the poet suggests that he has finished essaying himself.  
Confessing that he has “looked on truth / Askance and strangely,” the poet reveals that 
his “appetite” – personal, poetical, epistemological – he “never more will grind / O  
newer proof.”  Having probed the purity of his poetics, the poet decides that his “worse
essays proved thee my best of love.”  These “worse essays” lead the poet to ask his 
beloved to “chide” Fortune for his “harmful deeds” even as he admits that his sins are hi
own: “Pity me, then, and wish I were renewed” (111).   
Perhaps the most surprising reversal of all, however, occurs in sonnet 112 when 
the poet declares, “For what care I who calls me well or ill / So you o’er-green my bad, 
my good allow?”  The word “o’er-greene” might suggest transform or perhaps “cover 
over,” the very conundrum with which the poet wrestles in 95.  But he goes even further, 
turning his back on the world and inviting his friend not only to praise him (“my good 
allow”), but also to chide and rail against him: “You are my all-the-world, and I must 
strive / To know my shames and praises from your tongue” (112).95  If the praise poet as 
                                                                                                                                                              
gaze critically upon himself.  Resulting from this altered perception (a word that Charles Knight uses to 
define satire) is a satiric reversal, wherein the sp aker can affirm like Thersites that he is a “bastard,” and 
then retreat like Jaques from his position as satiri t.  See James Bednarz, Shakespeare and the Poet’s War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).  See also Stanley Wells, Shakespeare & Co. (New York: 
Pantheon, 2007).    
95 When Booth – the editor promulgating multiplicity n meaning and semantic ambiguity – throws up his 
hands in confusion, remarking that because of so many textual incoherencies, 112 is probably “an 
unfinished poem or one that Shakespeare abandoned in frustration,” his surprising pronouncement better 
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we knew him has symbolically died, his “death” eventually leads to restoration, to a ew
order, in which he affirms in the last full sonnet that his “heart” now knows “no art, / But 
mutual render” (125). 
 
“Reckoning Time”: The Wound of the Graft 
If we have ventured far beyond the purity of the Petrarchan rose, that is only 
because English Renaissance culture has in many respects made that shift in focus 
inevitable.  And yet, Shakespeare’s poet has acknowledged what every other sonnet 
sequence of his period probably also knows but does not articulate: that the cut which 
allows a poet to tie and bind his beloved scion – his rose – onto the poetry stock is also 
the wound that produces the canker.  He learns that the drive to “know more than the 
letter expresseth” and the need to assess failures are inextricably and par doxically tied to 
his discovery of vice within himself and his poetry as well as in the beloved.  Affirming 
with Montaigne that “external objects surrender to our mercy,” the sequence also 
expresses that we should we more cautious because of it, and because we just might 
surrender ourselves as well.  Thus, the poet contends by sonnet 121 that “’Tis better to be 
vile than vile esteemed, / When not to be, receives reproach of being, / And the just 
pleasure lost, which is so deemed / Not by our feeling, but by others’ seeing.”  “No, I am 
that I am,” the poet says, exalting only in an honesty of being, for “they that level / At my 
abuses, reckon up their own.”  As the poet comes to recognize, we see wounds in others 
only insofar as we see defects within ourselves, and we strive to know others in order to 
understand ourselves.   
                                                                                                                                                              
reflects the decisive shift from blame to self-blame than it explains Shakespeare’s authorial intent, which 
must ever remain a mystery (Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 369). 
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If, then, the graft represents the postlapsarian predicament expressed in Paul’s 
letter to the Romans, it is also an inevitable part of living; the graft is our only conne tio  
to the world and to each other.  Because we have no choice but to be grafted and to graft 
in turn, we must knowingly participate in an artistic practice that is flawed.  In our 
attempt to preserve life and bridge connections, we mark time, advance decay, and 
emphasize division.  If in religion the graft is our only salvation, the graft of praise poetry 
is cankered and reinforces inherent defect, that original stain within the individual that 
praise will always discover and that blame will always exacerbate.   
And so, the debate between inherency and contiguity – between the “drive” to 
“conceive more, or less, or beyond, or otherwise than the letter expresseth” and the 
tendency to misname or exaggerate virtues and vices – resolves itself in a truth that unites 
these competing camps: that the canker is inherent in the practice of praise.  By no 
means, however, does this spell the end of praise, “for [if] the letter killeth, then the Spirit 
giveth life.”96  Shakespeare’s tragic assessment of praise has deepened his poetics and 
allowed him to embrace, if not the mythical rose, then the spirit of that rose.  For the poet, 
having “reckon[ed] up his own [abuses],” can cling to the beauty that remains because of 
the ordeal of the rose.  And even with the canker, or “reckoning time, whose millioned 
accidents / Creep in ’twixt vows, and change decrees of kings,” and even if such change 
should “[t]an sacred beauty” and “blunt the sharp’st intents,” his “Love is a babe” that 




                                                      




The Wonder-Wounded Hearers in Hamlet 
 
 In this chapter, I explore in greater detail the tragic dimension of Shakespear ’s 
epideictic skepticism by reading Hamlet in terms of the young-man sonnets.  Unique 
among Shakespeare’s tragic heroes, Hamlet possesses a metatheatrical awa eness that 
Lear, Macbeth, Othello, and Romeo do not have.  As we will see, Hamlet considers the 
same problems that the poet does in the Sonnets.  Like the poet, Hamlet ponders the 
persistence and force of the canker, the dangers of slander and praise, the skeptical aspect 
of wonder, and the limitations and liabilities of representation.  Thus, I aim to show that 
even as Hamlet illuminates the complexities of Shakespeare’s poetics of appraisal, the 
young-man poems have something vital to offer in our quest to understand Hamlet in 
particular and the nature of tragedy in general. 
*** 
Hamlet grapples with two conflicting perspectives on verbal and dramatic 
representation: the desire to be authentic (in Polonius’ words, to himself “be true”) and 
the need to “act.”  Within two dozen lines of his first appearance in the play, Hamlet 
expresses disdain for theater, insisting that representation of internal states i   paltry 
endeavor.  Nonetheless, the prince later discovers that theater can work to his advantage, 
putting on an “antic” disposition, supposedly to deflect suspicion, and working with the 
players on The Murder of Gonzago.  Thus, by the fifth act of the play, Hamlet has 
surrendered to more than just divine providence.  He has capitulated to language itself – 
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to artifice – when he commissions Horatio, the orator, to “tell” his “story” in order to 
repair his “wounded name” (5.2.378-84).1 
Hamlet’s struggle over how to act (as mourner as well as avenger) produces 
dissonance between the words he speaks and the identity he conveys.  This dissonance 
contributes to our sense of his depth.  Indeed, his assertion that he has “that within which 
passes show” – and that nothing external, not his “inky cloak,” his “forced breath,” his 
mournful “river in the eye,” or “dejected havior,” can “denote” him “truly” (1.2.80-8) – 
has ensured ongoing interest in his subjectivity.  Since the time of Coleridge, critics have 
been drawn to Hamlet’s “great enormous intellectual activity” and, recently, Marvin Hunt 
boldly argues that “Shakespeare’s greatest tragedy enacts a radic l and unprecedented 
internalization of reality” and that Hamlet’s “resulting sense of a palpable interiority has 
reflected and shaped the intellectual history of the West.”2  Katherine Eisaman Maus does 
not make so broad a claim, but she nonetheless finds in “Hamlet’s conviction that truth is 
unspeakable” a model for a period that used drama as “a form of display which flaunts 
the limits of display.”3  Michael Schoenfeldt and Douglas Trevor also explore the 
prince’s inwardness but associate it with the period’s intense interest in the humors.4  
“While Hamlet,” Trevor argues, “sees himself forever worked upon by forces beyond his 
control, he roots these forces inside of himself, where fluctuations he cannot control
make and remake him as a tortured, Galenic subject” (72).  Hamlet’s wild struggle with 
                                                      
1 All references to Hamlet are taken from the Folger edition, which conflates the second quarto and folio 
versions.  Eds. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (1992: rpt. New York: Washington Square Press, 
2004).  
2 Coleridge’s Criticism of Shakespeare, ed. R.A. Foakes (New York: Continuum, 1989), 72; Marvin W. 
Hunt, Looking for Hamlet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7. 
3 Katherine Eisaman Maus, Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance, 1, 210.   
4 Douglas Trevor, The Poetics of Melancholy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  See also 
Michael Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness in Spenser, 
Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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the “forces inside of himself” can be attributed, of course, to more than physiological 
causes.  According to James Shapiro, the prince’s “sense of inwardness” reflects an 
important, end-of-the-century “cultural moment marked by a high degree of skepticism 
and a deepening interest in how subjective experience could be expressed.”5  Probably for 
most scholars, and regardless of their critical perspective, Hamlet gives off what Joel 
Fineman calls the “subjectivity effect” or what Marjorie Garber describes as the “illusion 
of roundedness or interiority.”6  Is it any wonder?  Hamlet spurns anyone who tries to 
pluck out the heart of his mystery.  Skeptical of visual and verbal representation, Hamlet
convinces us and the other members of the court that he is more than what he says and 
shows, that even his own language (much less that of others) cannot capture his character. 
Without dismissing these claims about Hamlet’s inwardness, I concentrate on 
how his doubtful attitude toward representation – in other words, his epideictic 
skepticism – underwrites the play’s tragic shape and the prince’s tragic identity.  I begin 
with his reference to the “wonder-wounded hearers” in 5.1.  Just before emerging from 
the shadows to utter this phrase, the prince hears his mother lament to Ophelia’s corpse, 
“I hoped thou shouldst have been my Hamlet’s wife” (255), to which Laertes replies, “O 
treble woe / Fall ten time treble on that cursed head / Whose wicked deed thy most 
ingenious sense / Deprived thee of!” (259-261).7  When Hamlet advances soon after 
                                                      
5 James Shapiro, 1599: A Year in the Life of Shakespeare, 293. 
6 Joel Fineman, The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); 
Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare and Modern Culture (New York: Anchor, 2009), 201.  For a discussion of 
how interest in Hamlet’s psychology (post-eighteenth century) led us to perceive the prince’s interiority as 
modern, see Margeta de Grazia, “Hamlet” without Hamlet (rpt. 2008; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007).  As de Grazia observes, “for the first couple of centuries after its publication, Hamlet was 
modern not because of its intimation of things to come, but because of its problematic relation to what had 
gone before.  Inwardness emerges on the literary scene as a defining trait of the modern that conclusively 
dissolves its ties to the past and puts it in touch wit  the future” (22).    
7 The second Quarto uses “double” rather than “treble,” thus suggesting a need at some point to amplify 
Laertes’ rhetoric even further. 
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Laertes leaps into Ophelia’s grave and begs that the onlookers “pile…dust upon the quick 
and the dead, / Till of this flat a mountain” they “have made / T’ o’ertop old Pelion or the 
skyish head / Of blue Olympus” (263-266), the prince is spurred on as much by Laertes’ 
criticism of himself as he is by his violent anguish.  “What is he whose grief / Bears such 
an emphasis,” Hamlet retorts, “whose phrase of sorrow / Conjures the wand’ring sta s 
and makes them stand / Like wonder-wounded hearers?  This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” 
(267-271).  Here Hamlet not only describes how Laertes’ “phrase of sorrow” has power 
to conjure and arrest the planets; by personifying the stars as wounded hearers, he also 
implies that this sort of language can hurt any listener.   
Examined from a broader perspective, then, Hamlet’s speech should give us 
pause.  What does it mean for wonder, which is so often associated with physical objects,
to wound our ears?  What sort of language has such power to assail and disturb?  In 
condemning Laertes for his unseemly and violent turgidity, Hamlet is arguably criticizing 
Renaissance tragedy’s chief vehicle for wonder: epideictic oratory.  His criticism, uttered 
in tandem with his assertion that he is “Hamlet the Dane,” reinforces the central t nsion 
in the play between identity and language.  The prince, however, embraces that tnsion.  
He uncovers a way to assume the role of the tragic hero while remaining skeptical about 
the demonstrative language typically used to represent that hero.8   
Insofar as epideixis denotes the amplified display of virtues and vices, tragedy 
represents demonstrative oratory in its most comprehensive form, depicting a world in 
which lofty speeches and the language of heroism clash with the rhetoric of abuse, 
suffering, and detraction.  The fact that tragedy both lauds and loathes its hero provides a 
                                                      
8 For a discussion of how wonder since the time of Aristotle has always been an “effect proper” to tragedy, 
see J.V. Cunningham, Woe or Wonder: The Emotional Effect of Shakespeareian Tragedy (Cincinnati: Ohio 
University Press, 1969), 60.   
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fertile environment for wonder, the emotional and epistemological counterpart to 
epideixis.  Inherently ambivalent, wonder comprises on the one hand admiration, 
amazement, and praise and, on the other hand, fear, surprise, even doubt.9 This last 
characteristic can be traced to Aristotle and Plato, who insist that wonder is a prelude to 
knowledge and thus an indication of uncertainty as well as curiosity.10  Hamlet’s 
skepticism, then, about the language of wonder – and, consequently, about the rhetoric of 
tragic heroism – also reinforces the centuries-old connection between wonder and 
doubt.11     
This connection is strengthened by Hamlet’s reliance on the word und, which 
not only evokes an image of an audience member transfixed (or amazed) by wonder but 
also represents the physical and epistemological violence wrought by a poet’s amplified 
language.  Laertes’ reference to the “skyish head / Of blue Olympus” and Hamlet’s 
retaliatory description of the wonder-struck “wand’ring stars” metaphorizes that 
linguistic power – that rhetorically-induced wonder wound – but only Hamlet is aware of 
the implications.  Mocking his rival’s attempt to verbalize his great grief, Hamlet 
suggests that Laertes’ exaggerated rhetoric disorients and confuses those who stand by to 
                                                      
9 See “wonder, v.”  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  10 October 2009 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50286808>.  Entry 1 shows how wonder means “to be struck with 
surprise or astonishment” and “to marvel,” while entry 2 connects wonder with “doubt.” 
10 In Theatetus, Socrates affirms that “wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in 
wonder” (104). Almost the same definition of wonder reappears in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “It is from a 
feeling of wonder that men start now, and did start in earliest times, to practice philosophy” (19).   
11 See Anita Sherman, Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne.  Although Sherman does not 
offer extensive commentary on Hamlet, she contrasts the “dignity and formidable intelligence of skeptics 
like Montaigne and Hamlet” with the Pyrrhonist as a “figure of fun” (7).  For other discussions of Hamlet’s 
skepticism, see James Shapiro, A Year in the Life of Shakespeare: 1599; A.D. Nuttal, Shakespeare the 
Thinker; Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human; Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge; 
Graham Bradshaw, Shakespeare’s Scepticism; and Millicent Bell, Shakespeare’s Tragic Skepticism.      
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listen.12  To be wounded through wonder, Hamlet insinuates, is to lose one’s sense of 
reality.   
Hamlet also implies, however, that to be a “wonder-wounded hearer” is to be 
estranged from oneself; thus, the wound points to an ontological as well as 
epistemological dilemma.  This is made clear in Hamlet’s description of “wand’ring 
stars” stilled by human speech.  Disparaging Laertes for turning these visual objects of 
speculation and marvel into “wonder-wounded hearers,” Hamlet emphasizes the power 
of language to disturb the natural order of things, to prevent us from asserting our 
identities, to disrupt a tragic hero’s control over his play.  Surely Hamlet must at this 
point be less troubled by Laertes’ emphatic grief than by his attempt to reduce the prince 
to a “cursed head” committing a “wicked deed.”  For Hamlet, Laertes’ “phrase of 
sorrow” has disturbingly – but perhaps unsurprisingly – tried to conjure the audience, the 
characters, even perhaps the prince himself not with his brotherly tears but with his 
potentially destructive verbosity.  
Through his criticism of Laertes, then, Hamlet exposes a wound at the heart of 
epideixis: amplified language (whether celebratory or disapproving) impairs the 
movement toward identity by creating a false representation at odds with the presumed 
original.  While this problem is articulated most concisely in the graveyard, it is 
embedded in Hamlet’s world from the beginning of the play.  In other words, the wound 
that he invokes in 5.1 is a manifestation of the wound inflicted upon Elsinore when 
Claudius steals into the garden and introduces the poison into the “ear” of the state.   
                                                      
12 See Cornelius Verhoeven, The Philosophy of Wonder, t ans. Mary Foran (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1972).  Verhoeven emphasizes the connectio between “wand’ring” and “wondering,” 




And yet, this is a poison that Hamlet himself must willingly administer.  Another 
look at 5.1 shows that while he is skeptical of epideictic display and critical of Lertes’ 
histrionics, the prince deploys the same language that he decries.  After all, “he” at 
5.1.267 may also be “Hamlet the Dane” and the demonstrative pronoun “this” may point 
to Hamlet’s own critical remarks as well as to himself: “What is he whose grief / Bears 
such an emphasis, whose phrase of sorrow / Conjures the wand’ring stars and makes 
them stand / Like wonder-wounded hearers?  This is I, / Hamlet the Dane.”  Read in this 
way, these lines show the prince identifying himself with – and participating willingly in 
– the act of wounding.  At once cutting down Laertes’ amplified wailings about Ophelia 
and aggressively flaunting his linguistic superiority, Hamlet parries wth a deliberately 
self-conscious variation of the same affected rhetoric, wrestling the laur l out of his 
rival’s hands and keeping it for himself.  The play, after all, is not Laertes’ revenge drama 
but Hamlet’s, whose endeavor to inflict the wonder-wound merely begins what he later 
commands Horatio to finish, which is to repair his “wounded name.”   
Of course, the paradox that a tragic hero is both wounded and wounding is 
commonplace and so not unique to this particular play.  Nonetheless, for Hamlet to 
demonstrate this paradox through speech distinguishes this play from other tragedies.  
Hamlet, in other words, shows a level of self-consciousness that surpasses a tragic hero’s 
recognition and affirmation of his flaws.  And through his speech, the prince even 
suggests that rhetorical wounding is a form of self-repair.  Exploiting the epideictic 
language that he disdains, Hamlet is not merely embracing stoic surrender and l tting be.  
The prince is also reinventing himself and his play, reinterpreting events, and thus 
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controlling how we perceive him as a tragic hero.13  Hamlet suggests, for example, that 
he was not speaking sincerely when he told Ophelia, “I loved you not” (3.1.129).  Now, 
he maintains, “I loved Ophelia.  Forty thousand brothers / Could not with all their 
quantity of love / Make up my sum” (5.1.285-287).  And when Hamlet narrates how he 
substituted Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s names for his own and ordered their deaths, 
he insists that “they did make love to their employment” and that “their defeat / Does by 
their own insinuation grow” (5.2.64-66).  Disowning responsibility for what he considers 
collateral damage, the prince claims it was God’s will.  He positions himself as Claudius’ 
“mighty opposite,” a divine surrogate at war with the devil’s representative: “‘Tis 
dangerous,” he adds, “when the baser nature comes / Between the pass and fell incensd
points / Of mighty opposites” (67-69).    
Similarly, Hamlet refuses to be accountable for Polonius’ death, informing 
Laertes before the final contest that he was “punished” with a “sore distraction”: 
                                                                                   What I have done 
                                            That might your nature, honor, and exception 
                                            Roughly awake, I here proclaim was madness. 
                                            Was ‘t Hamlet wronged Laertes?  Never Hamlet. 
                                            If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away, 
                                            And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes, 
                                            Then Hamlet does it not; Hamlet denies it. 
                                            Who does it, then?  His madness.  If ‘t be so, 
                                            Hamlet is of the faction that is wronged; 
                                            His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy. (5.2.243-53)  
Hamlet employs the third person as if to emphasize that this character was born in the 
graveyard and not before.14  He also represents himself as both a victim of his own 
                                                      
13 The only other public criticism of Hamlet occurs in the first act, when Claudius berates him for his 
womanish grief (1.2.90-121). 
14 And, indeed, Hamlet is right in more ways than one, for 5.1 is where we hear the gravedigger speak of 
Hamlet’s birth, the same day that “King Hamlet overcame Fortinbras” (148-49) and, just as significantly, 
the same day that the gravedigger himself started making houses to last “till doomsday” (61). 
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madness and a tragic protagonist who has managed heroically to overcome it.  This 
reversal of perspective is consistent with the prince’s altered attitude toward revenge.  
While earlier in the play Hamlet is plagued by the idea that killing Claudius co ld 
endanger his soul, the post-sea voyage Hamlet asks Horatio whether “he that ath killed 
my king and whored my mother, / Popped in between th’ election and my hopes, / 
Thrown out his angle for my proper life / And with such cozenage – is it not perfect 
conscience / To quit him with this arm?” (5.2.72-77).  Hamlet then goes further to 
consider both the moral rightness of the act and the mortal danger in refusing it: “And is 
‘t not to be damned / To let this canker of nature come / In further evil?” (77-80, my 
emphasis).15  These questions, together with his revised sense of authority, suggest that in 
the final act of the play, Hamlet does not merely commit himself to Horatio, asking that 
he alone repair his “wounded name”; Hamlet now actively re-conceptualizes his 
character and the very nature of his task. 
While Hamlet’s ostentatious assertion of his name in 5.1 crystallizes his 
propensity for reinvention, I chart his evolution toward wonder-wounding speaker across
the entire play.  Taking a broader look at how heard wonder annuls, limits, or interrupts 
identity, as well as how Hamlet incorporates this wonder-wounding language into his 
new role, I address Kenneth Gross’ assertion that “[i]t is not a simple thing to say what 
the poisoning of an ear amounts to in Hamlet, how ears are opened to their own damage, 
what states of mind allow a certain poison to take hold, what its mode of infection is.”16  
In his study, Gross uses the play’s references to the stunned, wounded, or damaged ear to 
                                                      
15 This passage is only in the 1623 Folio and (while we do not know whether the Folio version preceded or 
succeeded Q2) could well represent an attempt on Shakespeare’s part to build more coherence in the play;
thus, along with Hamlet’s new perspective on divine providence, the prince reconfigures his task as a 
Christian one: no longer do Roman ideals of honor conflict with Christian ethics. 
16 Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 14. 
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illuminate the “wounding presence of the word.”17  But no one has yet considered how 
this tragedy is structured according to this kind of language or how the princ finally 
accepts the wound as a necessary component of tragic heroism.18  Reminiscent of the way 
the poet grows to appreciate the canker resting at the heart of praise, Hamlt’s epideictic 
skepticism teaches him how to give shape to the language that has long been shaping him 
and thus to reclaim an identity that he reluctantly yields up to the ghost, the play’s first 
and most potent “wonder-wounding” speaker.19  
 
The Ghost: The Wonder-Wounding Speaker   
The idea that heard wonder threatens (or forestalls the progress toward) identity
derives from a rather simple premise: all meaning requires language.  Visual wonder 
means nothing until the viewer translates that experience into words.  Even if we are 
stunned and stupefied, visual marvels invite the opportunity to shape and interpret what 
we see.  This perspective is especially relevant to a period that still believed that seeing 
                                                      
17 Gross, 200.  Playfully performing the linguistic exc ss that he writes about, Gross addresses the play’s
creative exploration of everything from slander and rumor to “defamation, detraction, derogation, 
denigration, delation, calumny, contumely, traducement, [and] backbiting” (17).     
18 See, for example, Mark Robson, “Looking with ears, seeing with eyes: Shakespeare and the ear of the 
early modern,” in Early Modern Literary Studies 7.1 (2001), par. 1-23; Wolfgang Clemen, The 
Development of Shakespeare’s Imagery (New York: Routledge, 2005); Peter Cummings, “Hearing in 
Hamlet: Poisoned Ears and the Psychopathology of Flawed Audition,” in The Shakespeare Yearbook 1 
(1990), 81-92.  For a discussion of how Hamlet’s “satiric relationship to language” reflects his attempt to 
distance himself “from that genealogy of fathers upon which a hereditary (in contrast to an elective) model 
of kingship depends,” see Philippa Berry, “Hamlet’s Ear,” in Shakespeare Survey 50 (1997): 57, 64. 
19 Given the play’s preoccupation with ears, it should not surprise us that Hamlet reduces visual theater, or 
physical representation, to “inexplicable dumb shows” (3.2.12-13).  Claudius himself does not noticeably 
react to the dumb show during the performance of The Murder of Gonzago; he calls for the lights only after 
Hamlet begins to narrate the play.  Stanley Cavell seems persuaded by W.W. Greg’s suggestion that 
Claudius does not react because he did not poison h brother through the ear (Disowning Knowledge, 180).  
Perhaps, however, we can interpret this moment in theoretical terms: this play is criticizing an art wi hout 




involved emitting beams from the eyes (rather than passively admitting images).20  Aural, 
or heard, wonder, however, imposes meaning.  It is at once more disruptive and more 
diffuse than a visual marvel because it freezes a hearer’s natural thought process.  Hans 
Jonas, contrasting the eye and the ear, defines sounds as “dynamic events” and 
“trespassers by nature,” while Don Parry Norford argues that a word “penetrates to the 
soul and brings about a transformation of the entire being.”21   
Heard wonder is therefore sinister as well as seductive.  Creeping around corners
and arrases, its power can catch us unaware, mastering us before we are given the chance 
to master it.  As Lucretius explains, “an utterance makes its way intact through the 
labyrinthine passages in objects impervious to visual films.”22  This is because the ear, 
observes Mark Robson, “unlike the eye, is always open, always ready to receive, and can
only be ‘closed’ with difficulty….to decide whether or not to ‘listen’ to a speech, one 
must already have heard it.”23  Thus, while visual wonders (no matter how seductive and 
beguiling) lend interpretive power to a viewer who can freely gaze upon the marv l or 
studiously look away, heard wonder obstructs our authority to interpret.  This means that 
it is only with great effort that the “spoken word,” to quote Gross, can be “thrown back at 
                                                      
20 Stephen Booth discusses this “popular Renaissance theory of optics” in relation to Shakespeare’s Sonnets 
(Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 163). 
21 Don Parry Norford, “‘Very Like a Whale’: The Problem of Knowledge in Hamlet,” in ELH 46.4 (1979), 
564.  Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 139 
(qtd. in Norford 560-61).  
22 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R.E. Latham (New York: Penguin, 1994), 110.  
Discussing the violence of sounds, Lucretius goes on to argue that “sounds are disseminated in all 
directions because each one, after its initial splinter ng into a great many parts, gives birth to others, just as 
a spark of fire often propagates itself by starting f res of its own.  So places out of the direct path re filled 
with voices, and all around they boil and thrill with sound.  But visual films all continue in straight lines 
along their initial paths” (110-111).   
23 Mark Robson, “Looking with ears, hearing with eyes,” par. 3.  Elsewhere in his essay, Robson argues 
that the “openness of the ear can be viewed as an aset to those who wish to persuade, but it can also be 
seen as a threat, since it may be penetrated for good or ill…” (par. 14). 
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speakers” with “force.”24  As we see in Hamlet, a wonder-wounded hearer who struggles 
to speak is fighting for a chance to advance a competing interpretation of what he sees – 
and often a competing representation of himself.25    
***  
 While the ghost is the first “wonder-wounding” speaker of the play, the first 
character to wound the “ear of Denmark” is of course Claudius, whose murderous act – 
the literal corruption of his brother’s body through the ear – is subsequently covered up 
through “a forged process” of King Hamlet’s death (1.5.43-44).  It is easy to forgetthat 
we, the audience, are also taken in by “a forged process” in 1.2.  Before we even larn 
that King Hamlet was murdered, his death is depicted as “common” and Hamlet is 
encouraged merely “for some [short] term / To do obsequious sorrow” (1.2.74-96).  Only 
after we learn the ghost’s version of old Hamlet’s extraordinary demise do w recognize 
this scene for what it really is: a performance on Claudius’ part to convince the ourt that 
the time is not out of joint – that Denmark is not in fact “disjoint and out of frame” (20) – 
because by his side stands the “imperial jointress to this warlike state” (9).  Examined 
retrospectively, this scene explains why the ghost uses Hamlet not only to exac  revenge 
but also to restore an identity that his brother has usurped.  To achieve this, the ghost 
turns Hamlet into a wonder-wounded hearer. 
 Ultimately, then, the ghost’s horrific story – and not his strange presenc – has 
greater power over Hamlet’s imagination and the play generally.  However, the 
apparition dominates the opening scene as a visual wonder battling against Horatio and 
the guards’ appetite for interpretation.  Here we are witness to a curious rivalry played 
                                                      
24 Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise, 200. 
25 One could say that the practice of interpreting Hamlet profoundly manifests this problem. 
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out between the ghost – who says nothing and asserts nothing but the wonder of itself – 
and the guards, who attempt to impose meaning on what they see and to wring out the 
truth of the specter by charging it to speak. 
 Act 1 opens with men who, commissioned to watch for potential trouble from 
Norway, are “sick at heart” and living in fear (1.1.9).  Why?  Not because of a threat (as 
they see it) from anything alive, but rather a danger from the other-world: a ghost that 
looks exactly like Hamlet’s father.  The play’s first line – “Who’s there?” – stresses the 
extent to which the presence of “this thing” (26) has undermined characters’ perspectives 
of one another and even, perhaps, their sense of themselves.  Stephen Greenblatt 
describes Hamlet “as a play of contagious, almost universal self-estrangement.”26  From 
Horatio’s response that only a “piece of him” has arrived to see the ghost (1.1.24) to his 
affirmation that the ghost is as “like the King” as Marcellus is to himself (57-58), the 
opening sequence explores the “possibility of a difference between oneself and 
oneself.”27  
 The scene suggests, however, that the guards will gain some control over the 
horrid image, their fears, and even themselves by both speaking about the ghost and 
making Horatio speak directly to it.  A source of visual wonder, the ghost encourages 
speech even as it is encouraged to speak.  As Marcellus says, “I have entreated him 
[Horatio] along / With us to watch the minutes of this night, / That, if again this 
apparition come, / He may approve our eyes and speak to it” (31-34).  And he seems to 
take comfort in that fact.  Barnardo, meanwhile, finds solace in story, commencing a 
                                                      
26 Stephen Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 212.   
27 Ibid., 211.  As Greenblatt shows, the description of the characters at the beginning of the play anticipates 
the manner in which Hamlet characterizes his own madness at the end of the play – who “from himself be 
ta’en away” (5.2.248) – and the way that Claudius de cribes the sore distraction of Ophelia, who is, the 
King claims, “divided from herself and her fair judgment” (4.5.92).  Hamlet’s struggles with and against 
his identity, as we will see, deepen after his encou ter with the ghost. 
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narrative to Horatio that he makes clear he has told him before: “Sit down awhile, / And 
let us once again assail your ears, / That are so fortified against our story, / What we have 
two nights seen” (36-39, my emphasis).  As if the ghost has been conjured, he enters th  
scene just in time to interrupt Barnardo’s narrative and prevent his being described.  
“Peace, break thee off!  Look where he comes again,” Marcellus yells aftr Barnardo has 
only had time to narrate the location of the North Star and the time of night (42-47).  
Barnardo’s attempt, then, to “assail” Horatio’s “ears” “once again” is foiled by the 
entrance of the ghost, who competes with the guards for authority.  At this moment, the 
visual wonder momentarily trumps the wonder-filled story, forestalling Barnardo’s effort 
to ascribe meaning to what he has seen and thus to assert a claim over the image.  
 Horatio, however, is prepared for the challenge.  Addressing the ghost, he seems 
to drive it away: 
 HORATIO 
 
 What art thou that usurp’st this time of night, 
 Together with that fair and warlike form 
 In which the majesty of buried Denmark 
 Did sometime march?  By heaven, I charge thee, 
                  speak. 
 
 MARCELLUS 
                It is offended. 
 
 BARNARDO 
                            See it stalks away.  (64-60) 
 
Scholars have offered different reasons for the ghost’s departure.  Eleanor Prosser argues 
that the ghost is demonic and so leaves when Horatio appeals to heaven.28  Gr enblatt is 
more persuaded by G.R. Hibbard’s suggestion that the ghost is offended when Horatio 
                                                      




accuses him of usurping the night and the “warlike form” of the king than by Harold 
Jenkins’ claim that the ghost leaves because he does not see Hamlet standing there.29  
Admittedly, no single answer will satisfy all readers, but it is possible to expand on 
Hibbard’s observation.  Perhaps the ghost leaves not just because Horatio has accused 
him of usurpation, but because Horatio has – through words – usurped the ghost by 
speaking about it in its presence. 
 As becomes evident when the ghost reappears, Horatio’s insistence that he 
“speak” (61) seems to mask a deeper need to prevent his doing so.  This time Horatio 
draws a ring of speculations and conditionals around the specter, preempting his authorty 
to speak for himself:        
If thou hast any sound or use of voice, 
Speak to me. 
If there be any good thing to be done 
That may to thee do ease and grace to me, 
Speak to me. 
If thou art privy to thy country’s fate, 
Which happily foreknowing may avoid, 
O, speak! 
Or if thou hast uphoarded in thy life 
Extorted treasure in thy womb of earth, 
For which, they say, you spirits oft walk in death, 
Speak of it.   (140-151)       
If Horatio has won this small battle, he does not emerge unscathed.  As he himself has 
already admitted, the ghost has “harrow[ed]” him “with fear and wonder” (51).  This 
phrase deserves more than a passing glance.  The harrow reinforces the play’s skeptical 
attitude toward wonder and establishes a connection between “wonder” and “wound.”  
This phrase also shows that Horatio conceives of the specter as a painful stimuls, even 
though modern readers are unlikely to experience that sense of pain.  To many, a 
                                                      
29 Qtd. in Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 303n.12.  See also Shakespeare, Hamlet, ed. G.R. Hibbard 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 147. 
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“harrowing” tale is merely fearful and scary.  Horatio, however, surely intended to 
conjure an image of the agricultural tool whose sharp teeth tear into the soil, breaking it 
open in preparation for planting.  In the context of the play, the harrow carries a similar if 
symbolic function, wherein the iron rake drawn across Horatio and the audience during 
the opening scenes makes him and us vulnerable to the information about to be planted 
by the ghost.    
 Horatio’s reaction to the ghost and his reference to the harrow also shed light on 
his function in the play, which is not to play the stoic or skeptic at all, but rather a 
storyteller with a wondrous narrative to unfold before an amazed audience – a storyteller 
who will harrow the ears of the next generation of listeners.30  For what kind of stoic, we 
ask, would inform Hamlet to “season” his “admiration for a while / With an attent ear” 
until he “may deliver” a “marvel” (1.2.201-204)?  Surely only one who is assured of a 
dark upsurge of evil brought on symbolically by the act of the harrow: “In what particul r 
thought to work I know not,” Horatio muses to the guards, “But in the gross and scope of 
mine opinion / This bodes some strange eruption in our state” (78-80).  Horatio’s use of 
the word eruption, together with his mention of the harrow, foreshadows the extent to 
which the ghost’s harrowing tale will break open the play’s “plot,” allowing the seeds of 
information to be planted, seeds that will later burst into something dangerous and 
                                                      
30 Horatio’s task at the end of the play, and the manner in which he presents this task to Fortinbras, cn be 
compared to God’s order to Moses to convert the laws into a song so as to facilitate his teaching them to the 
sons of Israel.  At the end of Deuteronomy, God tells Moses that his “song shall answer them to their face 
as a witness: for it shall not be forgotten out of he mouths of their posterity” (Geneva Bible, 31:21).  Moses 
appropriately begins his song with an invocation: “Hearken, ye heavens, and I will speak: and let the earth 
hear the words of my mouth” (32:1).  Horatio’s final speech captures something of the intonation and 
cadence of this line. 
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strange.31  These images also underline the epistemological conundrum explored by the 
play and suggested, in particular, by the compound adjective “wonder-wounded”: To 
what extent does the external stimulus (the ghost) help create the internal eruption within 
Elsinore?  What power is given in this play to words and can they really transform a 
landscape, or a character?  
 These questions about corruption are developed in 1.4, just before the ghost 
appears to Hamlet.  This scene begins somewhat like the first, with the prince’s 
acknowledging (as did Francisco in 1.1) that the “air bites shrewdly” and that “it is very 
cold,” while Horatio adds that the “air” is “nipping” and “eager” (1.4.1-2).  Unlike his 
acquaintances, however, Hamlet seems calm enough to expound upon the flourish of 
trumpets signaling the start of the evening’s festivities.  To Hamlet, these sounds, instead 
of “respeaking earthly thunder,” as Claudius earlier boasts (1.2.132), “bray out,” animal 
fashion, the “triumph of his [Claudius’] pledge” (1.4.12-13).  What seems to bite and nip 
Hamlet shrewdly and eagerly, then, is not the cold air through which the ghost will 
eventually approach him but rather the celebratory noise coming from inside the castle, 
causing Hamlet to wonder whether his country’s “wassail” will make it “traduced and 
taxed of other nations” (1.4.10-20). 
 These references to “nipping” and biting lead directly to Hamlet’s discussion of 
the sort of language that has power to nip and bite: slanders, rumors, and enforced 
“attribute[s]” (reputation).  Hamlet begins with a political criticism, explaining that the 
tendency of nations to traduce and tax “takes / From our achievements, though performed 
                                                      
31 Claudius echoes this fear later in the play when h rejects Polonius’ idea that Hamlet is lovesick and
posits instead, “There’s something in his soul / O’er which his melancholy sits on brood, / And I do doubt 
the hatch and the disclose will be some danger…” (3.1.178-81).  
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at height, / The pith and marrow of our attribute” (22-25).32  In the second half of his 
meditation, however, Hamlet considers “particular fault[s]” in “particular men”: 
                     So oft it happens in particular men 
That for some vicious mole of nature in them, 
As in their birth (wherein they are not guilty, 
Since nature cannot choose his origin), 
By the o’ergrowth of some complexion –  
(Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason), 
The form of plausive manners – that these men, 
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect, 
Being nature’s livery or fortune’s star, 
His virtues else, be they as pure as grace, 
As infinite as man may undergo, 
Shall in the general censure take corruption 
From that particular fault.  The dram of evil 
Doth all the noble substance of a doubt 
To his own scandal. (1.4.26-41)    
 
This may be the most syntactically tortuous passage in the play, and it is not entirely clear 
how we should read it.  Perhaps Hamlet is continuing to denigrate the political realm; 
words like “scandal” and “general censure” are consistent with his discussion of 
traducing and taxing in the first part, and “particular men” may certainly inc ude someone 
like Hamlet’s father or Gertrude’s own “vicious mole”: her sexuality.   
 Equally as likely, however, Hamlet has also begun considering how the public 
may distort his own flaws.  Indeed, his reference to “general censure” reminds us of 
Claudius’ hypocritical speech in 1.2, in which the king argues publicly that Hamlet’s 
“unmanly grief” and his “obstinate condolement” are a “fault to heaven, / A fault against 
the dead, a fault to nature,” and “to reason most absurd” (97-107).  Claudius cannot tell 
what Hamlet “has within which passes show” (88); and yet, he can potentially turn 
Hamlet’s “unmanly grief” into an “o’ergrowth” of his mournful “complexion,” thereby 
                                                      
32 This speech, which exists only in the second quarto, clarifies Hamlet’s preoccupation elsewhere in the 
play and Shakespeare’s preoccupation (in the Sonnets) with the canker in the rose. 
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staining the “pith and marrow” of his being.  We might say, then, that Hamlet fears 
whether he can protect himself from slander and the “general censure.”  He wond rs 
whether he, too – like other “particular men” – may in the “general censure take 
corruption” from a “particular fault.” 
 Most significantly, this difficult passage focuses on three problems central to 
Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism: how do we understand and interpret corruption?  
How can one possibly talk about perceived evil without destroying a person’s “virtues 
else”?  And how do we give blame without inviting blame ourselves?  As Hamlet 
suggests, the corruption caused internally by “the o’ergrowth of some complexion” 
(1.4.27) also responds to the external “general censure.”33  Thus, we may never know 
whether the censorious public eye merely notes what is actually present or adds to that 
corruption by magnifying the “dram of evil,” thereby misnaming it.  Indeed, this passage 
is a fine prelude to the ghost, who enters the scene as soon as Hamlet utters the wo d
“scandal” and who earns the title “old mole” by the end of Act 1 (1.5.183).   
As if the specter has awoken him from a sleep or pulled him out of his 
melancholic lethargy, Hamlet’s language changes as soon as the ghost appears: 
Angels and ministers of grace, defend us! 
Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damned, 
Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell, 
Be thy intents wicked or charitable, 
Thou com’st in such a questionable shape 
That I will speak to thee.  I’ll call thee “Hamlet,” 
“King,” “Father,” Royal Dane.”  (43-50)        
                                                      
33 Gross gives a very succinct explanation of this difficult passage: “The drift of this speech is curiosly 
two-fold.  Hamlet is anxious about the way a continge t habit of character can overturn ‘the pales and forts 
of reason,’ becoming a source of madness within an i dividual soul, like a miner working underground, 
buried from view.  Yet he is also troubled by the fact that an elusive ‘dram of evil,’ a small but visible blot, 
provokes corruption through being taken up by the ‘general censure.’  Wounded names harm the living 
more than they harm the dead.  Hamlet’s words imply that a person’s private character can in some 
essential, if uncanny, way be shaped by the scandalous rumors which the world perpetuates…” 
(Shakespeare’s Noise, 14). 
176 
 
Like Horatio, Hamlet’s first impulse is to ascribe an identity to the visual wonder, and he 
does so with energy and authority.  Contrasting the long, syntactically awkward language 
in the previous speech, the language here is clipped and staccato, less ponderous, more 
assertive.  Even as Hamlet desperately desires this ghost to speak, he insists on painting a 
picture of the ghost as a body risen from the dead.  In other words, the image of his 
father, whose bones appear to the prince to have “burst their cerements,” has forced open 
Hamlet’s own mouth: 
                               O answer me! 
Let me not burst in ignorance, but tell 
Why thy canonized bones, hearsed in death, 
Have burst their cerements, why the sepulcher, 
Wherein we saw thee quietly interred, 
Hath oped his ponderous and marble jaws. (50-55)        
At the end of his manic speech, Hamlet is ready for the ghost.  “What should we do?” he 
asks him, and the ghost beckons (62).  Once alone, Hamlet beseeches the ghost to speak 
and with the exception of a few interjections and supplications, the prince is closed down 
for nearly one hundred lines.  
 Almost immediately, the ghost transforms Hamlet into a wonder-wounded hearer 
ready to “wipe away all trivial, fond records, / All saws of books, all forms, all pressures 
past” (1.5.106-7).  The ghost begins by informing the prince, “I could a tale unfold whose 
lightest word / Would harrow up thy soul, freeze thy young blood” and “make thy two 
eyes, like stars, start from their spheres, / Thy knotted and combined locks to part, / And 
each particular hair to stand an end, / Like quills upon the fearful porpentine” (20-26).  
Exploiting the harrow’s figurative potential, the ghost expands upon its function using 
sensual detail: just as the agricultural tool creates grooves in the soil, so his story would 
cause a listener’s “knotted and combined locks to part.”  Such a description unites the 
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image of the harrow to the experience of wonder – not only because it harkens back to 
Horatio’s comment that the ghost “harrows” him with “fear and wonder” but also 
because it foreshadows Hamlet’s criticism in the graveyard.  While the prince denigrates 
amplified language that “Conjures the wand’ring stars and makes them stand / Like 
wonder-wounded hearers,” the ghost boasts that his story, which can make Hamlet’s “two 
eyes, like stars, start from their spheres,” is capable of inflicting the sam ort of wonder-
wound. 
 Of course, the ghost’s decision not to describe his purgatorial tortures only means 
that he will endeavor to harrow Hamlet in other ways.  Indeed, the spirit’s mere ref nce 
to such tortures is enough to incite fear and wonder in the prince, and to compel his 
commitment to the task.  Before even recounting any details of the murder, Hamlet 
beseeches, “Haste me to know ‘t, that I, with wings as swift / As meditation or the
thoughts of love, / May sweep to my revenge” (1.5.35-37).34  Satisfied that the rhetorical 
harrow has done its work, the ghost, in one of the most chilling comments in the scene, 
replies, “I find thee apt” (38); in other words, he finds Hamlet sufficiently raked nd 
ready for planting.  The ghost then sows into his conversation a circumlocutionary phrse
that forces Hamlet to identify the murderer.  To draw out those necessary words, he 
appeals to Hamlet’s vitality and his social status, calling him a “noble youth” who has the 
right to know that the “serpent that did sting” his “father’s life / Now wears his crown” 
(45-47).  Completing his verbal picture of the biblical serpent by crowning its head, the 
spirit injures Hamlet’s ear and exploits his imagination in a way that reinfo ces the very 
problem of corruption and abuse with which the prince wrestles in 1.4.  Once Hamlet 
                                                      
34 Hamlet’s readiness to turn sworn avenger suits G. Wilson Knight’s observation that Hamlet becomes a 
cynic and “embassy of death.”  See The Wheel of Fire (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 17-46. 
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finally does cry out, “O my prophetic soul!  My uncle!” the prince has invited th  ghost 
to broach the particulars of his story (48).   
Most readers recognize the connection between Claudius, who pours poison into 
his brother’s vulnerable ear, and the ghost, who pours poison of a different, though 
equally virulent kind, into the harrowed ear of Hamlet when he incites him to revenge.  
For the ghost’s account of the murder is so grotesque, so vivid, and so palpable that it is 
easy to forget that they are words – they seem to course through the ear like a vile poison.  
The first half of the ghost’s narrative is pure invective, in which the specter rails at both 
Claudius, “that incestuous” and “adulterate beast” (1.5.49-50), and Gertrude, the 
depraved harpy-wife whom Claudius “won to his shameful lust” (52).  We can conjecture 
that the ghost would have gone even further in his abuse of Gertrude, expanding on his 
description of a “lust” that had “sate[d] itself in a celestial bed” to “prey on garbage” (62-
64), if he had not “scent[ed] the morning air” (65).  This sudden awareness does not stop 
him, however, from commencing a painfully protracted account of his death.  Describing 
the poison as a “leprous distilment,” the ghost explains how it curdled the king’s blood 
before working itself outward to the skin, where a “most instant tetter barked about,” so 
that the king appeared “most lazar-like, with vile and loathsome crust” over his formerly 
“smooth body” (71-80). 
 By comparing his scabby skin to buboes on the bark of an infected tree, the ghost 
also invokes a disease more commonly associated with plants, a disease cognate with 
Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism – the canker. 35  The ghost’s report of the poison’s 
fatal path mimics the effect of the canker: the distillation first infects the interior man, the 
                                                      




blood, before moving outward to the skin much as a canker would infect a plant.  From 
another perspective, the canker works in the rose just as words and poison work through 
the ear, a body part that somewhat resembles a rose.36  Implicit and explicit references to 
the canker pervade the play, and so it is not surprising to discover that the canker makes 
its way into the ghost’s story – the transitional section of the drama.  The word eme ges 
earlier when Laertes, warning Ophelia to steer clear of Hamlet, says that the “canker galls 
the infants of the spring / Too oft before their buttons be disclosed, / And, in the morn 
and liquid dew of youth, / Contagious blastments are most imminent” (1.3.43-46).  
Similarly, the ghost tells Hamlet that like a cankered rose he was “cut off, even in the 
blossoms of my sin” (1.5.83).  In this way, the ghost establishes a solid connection not 
only between the canker and the poison, but also between the murdered king and the 
blighted flower.  As for Claudius, he is both the serpent in the garden and the “canker of 
our nature” (5.2.79).37  
In the Sonnets, we saw how the canker – a figure of skepticism and satire – 
                                                      
36 I owe this idea to Kenneth Gross, who alerted me to the connection during an e-mail exchange.  See also 
Joel Fineman, “Shakespeare’s Ear,” in The Subjectivity Effect.  In this essay, Fineman looks at the 
iconography of the “vulva-like quality of the ear[s]” on Queen Elizabeth’s dress in the famous Rainbow 
Portrait, which shows a queen covered in body parts, the most significant being the “salacious ear that both 
covers and discovers” her genitals (228-229).  Taking up this idea of Fineman’s, Mark Robson explores th  
synesthetic effect of ear and eye when discussing hearing in terms of an audience (readers, particularly) 
predisposed to visualize words.  Hoping to enlarge our understanding of Renaissance orality, Robson uses
Fineman to substantiate the connection between seeig and hearing, pointing out that “the pornographic 
fetishistic quality [Fineman describes] of the ear c n only be seen, not heard” (“Looking with ears, hearing 
with eyes,” par. 18).  Interestingly, Robson also explores the way in which the wounding power of sounds 
needs to be seen or visualized in order to appreciate fully (par. 14).  In the end, Robson wants readers to 
appreciate the “interpenetration of eye and ear” in Shakespeare, an interpenetration that in Fineman’s and 
Robson’s case is sexual as well as textual or rhetoical (par. 19).  What makes both arguments persuasive is 
the fact that most people today spend more time reading Shakespeare than listening to the plays on tape or 
in the theater.  The idea that Shakespeare was writing not only for posterity generally, but for a future 
readership particularly is important.  For a discusion of this issue, see Lukas Erne, Shakespeare as Literary 
Dramatist.             
37 This quotation only appears in the 1623 Folio.  When Hamlet meditates on Fortinbras’s army in Q2, he 
treats the canker as an internal infection that does not rise to the surface: “Two thousand souls and twenty 
thousand ducats / Will not debate the question of this straw. / This is th’ imposthume of much wealth and 
peace, / That inward breaks and shows no cause without / Why the man dies” (4.4.26-30). 
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symbolizes corruption and vice as well as the interrogatory process.  Thus, the poet not 
only learns to appreciate the vicious mole in himself but he also discovers that the canker 
inheres in the practice of praise.  In Hamlet, a similar complexity emerges regarding the 
ghost’s story and Hamlet’s subsequent behavior.  The key resides in the prince’s 
affirmation that Claudius is the “canker of our nature.”38  Not just a figure of original sin 
(or, from a secular standpoint, of the original poison), the canker is the “wonder-
wounding” residue of epideixis, the thing that eats away at a listener’s expression of 
identity.  The canker has already worked its way into King Hamlet’s ear and thus his 
story, making it impossible for the ghost not to pass it to Hamlet through speech. 
But wounding words require an eager listener, for the canker is spread through 
interaction.  The story of the king’s horrific death helps illustrate this complicity.  Using 
medicinal materials to convey the effects of the poison, the ghost begins by saying that 
the distillation “holds…an enmity with blood of man” but also suggests that this 
“enmity” exists mostly within the victim himself (1.5.72).  As the ghost explains, the 
pollutant moves as “swift as quicksilver” – or mercury, a toxic cure for syphilis and other 
diseases – “through / The natural gates and alleys of the body” (73-74).  In describing 
how the poison then forces the blood to clot, the ghost employs yet another medicinal 
                                                      
38 Hamlet’s description is filled with etymological and historical significance, making the “canker” an 
extremely important image in the play.  In Saxo’s and Belleforest’s versions of Hamlet, Claudius is called 
Feng, which in one definition means the “venom-tooth of the serpent.”   See “fang, n.”  2nd ed. 1989.  OED 
Online.  Oxford University Press.  1 December 2009 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50082151>.  See 
Saxo Grammaticus, Historiae Danicae, trans. Oliver Elton (1894), in Narrative and Dramatic Sources of 
Shakespeare, ed. Geoffrey Bullough, 8 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), VII.60-79.  When 
Kyd or Shakespeare chose to rename the usurping king Claudius, their selection was no less appropriate.  
“Claud-” suggests “claw” and thus acts as a synonym for “Feng” (See “claw, v.”  2nd ed. 1989.  OED 
Online.  Oxford University Press.  1 December 2009 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50041090.).  
Moreover, Claudius, fourth Roman Emperor and successor to Caligula, was known for his physical 
deformity, and his name now means “club-foot.”  Sources that Renaissance writers would have been 
acquainted with on this subject are Suetonius’ The Lives of the Twelve Caesars nd Seneca’s Menippean 
satire Apocolocyntosis.  Interestingly, Claudius’ physical deformity places him in company with Oedipus, 
who inspired Freud’s psychoanalytic interpretation of Hamlet, and Vulcan, the mythological blacksmith.     
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image, the posset, or curdled milk: “And with a sudden vigor it doth posset / And curd, 
like eager droppings into milk, / The thin and wholesome blood” (75-77).39  Suggesting 
that the victim has partly killed himself, the ghost depicts the distillation in terms of 
established Renaissance cures which the body itself made poisonous.40  However subtly, 
then, these lines help introduce one of the central problems of the play, a problem which 
is also explored in the Sonnets: to what extent is Hamlet susceptible to the ghost’s
poisonous words because he is already corrupt and to what extent does the ghost wound 
him entirely from without?  To put it another way, can we distinguish Hamlet from tragic 
heroes like Macbeth, Lear, and Othello because the prince has no discernible tragic rror, 
or is he as flawed as the rest of them?41      
Regardless of how we answer these questions, Hamlet is utterly transformed after 
his meeting with the ghost.  By the end of Act 1, the prince not only resolves to avenge 
his father’s murder, but he also vows to yield up his entire value system, his former
identity, and even (“shall I couple hell?”) his harrowed soul: “Yea from the tabl of my 
memory,” he says, “I’ll wipe away all trivial, fond records, / All saws of books, all forms, 
all pressures past, / That youth and observation copied there, / And thy commandment all 
alone shall live / Within the book and volume of my brain” (1.5.105-10).  And who, 
                                                      
39 Hamlet, abusing and berating his mother in her bedoom, picks up this idea later when he describes 
Claudius as a “mildewed ear / Blasting his wholesome brother” (3.4.74-75). 
40 From a religious standpoint, if the king is in purgatory, Claudius should not receive all of the blame; the 
king, resting lazily in his garden, does not prepar himself and so he dies “even in the blossoms of his sin” 
and with all his “imperfections” on his “head” (83-86).  At the very least, this passage explores the ext nt to 
which one man can dictate the spiritual fate of another; it also explores the extent to which certain 
individuals may be more susceptible than others to the poison. 
41 For one discussion of this issue, see James Calderwood, To Be and Not To Be: Negation and Metadrama 
in Hamlet (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).  Calderwood argues that “Hamlet inherits a 
world already contaminated by the misdeeds of Claudius and his mother.  To come to terms with evil, the 
heroes of King Lear, Othello, and Macbeth have largely to come to terms with themselves; an order of 
recovery must begin with self-knowledge.  But Hamlet has not merely himself to come to terms with 
himself but also an outside world warped through no act of his – a world miasmal with mystery, disease, 
degeneration, death, betrayal, and false seeming” (20).    
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precisely, will feel the effects of such a commandment?  On the one hand, the ghost 
works hard to convince the prince of Claudius’ evil and of the necessity of killing him: 
“O horrible, O horrible, most horrible!” the ghost cries.  “If thou hast nature in thee, bear 
it not. / Let not the royal bed of Denmark be a couch for luxury and damned incest” (87-
90).  The ghost, on the other hand, works equally hard at implicating Gertrude: “Taint not 
thy mind, nor let thy soul contrive / Against thy mother aught,” the ghost knowingly 
implores Hamlet.  “Leave her to heaven / And to those thorns that in her bosom lodge / 
To prick and sting her” (1.5.85-88).  And so, if the ghost has taught Hamlet anything, he 
has certainly shown him how to be that prickly thorn in the bosom (or that canker in the 
rose) that spreads the infection around, to take the poison in one ear and use it to poison 
the entire ear of Denmark.  If Claudius begins it, then Hamlet – in his vow of revenge – 
promises to lead the corruption to its fruition.  “O most pernicious woman!” Hamlet 
responds, as if assenting to this task.  When Hamlet goes on to cry, “villain, villain, 
smiling , damned villain!” he succeeds only in ambiguously assigning “villainy” to 
Claudius, to Gertrude, and thence, we soon learn, to every inhabitant of Elsinore, 
including himself (1.5.105-06).42 
 Hamlet, of course, is acutely aware that he has been verbally abused, uttering “O, 
wonderful!” (128) when he returns to his friends.  Here the prince is referring not to the
sublime, innocent wonder we typically associate with miracles and marvels but rather to 
the kind of wonder evoked through terror and violence.  As I have suggested, the most 
                                                      
42 For a discussion of the way in which Shakespeare unit s the rhetorical and the judicial – and thus the way 
in which narrative delay works with accusation and rhetorical amplification – see Patricia Parker, 
“Shakespeare and Rhetoric: ‘Dilation’ and ‘Delation’ in Othello,” in Shakespeare and the Question of 
Theory, ed. Patricia Parker (New York: Routledge, 1986).  Although Parker does not discuss Hamlet, one 
can see how these issues come together in this scene with the ghost.  The apparition delays, amplifies, 
accuses, employs vivid language; and Hamlet feeds into this by demanding a narrative (“Haste me to know 
‘t”) and revealing his desire that the truth be brought “to light” (69). 
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profound symbol of that violence is the iron-toothed harrow, which facilitates planting by 
breaking open a plot of land.  This tool unites the epistemological and emotional 
dimensions of wonder (harrow suggesting “horror”) with the agricultural metaphor of the
canker.  If the harrow, therefore, is a figure that enables change, then wonder is its 
accomplice and the canker – wonder’s wound – the generic and rhetorical symbol of such 
change.   
       
To Speak or Be Spoken: The Wonder-Wounded Hearers in Hamlet 
Hamlet’s encounter with the ghost directly affects the way that he employs 
language in the middle of the play and underlies our difficulty interpreting his character 
after the first act.  Hamlet supposedly puts on the antic disposition to deflect attention 
from his true focus – plotting the murder of Claudius.  And yet, by the second act of the 
play and several weeks after his meeting with the ghost, Hamlet has not acted and has 
instead drawn more attention to himself than he had perhaps intended, the other 
characters scrambling to figure out “the very cause of Hamlet’s lunacy,” to borrow 
Polonius’ phrase (2.2.52).  At the beginning of Act 2, even readers, separated from the 
prince for more than three hundred lines and encouraged to view him from the other 
characters’ perspectives, begin asking similar, albeit more informed, questions about 
Hamlet’s madness, his strange behavior, his plans for revenge, and his relationship with 
and courtship of Ophelia. 
In entertaining such queries, we, like the characters, become wonder-wounded 
hearers and implicated in the process – listening in on soliloquies, spying on Hamlet, and 
eavesdropping on conversations.  However, if we can wrestle with our perplexities from 
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the comfort of a desk or an armchair, characters cannot.  As the play demonstrates, 
seeking out answers is exceedingly dangerous: Polonius is stabbed while spying behind 
the arras; Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are said to “make love” to their “employment” as 
detectives for the king and so die (5.2.64); and even Ophelia becomes emotionally caught 
up in the claustrophobic world of the court when she reluctantly agrees to be her father’s
lure – to be the “bait of falsehood” that catches the “carp of truth” (2.1.70) – and so like 
bait she is pulled beneath the water.  All the characters become, like Hamlet, wonder-
wounded hearers one way or another.43  
These same characters, however, also play wonder-wounding speakers, narrating 
off-stage events, crafting disparate accounts of one another, and so competing with one 
another to report what they have witnessed or been privy to – from Polonius’ long-
winded homilies about Hamlet’s lovesickness and the players’ performance of Th
Mousetrap to Ophelia’s account of Hamlet in his antic disposition (2.1.87-112).  
Characters thus become writers, authors, and painters of identity.  Ophelia, for example, 
also imposes an idealized view of Hamlet that alters how we perceive him; through her, 
we begin to understand what he may have been like prior to his father’s death.44  Her 
                                                      
43 Those who might still be objecting to this tendency in the play will probably point to the moment in The 
Mousetrap when Hamlet, narrating the murder, speaks the truth into Claudius’ ear and gives an accurate 
portrayal of his identity.  Nevertheless, Hamlet’s narration is still disruptive, transporting Claudius out of 
his present experience with the players and back to that moment in the garden.  The fact that Claudius 
moves from the theater to the chapel to pray suggests that he perceives his identity for a while as nothing 
beyond that of a killer.  My concern in this chapter is not whether characters are speaking truths, but the 
way they fight for control over the speaking of “truths” and the subtle ways speech can indeed transform 
the way we see one another and the way we see ourselves.  Hamlet would like nothing more than to 
transform Claudius into a vice-villain; his rhetorical reduction of Claudius to a “mildewed ear” 
corroborates that.  
44 In Shakespeare in Performance, eds. Keith Parsons and Pamela Mason (New York: Random House, 
1995), Romana Beyenburg, mining phrases from Ophelia’s speech and from other sections of the play, 
applies epigraphs to the list of contemporary actors hat have played Hamlet – Laurence Olivier, for 
example, is “Hamlet the Dane”; Innokenti Smoktunovsky, “most sovereign reason”; David Warner, “a 
noble mind”; Alan Howard is “desperate with imaginat on”; Mark Rylance is “dangerous lunacy”; Daniel 
Day-Lewis is the rose of the fair state”; Mel Gibson is, of course, the “glass of fashion”; and Kenneth 
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references, moreover, to courtiers, scholars, and soldiers – and her description of Hamlet 
as the “glass of fashion” and “mold of form” (3.1.154-56) – explain Claudius’ obsession 
with Hamlet’s former and perhaps current popularity, the ease with which he can spe k 
with old friends, his comfortable rapport with the tragedians, and thus what Gross calls 
the “loomings of a great, unfathomable generosity.”45  Indeed, Ophelia’s description 
challenges the commonplace notion that Hamlet is merely a procrastinating, world-weary 
misogynist.46     
This vacillation between spying and verbal disclosure persists to the end of the 
play; indeed, the middle of Hamlet is built upon this duality.  Gertrude, recounting 
Ophelia’s accidental death (4.7.186-210), does so in a truly sympathetic way so as to 
forestall blame and keep the peace, for her second-hand narrative of Ophelia’s death 
                                                                                                                                                              
Branagh is called “the mold of form” (69).  However whimsical and subjective this list, it does testify o the 
various ways Hamlet’s character can be played, what speeches can be emphasized, and thus the extent to 
which the audience’s reaction to the character depends on the performer.   
45 Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise, 16. 
46 For an essay that discusses the correlation between th  play’s obsession with ears and hearing and the 
preponderance of narrative insets, see Robert R. Wilson’s “Narratives, Narrators and Narratees in Hamlet,” 
Hamlet Studies 6 (1984), 30-40.  Wilson sees this play as the “richest in narrative materials” of any 
Shakespeare play (30).  Taking as his point of departure Tzvetan Todorov’s notion that “every new 
character signifies a new plot” (qtd. in Wilson 30), Wilson argues that Shakespeare’s narratives reflect 
“authorial self-consciousness” – which implicitly connects Shakespeare himself as author with the 
character speaking those words (32).  As Wilson observes, “old stories…can be transferred from perceived 
character to the voice of the narrator…and from there to the audience, the external narratees, the actual 
ears, that hear the narrative” (39).  He goes on to say that “narratives thread ears, labyrinthinely, it seems, 
through many dimensions of reality” (39) and concludes his discussion contemplating the way Horatio’s 
narrative will “command ears” and the way that the audience, with “greedy ears,” will willingly be 
commanded (39-40).  For a discussion that goes beyond the function of hearing and the nature of narrative 
conventions to consider the epistemological implications of narration, see James Calderwood, To Be and 
Not To Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet.  Calderwood argues that because the narratives are never 
dramatized, they operate almost like a “cause.”  “Hamlet’s adventures at sea,” for example, “all are 
‘caused’ by the narrative Insets that tell them” because the “present” performance is all we have: the “world 
offstage resides only in the word onstage” and the action originates with the word (164-165).  
Calderwood’s notion accords with my sense of the way characters’ narratives are re-creating themselves, 
others, and events.  For essays on other ways of interpreting the narrative insets of Hamlet, see for example, 
David Thatcher, “Horatio’s ‘Let me Speak’: Narrative Summary and Summary Narrative in Hamlet,” 
English Studies 74.3 (1993), 246-57.  See also Barbara Hardy, “The Figure of Narration in Hamlet,” in A 
Center of Excellence: Essays Presented to Seymour Betsky, ed. Robert Druce (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987), 
1-14.  Hardy looks at the soliloquies themselves as part of the narrative insets and sees narration as granting 
a small “freedom from the pressures of tragic necessity” (11).     
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hardly sounds like an unnatural suicide.  Gertrude also presents a rather curious picture of 
Hamlet.  Earlier in the play, after Polonius’ death, Gertrude tells her husband that Hamlet 
has left “[t]o draw apart the body he hath killed, / O’er whom his very madness… / 
Shows itself pure: he weeps for what is done” (4.1.25-29).  While Hamlet’s behavior in 
the previous scene suggests that Gertrude is probably fabricating this story, our surmises 
can never be confirmed and so we must hold in suspension two opposing views of 
Hamlet – one of a prince who irreverently “lug[s]” Polonius’ “guts” (3.4.235) out of his 
mother’s bedroom and another of a remorseful man crouched and crying over the body.    
Laertes, too, takes part in this attempt to reinvent himself and the play.  As 
already discussed, he returns from France ready to take over the revenge drama and even 
outdo Hamlet in his praise of Ophelia; through Laertes, we are invited to reassess the 
nature of revenge and Hamlet’s complicity in the evil of the court.  And finally Claudius, 
desperate to deflect blame, positions himself as the victim of accumulated incidents 
rather than the primary cause.  Attributing Ophelia’s madness to the “poison of deep 
grief” rather than to the poison that began in the king’s “orchard” (1.5.66), Claudius 
laments, “O Gertrude, Gertrude, / When sorrows come, they come not single spies, / But 
in battalions; first, her father slain; / Next, your son gone, and he most violent author/ Of 
his own just remove…” (4.5.80-86).  He goes on to describe the “whispers” surrounding 
Polonius’ “hugger-mugger” burial and “the buzzers” that “infect” Laertes’ “ear / With 
pestilent speeches of his father’s death,” before discussing the loudest noise of all, the 
cacophony of a cannon blowing a hapless king apart: “O, my dear Gertrude,” he 
complains, “this [these troubles], / Like to a murd’ring piece, in many places / Gives me 
superfluous death” (88-103).  While Claudius insists that these events are harming hi , 
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they are also helping him smother the cries of a dying brother, cries that begin to 
intensify even before The Mousetrap, when Polonius’ remark that we “with devotion’s 
visage / And pious action…do sugar o’er / The devil himself” leads Claudius to ponder, 
“How smart a lash that speech doth give my conscience” (3.1.53-58). 
Indeed, Claudius’ awakened conscience, along with his superlative rhetorical 
skills, explains why audiences often shift the blame to Hamlet, seeing the princ as a 
villain rather than a victim.  The play’s references to aimless arrows and misdirected 
cannons serve as metaphors for the way that our allegiances can be manipulated through 
language.  Well before Claudius’ 4.5 speech, the cannon, or “murd’ring piece,” emerges 
in conversation with Gertrude.  Here again, the king, worried about the rumors 
surrounding Polonius’ death, hopes to redirect such slanders against him so that this 
cannon’s “poisoned shot, may miss our name / And hit the woundless air” (4.1.42-45).  
The fact that the cannon’s danger lies not only in the force of the blow but in the poison 
within or around it makes this image consistent with all the other poisoned points in the 
play, from the envenomed sword in 5.2 to the verbal daggers and arrows.  Indeed, the 
arrow that Hamlet tells Laertes has been “shot…o’er the house” and struck his brother 
(5.2.257-8) refers to his killing of Polonius, certainly, but also to the wounds brought 
upon the court through his abusive, poisonous speech.  Then there are the arrows of 
deception (in their own way envenomed) that Claudius wishes could save him from the 
poisoned cannon and earn him undue pity.  He would have punished Hamlet directly for 
Polonius’ murder, but the king explains to Laertes that the public’s affection for the 
prince is so strong that his punishing “arrows, / Too slightly timbered for so loud a wind, 
/ Would have reverted to my bow again, / But not where I have aimed them” (4.7.23-26).  
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The play makes it clear that to avoid suffering the “slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune” is to dodge the poisoned points that fly in from every direction and, perhaps 
more importantly, to use the (h)arrow to fend them off (3.1.66).47  Such power extends to 
the way characters manipulate us, the audience.  
 In this respect, one might argue that no other Shakespeare play pursues so 
aggressively the way that words not only wound but also expose weaknesses within the 
speakers themselves – and the way in which speech opens one up for retaliation.  
Standing in the foreground of this problem is of course Hamlet himself, whose meeting 
with the ghost in 1.5 produces a struggle to understand the nature of the specter, to assess
the ethics of revenge, to draw out Claudius’ guilt, and, eventually, to reinvent himself.  
Hamlet’s progress from wonder-wounded hearer to wonder-wounding speaker bears 
notable resemblance to the poet’s development in the young-man sonnets.  Both works 
show the poet/protagonist agonizing over a representation (whether the young man or the 
ghost) and weighing the differences between the portrayal and the putative original; both 
works use the canker to expose the damaging effects of praise; and both works center on 
the poet/protagonist’s heroic struggle to come to terms with the canker in himself. 
 
The Ghost, the Young Man, and the Rhetoric of Blame 
 The apparition that appears to Hamlet in 1.5 has been read as the ghost of 
European history, the specter of memory, and the legacy of the revenge genre – including 
perhaps the ghosts of Kyd, Marlowe, even Seneca.48  Greenblatt argues that by 
                                                      
47 Of course, Hamlet is a tragedy and in the end, the points fly too fast and furiously to be avoided. 
48 See, for example, Alexander Welsh, Hamlet in His Modern Guises (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), 39.  See also Calderwood’s To Be and Not Be, which emphasizes the relationship between 
Shakespeare and Kyd, and Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, passim.  
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participating in this tradition of staging ghosts, Shakespeare “suggests that the dead do 
not simply rot and disappear, nor do they survive only in the dreams and fears of living 
individuals: they are an ineradicable, embodied, objective power.”49  They also inhabit a 
middle realm and so in their own way redefine purgatory.  According to Greenblatt, “the 
space of Purgatory” transcends Catholicism and “becomes the space of the stage where 
old Hamlet’s Ghost is doomed for a certain term to walk the night” (257).   
But this “objective power,” as Greenblatt puts it, also pertains to the ghost’s 
rhetoric and Hamlet’s ensuing inquiry into his character.  Although Hamlet intends o test 
Claudius’ guilt during The Mousetrap – to “catch,” as he says, “the conscience of the 
king” (2.2.634) – he also uses Claudius to test the veracity of the ghost: “The spirit that I 
have seen / May be a devil,” the prince declares, “and the devil hath power / T’ assume  
pleasing shape; yea, and perhaps, / Out of my weakness and my melancholy, / As he is 
very potent with such spirits, / Abuses me to damn me” (627-32).  Hamlet’s decision to 
trap the king grows out of his desire to “have grounds / More relative than” his own 
surmises about the spirit, grounds which he hopes will illuminate the truth of the ghost 
who has wounded him (632-33).   
 Hamlet’s skeptical assessment of the ghost is similar to the poet’s ethical 
investigation of the young man.  In both works, the poet/protagonist struggles to remain
loyal to a deeply ambiguous, even manipulative, figure.  In the Sonnets, the young man’s 
vices, or the poet’s anxieties about the beloved’s potential imperfections, erect an 
aesthetic and emotional barrier between the poet and the young man.  In Hamlet, the 
ghost prompts the prince to doubt whether he is dealing with a father from purgatory or a 
demonic spirit tempting Hamlet to commit a mortal sin.  And just as the young man’s
                                                      
49 Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 179-80. 
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questionable character deflects the poet from his purpose – praise – so the ghost’s 
equivocal character contributes to Hamlet’s delay in killing Claudius. 
 Also under scrutiny in both Hamlet and the Sonnets is the very legitimacy of 
representation.  In the poems to the young man, the poet is not just evaluating whetherthe 
male beloved’s “sweet virtue answer not” his “show” (93) or whether he “do[th] common 
grow” (69); the poet also avers that “there lives more life” in the beloved himself than in 
any “praise” he can “devise” (83).  In acknowledging the limitations to his individual 
perception and the likelihood that he can never portray the young man accurately, the 
poet suggests that the beloved may not only look better in poetry than he really is, but 
that he may also look worse.  A comparable dilemma faces Hamlet, who is visited by a 
representation of his living father – a representation that chafes against his ideal zed 
image of this former king and so provokes debate about the king’s real nature.   
Indeed, if Prince Hamlet undertakes the task of discovering whether the “figure 
like” his “father” really is his father’s ghost (1.2.209) or a demon in disguise, he is 
confronted with a problem.  Some of the evidence pointing to the ghost’s demonic nature 
– evidence that Prosser herself uses to make her case – can also be ascribed to old 
Hamlet, whose characterization in the play does not always reflect the Hyperion to which 
Hamlet repeatedly compares him.  Emerging in menacing armor in 1.1, the ghost 
represents a belligerent king whose fearless militarism is ambiguous at be t.  Reinforcing 
this ambiguity is the fact that the ghost’s appearance recalls two distinct acts of violence: 
the time when King Hamlet “combated” “ambitious Norway” and the day he “smote the 
sledded Polacks on the ice” (1.1.72-4).  Against Norway, Hamlet is described as 
“valiant,” proud, and, most importantly, self-controlled (96); their duel is “ratified by law 
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and heraldry” and entered into through a “sealed compact” (98-99).  That the ghost 
appears “frown[ing]” as well as armed, however, also prompts the memory of the Polacks 
killed not in an organized duel – or an honorable combat – but in an “angry parle” (73).50  
This precipitous slaughter is less like the planned killing of Norway than the “rash and 
bloody deed” perpetrated by Hamlet in the closet scene (3.4.33), or the massacre of men 
ordered by the “unimproved” (or unrestrained) young Fortinbras (1.1.108).  “Cut off,” 
significantly, “even in the blossoms” of his “sin” (1.5.83), King Hamlet’s rightful 
successor to the throne of Denmark is neither Claudius nor even Prince Hamlet, but 
rather Fortinbras, who “find[s] quarrel in a straw” and exterminates opponents for an 
“eggshell,” a “trick or fantasy of fame,” a useless “plot / Whereon the numbers cannot try 
the cause” (4.4.56-66).51  Thus, King Hamlet is from one perspective a true descendent of 
Francois de Belleforest’s Horvendile, the “most renouned pirate that in those dayes 
scoured the seas and havens of the north parts.”52              
 Is the ghost, then, really a demon or is he a representation of Hamlet’s father th t 
the prince would rather not confront?  In the Sonnets, the poet is often dismayed by his 
own portrayal of the young man, painfully aware that the canker in his poetics could 
                                                      
50 See “parley, n. (and int.).”  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  3 March 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/501718089>.  I am taking parley to mean negotiation or “truce,” a 
“meeting…for discussing the mutual arrangement of matters such as terms for an armistice” (2.a).  In most 
cases, parleys imply peace not slaughter.       
51 The complicated textual history of Hamlet reflects the tension in the play regarding the prince’s (and the 
play’s) attitude toward old Hamlet.  Shapiro prefers the Folio version, which omits Hamlet’s seventh 
soliloquy.  He points out that the “image of Fortinbras marching through Denmark on his way to slaughter 
Poles can’t help but invite comparison to a scene enact d thirty years earlier when Hamlet’s father had
taken the same route to the same end.  Were his actions,” Shapiro muses, “any less brutal than 
Fortinbras’s…?” (A Year in the Life, 311).  Indeed, omitting a soliloquy that invites such a comparison also 
reinforces the “Hyperion” image that Hamlet sustains of his father.  Shapiro himself suggests that omitting 
the seventh soliloquy gives Claudius’ speech about his plans to have Hamlet executed greater emphasis and 
turns the king “into a more formidable adversary…” (312).  Again, to emphasize Claudius’ “formidable” 
character mitigates the questionable nature of old Hamlet.      
52 Belleforest, The Hystorie of Hamblet (1582), in The Sources of Hamlet, ed. Sir Israel Gollancz (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1926), 181. 
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suggest a living blot within the beloved.  However, even as praise discovers vice, vice 
provokes more praise.  As we see in the Sonnets, the poet repeatedly attempts to obscure 
the canker with heightened celebrations of his rose; in Hamlet, the prince copes with the 
ghost’s unnatural demands by making idealized, encomiastic effusions about his father. 
As a representation of Hamlet’s father, the ghost also shares another quality with the 
young man of the Sonnets: belatedness.  In Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye, Fineman argues 
that because the young man appears so late in the history of sonnet writing, he cannot but 
gesture toward the idealized beloveds who precede him and so signify his own 
insufficiency.  Born too late, the young man can never be purely ideal.  The ghost, too, as 
a wonder-wounding speaker and wielder of the harrow, represents a dying state; he is a 
spectral figure of an epideictic mode that has always been corrupt and corrupting.  And 
so, instead of inheriting from the ghost a legacy of praise, idealism, and wholeness – all 
of which old Hamlet seems to embody for his son – the prince inherits the revenge 
drama, a compromised subjectivity (or cloven identity), and the canker in the rose. 
 The “beloveds’” presumed insufficiencies therefore incite the poet and 
protagonist to investigate their own roles.  Just as the speaker of the Sonnets deploys the 
canker only to incur doubt about himself and his poetics, so Hamlet’s skeptical musings 
prior to the performance of The Mousetrap initiate moments of self-appraisal, self-
examination, even self-blame.  The fact that the climax of Hamlet’s self-abuse – his third 
soliloquy (2.2.576-634) – coincides with his greatest skepticism about the ghost 
reinforces the connection he shares with this apparition.  As already discussed, Hamlet’s 
soliloquy at the end of Act 2 culminates with his decision to catch the king’s conscience 
and to test the ghost’s veracity.  However, Hamlet has presumably devised the plan 
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before this meditation begins, having asked a player only moments earlier whether  can 
insert some lines into the play he has suggested – The Murder of Gonzago (2.2.566-69).  
Oddly, Hamlet’s lament, “O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!” (577), seems to have 
picked up at a place in his emotional development prior to his request to alter the script.  
In this way, the soliloquy appears to backtrack so as to re-trace his development toward 
his plan, and toward an appreciation for drama’s capabilities.53    
How Hamlet attempts to overcome his impulse to flagellate himself is important.  
The first several lines of the soliloquy – his comparison of himself to the actor playing 
Hecuba; his meditation on what an actor with his passion would do; his invitation to an 
imagined audience to berate him; his violent outburst against Claudius, the real “slave”
whose “offal” should have “fatted all the region kites” (606-607) – develops gradually 
into a moment of intense self-deprecation:  
Why, what an ass am I!  This is most brave,  
That I, the son of a dear father murdered,  
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell,  
Must, like a whore, unpack my heart with words  
And fall a-cursing like a very drab,  
A scullion!  Fie upon ‘t! (611-616).                     
Paradoxically, Hamlet’s spirited self-blaming begins finally to reach toward a cause: he is 
a whore not only to himself, his scruples, his self-doubt, but also to the ghost from 
“heaven and hell.”  Finally, in the last section of the soliloquy, Hamlet’s equivocat on 
seems to have provoked a need to choose one over the other: “The spirit that I have seen / 
                                                      
53 G.R. Hibbard remarks in his edition of Hamlet that “the convention of the soliloquy is employed in an 
unusual and highly original fashion here” and that “what Hamlet does in this speech is to voice, in their 
right sequence, the ideas that have been going throug  his mind since he asked for the speech about 
Pyrrhus….” (233).  See also J. Dover Wilson, What Happens in Hamlet [(Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1951)], which argues that the third soliloquy is “in effect a dramatic reflection of what has 
already taken place” (qtd. In Hibbard 142).   
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May be a devil” (627-28).  Here he implicitly identifies the cause of his delberation and 
a need to know the truth.     
Looking at this soliloquy in isolation, one notices how Hamlet’s skepticism about 
the ghost seems to quell his self-doubt and curtail self-abasement: I shouldn’t hate myself, 
this meditation suggests.  I haven’t acted because I doubt this ghost.  Nonetheless, setting 
the soliloquy in the context of what comes before and after complicates this simple
reading.  Hamlet in fact remains uneasy even after he seems to have purged his negative 
emotions; and his decision to test the ghost does not curb the impulse to blame himself.  
In the next scene and his most famous soliloquy in the play (3.1.64-96), he contemplates 
death.  The ensuing “get thee to a nunnery” speech shows him confessing madly to 
Ophelia, “I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious, with more offenses at my beck than I 
have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to act them in” 
(3.1.134-138).  Hamlet’s conclusion to these revealing lines – “We are arrant knaves all; 
believe none of us” (139-140) – explains why he continues to be uneasy.  Rather than pin 
the blame on Claudius, as he does in Act 1 [“There’s never a villain dwelling in all 
Denmark / But he’s an arrant knave” (137-38)], Hamlet now widens the signifier to 
include all men – himself and necessarily the ghost, who has called for an act of revenge 
that Hamlet criticizes by 3.1.  By yoking himself to all the arrant knaves of the world, 
Hamlet demonstrates why his skepticism about the world – and about the ghost – only 
deepens his self-doubt.   
Consequently in Hamlet, as in the Sonnets, the poet/protagonist clings devotedly 
to a representation that threatens to destroy him.  In the poems, the speaker quickly 
recognizes that the quality of his poetry depends on the nature of an ambiguous beloved; 
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in Hamlet, the protagonist seems initially to believe that the authenticity of the ghost 
determines the integrity of his own role and thus the play itself.  In both cases, a peron’s 
doubt – however natural and necessary – challenges the legitimacy of the object on whom 
his work or his play depends.  And so, Hamlet rebels.  Self-blame, he discovers, does 
little to fix the problem; and his skepticism about the ghost proves merely to be an 
obstacle, for it provokes questions that the play never answers.54  With the ghost having 
interrupted Hamlet’s progress toward identity, and Claudius – as we shall see in th  next 
section – having usurped the language of “praise and ceremony,” the prince becomes a 
cruel jester, a Yorick who trades in his coxcomb for a whip.55     
 
Claudius, the Canker, and the Problem of Praise 
 If Hamlet’s ethical struggle with the ghost echoes the poet’s fraught perspective 
on the young man, Claudius and Hamlet reflect the problem of the canker and the rose.  
As I will show in this section, these two characters – these “pass and fell incensed points / 
Of mighty opposites” – represent admixtures of a now skeptically-inflected epideixis and 
so both embody versions of the canker and the rose (5.2.68-69).  Although Claudius’ 
character remains half-shrouded beneath his public persona, we know that he is 
ambitious, lustful, and jealous.  Nonetheless, he is also a persuasive, charismatic ruler, 
having garnered enough votes to legitimate his succession.  In this respect, Claudius 
represents not only the canker – or the snake in the garden – but also the canker rose: the
specious praise of the fallen world. 
                                                      
54 As Greenblatt affirms, Hamlet’s test “notoriously leaves the question of the Ghost’s origin unanswered” 
(Hamlet in Purgatory, 239).  Harry Levin moves in this direction as well.  See The Question of Hamlet 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951). 
55 Kenneth Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise, 20. 
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 To understand his rhetorical methodology, we need only look at what troubles 
him about Hamlet: his popularity.  In conversation with Laertes, Claudius worries that the 
public “dipping all his [Hamlet’s] faults in their affection,” will “Work like the spring 
that turneth wood to stone, Convert[ing] his gyves into graces” (4.7.21-24).  For 
Claudius, praise has power both to coat and to transform.  Thus, the king’s description 
transcends the notion that praise highlights virtues while blame enlarges vices; 
“affection” and admiration can turn “wood to stone” and vicious moles of nature into 
laudable distinctions.  The poet explores this very tendency in sonnet 95, lamenting, 
“How sweet and lovely dost thou make the shame / Which like a canker in the fragrant 
rose / Doth spot the beauty of thy budding name: / O in what sweets dost thou thy sins 
enclose!”  By the end of the poem, and after remarking that he cannot “dispraise but in a
kind of praise” (turn gyves to graces), the poet says of the young man: “beauty’s veil doth 
cover every blot, / And all things turn to fair that eyes can see!”  Here the poet seems to 
blame the young man for transmuting “shame” into a kind of sweetness, even though he 
knows that he, too, is complicit in this deception.   
Using praise in an unethically transformative way, the poet knows that 
manipulating his representation of the young man shields the canker from himself as w ll 
as from us.  Similarly, in Hamlet, Claudius’ public flattery and his manipulation of others 
are partly intended to quell his surging conscience and to “cure” the “hectic” in his 
“blood” (4.5.75-76) so that “all may be well” (3.3.76).  This suggests that Claudius 
endeavors not only to conceal his crimes from others, but also perhaps to hide his sins 
from himself.  One of the most complex villains in his corpus, Claudius seems at times o 
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be a sympathetic villain, a villain with a conscience and an interiority that he would, quite 
literally, fain (and so feign to) deny.   
Self-deceived as well as deceiving, Claudius on one level seems to teeter between 
self-delusion and self-concealment such that the latter characteristic seems to create or 
enable the former.  On another level, his manipulation of others – the way he molds them 
into loving wives who are quick to cast off their mourning gear, avengers who know no 
bounds, trusted subordinates who dutifully undertake to sift his nephew for the truth – 
allows a double ratification: the people will protect him (so he hopes), and they will help 
conceal a part of himself that he would rather not see.  Of course, Claudius is smart 
enough to recognize that his mysterious nephew is exceedingly dangerous.  
Paradoxically, this could well explain his initial flippancy about Hamlet’s behavior – an 
attempt temporarily to convince himself that Hamlet is nothing more than an excessively 
mournful, lovesick schoolboy.  In an odd moment early in the play, the king says to 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, “Something have you heard / Of Hamlet’s transformation, 
so call it, / Sith nor th’ exterior nor the inward man / Resembles what it was” (2.2.4-7)   
Perhaps “inward” refers merely to Hamlet’s behavior, but it is strange how Claudius can 
presume to distinguish Hamlet’s exterior from his interior.  At the very least, Claudius’ 
cavalier attitude toward a person’s interiority reflects a kind of wishful belief in its 
malleability, or denial of its dangerous power to consume a person from the inside out. 
Such an attitude also makes Claudius adept at manipulating people whom he 
knows can be seduced by wood if he coats it sufficiently in honey, people who have the 
same need to conceal truths from themselves as he does.  Indeed, his rhetorical tactics 
work on most of the characters in the play, and Claudius mistakenly believes early on that 
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Hamlet will succumb to this sort of deception as well.  During his meeting with 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Claudius “entreat[s]” them to “draw” Hamlet “on to 
pleasures” in order to uncover the cause of his unusual behavior (2.2.10-18).  The line’s 
sensual inflection cannot help but indicate how Claudius may have wooed Gertrude, 
whose probable infidelity made her keen to hide her “black and grained spots” beneath a 
second marriage contract (3.4.101).  In their shared intimacy, Gertrude and Claudius 
satisfy each other’s need to conceal themselves from themselves.  
 Later in the play, Claudius employs a similar rhetorical strategy on Laertes when 
they concoct their competing revenge drama against Hamlet.  Just before they d vise the 
plan, Claudius reminds Laertes of the Norman who gave him “such a masterly report / 
For art and exercise,” declaring that it “’twould be a sight indeed / If one culd match” 
his ability (4.7.109-113).  In praising Laertes indirectly through the Frenchman, the king 
slowly draws the vulnerable, would-be avenger toward his own purpose.  To legitimize 
the tournament, Claudius describes how he will incite others to praise Laertes’ bility, 
encouraging them to set up a wager.  In Claudius’ words, he will “set a double varnish on 
the fame / The Frenchman gave” Laertes (149-150).  This comparison of praise to a kind 
of varnish reinforces Claudius’ description of praise earlier in the same scene as well as 
illuminates the play’s (and the Sonnets’) fundamental skepticism of praise and flattery.  
The Folio takes this idea further when it shows Claudius working even harder to persuade 
Laertes to go along with the plan.  In this edition, Laertes does not immediately consent; 
the line – “My lord, I will be ruled, / The rather if you could devise it so / That I might be 
the organ” (4.7.76-79) – has been omitted.  Mitigating Laertes’ eagerness to act, the Folio 
instead stresses the function of false praise in turning him into a willing partici nt. 
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Relatively minor, this textual modification nonetheless sharpens the contrast 
between Claudius and Hamlet’s epideictic point of view.  While Claudius gives 
admiration the ability to turn wood to stone, and gyves to graces, Hamlet pointedly 
distances himself from such a perspective by suggesting that the coating will only make 
the interior worse.  In the closet scene, Hamlet tells his mother that a “flatering 
unction…/ will but skin and film the ulcerous place, / Whiles rank corruption, mining all 
within, / Infects unseen” (166-170).  He goes on to advise her not to “spread the compost 
on the weeds / To make them ranker,” words that remind us of the rank garden invoked in 
the first soliloquy and then reiterated in the ghost’s assertion that the ear of Denmark has 
been “rankly abused” (172-73). 
Just as Hamlet’s skepticism about the ghost incurs self-blame, so praise – whether 
sincerely meant or not – reinforces his own failings, or the wound within himself.  Prior 
to his professed admiration of Yorick and Ophelia in 5.1, Hamlet praises only three other 
people in the play – the actor playing Hecuba, Horatio, and of course his father – and in 
each case, his verbalized admiration does not perform what ideal praise should perform, 
which is to bind together the speaker and the addressee, or narcissistically to commend in 
the other what one would like to recognize in himself.56  Quite the opposite, praise 
confers a lack and does not stem from narcissism but envy.  In his first soliloquy, Hamlet 
refers to his father as “so excellent a king” and “Hyperion” (1.3.143-144) before 
declaring that his uncle is “no more like my father / Than I to Hercules” (157-158).  To 
                                                      
56 One could also add Fortinbras to this list, but I withhold his name for two reasons.  First, the only time 
that Hamlet shows some admiration is in his seventh soliloquy, which is not in all versions of the play.  
And second, the admiration that Hamlet does express is equivocal.  While Fortinbras’ ability to “expos[e] 
what is mortal and unsure / To all that fortune, death, and danger dare” (4.4.54-55) reminds Hamlet of what 
he himself has failed to do, the prince also consider  that Fortinbras is doing all this for an “eggshell” (56) 
and for a “fantasy and trick of fame” (64) – not for real honor.  In this respect, Hamlet’s mixed admiration 
for Fortinbras does not reinforce his own failings at all; instead, Hamlet’s recognition of Fortinbras’ 
problems makes himself look better.  
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Horatio’s remark that old Hamlet was a “goodly king,” the prince replies, “He was a man.  
Take him for all in all. / I shall not look upon his like again” (1.2.195-96) – especially, 
perhaps, when Hamlet looks into a mirror.  Later, in one of his zany conversations with 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hamlet confesses that he cannot make them a 
“wholesome answer” because his “wit’s diseased,” a word that takes us back to the 
canker or the wound (3.2.349-350).  Part antic, part truth, this confession seems to follow 
Hamlet into the closet scene, where he describes Claudius as a “mildewed ear / Blasting 
his wholesome brother” (3.4.74-75).  For the entire play, we watch Hamlet anxiously 
trying to measure up to his father and, as he perceives it, becoming instead a kind of 
mildewed ear blasting the world.     
Hamlet’s praise of the actor playing Hecuba, too, stems from a desire to be like
that actor and thus from an acute recognition that he is not.  “Is it not monstrous,” Hamlet 
laments, “that this player here, / But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, / Could force his 
soul so to his own conceit / That from her working all his visage waned” (2.2.577-581).  
In his jealous admiration, Hamlet bemoans the fact that a mere player can produce the 
illusion of depth.  Even Hamlet’s private admiration for Horatio only emphasizes the 
distance between them.  To Hamlet, Horatio “hast been / As one in suffering all that 
suffers nothing, / A man that Fortune’s buffets and rewards / Hast ta’en with equal 
thanks” (3.2.69-72).  Indeed, Horatio’s “blood and judgment” are “so well commeddled” 
that Hamlet (in his “homily on the Mount”) calls him “blessed” (72-4).  And if the prince 
desires to “wear” this friend in his “heart’s core” – in his “heart of heart” – i  is because 
Horatio represents what Hamlet does not: a man who is not “passion’s slave,” a man who 
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can sit quietly through a performance of The Mousetrap without violently disrupting the 
play (77-8).  
 
From Wonder-Wounded Hearer to Wonder-Wounding Speaker 
 So far I have explored the relationship between Hamlet and the Sonnets in terms 
of relatively static patterns.  The ambiguity of the “beloved” other, the canker ad the 
rose, and the problem of specious praise (symbolized in the Sonnets as the canker rose) 
are important features in both works.  Now I turn to dynamic patterns, demonstrating how 
Hamlet’s development into “scourge and minister” in 3.4 mirrors the poet’s development 
across his lyric sequence.  The poet and protagonist make compromises to maintain ther 
identities; then they transgress the bounds of rhetorical decorum to save themselves and 
their work, discovering in the end that their own artistic identity has changed. 
 
Hamlet’s Rebellion Against Revenge 
 When one assesses a tragic hero, what ethical standards apply?  At the beginning 
of Hamlet, the prince is told that his primary task is to kill Claudius, but would such an 
act ennoble him?  Initially, it would seem so.  The ghost makes it clear that King 
Hamlet’s memory depends on Hamlet’s plucking Claudius from the rose of the fair state.  
Likewise, in the Sonnets, the poet recognizes that his rose of praise – and the integrity of 
the young man and his work – is undermined by the canker.  But in neither case is the 
canker avoidable.  The poet comes to appreciate that the vicious mole of nature is part 
and parcel to the work of praise and that eliminating it would only be possible if he put 
down his pen, burned his manuscript, and never composed sonnets again.  In Hamlet, the 
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relationship between the canker and the rose is more complex but analogous.  For the 
prince to kill Claudius in cold-blooded revenge would hardly protect the rose, nor would 
it rid Elsinore of the canker.  To play the avenger puts us in danger of becoming what we 
loathe.  And so, like the poet of the Sonnets, Hamlet rebels against the expectations 
established at the beginning of the play: just as Shakespeare’s poems are not about pure 
praise, so Hamlet is not a typical revenge drama.  At stake in both works is the 
poet/protagonist’s need to reassert an autonomous self, come what may. 
 Questions about Hamlet’s identity should of course consider “the question” of the 
play – what it means “to be.”  The prince’s deceptively straightforward soliloquy not only 
explores the nature of existence and the afterlife; it also marks an early turning point in 
Hamlet’s development into “scourge and minister.”  Most readers, however, tend to 
interpret the soliloquy as merely a meditation on suicide, failing to recognize that it is 
also a rumination on the ethics of revenge, with Hamlet weighing earthly suffering and 
political justice against divine judgment and the suffering that may come after death, the 
“undiscovered country from whose bourn / No traveler returns” (3.1.87-88).   
To illuminate this level of complexity, Harry Levin divides the soliloquy into a 
four-part, rather than two-part, medieval debate, persuasively showing how the first part 
of the question – “to be” – is further broken down and “entails two possibilities: ‘to 
suffer,’ and, if we flinch from that for the moment – ‘to take arms…’”.57  According to 
Levin, the first five lines of the soliloquy fall under the “be” category, which means that 
Hamlet’s war against a sea of troubles describes one way of living in thisworld – not 
necessarily an act of self-slaughter intended to propel a person into the next.  Thus, the 
                                                      
57 Harry Levin, The Question of Hamlet, 69. 
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soliloquy seems to suggest that “how we end our troubles by opposing them is equivocal” 
and that “our opposition may do away with them or with ourselves.”58 
What, however, if we read the soliloquy as an exploration of the way in which 
“opposition” could “do away with them” and “with ourselves”?  The enjambment in lines 
4 and 5 corroborates this possibility when it forces the first part of the debate – ac ion – 
into the same line as Hamlet’s first reference to death: 
                        To be or not to be – that is the question: 
                                              Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer 
                                              The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
                                              Or to take arms against a sea of troubles 
                                              And, by opposing, end them.  To die, to sleep – (3.1.64-8)    
The fact that the phrase, “opposing, end them,” rests on the same line as “to die, to sleep” 
suggests that any kind of violent action – self-directed or outwardly directed – lea s to 
death.  For Hamlet to make Claudius’ “quietus” with a “bare bodkin” is, so he believes, 
to make his own (83-4).     
With all its faults, Kenneth Branagh’s Hamlet (1996) neatly crystallizes my 
interpretation.  Performing the meditation while looking in a mirror, Branagh points the 
dagger at Derek Jacobi (spying on the other side of the mirror) and himself.  This 
cinematic adaptation aside, the language throughout the passage – from the “law’s de y” 
(80) and the “insolence of office” (81) to “a sea of troubles” (67) and “enterprises of great 
pitch and moment” (94) – shows that Hamlet is not just focusing on inner turmoil, 
despair, and self-slaughter (which he rejects in his first soliloquy as something against 
                                                      
58 Ibid., 69 (my emphasis).  See also Phoebe S. Spinrad, “The Fall of the Sparrow and the Map of Hamlet’s 
Mind,” Modern Philology 102.4 (2006), 453-77.  In this essay, Spinrad argues that “we need not take his 
‘to be or not to be’ question as personal suicide” since it is “rejected” in the first soliloquy (465).  For other 
discussions on the possibility of a shift between slf- laughter and action against Claudius, see V.K.
Whitaker, The Mirror up to Nature (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1965); and Walter N. 
King, Hamlet’s Search for Meaning (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1982).  
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which the Everlasting has fixed his canon), but also pitting himself against external 
problems. 
The idea that Hamlet, in murdering Claudius, could also succeed (literally and 
figuratively) in killing himself describes the very essence of revenge.  After all, heeding 
the ghost and becoming a typical avenger does more than immortalize his father; 
“locate,” as Gross contends, “the image or memory of the father, however diminished, in 
the subjectivity of the son”; or, as Stanley Cavell argues, obviate his subjectivity 
altogether by “debar[ring] Hamlet from existence.”59  Such an act also tightens the 
unsettling bond between Hamlet and Claudius through an act of retribution that ideally 
mirrors, in order to set right, the first act of violence.  Extracting an eye for an eye, an 
avenger runs into danger of becoming like the person who perpetrates the original crime.  
Though commonplace, this logic unites the century-old Freudian interpretation of 
Hamlet’s Oedipal complex with the play’s generic struggles.  Both points of view are 
represented in a similar way in the play and define each other; thus we can look at the 
generic difficulties as a kind of generic incest, and the psychoanalytic complexities 
developed by Freud (and elaborated on by Ernest Jones) in terms of the logic of 
revenge.60  During The Mousetrap, when Hamlet makes the killer and usurper the 
nephew Lucianus rather than the uncle/brother, he can dramatize the murder and fulfill 
the act of revenge (as well as bring to the surface repressed Oedipal desires) all in a 
single moment.  This also, however, makes Hamlet more like Claudius.61     
                                                      
59 Gross, Shakespeare’s Noise, 29; Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, 188. 
60 Ernest Jones, Hamlet and Oedipus (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954). 
61 Indeed, Hamlet does not kill Claudius while in prayer because he intends to do to his uncle precisely 
what his uncle did to his father: “He took my father grossly, full of bread, / With all his crimes broad 
blown, as flush as May…. / And am I then revenged / To take him in the purging of his soul, / When he is 
fit and seasoned for this passage? / No. / Up sword,” he concludes, deciding that he, too, will cut off 
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 The connection between these characters reaches a critical point in the “to be or 
not to be” soliloquy.  Poised in the dead center of the play, this meditation, Levin argues, 
is a “prelude to action” and a turning point in the way Hamlet confronts the world and 
himself in that world.62  Thus, even as the soliloquy knits Hamlet to his enemy, it also 
shows him coming into his own as a character.  It recapitulates only to reject the sort of 
premeditated vengeful action that would, as Maus points out, culminate in the avenger’s 
immediate demise.63  Of course, it would be a logical fallacy to claim that Hamlet does 
not act; he does kill Polonius.  However, I want to suggest that Hamlet, by taking the path 
of rhetorical revenge in which he can publicly vent his anger on the court, allows him to
oppose, rather than become another, Claudius.  Attempting to distance himself from the 
public praise of which he is so suspicious, Hamlet commits himself as much to speaking 
daggers as flinging real ones, of using cankered language against an already cankered 
court.  This commitment is made possible by Hamlet’s abandonment of his original quest 
to understand the nature of the ghost.64  Having minimized his skeptical explorations, 
Hamlet works instead to assert an interpretation, re-crafting his role and the events 
surrounding him, and thus shifting rather decisively from wonder-wounded hearer to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Claudius in the blossoms of his sin (3.3.85-93).  One can read this moment, however, as an attempt by 
Hamlet to justify inaction and thus to ensure that he does not become another Claudius. 
62 As Levin affirms, Hamlet, “having taken this long look…will leap into a quick succession of adventures; 
he will make choices, right or wrong, thick and fast.  The decisive event will be planned by others, and will 
play unexpectedly into his hands” (The Question of Hamlet, 73).   
63 Maus, Inwardness and Theater, 56. 
64 The ghost continues to evoke a sinister character – even after Hamlet is convinced of Claudius’ guilt.  
See again Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 239.  Also, the fifth soliloquy echoes in a rather disturbing way 
the horror evoked in the first scene: “’Tis now thevery witching time of night, / When churchyards yawn 
and hell itself breathes out / Contagion to this world” (3.2.419-421).  Here Hamlet seems to be modeling 
himself after the sinister apparition of 1.5, a point I will develop later in the chapter.  Further evidence of 
the ghost’s ambiguously sinister character can be found in the closet scene.  When Hamlet sees the ghost, 
he immediately invokes heaven: “Save me and hover o’er me with your wings, / You heavenly guards!” 
(3.4.118-119).     
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wonder-wounding speaker.  Indeed, his fifth soliloquy charts that transformatin when it 
shows Hamlet espousing a new role:  
                                                                   Now could I drink hot blood 
                                                 And so such bitter business as the day 
                                                 Would quake to look on.  Soft, now to my mother. 
                                                 O heart, lose not thy nature; let not ever 
                                                 The soul of Nero enter this firm bosom. 
                                                  Let me be cruel, not unnatural. 
                                                  I will speak daggers to her, but use none. 
                                                 My tongue and soul in this be hypocrites: 
                                                 How in my words somever she be shent, 
                                                 To give them seals never, my soul consent.  (3.2.422-32) 
The key word here is hypocrite, which has less to do with professions of false virtue than 
with dramatic representation.  Derived from the Greek, hypocrite suggests “actor on the 
stage,” “pretender,” and “dissembler.”65  But if Hamlet indeed becomes a “hypocrite,” he 
does so on his terms.  “Speak[ing] daggers” and “cleav[ing] the general ear with horrid 
speech” (2.2.589), Hamlet decides to force his soul so to his own conceit, or his soul – as 
he affirms here – to his tongue.      
 
Hamlet as Scourge and Minister      
 Instead of heeding the ghost’s request to the letter, therefore, Hamlet becomes like 
the ghost, mimicking his language and behavior in a protracted battle for rhetorical 
control.  This battle begins with Hamlet’s inexplicable dumbshow in 2.1.  The first 
character to report his bizarre behavior is Ophelia, who describes him as looking (with 
his ridiculous accoutrements and frightful demeanor) “as if he had been loosed out of hell 
/ To speak of horrors” (2.1.93-4).  She goes on to say that after holding her at arm’s 
length and perusing her face for several seconds, Hamlet departs just as strangely: “with 
                                                      




his head over his shoulders turned,” Ophelia says, “He seemed to find his way without 
his eyes, / For out o’ doors he went without their helps…” (109-11).  Other points of 
contact between Hamlet and the ghost quickly emerge as well.  As we know, Marcellus 
tells Horatio that the specter “hath gone by our watch” “twice before” (1.1.76-77); and 
Horatio reiterates this ominous behavior when he says to Hamlet, “Thrice” the ghost 
“walked / By their oppressed and fear-surprised eyes / Within his truncheon’s length” 
(1.2.212-214).  Considered in the context of these passages, Polonius’ description of 
Hamlet “walk[ing] four hours together / Here in this lobby” (2.2.173-174) suggests that 
the play has already begun to repeat itself with Hamlet as the new ghost: first with the 
appearance of the silent prince; then the perplexing description of his strangeness (by 
Ophelia in this case); and, finally, the decision to draw out his truth and make him speak. 
Much more than a mere shadow of the ghost, Hamlet effectively becomes the 
ghost once he learns to imitate his rhetorical patterns.  This imitation reaches its climax in 
the closet scene (3.4), where Hamlet’s encounter with Gertrude mirrors in st ucture and 
content the ghost’s encounter with Hamlet.  We can begin sketching out the similarities 
by first looking at Gertrude’s reaction to The Mousetrap.  Rosencrantz remarks to Hamlet 
after the play that his “behavior hath struck her [Gertrude] into amazement and 
admiration” (3.2.354-5), to which Hamlet knowingly replies, “O wonderful son that can 
so ‘stonish a mother!” (356-7).  In keeping with Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism, 
wonder here connotes a profoundly negative emotion, which Hamlet’s sardonic remark 
substantiates further.  Gertrude is amazed and wonderstruck because she has just 
witnessed Hamlet’s misogynistic behavior toward Ophelia and, implicitly, toward 
herself; and she has watched his passionate, disruptive outburst during the performance 
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of the play.  The queen has also heard herself severely criticized for marrying Claudius.  
Despite her nonchalant objection that the “lady doth protest too much, methinks,” 
Gertrude cannot but be disturbed by the players’ theatrical mirror (3.2.254) – even ifth  
reflection of herself is distorted.   
The assault on Gertrude builds in 3.4.  Once in his mother’s room, Hamlet 
immediately insists that killing Polonius is not quite as bad as “kill a king and mrry with 
his brother” (3.4.35).  Such words – though astonishing in their directness – take us back 
to the player queen, who maintains that “none wed the second [husband] but who killed 
the first” and a “second time I kill my husband dead / When second husband kisses me in 
bed” (3.2.203-08).  The answer to the question, then, of whether Hamlet truly accuses his 
mother of murder is ambiguously in the affirmative.  By virtue of marriage, Gertrud  is a 
murderess because she has become one flesh with a murderer, a Christian tenet that 
Hamlet refers to more than once in the play.  While this accusation of murder never 
becomes literal – that is, the play does not support the notion that Gertrude knew about or 
was involved in her husband’s death – Hamlet nonetheless disables his mother from the 
very beginning of the scene, turning her into a wonder-wounded hearer.   
In this respect, Gertrude’s experience parallels Hamlet’s meeting with the ghost.  
True, she denies knowledge of the murder [“As kill a king?” (3.4.36)] while Hamlet 
claims to have foretold it (“O, my prophetic soul!  My uncle!”), but the prince is just as 
broken up in 1.5 as his mother is in 3.4.  As we know, the ghost does not have to say 
much to strike fear and wonder in Hamlet at the beginning of their encounter.  Without, 
for example, disclosing the “secrets” of his “prison house,” the specter harrows up 
Hamlet’s soul, “freez[ing] his “young blood” and causing his “two eyes, like stars, [to] 
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start from their spheres” (1.5.21-23).  In the closet scene, Hamlet takes up the same 
rhetorical harrow, raking his mother with his violent rhetoric and planting his 
condemnation of her second marriage.66  Before disclosing the source of his complaint, 
however, Hamlet tells her, “Leave wringing of your hands.  Peace, sit you down, / And 
let me wring your heart; for so I shall / If it be made of penetrable stuff, / If damned 
custom have not brazed it so / That it be proof and bulwark against sense” (41-46).  Such 
a command reminds us of the ghost’s admonition to Hamlet: “I find thee apt; / And duller 
shouldst thou be than the fat weed / That roots itself in ease on Lethe wharf, / Wouldst 
thou not stir in this” (1.5.38-41).  In both instances, the speaker captures the listener by 
challenging his or her authority and power to listen and react appropriately; both orators 
rein in their unwilling but captivated auditors by encouraging them to fight for their sense 
of worth.  
In each case, the speaker’s rhetorical control depends on the listener’s willingness 
to contribute – to respond, to ask questions, to put himself within the compass of the 
speaker’s authority.  Just as the ghost’s story demands Hamlet’s participation, so 
Hamlet’s own tirade plays heavily off of his mother’s questions and objections – 
Gertrude spurring her son on by twice imploring what she has done.  Hamlet, much like 
the ghost, responds to his mother by recounting the evil of the act before describing the 
                                                      
66 The oft-mentioned connection between verse and furrow offers another way of understanding the 
relationship between the agricultural harrow and verbal harrowing.  Verse suggests a “succession of 
words…forming a complete metrical line” (see “verse, n.” 2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University 
Press.  7 March 2010 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50276636>).  However, the Latin form of the 
word versus suggests “literally a line or furrow drawn by turning the plough” [see The Encyclopedia 
Brittanica, ed. Hugh Chisholm, 11.27 (1911), 1041.]  The harrow can thus be read as a more violent 
expression of this process, whereby words quite literally do succeed in wounding the hearer, “turning” him 
upside down and inside out.  Indeed, the verb form f verse, which means “overthrow, overturn, or upset,” 
itself takes this violent “turn” (see “verse, v.2.” nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  7 
March 2010 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50276639>.).  And if one wants to elaborate further on 
the connection among harrow/speaking, furrow/verse, and epideictic skepticism, I will also add that in his 
same entry, verse also means “to turn over (a book) in study or investigation.”    
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act itself.  And so, to Gertrude’s question, “what have I done, that thou dar’st wag thy 
tongue / In noise so rude against me?” Hamlet replies (both completing her line and 
interrupting her), “Such an act / That blurs the grace and blush of modesty, / Calls virtue 
hypocrite, takes off the rose, / From the fair forehead of an innocent love / And sets a 
blister there” (3.4.49-53).  In form and content, these lines echo the ghost’s periphrastic 
response to Hamlet’s inquisitorial demand, “Haste me to know ‘t” (1.5.35).  Avoiding a 
direct answer to this question, the ghost instead describes the serpent in the garden and 
invokes an image of a cankerworm eating its way into the ear of Denmark.  In his own 
effort to evade Gertrude’s “What have I done?”, Hamlet distills the ghost’s complex 
picture down to a simple image of a rose being flung off and replaced with a canker
(blister). 
This picture, though, is incomplete.  Similar to the ghost, Hamlet has only just 
begun his tirade, going on to insist that Gertrude’s “deed” turns “sweet religion” nto a 
“rhapsody of words” (54-57).  Hamlet’s use of the word rhapsody, or gallimaufry, says 
less about Gertrude’s morality, however, than about the prince’s rhetorical pra tice, 
which involves creating that “rhapsody of words” himself, and exploiting the potential 
for words to become (s)words (or “daggers”).  The fact that Hamlet subsequently focuses 
on the “counterfeit presentiment[s]” of Claudius and old Hamlet also reveals something 
of his linguistic strategy (64).  For counterfeit does not merely mean “imitation” and 
“forgery”; it also denotes “in opposition to” as well as “pattern.” 67  From one angle, then, 
counterfeit precisely defines what Hamlet is doing when he forces his mother to examine 
the pictures side by side, and to detect points of “opposition.”  Counterfeit, from another 
                                                      




angle, offers a way of understanding Hamlet’s relationship to the ghost, who has setin 
motion a “pattern” that the prince can at once imitate as well as “oppose.”  Thus, Hamlet, 
like the pictures, is also a counterfeit. 
 Is, then, Hamlet’s use of the counterfeit presentiments truly problematic, as some 
scholars insist?  R. Clifton Spargo, responding to René Girard’s observation th t the 
pictures of the two brothers could not be very different from one another, sees this as an 
“aberrant moment in the play” and “atypical of Hamlet himself.”68  According to Spargo, 
Hamlet’s reliance on the pictures is inconsistent with Hamlet’s skepticism about this form 
of representation in particular; Spargo conjectures, finally, that the “rhetorical u gency 
temporarily works its spell on his mother and that he becomes most persuasive precis ly 
when he confronts the limits of his own estimation of the father’s merit.”69  But one could 
also argue that the pictures enhance Hamlet’s rhetorical strategy, allowing him to mirror 
the ghost’s visual imagery, to use language to underscore the portraits’ inadequacy, to 
call attention to his hyperbole, and thus to advance his attempt to turn his mother into a 
wonder-wounded hearer.  In the end, the true source of wonder lies not in the portraits 
themselves but in Hamlet’s description of them.70 
In focusing on the “counterfeit presentiments” of his father and Claudius, 
moreover, Hamlet moves across the rhetorical grooves patterned by the original harrow 
                                                      
68 René Girard, A Theater of Envy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 275-276; R. Clifton Spargo, 
The Ethics of Mourning: Grief and Responsibility in Elegiac Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 71.  
69 R. Clifton Spargo, The Ethics of Mourning, 72. 
70 Patricia Parker argues that the “vivid description” ften accompanying amplified, accusatory speeches 
“elides the distinction between false report and true, since it is capable of depicting fictional – or pu ely 
invented – events as if they were present before the ye” (“Shakespeare’s Rhetoric,” 65).  The rhetoric f 
amplification reveals the fine line between true and false: of course Claudius is not a “mildewed ear” and of 
course old Hamlet is not a “Hyperion.”  At the same time, his words make these images vivid and present.  
Hamlet’s language calls attention to the counterfeit quality of the counterfeit presentiments even as such 
portraits point to the counterfeit quality of the language itself – for words and images both miss the mark.  
Word and image work together to “wonder-wound” Gertrude.   
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in 1.5.  The ghost, we remember, delays describing the murder in order to paint a visual 
image of a virtuous king surrounded by two lusty vice villains.  Similarly, in the closet 
scene, when Gertrude asks Hamlet for the second time, “what act / That roars so loud and 
thunders in the index?” (61-62), the prince deliberately shifts the medium from print to 
picture, echoing the ghost’s language.  Focusing on the visual presentation of Gertrude’s 
two husbands, Hamlet avoids explaining the act itself.  King Hamlet is accordingly 
described as having “Hyperion’s curls, the front of Jove himself, / An eye like Mars’ to 
threaten and command, / A station like the herald Mercury… / A combination and a form 
indeed / Where every god did seem to set his seal / To give the world assurance of a 
man” (66-72).  Although textual evidence (as already discussed) suggests that the former 
king was far from the humanist ideal, Hamlet’s encomium tries to ensure that he be 
received this way, for his description here also echoes an earlier part of the play, where 
Hamlet refers to his father as the sort of man whose likeness he will never see again 
(1.2.196).  When Hamlet later laments to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, “What a piece of 
work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how 
express and admirable; in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god,” we 
sense he is referring to the old king (2.2.327-330). 
With these former descriptions of the king in our memory, we can appreciate how 
Hamlet endeavors to contrast the integrity of his father with the decadence of his mother 
and uncle, thus seeming to shift from celebrating wholesomeness to lamenting a 
disintegrated world and its fragmented inhabitants.  “Look you now what follows,” 
Hamlet tells her.  “Here is your husband, like a mildewed ear / Blasting his wholesome 
brother” (73-75).  While this passage describes an ear of corn poisoning a neighboring 
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crop, these lines also evoke a human ear.  By reducing Claudius to the conduit through 
which the poison is poured – the “mildewed ear” – Hamlet reverses the path of the 
original toxin, infecting Claudius himself. 
Hamlet’s distinction between Claudius and the former king appears to advance 
two opposing views of epideixis.  King Hamlet seems to represent a time now past when 
praise, an ideal form, made an object whole, while Claudius, the serpent in the garden, is 
a false usurper and figure of a fractured modernity – a modernity that has destroyed 
epideixis as a wholesome art.  And yet, wholesome could also be a pun.  We already 
know that Hamlet’s attitude toward the ghost is equivocal and, at times, hostile; and we 
also know that King Hamlet, “cut off” in the “blossoms” of his “sin” (1.5.83), has handed 
Hamlet a task that he feels could damn him, that perhaps already has.  Hamlet’s reference 
to the “mildewed ear blasting his wholesome brother” ever so subtly registers these 
anxieties and so reflects the fact that ideal praise is and always was an illu io .  That is, 
in harrowing Claudius’ counterfeit presentiment by using the device of synecdoche, 
Hamlet wounds his uncle even as he exposes that wound (that hole) at the heart of 
wholesome praise.71   
A wonder-wounded hearer herself, Gertrude, too, is broken apart like a harrowed 
landscape when Hamlet contends that her “sense” must be “apoplexed; for madness 
would not err, / Nor sense to ecstasy was ne’er so thralled, /But it reserved some quantity 
of choice / To serve in such a difference” (83-86).  Telling his mother that her senses 
have been fragmented through a fit of dizziness and not through ecstasy or madness, 
Hamlet creates in his mother what he would seem merely to be affirming (again, his 
“rhapsody of words”); the portraits aid him in this effort, offering up pictures that do not 
                                                      
71 I owe the connection between hole and wholesome to Theodore Leinwand. 
214 
 
resemble the words used to describe them.  In so doing, Hamlet embraces the insufficient 
language of representation that he had disdained, using that insufficiency to his 
advantage.  When Hamlet goes on to lament, “Eyes without feeling, feeling without sight, 
/ Ears without hands or eyes, smelling sans all…” (87-89), we hear Gertrude 
disintegrating right before our ears, and she knows it.  Struggling to keep herself whol , 
she implores her son three times to “speak no more” (99).  Instead, Hamlet, having 
harrowed up the listener, eventually (by 5.1) becomes whole himself, his words gaining 
in force and momentum, his language rising to such a pitch that Gertrude cannot bear it.   
“Tear[ing] a passion to tatters” (3.2.10) with his harrowing language, Hamlet 
concludes this long passage with another direct reference to the ghost’s speech in 1.5.  
His attack on his mother’s sexual impropriety, his flippant remark about “virtue…as wax 
/ Melt[ing] in her own fire” (3.4.94-95), his description of the “rank sweat of an 
enseamed bed,” and his allusion to his mother’s and uncle’s love-making “over the nasty 
sty” (104-106), all underscore the connection between Hamlet’s invective and the ghost’s 
portrayal of Gertrude’s “lust… / sate[ing] itself in a celestial bed / And prey[ing] on 
garbage” (1.5.62-64).  This image, together with that of Claudius as an “adulterate b as ” 
contrasts with the ghost’s picture of the deceased king as “radiant angel,” “whose love 
was of that dignity / That went hand in hand” with his marriage vows (1.5.55-62).  In 
both scenes, the speaker employs hyperbole to distinguish a prelapsarian marriage from a 
postlapsarian one.72  Thus, when Hamlet compares his father to a medley of gods, the 
most prominent being the Hyperion, he is repeating the ghost’s own representation i 1.5.     
                                                      
72 As the ghost implies, this “falling off” was precipitated not by Adam but by Eve and the serpent, who in 
the ghost’s version of the story go on to marry onea other.  See Arthur Kirsch, “Hamlet’s Grief,” ELH 
48.1 (1981), 17-36.  In this essay, Kirsch notes that “Hamlet’s memory of his father’s true marriage with 
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Nonetheless, as powerful as the ghost’s imagery is, and as pregnant as it is with 
biblical allusion, Hamlet’s description of his father as a god and his uncle as a mildewed 
ear tops the ghost’s extravagant narrative, thus suggesting that the prince is not only 
mimicking the apparition he calls “Hamlet,” “King,” “Father,” “Royal Dane,” but also 
competing with it to outdo an already amplified rhetoric.  The ghost’s depiction of the
king’s lazar-like body and congealed blood, and the vulgar words he uses to describe 
Gertrude’s and Claudius’ sexuality, is surpassed only by Hamlet’s language in this closet 
scene.  The audience (and of course Gertrude herself) is barraged with images of 
everything from mildewed ears, reechy kisses, and nasty pigsties to ulcerous and oozing 
infections, bloat kings, and broken necks.  We cannot help but cringe at the mingling of 
pathos with bathos – and even perhaps stifle an uncomfortable laugh – when Hamlet 
declares to his mother that he will “lug the guts [of Polonius] into the neighbor room”
(235).   
 In addition to the similarities in their language and in the way they organize their 
diatribes, both Hamlet and the ghost find that their rhetorical effusiveness is curbed by 
ostensibly external forces.  This happens at the same structural point in each scene.  As I 
have already mentioned, the ghost most likely would have continued vilifying Claudius 
and Gertrude if he had not “scent[ed] the morning air” (1.5.65).  Only then does the ghost 
finally provide details of the fratricide, instructing Hamlet to avenge his murder and 
remember him and so perversely tying memory and mourning with violent retribution.  
Hamlet, similarly, commences a hysterical, manic diatribe against Claudius – calling him 
a “murderer and a villain,” a “slave” (which recalls his third soliloquy in 2.2), “a vice of 
                                                                                                                                                              
his mother…has a pre-lapsarian resonance” (28).  This is certainly true, but we should also observe the way 
the ghost reinforces this idea in 1.5.   
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kings,” a “cutpurse of the empire,” and a “king of shreds and pieces” (3.4.110-117) – 
before the ghost’s appearance prevents his shredding Claudius even further.  Does the 
ghost arrive because of Hamlet’s hysteria or does the hysteria produce the ghost?  The 
fact that only Hamlet can see the apparition at this moment leaves us with a few w ys of 
interpreting its presence: one, the ghost can select whom he appears to and so can cho se 
to be seen by Horatio and the guards but not by Gertrude; two, Gertrude is incapable of 
seeing specters (a less likely possibility given that Horatio, skeptic that he is, saw the 
ghost); or three, Hamlet, having internalized the ghost at the end of 1.5, has – in his 
madness perhaps – manufactured him here.  This third possibility allows us to interpret 
the ghost as a projection of Hamlet’s “mind’s eye.”  Appropriately, the apparition does 
not appear to Hamlet armed, cap-a-pie, and with his beaver up, but rather “dressed in hi 
habit as he lived” (3.4.155).          
Reading the ghost as a figment of Hamlet’s wild imaginings, moreover, confers a 
greater degree of agency on a protagonist who seems ready to insist on his independence.  
Accordingly, this next point of contact between the two scenes – the scenting of the 
morning air in 1.5 and the reappearance of the ghost in 3.4 – also signals the place at 
which Hamlet comes into his own as a character in his play.  Although the ghost counsels 
Hamlet not to think too much on his mother and not to “let the bed of Denmark be / A 
couch for luxury and damned incest” (1.5.89-90) and Hamlet – after the ghost appears – 
tells his mother to live “purer” with her cleft heart and not to have further relations with 
Claudius (3.4.179-204), this last resemblance is where the connection begins to loosen.  
The ghost may know how verbally to manipulate Hamlet, but he still recognizes that he is 
dependent on the prince to build or reestablish his name; in contrast, Hamlet’s identity
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depends on severing such ties, which is in part the reason that Hamlet’s speech is more 
powerful: it involves an act of rebellious autonomy.  Unlike the ghost, the prince’s 
identity is not contingent on anything his mother commits to.73   
  While it might seem odd, even disempowering, for Shakespeare to write in the 
ghost’s appearance in order to curb Hamlet’s tirade and berate him, it makes sense if w  
interpret this moment as a kind of exorcism and the linguistic excess as a form of verbal 
expulsion.74  Hamlet has already killed Polonius, another father figure, and so he need 
only take responsibility for this action (“I do repent”) in order to turn it into a symbolic 
repudiation of the ghost of his own father.75  Before Hamlet does this, however, he 
watches the specter disappear through a “portal” (156), a word that we could also apply 
to the metaphorical space through which Hamlet himself enters at this moment in the 
play.  Even Hamlet’s language changes after the ghost leaves: he is calmer, focused, and 
more controlled.  Has he listened to the ghost (arguably just a figure of his inner 
conscience)?  Perhaps a little, but now he does things his own way.  He rejects his 
mother’s claims that he is mad, incredulously maintaining, “Ecstasy? / My pulse as yours 
doth temperately keep time / And makes as healthful music” (160-162).  After defending 
                                                      
73 Aside from trying to convince his mother to steer cl ar of Claudius, the only thing that Hamlet asks his 
mother to do is not to disclose that he is “mad in craft” (210).  However, The Mousetrap scene – coupled 
with Hamlet’s own violent behavior here in 3.4 – makes this request somewhat moot.  Hamlet’s actions are 
enough to incite Laertes’ ire and provoke Claudius’ next level of treachery; it hardly matters whether others 
think him mad or not.   
74 See Alexander Welsh, Hamlet in His Modern Guises, 65. 
75 In Hamlet’s Perfection, William Kerrigan stresses the importance of Hamlet’s admission here, arguing 
that he must indeed “answer for the murder of Polonius” and that the “bad dreams of damnation may just 
have come true.  When he departs for England, his commanding stage presence temporarily deserting its 
kingdom, the play reveals the consequences on this earth in the death of Ophelia, the wrath of Laertes, and 
the alliance of Laertes and Claudius; the murder of Polonius comes back with deadly force” (115).  Seealso 
Fredson Bowers, “Hamlet as Minister and Scourge,” PMLA 70.4 (1955), 740-49.  Alexander Welsh, in 
contrast, sees the death as necessary to Hamlet’s character development and the plot.  Tacitly reminding us 
of Hamlet’s position as a history play and setting it explicitly within the realm of literary history, Welsh 
argues that it is death that mobilizes – and is ratfied through – the progression of history (Hamlet in His 
Modern Guises, 69).   
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his own sanity, he goes on to proselytize to her (“Confess yourself to heaven”) and to 
challenge her not to use his madness as an excuse to ignore what is going on within 
herself (“Lay not the flattering unction to your soul / That not your trespass but my 
madness speaks”).   
In denying the fact that he is mad, Hamlet can repair what he lost in 1.5 when he 
becomes a wonder-wounded hearer and looks ahead to his assertion of himself as 
“Hamlet the Dane” in 5.1.  In both cases, he names himself at other people’s expense.  
Standing over Polonius’ dead body in 3.4, Hamlet declares, “I do repent; but heaven hath 
pleased it so / To punish me with this and this with me, / That I might be their scourge 
and minister” (194-196).76  With the ghost gone, the embodiment of the wonder-wounded 
hearer dead at his feet, and his mother gaping in amazement at her son, Hamlet has tak n 
one step closer to what he finally achieves in the graveyard.  Expanding on the role of the 
traditional avenger when he becomes Heaven’s minister a well as scourge, Haml t 
assumes a function that, instead of compromising his individuality, underscores it.  For 
even though the prince has not yet killed Claudius, he suggests that he has already earned 
the title of scourge (heaven’s punisher and heaven’s punished) and minister (“agent”) – 
not only by killing Polonius but also by scourging all of Elsinore with his verbal daggers.  
Surely this role could not, then, satisfy the ghost, who comes back to “whet” Hamlet’s 
“almost blunted purpose” (127).  Indeed, the ghost’s purpose is further blunted if we read 
the 1623 version of the play.  Emphasizing Hamlet’s liberation from a father who wants 
                                                      
76 This transitional line in 3.4 serves as an important bridge between this scene and the end of the play: on 
the one hand, Hamlet claims responsibility for the action (“I do repent”); on the other hand, he begins to 
shirk responsibility by attributing the cause to Heav n.  This latter stance defines his attitude in the final 




bloody revenge, the Folio does not print his seventh soliloquy and so never shows him 
embracing “bloody” action (4.4.68-69).77 
With Hamlet, therefore, as divine scourge instead of mere bloody avenger, the 
play also redefines the relationship between Hamlet and Claudius.  From Claudius’s 
perspective, of course, Hamlet (and not his evil deed) is the canker that gnaws incessantly 
on the king’s conscience; thus he believes that ridding himself of Hamlet will eradicate 
his guilt.  Without disclosing too much to Gertrude, Claudius compares himself to the 
“owner of a foul disease” who “to keep it [Hamlet] from divulging, let it feed / Even on 
the pith of life” (4.1.22-24).  Later, in soliloquy, Claudius writes the mandate ordering the 
“present death of Hamlet” before declaring, “Do it England, / For like the hectic in my 
blood he rages, / And thou must cure me” (4.3.74-76).  Like Measure for Measure’s 
Angelo, Claudius in prayer suffers a separation of words and thoughts: Heaven has his 
empty words while his thoughts remain below.  Claudius, like the duke’s deputy, will 
write good angel on the devil’s horn while razing the inner sanctuary of his conscience.   
And like Measure for Measure’s Vincentio (from Latin vincere, “to conquer”), 
who despises acting and theatrics but who decides that “craft against vice I must apply” 
(3.2.277), Hamlet capitulates to the sort of art that he disdains, attempting to expose (as 
scourge) what Claudius (the flatterer) tries to hide or destroy.78  If Hamlet, then, 
differentiates himself from the usurping king, he does so not because he is free from vice 
but because, unlike Claudius, he acknowledges (to us and to his mother) the canker 
within himself.  Thus, the prince recapitulates that altogether radical moment lat  in the 
young-man sonnets when the speaker, having confronted the canker again and again, 
                                                      
77 Welsh also makes this point (Hamlet in His Modern Guises, 65). 
78 Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, ed. A.R. Braunmuller (New York: Penguin Classics, 2000).  
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finally admits to his beloved, “I must / Strive to know my shames and praises from your 
tongue” (112).  The word “must” is important; it is as compulsory as Hamlet’s role as 
“scourge” is in 3.4.  A powerful moment in the poem and the play, the speaker gains 
authority by admitting to his complicity in the problem.79  Thus exploiting their 
vulnerability, the poet successfully elevates his poetics above the standard Petrarchan 
fare, while Hamlet insists that he is sanctified by heaven.   
In some sense, then, Hamlet becomes an individuated tragic protagonist because 
he exorcises a good deal of the revenge drama along with the ghost.  For Polonius’ death, 
instead of inciting a murderous rampage on Hamlet’s part, ignites a competing reve e 
plot that takes the pressure off of Hamlet himself.  Indeed, the final moments of the play 
suggest that Hamlet kills Claudius more for himself and his mother than for his father.  
Perhaps this is the prince’s way of taking revenge on revenge.  In this respect, he 
espouses a post-humanist attitude.  Maus observes that avengers are typically
“conservative” rather than forward-thinking and that their primary goal is to reclaim a 
past that a usurper has temporarily obliterated; avengers will die, in other words, trying to 
reestablish a prior socio-political model.80  Hamlet’s outlook, in contrast, is 
“revolutionary,” to borrow Maus’ word.81   
This “revolutionary” outlook can be understood in terms of Hamlet’s changing 
attitude toward praise, in the way in which he learns to exploit its weaknesses.  For if 
Hamlet extols his father in a way that makes Greenblatt and others see him as being 
unconvincing or insincere, it is because he discovers how to use praise as a weapon, to 
                                                      
79 This is quite different from the self-blame that pervades Hamlet’s character in Act 2 and the beginning of 
3. 
80 See Maus, Inwardness and Theater, 55-56, and her introduction to Four Revenge Tragedies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), xiii.  
81 Ibid., xiii. 
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create (and not simply reveal) that necessary distance between himself and his father.  
Indeed, as an epideictic skeptic, Hamlet may be nostalgic for the past, but he recognizes 
that it is just that – the past.  Subtly dismissing his father towards the end of the play, 
Hamlet insists that “Hercules…[may] do what he may” while he himself will “have his 
[own] day” (5.1.310-11).  Neither a Hyperion nor a Hercules like his father – nor a mere 
killer like his uncle – Hamlet has achieved an identity apart from both, an identity that 
sets him apart from that of the traditional avenger and that he hopes will elevate him as a 
post-Reformation, post-humanist rose of the fair state.  And so, even if the sort of praise 
that Hamlet reclaims for himself in 5.1 is not an unqualified ideal but rather a wounded 
wonder, it offers power once it is embraced.     
      
Interlude: Polonius, the Wonder-Wounded Hearer  
 As a way of highlighting the major points in this chapter, I want to provide a short 
character study of Polonius, who dies a “wonder-wounded hearer” in the same scene that 
Hamlet reaches the height of his verbal power.  Polonius is a kind of hollow man: the 
play depends on him dramaturgically and thematically; and he embodies Shakespeare’s 
epideictic skepticism.  His character thus is a touchstone for understanding the action 
preceding and following his death.   
The name Polonius brings to mind a series of literary antecedents and intra-
dramatic relationships established by way of its revealing etymology.  Literally meaning 
“of Poland,” Polonius connects the main plot of Hamlet with the play’s political frame – 
which involves Fortinbras’ quest to reclaim the land that he feels is ethically, if not 
lawfully, his own and to expand his nation’s territory, his march taking him past the 
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periphery of Denmark and into Poland.  As far as we know, Polonius was entirely 
Shakespeare’s invention.  In Belleforest’s version of the story, the counselor who is 
“killed, boiled, and fed to swine” is called Corambis, a name also appearing in the firs  
quarto of Hamlet and, most likely, in the Ur-Hamlet as well.82  In many ways, of course, 
Polonius, who claims he can “find / Where truth is hid, though it were hid, indeed, / 
Within the center” (2.2.169-171) and who makes it his task to protect Ophelia from 
Hamlet’s ostensibly half-hearted “tenders of affection,” does preserve, if ironically, 
vestiges of the original counselor, whose name suggests “wandering heart.” 
 The name Polonius, however, also evokes an image of the “sledded Polacks” 
“smote” by King Hamlet “in an angry parle” (1.1.74-75).  The connection is reinforced 
later when Fortinbras, probably retracing the steps taken by Hamlet’s father and thus 
seeking direction by indirection, marches into Poland to “gain a little patch of ground / 
That hath in it no profit but the name” (4.4.19-20).  In relating this information to Hamlet, 
the Captain’s assertion that such a land will not “yield… / A ranker” or higher “rate” 
reflects the fact that the territory is rotten as well as worthless, as evidenced by Hamlet’s 
use of imposthume in his reply: “Two thousand souls and twenty thousand ducats / Will 
not debate the question of this straw. / This is th’ imposthume of much wealth and peace, 
/ That inward breaks and shows no cause without / Why the man dies” (26-30).  
Remarkably, this worthless plot can somehow provoke a bloody debate for a mere “trick 
of fame,” Hamlet later points out in Q2’s final soliloquy (4.4.64).  How and why?  
Hamlet suggests that a wealthy nation is always susceptible to war and to the 
“imposthume” or canker, which attacks the body, killing it on the inside and revealing 
“no cause without.”  Poland, then, represents not only the site of war and bloodshed for 
                                                      
82 Marvin Hunt, Looking for Hamlet, 19.  See also Sir Israel Gollancz, The Sources of Hamlet.  
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some insignificant reason – in short, for a “name” or for “honor,” a word that 
Shakespeare had already taken pains to deflate in 1 Henry IV and Julius Caesar – but also 
the place that nurtures man’s self-destruction. 
 In the main part of the play, we know that Polonius is not just the stock figure of 
the fool and he is not just a bumbling idiot.  Enterprising and opportunistic, domineering 
and even mean, Polonius is the character around whom the main action of the play 
revolves (much like the plot of land in Poland), his influence extending to the very end of 
the drama when Laertes returns from France in a vengeful rage, impatient to kill in the 
name of his father.  Polonius even mirrors and foils many of the other characters in the 
play.  As Claudius’ chief adviser, Polonius stands second (after Gertrude) in the King’s 
estimation: “What wouldst thou beg, Laertes, / That shall not be my offer, not thy asking? 
/ The head is not more native to the heart, / The hand more instrumental to the mouth, / 
Than is the throne of Denmark to thy father” (1.2.45-50).  Although he certainly doubts 
Polonius’ naïve insistence that the “very cause of Hamlet’s lunacy” is his love for 
Ophelia, Claudius for a while follows his counselor in pursuing this possibility (2.2.52).  
We can even argue that Polonius indirectly sets Claudius on the trail to “sift” Hamlet for 
other causes of his altered behavior.  The king, more than Gertrude, is also peculiarly 
patient with Polonius’ verbal meanderings, which shows the power he wields during the 
first part of the play.  Only Hamlet speaks more lines than Polonius prior to the 
counselor’s death in 3.4.   
 We notice the extent of Polonius’ control by looking at his relationship with his 
children.  With Ophelia, Polonius is particularly cruel, attempting to control her passion 
in order to avoid appearing as if he is orchestrating her marriage to a prince.  In contrast 
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to Laertes’ playfully sexual warnings to his sister about the dangers of being courted by a 
prince whose “will is not his own” (1.3.20), Polonius insults his daughter’s character and 
intelligence, calling her a “green girl” (110) and a “baby” (114), and comparing her to the 
doltish “woodcock” easily trapped by a man’s “springes” (114).  That Ophelia seem  
without hesitation to obey her father, even going so far as to play the pawn in his spy
game or the bait to catch the carp, evinces her dependence and explains her violent 
reaction to her father’s death.    
 Polonius’ manipulation of his son is even more significant because it mirrors the 
logic of blame and slander endorsed by Hamlet himself.  Astonishingly officious to the
point of being injurious, Polonius enlists his servant Reynaldo to “breathe” his son’s 
“faults so / quaintly” so that, “laying these slight sullies,” his gentle slanders will obtain 
information about his son’s whereabouts and his exploits (2.1.34-45).  Hamlet is right in 
calling Polonius a “fishmonger” and is likely listening when Polonius argues that slander 
– or what he calls “the bait of falsehood” – will catch the “carp of truth” (70).  Hamlet 
surely picks up the fact that the counselor operates not only by using indirection to find 
direction out but also by exploiting libel and blame, which seem (as per Shakespeare’s 
epideictic skepticism) capable of drawing the truth to the surface.  Like the “imposthume 
of much wealth and peace,” slander operates in Polonius’ view the same way, insidiously 
and perniciously working its way into its hearers like a cankerworm, forcing them to 
convey information perhaps against their will, such that the confidants Reynaldo procures 
will know “no cause without” why they reveal what they do. 
 But it is Polonius himself who is a kind of dramatic canker.  Although the climax 
of the play begins with The Murder of Gonzago, which Hamlet nearly foils in his 
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impetuosity and impatience to draw out the king’s guilt, the climax peaks with Polonius’ 
death behind the arras.  Most of the subsequent stage action spins out from the 
counselor’s dead body.  Claudius, for example, finds in the body an expedient, a 
convincing reason for sending Hamlet away.  The play also makes it clear that Ophelia’s 
madness results directly from her father’s death; and Laertes, of course, returns from 
France as hot-blooded as young Fortinbras, vowing to “dare damnation” to avenge his 
father (4.5.151) – a father who seems to have the same hold on him (especially in death) 
that the ghost has on Hamlet.   
 With Laertes established in the last part of the play as Hamlet’s foil and Claudius’ 
tragic instrument, the ironic parallels between Polonius and King Hamlet become far 
more obvious.  Twice in the play Hamlet refers to his father as the sun god: in his first 
soliloquy, the prince laments that his father, “so excellent a King,” was like a “Hyperion” 
compared to Claudius, the “satyr” (1.2.143-144); in the closet scene, Hamlet compares 
his father to “Hyperion” a second time (3.4.66).  Not just a sun god but, quite literally, a 
god in the eyes of his son, King Hamlet’s characterization as this particular deity calls 
attention to the etymological relationship Polonius shares with Apollonius and of course
the sun god Apollo.83  Polonius, in a way, is almost a parody of the real thing.  And, as a 
caricature of a god, the counselor would hardly be condemned to walk the night all 
menacing and powerful and armor-clad but rather must take his place among the “pocky 
corpses” in the graveyard. 
 Preparing us, moreover, for Fortinbras’ entrance and strengthening the connection 
between the assault on Poland and the events circulating around Polonius’ death, the 
                                                      
83 Perhaps it is fortunate that while Hamlet wishes his mother would continue indefinitely to cry “Like 
Niobe, all tears” (1.2.153), she does not; in Greek mythology, Niobe’s intense grief arises from the murder 
of her sons and daughters by Artemis and Apollo.  In Hamlet, “Niobe’s” son kills “Apollo.”  
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counselor’s corpse also indirectly foments political instability in Denmark after Laertes 
returns from France, heated, violent and “in a riotous head” (4.5.111).  A messenger 
describing this homecoming affirms how the “rabble” have taken to calling Laertes 
“‘lord’” and “‘king!’” (112-116).  Despite Claudius’ quick recovery when he convinces 
Laertes to forgive him for the “hugger-mugger” burial of his father and of the necessity 
of exacting his revenge on Hamlet, Denmark does not stabilize itself politically, leaving 
Elsinore ripe for picking when Fortinbras arrives with his army.   
 Surely a profitable name, Polonius also highlights key parallels between his 
corpse and the worthless plot of land over which thousands of men fight with their 
nation’s “twenty thousand ducats” (4.4.26).  And the play corroborates such a connection 
even more subtly.  While we cannot be certain who Hamlet really thought was behind the 
arras when he ran over to it screaming “a rat,” Shakespeare at least used Hamlet to 
reinforce the connection between Polonius’ character and the Poland business when the 
manic prince adds, “Dead for a ducat, dead” (3.4.29).  An ironic comment on the 
ostensible worthlessness of Polonius’ body and a prologue to Hamlet’s conversation with 
the Captain about the numerous ducats being poured into the conquest of the Polish 
territory, this line also underscores this corpse’s ability to cultivate the play’s eventual 
destruction and decline (much like the imposthume described in 4.4), even though 
Polonius’ death appears to be worth but a “straw.”  Hamlet “lugs” Polonius’ “guts into 
the neighbor room,” but he effectively drags this body (and others) all the way into the 
final scene of the play.  Polonius not only occasions, but enables, Hamlet’s acceptance of 
the canker within himself – a perspective that will eventually bring him freedom from the 
canker.       
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Polonius’ connection with Hamlet and the motif of the canker is reinforced in the 
fourth act of the play when his corpse, which Hamlet tells Claudius is being eaten by a 
“certain convocation of politic worms…and maggots,” occasions the prince’s mad 
meditation on “how a king may go a progress through the guts of a beggar” (4.3.23-35).  
Beyond highlighting the idea that death is the great equalizer – the substance of Hamlet’s 
thanatopsis in the graveyard – this passage emphasizes the fact that all men are 
transformed into worms.  Such an image, furthermore, pulls toward it the many other 
references to cankers and imposthumes in this play and unites the reality of ev l, or the 
poison brought on by the canker, with the inescapability of death.   
Eaten by the convocation of politic worms, Polonius transforms into the worm or 
imposthume; he becomes, one might say, the very figure of slander and blame and thus a 
symbol of Shakespeare’s epideictic skepticism.  In this respect, he is both the fishmonger 
who releases the bait and the bait used to catch the carp – and indeed to catch the play.  
Ironically, perhaps, we might then venture that Polonius’ character acts as a kind of
portal through which the remainder of the tragedy must move.  Just as Fortinbras first 
leads his men into Poland before returning to Denmark to assume the throne, so Hamlet 
must literally go through Polonius to get to Claudius.  Eventually in tragedy, all the major 
characters become food for worms. 
 And so, Polonius, who is killed because of his vulnerable ear, literalizes the idea 
of the “wonder-wounded hearer.”  He is also a parody of the identity problems caused by 
heard wonder, for he is stabbed not just because he eavesdrops but because Hamlet 
claims to have mistaken him for Claudius.  Twice Hamlet hears Polonius cry out, first to 
protest what he thinks is imminent violence against Gertrude and the second time in h s 
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death agony, to declare that he has been slain.  Yet, Hamlet continues to doubt his 
identity.  To Gertrude’s lament, “O me, what has thou done?” Hamlet replies, “Nay, I 
know not.  Is it the King?” (31-32).  Readers often debate whether Hamlet knew he was 
killing Polonius; some have contended that because Hamlet just returned from watching 
Claudius praying in the chapel, he could not have thought it was the king.  Understanding 
the symbolism of this scene circumvents this debate altogether.  It does not matter who 
Hamlet thought was behind the arras, a debate that is impossible to settle; it matters 
merely that he misidentifies Polonius.  This scene, in short, dramatizes in the symbolic 
death of Polonius the way in which heard wonder disrupts identity (such a disruption, in 
this case, is manifested in the wound of death).  Pitting the vulnerability of the hearer 
against the great power offered Hamlet because of his death, this scene – indeed 
Polonius’ wound – opens up a space for Hamlet to come terms with his own identity as a 
tragic protagonist. 
 
Conclusion   
 An astute director may very well ask the actor playing Hamlet to hold the sam  
pose over Polonius in 3.4 that he does over Ophelia in 5.1.  In the first instance, Hamlet 
declares himself “scourge and minister”; in the latter, he labels himself “Hamlet the 
Dane.”  And in both cases Hamlet builds an identity at the expense of another character 
much as a Petrarchan poet finds aesthetic and artistic fulfillment in his beloved’s absence 
or death.  As I have already argued in the opening pages of this chapter, however, the 
prince (like the poet of the Sonnets) is aware of this seeming inequity and openly 
criticizes the method even as he deploys it.  To be a praise poet and a tragic hero – to 
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become in the process a wonder-wounding speaker – is to stand on other people’s 
shoulders.  What makes Hamlet, therefore, peculiar among Shakespeare’s heroes is how 
explicitly this truth is dramatized and how readily the play informs the “tragic nature” of 
the young-man sonnets and the tragic character of the poet himself.  Equally important in 
binding together these works is the way the poet/protagonist learns how to turn a 
weakness into a strength, to command authority by acknowledging inner vice while 
insisting on the permanence of the rose.  Just as the poet insists that the young man’s 
“rose” is his all in “all” (109), so Hamlet transforms himself by the fifth act of his play 
back into a “rose of the fair state” whose “wounded name” awaits Horatio’s final 


















Playing Shakespeare’s Will: Theater and Sexuality in the Dark-Lady 
Sonnets and The Taming of the Shrew      
 
 
In previous chapters, I explore how the poet’s examination of praise, his 
skepticism about the male friend, his suffering and self-doubt, and, finally, his 
acknowledgment of the canker within himself suggest that the young-man sequence 
contains evocations of tragedy.  While the poet does not endure physical death like 
Hamlet, Macbeth, or King Lear, the poet experiences a metaphorical death, suffering 
through his quest for knowledge and identity, publicly confessing his vices, and 
achieving a victory of sorts when he affirms the primacy of the rose.  But then he turns 
his back on the poetry that led him down his “tragic” path and on the epistemological 
investigation that inevitably accompanies praise.  Shakespeare’s comic epilogu  to this 
sequence is the dark-lady poems.  Rather than praise his mistress and subject her to 
ethical inquiry, the poet bargains and pleads as if they were characters in a story – or she 
an actress in his play.  Indeed, play is the operative word, because what the poet crafts in 
the dark-lady sonnets are poetic mini-dramas, scenes of comic interplay instead of 
epideictic introspection.1   
Most scholars, however, tend to read this second sequence as something other 
than comic recreation.  Joel Fineman, for example, is only gamesome en route to his 
sobering affirmation that the dark lady’s poet becomes divided forever from idealizing 
                                                      
1 Of course, to compare the dark-lady poems to comedy is, in some measure, to insist that they lack the 
depth, complexity, and skepticism of the young-man so nets.  Colin Burrow argues that the dark-lady 
poems are “far simpler than many of the poems before 126” (Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 134).  Robert Matz 
agrees with Burrow, adding that while the young-man poems are “really uncertain,” the “sonnets to the 
black mistress only play at uncertainty” (The World of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 147).   
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praise.2  Some scholars take an even darker view of the mistress, comparing her to a 
figure of racial difference that the poet laments and tries unsuccessfully to subjugate.  
According to Kim Hall, Shakespeare’s insistence (at least initially) on his black lady’s 
fairness is consistent with an imperialistic English society that wanted to “‘enrich’ the 
language with new world matter” as well as to “control encroachments of cultural 
otherness.”  Thus, the “whitening of the dark lady,” Hall argues, “becomes a cruci l 
exercise of male poetic power.”3  Marvin Hunt also explores the semiotics of blackness, 
contending that while we may never know the mistress’ real identity (if she has one), her 
“black value” suggests a “threat to racial and cultural purity.”4 
 Still other interpretations have shown how cultural and social contexts can be 
used to articulate the relationship between the two subsequences.  Margreta de Grazia, for 
example, argues that the “black mistress” represents “anarchy,” “miscegenation,” and 
“social peril,” forces that undermine the fragile social hierarchies preserv d in the first 
126 poems.5  Olga Valbuena, in contrast, looks at how the poems’ references to writing 
materials (“paper, leaves, pen, knife, and ink”) expose the possibilities and liabilities of 
artistic reproduction.6  Distinguishing the dark lady (the inky blot) from the fair youth 
(who is “fairly” copied), Valbuena argues that the mistress “has been made to blot up and 
absorb the blunted desires and ‘black lines’ (63.13) of the poet’s ‘perjured’ I (152.13)” 
                                                      
2 See Joel Fineman, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye; for a longer discussion of his argument, see chapter 1 of 
this dissertation. 
3 Kim F. Hall, Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1995), 71 and 115.  Hall sets her discussion of Shakespeare within a broader 
study of how white male writers enact poetic control. 
4 Marvin Hunt, “Be Dark but Not Too Dark: Shakespeare’s Dark Lady as Sign of Color,” in Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets: Critical Essays, 376.  
5 Margreta de Grazia, “The Scandal of Shakespeare’s Sonnets,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, 
103-07. 
6 Olga L. Valbuena, “‘The Dyer’s Hand’: The Reproduction of Coercion and Blot in Shakespeare’s 
Sonnets,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, 327. 
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and so her “subsequence bears the welled-up desires, jealousies, and hostilities the po t-
speaker has in store to ‘convert’ to black ink.”7  Robert Matz, who takes a similar 
approach, interprets the female addressee as a “scapegoat for anxieties about duplicity or 
sin in the relationships between fair young men.”8  For Matz, the mistress is a cultural 
symbol, not an actual person.9  Indeed, few critics have shown as much interest in the 
dark lady’s identity as A.L. Rowse, whose assertion that the mistress is Emilia Lanyer 
was famously rebuffed by Samuel Schoenbaum.10 
 This reluctance to explore biographical possibilities has also, David Schalkwyk 
observes, curbed our desire to see her as anything more than a troublesome “whore.”11  In 
saying this, Schalkwyk does not endorse Rowse’s method but rather aims to enrich our 
understanding of the mistress by exploring her “embodiment” in a performative (rath r 
than descriptive) art form.  Reading the Sonnets as the “theatre in which individual 
subject and society engage” (28), Schalkwyk imagines a “context of address and 
reception in which the response of the beloved, though not recorded in the poem itself, 
would not only have been possible but likely” (55).  This claim that Shakespeare’s poet 
                                                      
7 Valbuena, “‘The Dyer’s Hand,’” 333-338. 
8 Robert Matz, The World of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 147. 
9 Indeed, scholars have been significantly less tenta ive in positing the identities of the young man and the 
rival poet.  For a longer discussion of this issue, see chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
10 A.L. Rowse, Shakespeare’s Sonnets: The Problems Solved, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).  
Rowse bases his knowledge of Lanyer on Simon Forman’s astrological diary.  See also Samuel 
Schoenbaum, “Shakespeare’s Dark Lady: a question of identity,” in Shakespeare’s Styles, ed. Philip 
Edwards, Inga-Stina Ewbank, and G.K. Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 221-239.  
According to Schoenbaum, “External evidence alone – a reference in some contemporary diary or 
correspondence – can silence the sceptics, and that is the card some of us were hoping Dr Rowse had up his 
sleeve.  Probably it was foolish to think such a card could ever have existed.  Rowse and the others assume 
that the Sonnets comprise rhymed fourteen-line entries in a personal diary, and that their revelations 
represent the raw materials of experience.  But poes w ar masks.  May not much of what is intimate about 
these poems be private and interior, and what is exterior – derived from the world of events – transmuted 
and ordered by the implacable necessities of art?  The opposition between the Fair Youth and the Dark 
Lady is, after all, comprehensible in terms of poetic and moral symbolism; whether or not Shakespeare in 
his own life kept a mistress of that hue, he required her services for his poetry” (236). 
11 See David Schalkwyk, Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 89.  See also Rowse, xxvii-xliii. 
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“seeks reciprocity” (183) with his dark lady diverges from a critical tradi ion focused on 
how the poems “constitute the subjectivity of their creator” or how they “silence[]” the 
beloved (59).12  By favoring a theatrical interpretation of the Sonnets, moreover, 
Schalkwyk in many ways rescues a woman who has long been doomed to suffer quietly 
while her poet and her readers judge her; inviting us to envisage her “palpable” 
“presence” (55) and to hear her voice, Schalkwyk reminds us that the dark lady is not just
a symbol of blackness and ostensible depravity but also a person (however fictionalized). 
 My argument in this chapter crosses paths with Schalkwyk’s interpretation.  L ke 
him, I highlight the dark-lady sonnets’ dramatic potential and implicit “reciprocity,” thus 
building on the premise that “Shakespeare’s involvement with the theatre informs his 
writing of sonnets in decisive ways.”13  Unlike Schalkwyk, however, I will not focus on 
the theoretical, social, and cultural aspects of performance nor examine the poems’ us  of 
speech acts.  Thus, I will not advance the notion that the “player-poet seeks less to 
persuade…through rhetoric than to bring about something in the saying of it” (33).  
Moreover, I differentiate the two sequences while Schalkwyk insists that “i  is not fruitful 
to assume that” any part of Shakespeare’s sonnets is “primarily epistemological” (29).  
Ultimately, Schalkwyk sees the poet of both sequences not as a character bound by story 
or a writer stunted by skepticism, but as an actor-artist with all language at his command.  
 If, therefore, Schalkwyk reads the poems within a public “context of address and 
reception,” he seeks recourse in a public medium: the plays.  Helping to bridge the 
dramas and the poems, however, is not described action (or narrative) but the 
                                                      
12 For the most famous exploration of poetic subjectivity, see Fineman’s Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye.  For 
a feminist reading of the dark-lady poems, see Nona Feinberg, “Erasing the Dark Lady: Sonnet 138 in the 
Sequence,” in Assays 4 (1987), 97-108.  
13 Schalkwyk, Speech and Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 238. 
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performative utterance.  For Schalkwyk, theater is partly a linguistic exercise in which 
the action (such as it is) takes places inside the poem as the poet reads lyrics to his 
mistress/audience.  For me, theater manifests itself as a series of private transactions 
between a poet who no longer wants to praise and a mistress who doesn’t seek it; thus, I 
look at performance at the other end of the lyric/narrative continuum in which the poems 
allow us to extrapolate a plot that bears resemblances to (but does not depend 
theoretically on) the plays.  Indeed, I want to argue that in the dark-lady sonnet , the poet, 
by rejecting Petrarchan praise conceits as early as sonnet 127, by making physical contact 
with his beloved, and by bargaining with his mistress instead of praising her, learns th t 
the only truth to be found lies not in language (performative or otherwise) but in dramatic 
action.  In doing all this, the poet deliberately eschews what preoccupied him in the 
young-man poems: epistemological investigation.   
 Indeed, while the young-man sonnets present a quest to understand the canker and 
the rose, the poems devoted to the rebellious mistress trace the aftermath of that quest.  In 
this second sequence, the double trope disappears.  The poet may have seen flowers 
“damasked red and white” in the young man’s face, but the dark lady shows “no such 
roses…in her cheeks” (130).  One reason for this distinction is a pragmatic one; the poet 
has already confessed to the young man that “nothing this wide universe I call, / Save 
thou, my Rose” (109; my emphasis).  For less pragmatic reasons, the poet abandons the 
rose of praise to avoid the canker of skepticism.  This abandonment is clear enough in 
sonnet 127, which one could easily read as a dirge for “beauty’s rose” and thus an 
attempt to find a language outside that of public praise (1): 
In the old age black was not counted fair, 
Or if it were, it bore not beauty’s name; 
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But now is black beauty’s successive heir, 
And beauty slandered with a bastard shame: 
For since each hand hath put on nature’s power, 
Fairing the foul with art’s false borrowed face, 
Sweet beauty hath no name, no holy bower, 
But is profaned, if not lives in disgrace.  
Therefore my mistress’ eyes are raven black,  
Her brows so suited, and they mourners seem  
At such who, not born fair, no beauty lack,  
Sland’ring creation with a false esteem; 
   Yet so they mourn, becoming of their woe, 
        That every tongue says beauty should look so. 
The poet has already lamented in sonnet 95 that “beauty’s veil doth cover every blot” and 
turned “all things…to fair.”  By the second sequence’s inaugural poem, the poet 
proclaims that “[s]weet beauty” has been invalidated by misdirected and ubiquitous 
praise, by those poets who are “[f]airing the foul with art’s false borrowed face.”  No 
longer a meaningful word, beauty has become a floating signifier that one can no longer 
identify and describe, much less apprehend. 
 Symbolizing this failure of praise to sustain beauty is the dark lady herself, who 
not only recalls what poetry has lost, but who also mirrors and enacts a new standard.  
She is tied, in other words, to the image of blackness, beauty’s bastard successor, as well 
as to the activity of mourning.  127’s ambiguous treatment of slander and mourn 
emphasizes the dark lady’s multifaceted character.  Lines 10 and 13 show the mistress 
mourning the loss of beauty; in both instances, “they” could refer to the lady’s grievin  
brows gazing on a changed world.  However, “they” could also refer to other mourners 
contemplating either the mistress herself or women who have “slandered creation” with 
cosmetics.  Regardless of how we read these lines, the poem suggests at least two views 
of the dark lady: a figure of loss who elicits mourning and a figure of slander who merits 
nothing but shame. 
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The sonnet’s curious handling of the word beauty also adds to the mistress’ 
equivocal personality.  Three distinct manifestations are present in the poem: false, 
meretricious beauty reflected in conventional praise; the name beauty which now 
conjures a picture of blackness; and the true, ineffable beauty that has lost its name.  The 
fact that the poet continues to use beauty in its tautological sense (“beauty”) and beauty 
in its “bastard” state (“black”) precludes a straightforward interpretation.  The sonnet also 
obfuscates the poet’s attitude toward his mistress.  To what extent has she becoman 
emblem of a new beauty that transcends the other falsely-praised women?  To what 
extent is the beloved debased, scorned as merely an unfortunate byproduct of a 
corruptible and corrupting beauty?  In the end, the dark lady remains an ambiguous 
representation of praise and blame, virtue and vice, beauty and homeliness.  She provokes 
a mix of emotions ranging from empathy to revulsion. 
In one respect, then, the canker has not disappeared at all but has burst into full 
view.  With her “raven black” eyes (127), her black deeds (131), and her darkly 
duplicitous nature (152), the mistress is a “false plague” (137) and “female vil,” a figure 
of “despair” ready to tempt the beloved rose from the speaker’s side (144).14  And she 
succeeds.  The poet, however, exploits this mistress’ power, writing her into a tempt tion 
drama whose structural rigidity is belied by the actors who manipulate it.  Assonnet 144 
reveals, the poet no longer imagines himself “authorizing” his beloveds’ “trespass with 
compare” (35); rather, he dramatizes how his creations can be neither controlled nor 
contained by rhetorical or allegorical comparisons:   
                                                      
14 While Olga Valbuena does not explore the significance of the canker in-depth, she does argue that the 
“dark lady’s ‘art,’ in that word’s substantive and indicative senses, absorbs the poet’s as well as her own 
and the young man’s ‘shame’ (95.1), ‘canker’ (95.2), ‘spot’ (95.3), and ‘sins’ (95.4), represented in the ink 
‘blot’ (95.11) that taints the dark lady subsequence even while giving it material presence” (“The Dyer’s 
Hand,” 326).  
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Two loves I have, of comfort and despair 
Which, like two spirits, do suggest me still: 
The better angel is a man right fair, 
The worser spirit a woman colored ill. 
To win me soon to hell my female evil 
Tempteth my better angel from my side, 
And would corrupt my saint to be a devil, 
Wooing his purity with her foul pride; 
And whether that my angel be turned fiend 
Suspect I may, yet not directly tell; 
But being both from me both to each friend, 
I guess one angel in another’s hell. 
Yet this shall I ne’er know, but live in doubt, 
                        Till my bad angel fire my good one out. 
On the surface, this sonnet is just another rendering of the medieval “battle of souls,” an 
allegory that has pre-Christian origins but literary provenance in the work of Pudentius, 
a fourth-century Roman Christian.15  Having “transformed scriptural metaphor into 
allegory,” Prudentius, long before Shakespeare, wrote of “man’s two-sided nature…in an 
uproar of rebellion,” and of “opposing spirits at war” in the “dark prison-house of the 
heart.”16  Prudentius called his work Psychomachia, which suggests the “battle” 
(“machia”) both for the “soul” and for “life” itself (“psyche”).17  Prudentius’ innovation 
achieved such popularity in the medieval and Renaissance periods that Bernard Spivack 
considers him the father of the “allegorical poem” generally, reminding us that the writer 
“created a new literary type” and an “independent literary genre” (78-81).   
                                                      
15 For a discussion of the relationship of this “battle of souls” to such ancient faiths as Zoroastrianism and 
Manichaeism, see Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1958), 74.  
16 Macklin Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia: A Reexamination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976), 111.  Prudentius, trans. H.J. Thompson, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 1:343.   
17 “psychomachia, n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University 
Press.  4 February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/ gi/entry/50191637>.  See also “psyche, n.” The 
Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  4 February 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50191565 >.  
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For Shakespeare to invoke a major source for modern allegory at the culmination 
of his sonnet sequence (a sequence that was itself written at the end of a long period of 
sonneteering) is truly significant.18  More remarkable still is how Shakespeare reinvents 
that allegory, thus highlighting the distinct characteristics of his beloveds.  As numerous 
readers have noticed, while the poet seems to explore two “opposing spirits” – the young 
man (the good angel) and the dark lady (the bad angel) – the poem enacts a sort ofbait 
and switch when the classic battle of souls gives way to a romantic saga of lost l ve: 
when naughty and nice, in other words, become more interested in wooing each other 
than in persuading the poet to join their side.  Admittedly, the poem is compelling 
because the narrative of virtue and vice is thwarted.  Still, we pity the poet, who may on 
some perverse level like to think that his mistress is trying to “win” him “soon t hell” 
but who remains hopelessly estranged from his beloveds – an isolation intensified by his 
self-doubt.     
  If the poem undermines the psychomachia on a most basic level, then it also 
encourages us to rethink the allegory’s opposing components, for the sonnet is less a 
Christian or pre-Christian struggle between “good” and “evil” than a competition 
between an established source and the characters (the young man and dark lady) who star
in it.  For the subtle distinction in articles reveals that while “th worser spirit” and “the 
better angel” are grounded, accepted, and definite, “a man right fair” and “a woman 
colored ill” are intractable, protean, and i efinite.  Although the young man and the dark 
lady are “like two [competing] spirits” from that centuries-old psychomachia, they can 
also manipulate those spirits, skirting the pre-conceived narrative structure, adding
                                                      
18 Although Colin Burrow and others maintain that thedark-lady poems were composed first, the 1609 
Quarto has placed sonnet 144 in the last 10 poems of the sequence. 
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flexibility to a dramatic – but inherently inflexible – form, and so transforming the nature 
of the allegory.  And so, inasmuch as allegory suggests “speaking otherwise,” sonnet 144 
shows how allegory can speak against itself.19 
Indeed, the poem’s indefinite articles not only underscore the beloveds’ indefinite 
relationship to the psychomachia; they cause the poem to equivocate between vehicle and 
tenor.  After all, are the young man and the dark lady playing the good spirit and the ba 
angel, or is the poet inspired by the allegorical distinctions in the psychomachia and so 
disposed to craft “a man right fair” and “a woman colored ill?”  In other words, is the 
poet trying to use allegory to explain his beloveds or his beloveds to highlight (and so 
problematize) the allegory?  The poet, significantly, leaves these questions open, 
emphasizing at turns his beloveds as embodied fictions and his beloveds as allegorical 
representations.  
Paradoxically, the psychomachia, by failing on an allegorical level to capture the 
beloveds’ situation, evokes the rhetorical concerns that preoccupied the poet in the 
young-man sequence.  By exploring the sexual union of the “worser spirit” and the 
“better angel,” sonnet 144, that is, dramatizes the complex relationship of the rose and th
canker, or the confused blending of praise and blame within Shakespearean epideixis.  
Thus, Shakespeare manipulates the components of the allegory, as well as the 
relationship between the original source and its dramatic instruments (his beloveds).  
Only seeming to differentiate between “the worser spirit” and “the better angel,” the 
poem ultimately unites them.  In other words, even though the speaker seems to wonder 
                                                      
19 “allegory, n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  16 
February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50005920>. 
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whether the dark lady has corrupted the male friend (who is one letter away from turning 
fiend), the poem acknowledges that she already has.     
 At the core of the interpretative uncertainties is the word fire (line 14), which can 
refer equally to “ejection,” “sexual expulsion,” and “infection” (with venereal disease).20  
The first two denotations are logically linked.  Because the speaker assumes that “one 
angel’s in another’s hell,” the dark lady fires out the beloved when she (r)ejects him or 
drives him out (sexually or otherwise).  Only then can the poet tell if his “angel be turned 
fiend.”  The logic unravels, however, when we consider that the third meaning of f re – 
“infection” – helps eliminate the doubt embedded in the first two denotations, 
undercutting the “whether” of line 9 and the “guess[ing]” of line 12.  The poet suggests 
that the young man’s corruption is a foregone conclusion: the poet, that is, will wait n 
doubt only until the fair youth begins to show signs of infection.   
Thus, the sonnet narrates the fall of the poet’s good angel, not only in the way that 
the two main characters fail to accommodate themselves to the allegory, but also the way 
in which the poet fails to suit the allegory to them.  That is, the poet has arguably sought 
out the ostensible source for his sonnet sequence or imported the allegory into the 
problem only to demonstrate how the psychomachia does not fit – how he cannot 
transform the lovers’ sexual dalliance into a struggle about him after all.  Hinting at the 
mutual complicity of the young man and dark lady, the poet uses comparative adjectives 
(“better,” “worser”) to describe them, eliding their roles and undermining a simple 
allegorical distinction.  The fact that the young man is “better” and the dark lady 
“worser” reveals that quality is relative; the poem does not allow us to perceive th  young 
                                                      
20 See also Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 500.  For his assertion that fire also suggests venereal 
disease, Booth cites Hyder Rollins’ variorum. 
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man as purely “good” or the dark lady as entirely “bad.”  The embedded chiasmus, 
moreover, in which “angel” (3) migrates through “spirit” (4) and “fiend” (9) only to be 
transmuted, finally, into “bad angel” (14), points to the ambiguous crisscrossing of roles 
and reflects the poet’s fear of their mutual infection.  As the chiasmus suggests, a good 
angel will inevitably transform into a bad angel; Lucifer will be ousted from heaven; and, 
ultimately, mankind will fall as well.   
Aside, then, from dramatizing the problem of the canker (blame) and the rose 
(praise), sonnet 144 also somewhat alters the principle aim of Prudentius’ allegory, which 
is to illustrate the ongoing postlapsarian struggle between virtue and vice.  As Macklin 
Smith points out, although the Psychomachia (and its successors) can be considered an 
“allegorical history of Christian conversion,” the “conflict remains; the will must 
continually fight to affirm the aid offered by God” – almost as if conversion is never a 
permanent state and must happen daily.21  Sonnet 144, however, places greater emphasis 
on the fall itself – the descent of the poet and his beloved into time, decay, and mutability 
– in order to cast a backward glance at what has been left behind.  Instead of writing a 
poetry of eternity, of prelapsarian longings, Shakespeare is writing a poetry of the earth, 
of the fallen realm.  Shakespeare, moreover, is empowering his characters at th  expense 
of his theological source and giving them a life regardless of their origin.  And if we read 
the psychomachia as a metaphor for Shakespeare’s two sequences, then we see how this 
poem reinforces the way in which literary creations outlive – and frequently surpass – 
their creators.    
This bold new perspective is hardly disempowering, however, for it prevents 
many of the anxieties we should expect to see in a sequence devoted to lost beauty, 
                                                      
21 Smith, Prudentius’ Psychomachia: A Reexamination, 109 and 113. 
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temporality, and decay.  Partly this is owing to the dark lady herself, who does not elicit 
the same skepticism that the young man does.  Even in sonnet 144, the poet doubts the 
young man but not the dark lady.  Despite the poet’s frequent protestations that he has 
been misled, or blinded by her duplicities, he never doubts her tendency to wander or her 
penchant for making and breaking romantic bonds.  So how, then, are we supposed to 
regard her?  She possesses a coy cruelty similar to other Petrarchan beloveds, but she 
provokes little admiration or wonder to counterbalance those vices.  The poet instead 
vents his anger on several occasions, blaming the dark lady most of all for the “deep 
wound” inflicted on both the poet and his friend – his beloved rose (133).  A living 
canker, the dark lady seems to have eaten a hole in that rose; she has undermined the 
relationship between the poet and his beloved, deflecting his will to praise.   
However, the mistress – as a symbol of blame and darkness and doubt – also 
relieves the poet of the burden he carries during the entire young-man sequence, in which 
he struggles to fortify the fair youth against the ravages of time and stumbles at every 
pass.  Thus, the dark lady in all her imperfections liberates the poet from the need to write 
perfect verse and encourages him to find solace in dramatic performance.  In this way, 
her poems invert the canker/rose problem explored in the sonnets to the young man, 
where the poet learns that epideictic representation inevitably discovers the canker of 
doubt.  In the second sequence, the poet learns that dramatic representation has potenti l 
to recreate a new rose out of mutability and decay.  This view hardly discredits the 
argument that these sonnets are dark, misogynistic, and full of painful moments; as my 
use of the word “potential” implies, even though the poet attempts in sonnets 128-138 to 
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reform his mistress, his achievement (if one can call it that) is only temporary and reflects 
more a change on his part than the dark lady’s.   
To chart the poet’s progress from voyeur to negotiant to involved character, I 
want to read sonnets 128-138 as a theatrical prompt book.  Doing so reinforces the notion 
that despite the poet’s constant reminders that he has “sworn” the dark lady “fair,” we 
only see proof of this in sonnets 130 and part of 131.  For the rest of the sequence, the 
poet worries about writing praise poetry, but he never shows us such writing.  Instead of 
swearing the dark lady fair, the poet invokes the present perfect (“I have sworn”), 
clearing the poems of praise by making them passé.  Dramatic impulses, social 
interactions, and sexual compulsions rush into the interstices of a poetic genre alr ady 
eaten away by the canker, closing the aesthetic distance between the artis and hi  
beloved.  The consequences are far-reaching.  In no other sonnet sequence, except 
Spenser’s (whose final poems in the Amoretti look forward to the marital love celebrated 
in his “Epithalamion”), do the poet and beloved consummate their love. 
Indeed, the stark contrast between sonnets 128 and 129 invites us to imagine that 
some consummation has occurred.22  128 is a poem about foreplay.  It tells the story of a 
lover-poet who watches his beloved run her fingers along the aptly-named virginal and 
longs to be played upon like that instrument: “How oft… / Do I envy those jacks that 
nimble leap / To kiss the tender inward of thy hand, / Whilst my poor lips, which should 
that harvest reap, / At the wood’s boldness by thee blushing stand.”  The speaker must 
content himself, however, with the lover’s lips and agree to share her: “Since saucy jacks 
so happy are in this, / Give them thy fingers, me thy lips to kiss.”  The abundance of 
                                                      
22 See Gordon Braden, “Shakespeare’s Petrarchism.”  According to Braden, Shakespeare’s poet is “writing 
love poems to a woman with whom a physical affair appears underway almost from the start” (171).  
Braden’s almost implies that the sonnets chart the beginning of that affair.    
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synecdoche in this poem is not as remarkable as the way that the poet juxtaposes himself 
with the musical instrument, closing the distance between the jacks that kiss the 
beloved’s hands and the poet who kisses her lips.  As silly as this sonnet might seem, i
shows a poet cunningly forcing his way into the story by allowing the instrument to share 
some of the same qualities that he has. 
On and off in the sequence as a whole, the poet imports himself into the narrative 
sequence by using various comparisons, from the slave who “tend[s] / Upon the hours 
and times” of the beloved’s “desire” (57) to the monarch who drinks up the “plague” of 
flattery when his blinded eye “doth prepare the cup” of poison for the mind (114).  In 
these poems to the young man, however, the poet still maintains control over his praise 
object, perhaps because he never gets as physically close to his male beloved as he 
arguably does to the dark lady in 128.23  And, indeed, we learn the aesthetic 
consequences of this sort of intimacy when the poet describes the aftermath of the sexual 
experience: “Th’ expense of spirit in a waste of shame / Is lust in action; and, till action, 
lust is / Is perjured, murdered, bloody, full of blame / Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to 
trust” (129).  This opening quatrain is the first of several chiastic formulations in a sonnet 
that defines lust even as it enacts it.  Booth observes that the above lines show the 
“perverse and self-defeating energy the poem describes” and identifies the chiasmus as 
the figure which establishes this perversity.24 
Beyond reflecting the poet’s “energy” and mood, though, the chiasmus is also a 
temporal trap, catching him in between the before and after and closing him inside a  
                                                      
23 Pequigney disagrees with me here, maintaining that the poet is also sexually involved with the young 
man (see Such is My Love).  Fineman, however, suggests that because the young-man poems reenact 
traditional Petrarchism, they also show sexual desire that is unfulfilled (see Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye).     
24 Stephen Booth, Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 443. 
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endless cycle of desire and regret.  Lisa Freinkel, meditating on the temporal logic of the 
chiasmus, suggests that it “elides the present moment, plumping out the lyric now with a 
pathos of loss and longing.”25  The fact that the speaker obsesses over the past and future 
in 129 is clear enough.  Is, however, the present “elided” or is it simply too elusive – too 
prone to fluctuation – to be captured in words?  Is there, in other words, another logic we 
could construct out of the figure of the chiasmus?  One could argue that sonnet 129, more 
than any other poem in the sequence, effectively conveys the now of experience precisely 
because it only obliquely articulates that now – the strength of that present moment 
scattering the poet’s words on either side of experience and leaving behind the illusion of 
movement.  In this respect, the poem not only suggests that the speaker cannot lift 
himself out of the cycle of regret and desire; it also mimics the sexual act: 
   Enjoyed no sooner but despised straight; 
                                    Past reason hunted, and no sooner had, 
                                    Past reason hated as a swallowed bait 
                                    On purpose laid to make the taker mad: 
                                    Mad[e] in pursuit and in possession so: 
                                    Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme; 
                                    A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe; 
                                    Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream. 
                                    All this the world well knows, but none knows well, 
                                    To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.      
Through the chiasmus, the poet can convey the fantasy of eternity felt in a moment of 
lust; he can describe how lovers repeatedly seek – over and over again – the heaven of 
one another’s arms in order to vanquish the hell of Time’s passing.26  Thus, sonnet 129 
offers a dramatic counterpoint to 116, which uses the chiasmus (“Love alters not when i
                                                      
25 Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 219. 
26 Although the poet uses other devices to describe his ntrapment (notably the polyptoton in the line, “Had, 
having, and in quest to have, extreme,” and parallelism in the line, “Before, a joy proposed; behind a 
dream”), the chiasmus best illustrates the poet’s predicament. 
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alteration finds”) to emphasize the eternal marriage of minds not through lustful action 
but through effusive love and praise. 
 Indeed, this contrast illustrates how far the poet has strayed from his original 
devotion to his beloved rose.  For, as it turns out, the poet’s sexual consummation spells 
the end of his ability to protect himself aesthetically, to create a poetics capable of acting 
outside or in spite of the pitfalls of human character.  Having refused to cushion his 
mistress with Petrarchan praise conceits to soften the fall – and she does fall – the speaker 
makes it clear that she must play a part in this artistic enterprise.  What follows are a 
series of transactions between the poet and the dark lady that dramatize their reciprocal 
dependency – their “mutual render.”  Unlike in the procreation sonnets, where the poet 
finally promises to immortalize the beloved in his verse, and unlike the conclusion of the 
young man sequence, where the poet vows to praise his beloved in spite of the canker, the 
poet for a while stipulates that his representation of his female beloved depends on the 
way she represents herself to the speaker, and not necessarily on the way she really is.  
While the speaker meditates obsessively about the young man’s interiority (the recurring 
canker alerting us to this obsession), the speaker merely doubts what (and perhaps whom) 
the dark lady might do.    
In fact, the opening sonnet of the dark lady sequence immediately establishes the 
conditional nature of the poet’s verse and the mistress’s praise: “Sweet beauty hath no 
name,” so “Therefore my mistress’ eyes are raven black” (127).  Surprisingly, perhaps, 
the poet for several sonnets seems content with this arrangement, and, despite th  ensuing 
sexual event that brings about so much pain, he stays more or less optimistic about his 
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beloved, calling her as fair and “rare as any she belied with false compare” (130).  
Neither a rose, nor a coral, nor a sun, the dark lady has nonetheless charmed her poet.   
The fact that the mistress has been rhetorically stripped, however, means that this 
fascination cannot last – nor can the praise.  Thus by sonnet 131, the mistress stands fully 
exposed to an audience, and the poet is beginning to grow anxious: 
Thou art as tyrannous, so as thou art, 
As those whose beauties proudly make them cruel; 
For well thou know’st to my dear doting heart 
Thou art the fairest and most precious jewel. 
Yet in good faith some say that thee behold 
Thy face hath not the power to make love groan; 
To say they err I dare not be so bold, 
Although I swear it to myself alone. 
And, to be sure that is not false I swear, 
A thousand groans, but thinking on thy face, 
One on another’s neck do witness bear 
Thy black is fairest in my judgment’s place. 
   In nothing art thou black save in thy deeds, 
   And thence this slander as I think proceeds.    
How can a speaker who has obsessively pondered the young man’s dark deeds possibly 
dismiss the dark lady’s?  The word tyrannous in the opening line reflects a deeper motive 
summed up in the poem’s ironic conclusion.  As Helen Vendler avers, the poet in the last 
line “appeals” to the dark lady’s “social self-interest” and tries to convince her to “behave 
better toward him so that the world will forgive her and enroll her among those attractive 
enough to provoke love.”27  Because the speaker’s poetry depends on the dark lady’s 
behavior, he cannot extenuate her black deeds or couch her flaws in sardonic wit.  The 
fact, moreover, that he grows uncomfortable with his mistress suggests that he is 
becoming increasingly wary of the audience’s expectations and concerned whether t  
dark lady can convince that audience – and himself – of her worth.   
                                                      
27 Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets, 560. 
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 Thus the sonnet captures that inescapable tension between the world’s judgment 
and a poet’s private preference for an unconventional beloved.  The mistresses’ “black” 
may be “fairest” in the speaker’s “judgment” now, but that judgment will be test d by 
society, and the poet cowers at the possibility (line 7).  As he comes to recognize later, 
“Love’s eye is not so true as all men’s no” (148).  Perhaps the poet is weak.  But perhaps 
he is merely realistic, acknowledging that to discredit that power of “no” is t  traverse the 
same impossible path carved by Romeo and Juliet, who die trying to write a privatelove 
story that miraculously transcends the public world.  After sonnet 131, the speaker 
discovers that he must take refuge in the consolations of performance (his as well as 
hers). 
Such a performance, though, must be persuasive.  Hamlet provides an appropriate 
analogue for this idea.  Just before the performance of the Murder of Gonzago, Hamlet 
warns his players to “speak the speech…as I pronounced it to you, trippingly on the 
tongue” (3.2.1-2).28  He advises them to do no more or less than the play commands, to 
“suit the action to the word, the word to the action” so that they “o’erstep not the modesty 
of nature” (17-19).  “For anything so overdone,” he adds, “is from the purpose of 
playing” and fails to “hold, as ‘twere, the mirror up to nature, to show virtue her feature, 
scorn her own image” (19-23).  In the Sonnets, we can imagine a similar exchange 
between the poet and his dark lady – a female subject who refuses to play by the rules 
and stubbornly resists the poet-playwright’s script by doing more or less than he devises.   
For a while, however, the poet attempts assiduously to coach a beloved whose 
eyes, which “look[] with pretty ruth upon” his “pain,” have failed to conceal her 
                                                      
28 All quotations derive from the edition published by The Folger Shakespeare Library.  The Tragedy of 
Hamlet, eds. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992). 
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“torment[ing]” and “disdain[ing]” heart:  
Thine eyes I love, and they, as pitying me, 
Knowing thy heart torment me with disdain, 
Have put on black and loving mourners be. 
And truly not the morning sun of heaven 
Better becomes the gray cheeks of the east, 
Nor that full star that ushers in the even 
Doth half that glory to the sober west 
As those two mourning eyes become thy face. 
O, let then as well beseem thy heart, 
To mourn for me, since mourning doth thee grace, 
And suit thy pity like in every part. 
   Then will I swear beauty herself is black, 
    And all they foul that thy complexion lack.  (132)  
 
We can almost hear Hamlet’s injunction to the players to “suit the action to the word, the 
word to the action” when we read the three lines preceding 132’s couplet.  The speakr 
does not just want his mistress’s pitying eyes; he also wants her to show, and perhapsto 
feel, what she shows.  The speaker wants her to suit, as it were, her words to her ac ions, 
and she can only do so if her heart is in it.  For Hamlet as for the speaker, however, the 
key word here is uit, which has less to do with authenticity than with representation – 
like Hamlet’s suit of sables or his reference to the “customary suits of solemn black” 
(1.2.81), or the speaker’s use of suit in the very first sonnet to the dark lady, who is 
described as having eyes “suited” or dressed in black.   
 Sonnet 132, in fact, looks backward to sonnet 127 and beyond the Sonnets to 
Hamlet.  Represent yourself to me, the speaker seems to say in 132, as a woman whose 
pity runs so deeply that it has affected her heart.  Suit your heart to your eyes, your eyes 
to your heart.  Echoing Hamlet’s jealous admiration for the actor playing Hecuba, this 
poem shows a poet counseling his beloved to “force” her “soul” to her own “conceit,” or, 
to put it another way, to suit her “whole function…/ With forms to [her] conceit” 
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(2.2.580-84).  Interestingly, in the play and in the poem, the fact that the soul is forced 
and the heart beseems (which sounds like “seeming”) suggests that the dark lady’s 
interiority is also part of the act, that the heart, too, can play a role.  In drama, the 
interiority of any character is an illusion, as is the actor’s attachment to that illusion.  
Although the actor is nothing to Hecuba and Hecuba nothing to the actor, he can still 
weep for her; he can still force his soul so to his own conceit.  In this sonnet, the poet 
promises the beloved that if she proves herself capable of seeming her heart and 
“suiting” her “pity like in every part,” “Then will I swear beauty herself is black, / And 
all they foul that thy complexion lack.”  Sonnet 132 thus contains the poet’s first attempt 
to bargain with his mistress, or to implore her to represent herself a certain way if she 
wants her lover to write her well.   
 Because the poet, however, never again “swear[s] beauty herself is black,” we an 
presume that the beloved does not comply with his wishes any more than she is tempted 
by his oath-taking and promises of fame.  By sonnet 134, the poet confronts the young 
man’s waywardness (which he quickly palliates) and his mistress’s infidelity.  This time, 
though, the dark lady has not only failed to “suit” her “pity like in every part,” but, as the 
poet sees it, she has wounded the young man as well (133) when the latter becomes the 
poet’s “surety” and “debtor”: 
    So, now I have confessed that he is thine 
                                                And I myself am mortgaged to thy will, 
                                                Myself I’ll forfeit, so that other mine 
                                                Thou wilt restore to be my comfort still: 
                                                But thou wilt not, nor he will not be free, 
                                                For thou are covetous, and he is kind; 
                                                He learned but surety-like to write for me 
                                                Under that bond that him as fast doth bind. 
                                                The statute of thy beauty thou wilt take, 
                                                Thou usurer that put’st forth all to use, 
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                                                And sue a friend came debtor for my sake; 
                                                So him I lose through my unkind abuse. 
                                                     Him have I lost, thou hast both him and me; 
                                                     He pays the whole, and yet I am not free.  (134) 
 
This poem sounds a bit like something Bassanio would have written to Portia, asking that 
she abate the power she wields over Antonio in the final act of the play.  One could also 
hear echoes of Antonio in this poem and imagine a scene in which the merchant begs 
Portia to give her husband back to him – Bassanio’s first love.  In either scenario (ad n
keeping with the poem and the end of The Merchant of Venice), Portia does not yield.  In 
sonnet 134, the young man gladly “pays the whole” (with an obvious sexual pun) but 
cannot convince the mistress to free him – and thus to cling only to his poet.   
 So what, apart from the poet’s unconvincing attempt to canonize the young man 
and demonize the dark lady for their mutual infidelity, is going on in these two poems?  
The financial language is overwhelming in sonnet 134, where words like mortgaged, will , 
bond, usurer, debtor, and pays lace themselves with the economically-inflected covetous 
and kind.  If we read the financial language as a metaphor, the poet is wrestling with the 
realities of artistic ownership and originality, recognizing that despite his intense desire to 
control the beloved, she has a will of her own – as do the readers, who will peruse the 
poet’s work and freely draw their own conclusions about its merit.  In this sense, the 
young man is a necessary intrusion, prompting the poet to recognize that he can 
“confess” himself to the young man and yet be “mortgaged” to the dark lady’s “will”; 
exploiting the young man as a surety who “pays the whole,” the poet demonstrates that h  
can never be liberated.  As we saw in sonnet 144, a poet can create, but he cannot 
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necessarily contain, a character.  At the same time, he is never free of his creations, or of 
his creative impulses.   
 This truth achieves its climactic expression in sonnets 135 and 136, the oft-
discussed Will poems.  I quote them both in full: 
Whoever hath her wish, thou hast thy Will, 
And Will to boot, and Will in overplus. 
More than enough am I that vex thee still, 
To thy sweet will making addition thus. 
Wilt thou, whose will is large and spacious, 
Not once vouchsafe to hide my will in thine? 
Shall will in others seem right gracious, 
And in my will no fair acceptance shine? 
The sea, all water, yet receives rain still 
And in abundance addeth to his store; 
So thou, being rich in Will, add to thy Will 
One will of mine to make thy large Will more. 
   Let no unkind, no fair beseechers kill; 
   Think all but one, and me in that one Will.   (135) 
 
If thy soul check thee that I come so near, 
Swear to thy blind soul that I was thy Will, 
And will, thy soul knows, is admitted there: 
Thus far for love my love suit, sweet, fulfill. 
Will will fulfill the treasure of thy love 
Ay, fill it full with wills, and my will one. 
In things of great receipt with ease we prove, 
Among a number one is reckoned none. 
Then in the number let me pass untold, 
Though in thy store’s account I one must be; 
For nothing hold me, so it please thee hold 
That nothing me, a some-thing, sweet, to thee. 
   Make but my name thy love, and love that still, 
   And then thou lovest me, for my name is Will.   (136) 
 
No other poems in the sequence so beg the readers, as these do, to consider the ontology 
and significance of a single word.  How does one interpret Will?  According to Fineman, 
the word not only names the poet but also “gives voice to a sexual union,” which “is 
purchased at a specific personal price” and comes “at the cost of the loss of unity
253 
 
himself.”29  The Will sonnets, for Fineman, reveal the paradox of subjectivity: the 
moment we first speak about ourselves is the moment we become strangers to ourselves, 
our personality rendered into a third-person character capable of being represented by 
others in our absence.  For Freinkel, Will is the ultimate catachrestic “supplement” that 
exposes its own failure to represent anything in particular; that is, the word’s proliferation 
in the poems only underscores its insufficiency.30  As I have mentioned in chapter 2, 
Freinkel argues that catachresis dominates Shakespeare’s Sonnets because h  is writing 
in a post-Reformation “culture that has come to distrust figures” and a “Lutheran 
universe” that began to doubt Biblical hermeneutics (164-5).        
 Ultimately, however, Freinkel’s and Fineman’s theoretical interpretations of 
sonnets 135 and 136 are not altogether different.  The idea that Shakespeare’s poems 
march inevitably, relentlessly, towards Will unites their analyses, as does their notion that 
Will reflects some sort of loss – whether a loss of part of the self as it develops a new 
relationship with (or awareness of) language or a loss of faith in Christian figurality.31  
Their studies are equally bold, even a bit cheeky, for they force upon us a totalized 
reading of the poems.  Both scholars make assertions that they claim responsible readers 
cannot help but find plausible, and they challenge readers to disagree.  This is no wonder, 
for they both make use of the proper name Will – the author, the subject, or the 
catachrestic insertion – in order to ground their points.  This enables them to claim 
preemptive critical authority.    
                                                      
29 Fineman, Shakespeare’s Perjured Eye, 293.  As Fineman avers (following Lacan), “Will” is the “mark of 
homogenous sameness as well as the ‘cut’ (Elizabethn slang for “cunt”) which is the mark of 
heterogeneous difference, joining these together in the verbal intercourse of heterosexual ‘whole’ and
‘hole’” (26). 
30 Freinkel, Reading Shakespeare’s Will, 232. 
31 While Fineman argues that the poet, with Will, “speaks the name and lets in difference,” Freinkel argues 
for a variation on that idea – that Will “marks the endless reiteration of difference” (234).  Her distinction 
could be clearer. 
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Although I, too, cannot help but be seduced by the presence of Will, I contend that 
sonnets 135 and 136 – in the way they acknowledge the powerful presence of character, 
sexuality, and drama – work against preemption.  To see this, one need only consider 
what that “large and spacious” Will, capable of adding “abundance” to its store, lends to 
the poet’s work.  If language is the only real power a poet has, then what happens when 
the poet (paradoxically) uses language to give up this power?  What happens when the 
poet – with all his authority, with the power of the pen at his fingers, with the ability to 
create his version of the dark lady and of the truth – affirms the madness of words and the 
truth in action?  In recognizing the autonomy of his creation, the poet frees himself up as 
well, for he is free to chase after his lover, and he is free to let her go.   
With this in mind, I shall start by saying that Will is in part the poet’s bargaining 
chip for negotiating his way back into the mistress’s favor, a favor he temporarily loses 
after the young man’s reemergence (the youth may also have been called Will).  
Ultimately, the poet achieves this by reminding the mistress that to love her “will” – her 
freedom, her desire to act, her individuality, and, of course, her will to accommodate 
other wills (male parts) in her will (female genitalia) – is to love her Will, or the poet who 
has recreated her in this verse but who has also joined her as a character in more ways 
than one: “Make but my name thy love, and love that still, / And then thou lovest me, for 
my name is Will.”  Will cleverly imposes himself in a way that makes him impossible to 
ignore, even impossible not to love. 
More importantly, perhaps, the poet’s playful engagement with sexual innuendo 
ignites an exploration of his role as artist.  As these poems suggest, the poet’s assertion of 
his identity (his “one Will”) and artistic power is tied to multiplicity; if we see the poet 
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more clearly now that he has named himself and become a character, we can only watch 
him amid a crowd.  For the poet recognizes that ceding his will to his mistress entail
taking his place among countless other “wills”: “So thou being rich in Will, add to thy 
Will / One will of mine to make thy large Will more” (135).  “Think all but one,” he 
concludes, “and me in that one will.”  In other words, a poet can never act entirely alone.  
The juxtaposition of the one and the many is given fuller expression in the next sonnet, in 
which the poet counts himself “one” in the beloved’s “account,” yielding to the mistress 
his willpower, his will (phallus), even his reduced being – a name – and capitulating 
further to the presence of other wills (136).   
 At the same time, the poet in 136 intends to turn his self-abnegating “nothing” 
into a “some-thing,” in other words, to be number “one” in the beloved’s estimation: “For 
nothing hold me, so it please thee hold / That nothing me, a some-thing, sweet, to thee.”  
The implied sexual act that can turn two bawdy nothings (the poet’s and the beloved’s) 
into “some-thing sweet” illustrates a more significant paradox: that to yield power, or 
one’s will, is actually to wield and maintain that power; that is, reducing oneself to 
nothing allows for a return of something.  In giving up his place to others, Will puts his 
mark all over the page, his ostensibly sacrificial act enabling him to publicize himself 
with remarkable fervor.  We notice this simply by looking at the structure of the sonnets.  
Will fills almost every grammatical position – subjects, predicates, auxiliary verbs – in 
addition to spreading itself semantically from desire to genitalia (male and female) to the 
self-referential name.   
Schalkwyk sees these poems as an “obliteration of the proper name” and evidence 
for an “imaginative form of release from the social hierarchy and constraint th t is central 
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to both Petrarchan and the patriarchal modes of dealing in and with women.”32  Although 
Schalkwyk also reads the Will poems optimistically, observing in them a “liberating 
affront to particular, patriarchal expectations of female chastity,” he focuses almost 
exclusively on social identity and public interaction; he does not consider that these 
sonnets, more than any other poems in the sequence, reveal the poet at work.33  Although 
my interpretation more closely approaches Fineman’s, I want to suggest that Will 
represents something even more substantial than the poetic self, something that strikes at 
the heart of artistic creation.  Will is the deliberate action of a poet who recognizes his 
artistic powers and the potential barriers to artistic fulfillment; instead of limiting or 
discrediting a figural interpretation, as Freinkel argues, Will does the opposite: it 
legitimizes a reader’s ownership of the text and gives the poet more power because he 
must capitulate.  After all, for any poet, there will always be other wills – the will of an 
intractable character or beloved; the will of language that inevitably prevents us from 
saying precisely what we mean to say; the will of the audience, who enforces its will on a 
work of art; and the poet’s own changing will.  And all of these wills help reinvent the 
picture, but as long as the poet can articulate that fact, he can safely count himself as 
“one,” and thereby turn his “nothing” into a “something sweet.”  Merely to name Will 
gives him the authority to convert conflict and loss into a small victory. 
 Shakespeare could not but be keenly aware of the artistic possibilities that arise 
from perceived barriers to creativity, or what W.B. Yeats has called the “masterful 
images” grown out of “a mound of refuse… / Old iron, old bones, old rages, that raving 
                                                      
32 Schalkwyk, 183-86. 
33 Ibid., 188. 
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slut / Who keeps the till.”34  The dark lady, too, is more like that “raving” woman at the 
“till,” or Erato, the Greek muse of erotic verse, than Euterpe or Thalia, the muses of lyric 
song and bucolic poetry.  To return, then, to the question I asked earlier – how should we 
regard the dark lady? – I propose that we consider her an artistic challenge, so 
challenging, perhaps, that Shakespeare had to go back and write more than a hundred 
sonnets (the young-man poems) in order to perceive how he came to create her and to 
help him understand the complexities of this second sequence.  The dark lady, as we have 
seen, defies strict categorization: she is fair and foul, beautiful and homely, enticing and 
repulsive.  An accomplished actress, she glides comfortably between the roles of l ver 
and adversary, angel and fiend, and she manages successfully to pull the poet himself into 
this world as well.  Having stepped into the dark lady’s complex and contradictory world, 
the poet becomes a negotiant, offering praise if she represents herself as mourner and 
promising to “swear her fair” if she keeps her eyes straight on him.  After the 
understanding, however, achieved during the Will poems and, earlier, upon the entrance 
of the young man, the poet no longer endeavors to swear anything fair because he now 
recognizes that any attempt will make him “swear against the truth” (152).   
 As early as sonnet 140, in fact, the speaker stops promising praise if the mistress 
shows love and briefly threatens slander if she does not: “Be wise as thou art cruel; do 
not press / My tongue-tied patience with too much disdain, / Lest sorrow lend me words, 
and words express / The manner of my pity-wanting pain.”  Such a threat is only 
temporary, however, for the speaker quickly discovers that praise and blame can both 
deteriorate into a form of slander: “And in my madness might speak ill of thee: / Now 
                                                      
34 “The Circus Animals’ Desertion,” in The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats, 2nd edition, ed. Richard J. 
Finneran (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 356. 
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this ill-wresting world is grown so bad / Mad slanderers by mad ears believed be” (140).  
The poet concludes here that all words will eventually lead to madness, a point he 
addresses again later when he affirms that his “thoughts and my discourse are a  
madmen’s are, / At random from the truth vainly expressed” (147).   
The poet seems to have decided that it would be madness as well to try to make 
windows into women’s hearts.  This is pointedly different from his perspective earli r in 
the sequence, when the speaker begs the beloved to “let it then as well beseem thy heart / 
To mourn for me, since mourning doth thee grace, / And suit thy pity like in every part” 
(131).  By 140, the speaker is content to let the heart alone (“Bear thine eyes straight, 
though thy heart go wide”), and at the end of this poem, he ignores the potential 
incongruity between words and their meanings, between surface and substance, between
the dark lady’s exterior and interior.  This willful decision to overlook the problem of 
linguistic and representational ambiguity competes with the poet’s fixation (in sonnet 
152) on difference.  Thus, even though Fineman is right to fuss over the poet as a 
“perjured eye” swearing “against the truth so foul a lie,” the poems also narrate how the 
poet learns to use drama to defeat that difference.   
In no sonnet is this idea so clearly expressed as in sonnet 138, in my view the key 
to the dark-lady poems.  Appearing in two different forms – in The Passionate Pilgrim in 
1599 and then in the 1609 Quarto – sonnet 138 very likely commanded Shakespeare’s 
attention well into the seventeenth century.  Quoted below is a conflation of the two 
versions (in brackets are the lines that appeared in The Passionate Pilgrim): 
When my love swears that she is made of truth 
I do believe her, though I know she lies, 
That she might think me some untutored youth, 
Unlearned in the world’s false subtleties. [Unskillful in the world’s false forgeries.] 
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Thus vainly thinking that she thinks me young, 
Although she knows my days are past the best, [Although I know my years be past the 
best,] 
Simply [Smiling] I credit her false-speaking tongue, 
On both sides thus is simple truth suppressed. [Outfacing faults in love with love’s ill 
rest.] 
But wherefore says she not she is unjust? [But wherefore says my love that she is 
young?] 
And wherefore say not I that I am old? 
O, love’s best habit is in seeming trust, [is a soothing tongue,] 
And age in love love’s not to have years told. 
   Therefore I lie with her, and she with me, [Therefore I’ll lie with love, and love with 
me,] 
   And in our faults by lies we flattered be. [Since in our faults in love thus smothered 
be.]  
 
Edward A. Snow, maintaining that the sonnet that appeared in The Passionate Pilgrim 
was indeed written first, argues that the 1599 version reflects the central problem of 
Othello while the 1609 version captures the romantic relationship between Antony and 
Cleopatra.35  By this he means that in the 1599 poem, sexuality aggravates the speaker’s 
sense of isolation and disillusionment; by 1609, the speaker’s physical relationship with 
his mistress strengthens their “mutuality” (474).  As Snow suggests, the earlier sonnet 
belongs to the cluster of plays that shows “disgust with sexuality” and “distrust of 
women” (462).  Despite the poet’s assertions that his love is “made of truth,” he remains 
like the “subjectively isolated male protagonists” in Hamlet and Othello (462).  Snow 
bases his interpretation on the 1599 poet’s reference to “love’s ill rest” (line 8) and on the 
way he retreats from this beloved in line 6, speculating only about himself.  The climactic 
moment of the 1599 sonnet is of course the closing couplet, which Snow rightly sees as 
“repressive” and “claustrophobic” (463).   
                                                      




In the revised version of the poem, “flattered” lends life and animation where 
“smothered” suggests murder.  Appropriately, the abstract word “love” in 1599’s line 13 
becomes a concrete “she” by 1609.  Snow argues that, similar to Antony and Cleopatra, 
the modified sonnet suggests a “chastened yet visionary reaffirmation of the romantic 
idealism of Romeo and Juliet” (462).  Here the poet does not remain painfully “isolated” 
because “the mistress enters constitutively” into his “subjectivity: his con ciousness of 
her perspective [(in line 6, for example)] on him mediates his own reflection on himself” 
(471).  Thus the second version of the poem succeeds in capturing the dark lady’s 
peculiar ability to help the poet find comfort in the uncertainty of dramatic art, of acti n, 
and thus comfort in his own flawed identity.  Perhaps, then, the poet has, if temporarily, 
convinced his mistress to act, though not for the reasons he intended – not for praise, for 
fame, or for a larger audience, but rather for themselves.36   
In a way, the 1609 poem fulfills one of the principle aims of Donne’s “The 
Dream,” in which the speaker wishes his mistress would help him turn fantasy into reality 
by “act[ing] the rest” – the remainder and the stillness – and finding the rest in action.  In 
order for this kind of relationship to work, however, the poet and the beloved must accept 
each other’s version of the truth.  Consider again the opening lines of the poem, which 
suggest something more dynamic than the static Liar’s Paradox that Fineman observes: 
“When my love swears that she is made of truth / I do believe her, though I know she 
lies.”  Snow interprets the phrase, “I do believe her,” as a “pledge” and “an enactment” 
                                                      
36 Nona Feinberg, in “Erasing the Dark Lady,” argues against Snow’s interpretation by showing that while 
sonnet 138 “opens with the potential to make real the presence of the dark lady,” this “emergence is 
illusory” (101).  As Feinberg argues, the poet has ultimately “made” her “in his own image and out of his 
own language” (107); she also points out that reading sonnet 138 in the context of the sequence should 
“temper” much of the “optimism” (98).  Schalkwyk attempts to get around Feinberg’s argument by 
imagining an “original context of address and reception” (Speech and Performance, 55), while I focus not 
on the literal power given to the dark lady’s words but on a philosophy of drama espoused in sonnet 138 – 
how it affirms, if temporarily, an ontological truth in performance.  
261 
 
(465).  For Snow, the phrase is “self-consciously, challengingly paradoxical,” even 
illogical, and reflects the poem’s ability to transcend the “burden of experienc” (465-
72).  I would like to go further and argue that believing reflects the ontological emphasis 
of all drama, while knowing suggests the fraught epistemology of rhetoric.  In my view, 
knowing lies in the realm of language and belief (comprising within it the word lie), in the 
world of theater.  How?  Believe is actively self-conscious; it implies performance or 
animation, emphasized by the auxiliary verb do (“I do believe her”).  Know, however, is 
implicitly static, defining merely a passive, cognitive state (“though I know she lies”).  
Thus, the poem subtly stresses that a person can believe something different from what 
he knows.  The rest of the sonnet reflects this disjuncture when it reveals the poet and his 
dark lady actively living the lie as they lie in one another’s arms, suppressing “ imple 
truth” in favor of an existential one, and disregarding knowledge for belief.  Thus sonnet 
138 not only explores the joys of playing a role, but shows how players can turn that role 
into the only reality.   
  Built into this affirmation of drama is an essential dimension in theater – what 
Snow calls a “time-bound acceptance” in the 1609 version (468).  To admit so readily to 
mutability is not something we see in the young-man sonnets, where the poet tries 
obsessively to compensate for decay and time’s ravages only to reveal decay and to mark 
time.  In the dark-lady poems, however, the poet accepts time’s imminent destruction, 
acknowledging himself as “bound” within time and focusing exclusively on the present.  
Thus, he manages to amass power precisely because that power will not last.  As Marvell 
famously writes, “though we cannot make our sun / Stand still, yet we will make him 
run” (“To His Coy Mistress”).  Similar to Marvell’s speaker, Shakespeare’s poet invites 
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his mistress to stand in the sun’s exposing light, embracing in spite (or because) of their 
faults, and pushing the sun rather than allowing the sun to push them.  Thus the poet 
becomes a man of action, explicitly subordinating his poetry to a drama whose story can 
be creatively extracted from the lyric sequencing – a story that somehow surpas es the 
words that occasion its existence.  In this respect, sonnet 138 precisely demonstrates the 
very tendency toward action that the dark-lady sequence exhibits as a whole. 
 And so, by showing two lovers who believe in the power of dramatic action, 
Shakespeare invites us to see poet and mistress not as characters subject to investigation 
and inquiry, to praise and blame, but as living, breathing bodies existing within time.  If 
only briefly, the poet can ignore inscrutable problems; he can avoid obsessively reflecting 
on the nature of corruption and slander; and he can escape attempting futilely to capture 
in words an accurate representation of another.  Representations are false anyway.  As the 
poet affirms in sonnet 138, acting out a lie is perhaps the only real and true way of 
affirming anything, especially the only way to show love, for the poet discovers that to 
show is also to be.   
 
The Dark Lady Sonnets and Shakespearean Comedy 
 
 To contemplate sonnet 138’s complex perspective on mutability and knowledge is 
to meditate on Shakespearean comedy at its best.  At its worst, however, comedy can be 
as tense and as bleak as tragedy.  Focusing in this section on social attitudes, knowl dge, 
time, sexuality, gender, reciprocity, and role-playing, I want to suggest that the second 
sequence is (despite its pervasive misogyny and blame) thematically comic.  For just as 
the young-man sonnets explore tragedy’s paradoxical blend of affirmation, pessimism, 




In the opening scene of The Merchant of Venice, Antonio and Bassanio both 
convey frustration.  Nevertheless, Bassanio’s first remark, “Good signors both, when 
shall we laugh?” (1.1.66), offers a striking contrast to Antonio’s “In sooth I know not 
why I am so sad” (1.1.1).37  While Antonio’s declaration initiates, so we think, a quest to 
understand himself, Bassanio’s query reflects a desire for comic resolution.  By 
wondering “when shall we laugh,” Bassanio reminds us that laughter does not always 
arise spontaneously from a humorous experience; laughter can facilitate camraderie.38  
Significantly, Bassanio does not direct his question to Antonio, but rather to Solarino and 
Solanio.  Antonio, we quickly sense, laughs very little, and his desire for companionship 
extends only to Bassanio.   
The contrast between Bassanio and Antonio, in fact, captures the central tension 
in Shakespearean comedy between the individual and society, between self identity and 
social identification.39  The “Bassanio” characters will join a community of lovers, laugh, 
and marry; the “Antonio” figures will linger on the edge of the festivities, neither 
                                                      
37 Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, d. A.R. Braunmuller (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2000). 
38 See Laurent Joubert, Treatise on Laughter (1579), trans. Gregory David de Rocher (Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980).  Joubert argues that laughter is partly “voluntary because 
very often it stops at the command of reason” (121).  If laughter is voluntary, then we can speculate that
people choose to laugh more often in the company of others; Joubert, however, does not explore human 
relationships in any detail in his treatise.  Neithr, for that matter, does Quintilian, although he, too, allows 
us to speculate in a similar way about camaraderie when he claims that “laughter is not far from derision” 
(3:67).  Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, trans. Donald A. Russell, 5 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2001).  For a modern discus ion of the psychological and sociological 
implications of laughter that support the claim that laughter promotes social unity, see Robert R. Provine, 
“The Science of Laughter,” Psychology Today (November/December 2000), 58-61.   
39 For a discussion of the relationship between individual and society in Shakespeare’s comedies, see G.K. 
Hunter, “Comedy, Farce, Romance,” in Comedy from Shakespeare to Sheridan (Newark: University 
Delaware Press, 1986), 27-52.  In part what happens in comedy is characters join the new society through 
self-sacrifice, effectively by “insert[ing] themselv s into the identity of another” [Stephen Greenblatt, 
“Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture,” in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, eds. Patricia Parker and 
David Quint (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 219.].  Greenblatt himself does not 
focus on comedy per se, but his exploration of theatrical “impersonators” and “mask[s]” (222) – and the 
tensions and ambiguities this creates in drama – helps illuminate how comedy calls attention to these social 
masks by including characters who seem to refuse them.            
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shunning nor partaking of the new social order.  These comic outsiders and skeptical non-
conformists remind us that behind comedy’s promise of marriage, reliance on white 
magic or disguise, and celebration of renewal lurks something unsettling and dark, even 
(or perhaps especially) after the ousting or transformation of the comic vice villains.  As 
C.L. Barber rightly argues, while Shakespearean comedy is partly rooted in sixteenth-
century popular festival, this “saturnalian release” is a temporary state of which the 
characters themselves seem to be aware.40  Similarly, Northrop Frye – although he 
explores the mythical, archetypal underpinnings of comic structure by which characters 
move from chaos to resolution, winter to spring, darkness to light, and old society to new 
– also stipulates that “anyone’s attitude to the festivity may be that of Orlando or 
Jaques.”41   
In fact, plays like The Merchant of Venice, Measure for Measure, and The 
Winter’s Tale expose the fine line between comedy and tragedy.  Susan Snyder, 
exploring the “comic matrix” of Shakespeare’s tragedies and thus the tragic potential of 
comedy itself, argues that “comedy’s force [in general and in Shakespear in particular] 
is so centrifugal that in its welter of possibilities the potential fragmentation of all form 
and meaning is never far off.”42  “Chaos,” she goes on to say, “is held in check only by 
comedy’s arbitrary natural law, and perhaps those magicians and other manipulators were 
felt to be necessary as visible reassurance that things would finally not fall apart, that the 
center would hold” (55).  Lisa Hopkins similarly argues that even though “[m]arriage is 
appropriate as a provider of closure for comedy because it focuses primarily on the 
                                                      
40 C.L. Barber, Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), 4-9. 
41 Northop Frye, A Natural Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 46 (my emphasis). 
42 Susan Snyder, The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare’s Tragedies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), 55. 
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group, as opposed to the individualist, isolationist emphasis of tragedy,” Shakespeare’s 
comedies do not always provide us with “happy marriage[s].”43  Stephen Greenblatt, too, 
observes that it is the “deep game of virtually all of Shakespeare’s comedies…to contain, 
just barely, the wild and destructive energies that they release, yoking them like 
boisterous, unruly horses to the traces of the unconventional marriage plots.”44  Thus, 
even within the marriages themselves, we notice individuals threatening to break loose 
from the social group.  Portia’s manipulations in the final scene of The Merchant of 
Venice, for example, slightly sever her bond with Bassanio, undermining her ostensibly 
submissive speech in 3.2.  And her disturbing meditation on a “good deed in a naughty 
world” (5.1.91) illuminates a level of introspection and gloom emanating not only from 
her character, but also from Antonio and certainly Jessica, who in Act 5 speaks nothing at 
all to the heroine who helped destroy her father in order to “drop manna in the way / Of 
starved people” (5.1.294-5).  How much longer, we wonder, before Portia figures out that 
the “naughty world” had long since darkened any chance in this play for a purely“good 
deed”?  How faithfully can we cling to the promise of renewal in this “comedy?”           
 Shakespeare’s plays show that the characteristics that make tragedy tragic are also 
what make comedy dark: the reluctance of, or inability for, individuals to celebrate life 
and youth as one group.  Francois Laroque, expanding on the holiday tradition described 
by Barber, argues that tragedies often enact the fall of “those who believed in the festive 
system” and who found no one ready to reciprocate.45  The fact that “[f]estivity seems to 
produce [in tragedy] the improvidence, prodigality, and blindness that propel individuals 
                                                      
43 Lisa Hopkins, The Shakespearean Marriage: Merry Wives and Heavy Husbands (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998), 17, 54. 
44 Stephen Greenblatt, Hamlet in Purgatory, 164 (my emphasis). 
45 Francois Laroque, Shakespeare’s Festive World, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 262.  
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toward their downfall” emphasizes how fragile comic resolution really is – how it 
depends on individuals willing to commit themselves to one another and to shine that 
light (however temporary or illusory) in the darkness of a naughty world.46   
The tension in comedy between the individual and society, between comic closure 
and resistance to closure, corresponds with the equivocal conventionality of the dark-lady 
sonnets.  David Schalkwyk and Gordon Braden contend that Shakespeare’s dark mistress 
is classically Petrarchan in that she occasionally resists the speaker’s romantic sallies.47  
Like Stella and Delia, Shakespeare’s mistress evokes in the poet paradoxical emotions 
common to the sonnets tradition (love/hate, jubilation/despair, hope/agony); she also 
forces the poet into the same kind of isolation experienced by the dark figures of the 
comedies.  However, Braden and Schalkwyk also observe that the dark lady occasionally 
does the unthinkable: she reciprocates.48  Instead of coyly refusing the advances of her 
lover and preserving her virgin purity, she consummates her relationship with the poet, 
who then repudiates many of the praise conventions associated with Petrarchism, 
bestowing upon his mistress the power to create a version of herself.  Thus, she possesses 
an artistic function that other Petrarchan beloveds do not have.   
As I have already explored, the dark lady helps the poet recognize his limitations 
as artist and, at the same time, the great freedom in articulating those limitations.  The 
same can be said for the comedies, in which Shakespeare breaks from the normative 
                                                      
46 Laroque, 263. 
47 According to David Schalkwyk, “commentators tend to overlook the fact that sonnets 127-152 remain 
deeply Petrarchan insofar as they systematically try to overcome a resisting object of desire” (Speech and 
Performance in Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Plays, 185).  See also Gordon Braden, “Shakespeare’s 
Petrarchism,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, 163-183.  Braden suggests that “Shakespeare’s 
sequence is in certain ways one of the most Petrarchan sequences of its age – that some of its most 
distinguishing marks are not mockeries or refutations f Petrarchism, but fulfillments of some of that 
movement’s original potentialities” (171).      
48 See Braden, 171, and Schalkwyk, 55 and 83. 
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structures that Plautus or Terence would have used, and negotiates, so to speak, his way 
toward a deeper conception of comedy.49  Undoubtedly, Shakespeare often goes far in his 
quest for ingenuity and authenticity of character, pushing his work seemingly beyond the 
limits of comedy.  Similar to the dark-lady poems, some of Shakespeare’s most 
sophisticated comedies expose the tension between an artist’s will to create and his
difficulty in controlling that creation.  In a way, then, Greenblatt’s assertion that 
Shakespeare’s comedies “contain, just barely, the wild and destructive energies they 
release” also describes the dark-lady sonnets, whose poet tries to “contain, just barely,” 
his beloved’s “wild and destructive energies.”  Thus we might say that Shakespeare’  
dark-lady poems not only echo the creative dynamic of the comic genre; they also reflect 
the dramatic interactions within the plays themselves.      
Shakespeare’s wily mistress is arguably both a product of and inspiration for the 
richly textured heroines of his comedies – Kate, Portia, Beatrice.  Although these and 
many other female characters forge romantic relationships built on the same sexual 
energy that permeates the dark-lady sonnets, I am tempted to call the namelss istress 
Rosaline or Rosalind.  This particular character undergoes a notable metamorphosis in 
Shakespeare’s canon.  Rosaline is the disembodied Petrarchan mistress in Romeo and 
Juliet responsible for turning the play’s titular hero into an object of derision in the comic 
first act of the play.50  The Rosaline of the nearly contemporaneous comedy, Love’s 
                                                      
49 For a discussion of Shakespeare’s employment of the same comic conventions used by Plautus and 
Terence, see Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare and Classical Comedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).  See 
also Leo Salingar, Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy (London: University of Cambridge Press, 
1979).  Salingar explores the distinctions between Old Comedy and New Comedy (Plautus and Terence), 
the latter of which Shakespeare used more often as he dapted and combined source material.   
50 I am following Susan Snyder’s argument, in The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare’s Tragedies, that the first 
half of Romeo and Juliet follows the conventions of comedy.  Romeo’s infatuation with Rosaline, and his 
subsequent love-longing for Juliet, fits better with Shakespeare’s comedies than his tragedies.  Even the 
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Labor’s Lost, wields significantly more power as the central female character.  
Reminiscent of the Petrarchan beloved of R meo and Juliet, however, Rosaline refuses to 
consummate her relationship with Berowne until he has spent a year in a hospital, 
“enforce[ing] the pained impotent to smile” (5.2.844).  When Shakespeare later creas 
Rosalind, the androgynous love skeptic of As You Like It, he allows his heroine to 
reciprocate Orlando’s affections and marry.  But the question remains whether she truly 
submits to her would-be Petrarchan poet, Orlando.  The fact that she steps outside the 
festivities to speak the epilogue emphasizes that comic closure is tenuous.  If at play’s 
end, we delight in Rosalind’s marital happiness, we must also celebrate her individuality 
– her willingness to “kiss as many” of the bearded audience that “pleased” her (Epi.17-
18).51          
Despite similarities among these three characters, “ebony”-faced Rosaline of 
Love’s Labor’s Lost is probably the most obvious evocation of the dark mistress.52  The 
play contains several sonnets printed in The Passionate Pilgrim; and its three Petrarchists 
– Berowne, Longaville, and Dumaine – all speak love poems echoing some of the dark-
lady sonnets.  Berowne’s description of Rosaline, for example, matches sonnet 127 
almost exactly: 
Oh, if in black my lady’s brows be decked, 
It mourns that painting and usurping hair 
Should ravish doters with a false aspect; 
And therefore is she born to make black fair. 
Her favor turns the fashion of the days, 
For native blood is counted painting now; 
And therefore red, that would avoid dispraise, 
                                                                                                                                                              
ending of the play, which dramatizes a “marriage” btween the Montagues and the Capulets, could also be 
considered comic. 
51 Quotations from As You Like It and Love’s Labor’s Lost are taken from Shakespeare’s Comedies, ed. 
David Bevington (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2007). 
52 For one discussion of this connection, see Walter Cohen, “Introduction,” in Shakespeare’s Love’s 
Labour’s Lost (1982; rpt. New York: Norton, 2005), xliv-xlv.    
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Paints itself black to imitate her brow. (4.3.254-261)        
Berowne does not merely believe that his mistress is a new standard for beauty, one who 
“mourns” those women who “ravish doters with a false aspect.”  Nor does he simply 
argue that “black” is the new “fair” and thus beauty’s successive heir.  Berown  actively 
celebrates the succession, delighting in Rosaline’s power to transform the “fas ion of the 
days” and to inspire, paradoxically, the imitation painting he so disdains.  While the 
speaker of sonnet 127 also indicates that his black beauty could have successors, he 
remains somber and brooding right through the closing couplet, never once unequivocally 
celebrating his mistress’ distinctive character.       
 So what may we glean from these subtle differences between sonnet 127 and 
Berowne’s speech?  I believe that the lines I have cited from Love’s Labor’s Lost predate 
sonnet 127, perhaps by a number of years, and that Rosaline is an early draft of the dark 
lady.  Berowne gives us something like a prologue to the dark-lady poems, a taste of what 
Shakespeare’s poet means when he affirms that he has sworn the dark lady fair.  As we 
know, Berowne and the poet of the Sonnets are objecting to conventional praise.  Both 
works suggest that an internal flaw is exposed during any attempt to hold one’s beloved 
against a standard of virtue and beauty.  Thus Rosaline and the dark lady are both new 
standards, nonpareils.  Unlike the dark mistress, however, Rosaline inspires unequivocal 
admiration, perhaps because Shakespeare had yet to complete his sonnet sequence, to 
explore in the young-man poems the way that invented standards and particularized 
praise bring with them all kinds of problems.    
 Appropriately, the etymology for Rosaline/d reflects the very conflict within 
Shakespearean epideixis between praise and blame, between the rose and the canker.  
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While Rosa-lind can be broken down to its usual denotation, “beautiful rose” (the image 
of praise traceable to the Song of Solomon and Dante’s Paradiso), Ros in the Germanic 
suggests “hros” or “horse,” the animal that Greenblatt uses to describe the unruly 
characteristic of Shakespeare’s comedies and thus the sort of animal that bes  c ptures the 
intractability of the dark lady as well.53  And lind, although it comes from the Latin word 
for “beautiful,” is also associated with the Scandinavian and Swedish word, lindworm, 
the serpent, dragon, or snake depicted in Germanic folklore and mythology.54  The fact 
that lindworm seems on one level to be a grotesque incarnation of the lowly cankerworm 
casts a perplexing shadow over Rosaline.  Like the rose of the Sonnets, which contains 
within it the canker of doubt; like Shakespearean epideixis, which unsteadily vacillates 
between praise and blame; and like the dark lady herself, Rosaline embodies its own 
contradiction. 
 This linguistic conflict within the name Rosaline/d is symbolic of the larger 
tension within the comedies, the dark-lady sonnets, and the black mistress herself.  Both 
the poems and the plays attempt to carve out a drama of beauty and eternity inside a 
world of mutability and decay, to write a wedding dance over a dance of death.  Both 
genres strive to transform time’s ravages into time’s benefices not by altering or 
completely obscuring what is fundamentally destructive to existence, but by focusing 
almost exclusively on the temporality that destructive forces can never fully permeate – 
the present.   
                                                      
53 See “horse, n.”  The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University Press.  4 
February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50108178>.  This word horse derives in part from the 
Old High German word, ros.  See also Patrick Hanks et al., Oxford Dictionary of First Names, 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), in which Rosalind is shown to derive from the Germanic word 
hros, or horse (234).     
54 See “lindworm, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd ed. 1989.  OED Online.  Oxford University 
Press.  4 February 2010  < http://dictionary.oed.com/ gi/entry/50133571>.       
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To say, then, that the dark-lady sonnets are inherently comic is to see in these 
poems qualities germane to most of Shakespeare’s comedies: sexuality and innueo, 
underlying threats of violence (physical or emotional) that never materializ , cceptance 
of change, an overwhelming interest in histrionics and role-playing, and emphasis on 
wordplay.  Perhaps most important of all is their similar epistemological stances.  While 
Shakespeare’s comedies certainly invite skeptical inquiry and ethical investigation, the 
happiest characters typically do not pursue knowledge.  Philosophizing brings conflict; 
thinking too deeply into the mystery of things, in other words, is dangerous, divisive, 
lonely.  At the end of Twelfth Night, we are not satisfied that Viola fully appreciates what 
her “estate is” (1.2.46) or that Olivia has developed a greater awareness of herself and the 
world.  All the characters, especially Sebastian, submit to “wonder” (the mother of 
philosophy) but they stop there (4.3.3).  Even Orsino finds it possible to maintain his 
bisexual equanimity at the end of the play, continuing to call Viola “boy” (5.1.279) and 
later “man” (409) instead of demanding that she procure her “maiden weeds” and assume 
her true identity (267).  As Joseph Summers argues, “the inhabitants of Illyria discover 
that they are anything but free” and “most of them know neither themselves, nor others, 
nor their social world.”55  Arguably, the only genuinely self-aware character in the play is 
Feste, the “corrupter of words,” whose half-hearted antics make it possible for th  others 
to ignore the darkness that surrounds them and the dark house inside which they all 
(including Viola, to some extent) reside (3.1.38).   
The poet of the Sonnets, too, has one foot in the dark house, standing alongside 
both Feste and Orsino and possessing a curious mixture of self-knowledge and willful 
                                                      
55 Joseph Summers, “The Masks of Twelfth Night,” in Shakespeare: Modern Essays in Criticism, ed. 
Leonard F. Dean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957; reprint, New York: New York University Press, 
1975), 134-5.  
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naivete.  Like Feste, the poet senses the weight of the world; like Orsino at the end of the 
play, the poet (in the second sequence) chooses not to plumb the depth of things.  By 
imagining the dark lady in various interactive postures – fighting, bargaining, making 
love – the poet can avoid the darkness and skepticism that beset any person in seclusion 
and underlie any exercise in praise.  Thus pleading rather than praising, thus negotiati g 
instead of investigating, the poet crafts a character that he can “play” with.  And so, even 
if the poet ultimately possesses a greater, more intense awareness tha most of the 
characters in Twelfth Night, he participates like these characters in comic reciprocity. 
 
Kate and Petruchio, or The Speaker and his Dark Lady: Creation and Containment 
in The Taming of the Shrew 
 In the previous section, I tried to show how the dark-lady sonnets are 
conventionally comic.  The poetic language, the tension between individual and society, 
the poet’s epistemological attitude, and the dark lady herself are defining characteristics 
of both the Sonnets and the comedies.  The Taming of the Shrew is among a handful of 
plays that captures the spirit of this second sequence.  Not only does the relationship 
between Kate and Petruchio reflect that between the speaker and mistress of th  Sonnets, 
but the manner in which Petruchio sets out to reinvent and tame Kate – and, arguably, his 
combined failure and success in doing so – echoes the rhetorical games explored between 
the poet and his beloved: rhetorical games that come at the expense of epistemological 




In The Taming of the Shrew, the madcap wedding occurs in Act 3 and is soon 
overshadowed by the play’s real denouement and one of the most debated passages in all 
of Shakespeare: Kate’s final address on wifely subservience. 56  This play may, in fact, be 
the only one in his corpus in which our interpretation of the entire work – from our study 
of the plot to an investigation of the play’s source material to an exploration of the 
motives and personalities of the characters – hinges on a single speech.  How should the 
speech be interpreted?  Proponents of a literal approach might remind us that the final
scene contains no asides, no theatrical indications of verbal irony, and thus no tangible
evidence for anything other than a straightforward reading.  Among the critics arguing for 
a literal interpretation is Marjorie Garber, who marshals support from the 
contemporaneous Comedy of Errors.  According to Garber, the Abbess’ serious treatment 
of some of the same gender issues covered in Kate’s address indicates that we s ould 
take Kate seriously as well.57  Jeanne Addison Roberts similarly argues that “[t]here can 
be no question that the view of the dominant male and the submissive female survives to 
the end of the play.”58  Like Garber, Roberts looks beyond The Taming of the Shrew for 
evidence of a literal reading; however, instead of finding support in the moralistic 
musings of another early comedy, Roberts draws connections to Shakespeare’s 
romances.59  From this perspective, Kate undergoes an Ovidian metamorphosis and 
“Petruchio himself is equally ‘tamed.’”60   
                                                      
56 All quotations are taken from Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, ed. Burton Raffel (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2005). 
57 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare: After All (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 69. 
58 Jeanne Addison Roberts, “Horses and Hermaphrodites: M tamorphoses in The Taming of the Shrew,” in 
The Taming of the Shrew: Critical Essays, ed. Dana E. Aspinall (New York: Routledge, 2002), 67. 
59 The Taming of the Shrew, Roberts explains, “is not the social celebration characteristic of festive 
comedy”; rather, it reflects “the kind of individual salvation typical of romance” (67). 
60 Ibid., 68. 
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Of course, not all critics agree that the play ends happily, especially those 
committed to studying the cultural context.  Natasha Korda examines how the taming plot 
traces the evolution from “domestic use-value production to production for the market” in 
which Kate becomes an “educated consumer” whose final act of “obedience sigals her 
readiness to assume an active managerial role in domestic affairs.”61  If Korda diminishes 
Kate’s theatrical power with talk of commodities and “status objects,” she does not, 
however, commit to a literal reading of Kate’s final speech (131).  Lynda E. Boose, also 
historicizing the Shrew, does commit to such a reading, arguing that an ironic 
interpretation revises social history, undermines the point of the play, and merely 
appeases our modern sensibilities.62  Boose urges us to confront the hard truth: that the 
play reflects a culture invested in “suppressing women’s speech” and “shaming” scolds.63  
Laurie E. Maguire and Emily Detmer implicitly side with Boose.  Maguire maintains that 
the “play analyzes cultural control” in “Christian marriage,” one of the “indices of man’s 
progress.”64  Detmer, reading Petruchio’s “civilized domination” as a form of “domestic 
violence,” contends that in order to “enjoy the comedy of the play,” the audience must 
assume the point of view of the “abuser.”65 
Robert B. Heilman and Burton Raffel also take Kate at her word, but they try to 
justify Petruchio’s taming methods by rooting the play in Italian farce.66  As Heilman 
                                                      
61 Natasha Korda, “Household Kates: Domesticating Comm dities in The Taming of the Shrew,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 47.2 (1996), 110, 112, 128. 
62 Lynda E. Boose, “Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the Woman’s Unruly Member,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 42.2 (1991), 181. 
63 Boose, 184. 
64 Laurie E. Maguire, “Cultural Control in The Taming of the Shrew,” in The Taming of the Shrew: Critical 
Essays, 249. 
65 Emily Detmer, “Civilizing Subordination: Domestic Violence and The Taming of the Shrew,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 48.3 (1997), 274. 
66 Robert B. Heilman, “The Taming Untamed, or, The Return of the Shrew,” in The Taming of the Shrew: 
Critical Essays, 45-57; Burton Raffel, “Introduction,” Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), xix-xxxiii. 
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suggests, “Farce offers a spectacle that resembles daily actuality b t lets us participate 
without feeling the responsibilities and liabilities that the situation would normally 
evoke.” 67  If, however, we interpret the Shrew merely as a farce, in which “the human 
personality is without depth,” then we run the risk of relegating the play to mere 
spectacle, and taming the shrew would be no different from other Elizabethan 
entertainments: bear-baiting, jousting tournaments, even public punishments and 
executions.  Refusing to empathize with Kate, we root for Petruchio and laugh at his 
antics; we take visceral pleasure in watching him break and subdue his shrew.  While 
other, more sober-minded, critics argue that the play’s ending reinforces cultural norms 
for the sake of comic resolution, or that it ultimately endorses “Protestant marriage 
ideology,” many of them also imply (like the advocates of farce) that the play satisfies 
our desire for closure at any cost and that Shakespeare gives the people what they w nt – 
neither more nor less.68 
 One of the strongest proponents of an ironic reading of the speech is Harold 
Bloom, who asserts that the “Shrew is as much a romantic comedy as it is a farce.”69  
Following in the footsteps of Harold Goddard, Bloom argues in his usually candid way 
that “one would have to be tone deaf (or ideologically crazed) not to hear in…[Kate’s 
speech and Petruchio’s response] a subtly exquisite music of marriage at its happiet.”70  
For Bloom, the magic resides in Kate’s declaration, “I am ashamed that women are so 
                                                      
67 Heilman, 49. 
68 Margaret Lael Mikesell, “‘Love Wrought These Miracles’: Marriage and Genre in The Taming of the 
Shrew,” in The Taming of the Shrew: Critical Essays, 112.   
69 Harold Bloom, Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998), 29. 
70 Bloom, 33.  See Harold C. Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951).  According to Goddard, “Everything leads up to Kate’s long lecture at the end on the 
duty of wives to their lords.  What fun she has reading it to those two other women who do not know what 
every woman knows!  How intolerable it would be if she and Shakespeare really meant it (as if 
Shakespeare could ever have meant it!), though there is a deeper sense in which they both do mean it…” 
(1:71).   
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simple” (5.2.161).  He claims that this line refers not only to the shrewish practices 
directly following the assertion, but also to the practice of interpreting speech and 
detecting irony.  Kate is too smart, Bloom indicates, to be literal, and she expects smar  
audiences to catch her subtleties.  The BBC adaptation of The Taming of the Shrew 
(1980) takes the ironic interpretation to an extreme level, showing a quietly triumphant 
Kate (Sarah Badel) performing before an astonishingly subdued Petruchio (John Cleese).  
Reading the ending ironically certainly enriches the play, and Shakespeare is no stranger 
to rhetorical nuance.  Nor should we be surprised that Shakespeare would transform one 
play’s serious issue (The Comedy of Errors) into the next play’s comical one.  A text, 
furthermore, inevitably eludes the historical or socio-political context as well; some of 
the abovementioned attempts to examine the play through a cultural lens do more to 
distort or obscure than enlighten our understanding of Kate and Petruchio.   
Not surprisingly, some of the most persuasive criticism on The Taming of the 
Shrew reflects neither the stubborn effusions of Bloom nor the militant historicism of 
Boose.  Insofar as both extremes involve little textual analysis, both extremes miss the 
mark.  Critics who have spent the most time considering the whole play, including the 
role of the induction scenes, the function of theater, and the nature of the taming itself, 
have found a way to read Kate’s speech ironically without compromising Petruchio’s role 
in taming her.  Margie Burns and David Daniell, for example, contend that the induction 
scenes undermine a literal reading of Kate’s speech and that the ending of the play
creates a sense of equality between the sexes.71  Coppélia Kahn argues that the play 
“satirizes…male attitudes toward women” and that Kate learns from Petruchio himself 
                                                      
71 Margie Burns, “The Ending of The Shrew,” in The Taming of the Shrew: Critical Essays, 84-105; David 




how to “subvert[] her husband’s power without attempting to challenge it….”72  
According to Juliet Dusinberre, “Stage power appears here, even if the price of it is a 
speech on social submission.”73  Holly A. Crocker, expanding on this perspective, insists 
that “Katherine…must enact passivity in order to satisfy Petruchio’s expectations of her 
character,” but also to show the “illusory nature of the power he would wield over her.”74  
Helga Ramsey-Kurz looks at the power dynamic from a slightly different angle, ar uing 
that Katherine “overcomes her antitheatricality” with Petruchio’s help and that she 
“learns to appreciate the kind of complicity in which actors are united as they engage in 
such deception.”75  “Petruchio can afford to bet on Katherine’s compliance, not as his 
wife,” Ramsey-Kurz contends, “but as his accomplice actress.”76  Despite some subtle 
differences in approach, most of these scholars suggest that even though Petruchio 
maintains a measurable amount of control at the end of the play, other features – from the 
atypical comic structure and the sheer length and centripetal force of Kate’s speech to the 
strong rhetorical dimension of the taming plot itself and the general emphasis on 
metadrama – all help to transform Kate’s obedience speech into a powerfully ironic 
performance of submission.  Expanding on the work of these critics, I suggest that this 
double reading is consistent with Shakespeare’s approach in his sonnets and, in 
particular, in sonnet 138.  Showcasing the relationship between the dark lady and her poet
                                                      
72 Coppélia Kahn, “The Taming of the Shrew: Shakespeare’s Mirror of Marriage,” Modern Language 
Studies 5.1 (1975), 88-89. 
73 Juliet Dusinberre, “The Taming of the Shrew: Women, Acting, and Power,” in The Taming of the Shrew: 
Critical Essays, 180. 
74 Holly A. Crocker, “Affective Resistance: Performing Passivity and Playing A-Part in The Taming of the 
Shrew,” Shakespeare Quarterly 54.2 (2003), 153-156. 
75 Helga Ramsey-Kurz, “Rising above the Bait: Kate’s Transformation from Bear to Falcon,” English 
Studies 88.3 (2007), 271-279. 
76 Ibid., 279. 
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at its best, The Taming of the Shrew explores how an artist can create, but cannot 
necessarily contain, a character.  
*** 
 A cursory survey of the plot reveals some incongruities in Kate’s final speech.  In 
terms of rhetoric and content, it echoes an earlier part of the play: Petruchio’s not riously 
misogynistic assertion that his wife is “my goods, my chattels…my house, / My horse, 
my ox, my ass, my anything” (3.2.222-4).  Early in her bombastic oration, Kate, aping 
that speech, declares, “Thy husband is thy life, thy keeper, / Thy head, thy sovereign – 
one that cares for thee, / And for thy maintenance commits his body / To painful labor 
both by sea and land…” (5.2.146-9).  Kahn argues that it is “impossible that Shakespeare 
meant us to accept Petruchio’s…shamelessly blunt statement of the relationship between 
men, women, and property” – especially after Kate’s mockery of it.77  It is equally 
difficult to see how Kate can be talking about Petruchio, who rides the tail wind of the 
other suitors and who seeks Kate’s hand in the first place to avoid the labor she describes.  
Kate’s follow-up assertion, moreover, about a wife who “liest warm at home, secure and 
safe” and a husband who “craves no other tribute… / But love, fair looks, and true 
obedience” (151-53), seems ironic when juxtaposed with the details of the taming in Act 
4.  Even if we read this passage, not as a narrative of what has passed, but as a verbal 
contract that speaks of the future, Kate is setting the terms.  Is this the mark of a woman 
who has been broken by the taming?   
What, though, does it mean for Petruchio to tame Kate?  She is, after all, different 
at the end of the play.  Does an ironic reading of the speech necessarily preclude her 
being tamed?  The fact that the final speech invites such questions opens up a fruitful line 
                                                      
77 Coppélia Kahn, “The Taming of the Shrew: Shakespeare’s Mirror of Marriage,” 94-95. 
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of inquiry built on the rhetorical dimension of the taming plot itself.  Joel Fineman, 
working from the premise that speech is gendered, argues that this play is about language.  
He observes how the feminine language of rebellion and subversion is at odds with the 
masculine language of authority, which he claims is literal.  Tracing the way Petruchio 
acts and speaks the part of the shrew to tame the shrew – and to hold a mirror up to 
Kate’s own nature – Fineman explores whether it is “possible to voice a language, 
whether of man or of woman, that does not speak, sooner or later, self-consciously or 
unconsciously, for the order and authority of man?”78   
Through a series of intricate arguments that I cannot summarize here, Fineman 
reminds us that rhetorical subversion in general (or sub-version, as he writes it) depends 
on one’s perception of the literal meaning: irony, in other words, cannot be understood as 
such unless we are familiar with the situation alluded to or described.  From this prem e, 
Fineman maintains that the play dramatizes the development of language from subversive 
and female-centered to literal and male-centered.  This occurs when Petruchio’s 
(feminine) language of subversion – the language he uses to tame Kate – leads inevitably 
to an assertion of male authority: Kate’s final speech.  Because Fineman’s entire 
discussion hinges on a literal (male) interpretation of Kate’s address, analyzing it would 
undermine his point.79  Two issues, though, allow us to challenge such a heady argument.  
First, Fineman admits that because Bianca turns (or is revealed to be a) shr w at the end 
of the play, the narrative recounting how male discourse triumphs over feminine 
                                                      
78 Joel Fineman, “The Turn of the Shrew,” in The Subjectivity Effect in Western Literary Tradition 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), 120. 
79 What Freinkel has called a “refusal to give a close reading” of the Will poems (Reading Shakespeare’s 
Will, 225) is repeated again in Fineman’s discussion of The Taming of the Shrew.  That is, Fineman 
explicitly avoids interpreting the very passage which his entire argument leads up to and thus depends on in 
order to emphasize that passage’s self-explanatory nature.  To provide a close reading of such passage 
would either be redundant (in the Will poems) or undermine the thesis altogether (in the Shr w). 
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subversion keeps repeating itself and so must be retold: shrews beget shrews; subversion 
breeds subversion.  Second and along these lines, Fineman avoids the most obvious 
problem with this argument: that Kate’s final address is itself a form of subversion.   
Admittedly, reading Kate’s speech ironically would not only disrupt the 
“determinate patriarchal narrative” but also shake the foundations of so-called 
“conventional” comedy, which depends on men and women assuming their rightful place 
within a fixed social hierarchy.  Kahn, however, finds a way around this problem by 
suggesting that Kate is “affirming her husband’s superiority through outward conformity 
while questioning it ironically through words” and that “this rhetoric and the ironies it 
produces are Shakespeare’s way out of the difficulties he encountered in writinga 
critique of marriage in the form of comedy which must, somehow, celebrate marriage.”80  
Thus, rather than close the circle of language by suggesting that irony and subversion 
find their way back to literal discourse, Kahn sees the ending as a “mirror” in which
“Kate is clever enough to use his [Petruchio’s] verbal strategies against him.”81  
Modifying Fineman’s punchy questions, one could therefore ask if it is possible to speak 
for the language and authority of men without exposing subversion?  One could argue 
that Petruchio’s actions culminate in a moment of oratorical brilliance that takes he other 
characters by surprise.  Petruchio, in short, teaches Kate how to catch him at his own 
game. 
 The game actually begins with the induction scenes, which revolve around the 
theme of being caught – prey caught by the scent of the Lord’s and huntsmen’s hounds, 
alcoholics intoxicated by drink, a hawk caught in the grips of its human predator, 
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nightingales enclosed in a bird cage.  When the Lord tells the baffled tinker, Christopher 
Sly, that “thy horses shall be trapped, / Their harness studded all with gold and pearl,” w  
know that the word trapped conveys a double meaning: “adorned” and “caught” 
(Ind.2.39-40).  The idea that adornments themselves can “trap” reminds us of the way 
clothing can help manufacture illusions and how theater confuses, disorients, and 
enthralls.  Sly, caught up in the histrionics concocted by the Lord, players, and servants, 
seems half-convinced that he is royalty.   
Sly, in fact, straddles at least five roles.  Beyond the character of Christopher the 
tinker and the wealthy lord, he is also playing us, the audience.  As the Sly frame reminds 
us, theater depends not only on our willingness to suspend disbelief but also to enter into 
another world, to use our imaginations to forget ourselves, and sometimes even to 
become the very characters we are watching on stage.  This means that Sly does not 
simply reflect the audience; he also represents Kate, who under Petruchio’s disarmingly 
persistent taming methods becomes disoriented, confused, and stuck between sleeping 
and waking.  The servant Curtis, describing the manic episodes within Petruchio’s house, 
says that Kate, “(poor soul) / Knows not which way to stand, to look, to speak, / And sits 
as one new risen from a dream” (4.1.168-170).  Similarly, the Lord tells one of the 
huntsmen, “[p]ersuade him [Sly] that he hath been a lunatic, / And when he says he is, 
say that he dreams,” to which the huntsman replies, “He is no less than what we say he 
is” (Ind.1.60-61,68).  Like Sly, Kate would become under Petruchio’s direction “no less” 
than what he tells her she is.  Like Sly, however, Kate willingly accepts that illusion.  As 
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Daniell suggests, “Shakespeare makes Kate move herself urther into, rather than out of, a 
play-world.”82      
And finally, Sly, who willingly yields to an obsequious page boy dressed as a 
dutiful wife, serves as prologue to Petruchio, who surrenders to Kate’s dramatic 
performance at the end of the play.83  In the induction, the Lord, coaching the page 
beforehand, tells him, “Such duty to the drunkard let him do, / With soft low tongue and 
lowly courtesy, / And say ‘What’s is’t your honor will command, / Wherein your lady
and your humble wife / May show her duty, and make known her love?” (Ind.1.110-114).  
The Lord might as well have been talking to Kate herself, whose speech spins out from 
the central points mentioned here.  Just as Petruchio seems to applaud Kate’s 
performance by commanding her to kiss and then dragging her off to bed, so Sly 
approves of the page’s assertions, “I am your wife in all obedience” (Ind.2.105), by 
coaxing “her” to bed and affirming bawdily, “Ay, it stands so that I may hardly tarr  so 
long” (123). 
 Thus, Christopher the tinker slides slyly between the characters of Kate and 
Petruchio, eliding the difference between the real and the illusory, male and fmale, 
desire and consummation, belief and incredulity, credibility and deceit.  The induction 
sets us up to believe that the Kate/Petruchio romance merely elaborates on the Sly/page 
plot.  Critics are divided over whether or not it does.  Fineman sees the “absence of a 
final frame” and thus the “play’s apparent omission of a formal conclusion to the Sly 
story” as “evidence enough that the audience for the entirety of the play is left at its 
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conclusion with a desire for closure that the play calls for in rder to postpone.”84  
Daniell, although drawing parallels between the induction scenes and the rest of the play, 
also suggests that Sly’s disappearance “is surely right in view of the serious point about 
marriage which can be seen to be made at the end of the play.”85  Of course, on one level, 
the play gives us a final frame that complements the induction.  As Burns observes, “one 
should posit not that half the frame is missing, but that the unity of the play is its frame.  
Thus Sly’s loss can be discussed as the play’s gain, because the discontinuation of Sly’s 
story actually helps develop the Kate-Petruchio story.”86  If, therefore, the closing 
moments between Kate and Petruchio recapitulate the ending of the induction, these 
characters are at once more real due to Shakespeare’s sustained treatmen  of them over 
five acts and less real, given the fact that they are introduced to us as characters in  play 
– the Lord’s play and thus Shakespeare’s play.   
The induction scenes, then, do what The Mousetrap accomplishes in Hamlet.  
They force upon us a performance that reminds us of the theater at every turn – a 
performance that culminates in Kate’s final address.  This means that criics who read her 
performance merely literally would have to ignore the Sly frame altogether and see her 
words as somehow existing outside theater.  One might say that the induction is 
Shakespeare’s way of creating an illusion that he ensures cannot be contained by the 
literal words on the page (and, in Sly’s case, by the literal identity of the pag ). 
 This last point takes us back to the taming plot man-handled by Petruchio, a plot 
that reflects the rhetorical maneuverings and sly theatricality of the induction s ene.  
From the moment Petruchio steps on stage and commences a protracted debate over the 
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meaning of knock, we know where the play is headed and who will head it.  We watch 
Petruchio at once apply the conventions associated with the page characters – comic far e 
and callow wordplay – to his actions as the major male protagonist.  In a sense, then, 
Petruchio’s farcical behavior should be taken seriously.  As Fineman argues, the “very 
triviality” of the puns on knock “suggests the troubling way in which the problematic 
question raised by one word may eventually spread to, and be raised by, all.”87  
Petruchio’s behavior is no clownish sideshow designed to lighten the main plot or, at 
most, to underscore the moral issues raised by the play’s central characters; Pe ruchio is 
the central character.  The rhetorical games he plays with his manservant G umio become 
the major focus of the taming story and his abuse of language the driving force of the 
play.  Later in the scene, Grumio articulates Petruchio’s function as “tamer,” saying,  
O’ my word, an she [Kate] knew him as well as I do, she would think 
scolding would do little good upon him.  She may perhaps call him half a 
score of knaves or so.  Why, that’s nothing; an he begin once, he’ll rail in 
his rope tricks.  I’ll tell you what sir: an she stand him but a little, he will 
throw a figure in her face and so disfigure her with it that she shall have no 
more eyes to see withal than a cat.  (1.2.105-11)                                                                        
 
Grumio lays out in this short passage the impossible hurdle set in front of Kate, who has 
little hope of playing the scold once confronted with Petruchio’s rhetoric, his “rope 
tricks.”  As Grumio suggests here, Kate will have to find another way to assert her power 
or “she will have no more eyes to see.”  The words rail  and disfigure emphasize the fine, 
but distinct, line that the play draws between rhetorical violence and physical violence.  
Petruchio does not beat Kate into submission, but he does violence to language and to 
other established norms that visibly affect Kate.  Biondello’s minute description of 
Petruchio’s paradoxical wedding apparel, for example, from his “breeches thrice turned” 
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and “old rusty sword” to his worn-out armor and an equally decrepit horse, reflects th  
great lengths he will go to subdue Katherine (3.2.43-61).  Kate’s silence upon Petruchio’s 
arrival suggests that her “shame” at his delay quickly transforms into astonishment at his 
audacious histrionics (3.2.8).     
Significantly, however, of all the trials Petruchio puts his new wife through, it is 
the ownership he claims of language that forces Kate to the breaking point – his willful 
abuse of her words during the exchange with the haberdasher (4.3.63-85), his dispute 
with Kate over the question of the time (4.3.182-90), and finally, his avowal that the sun 
is the moon and the moon is the sun (4.5.1-7).  Petruchio attempts to tame Kate by 
refusing to take her at her word, and by accusing her of rope tricks even as he uses them 
himself.  “Look what I speak, or do, or think to do,” he declares, “[y]ou are still crossing 
it” (4.3.188-89).  His taming methods reach their climax and resolution on the road to 
Padua.  The scene begins with Petruchio’s affirming that “it is the moon that shines so 
bright” and insisting that, whatever Kate says – whether she agrees or not – she lies 
(4.5.6).  Kate halts and founders.  An automaton doing her master’s bidding, she seems 
thoroughly changed and subdued: “Then, God be blessed, it is the blessed sun. / But sun 
it is not, when you say it is not, / And the moon changes even as your mind. / What you 
will have it named, even that it is, / And so it shall be for Katherine” (4.5.19-23).  
Naming herself, Kate symbolically commits to Petruchio’s play; she seem  to become his 
character in a story where “male supremacy is ultimately based on such absrdities.”88   
Entering the theatrical world, however, is also empowering, and even though 
Petruchio seems to break Kate, the scene also marks a theatrical reversal and a transfer of 
power.  While earlier in the play, Petruchio had the rhetorical upper-hand, now Kate 
                                                      
88 Kahn, 96. 
286 
 
equals or exceeds his abilities, for she too now subverts, verbally undermines, and plays 
the game of “saying-the-thing-which-is-not.”89  When Kate rallies and speaks to 
Vincentio as a “young, budding virgin, fair and fresh and sweet” (4.5.38), she not only 
challenges his identity but also authorizes her own.  Petruchio’s attempt to undermine 
Kate once again by informing his “mad” wife that Vincentio is in fact a “man, old, 
wrinkled, faded, withered, / And not a maiden” suggests that Petruchio has caught 
himself in his own trap – and that Kate has begun to move beyond his control (42-44).  
One wonders if he perceives at this moment how far Kate might take her new role.   
*** 
 With the help of several critics, I have so far elaborated on an ironical 
interpretation of Kate’s speech.  I want now to focus the argument a bit, to tighten the 
rhetorical rope so that its loop encircles a hero and heroine who have more in common 
with the dark lady and the poet than previously recognized.  For Petruchio comes on the 
stage not only a consummate rhetorical gamester, powermonger, and wealth-seker.  He 
does not merely (by punning on k ock and subsequently strangling all of Kate’s words 
with his rhetorical rope tricks) rebel against the status quo of language.  Petruchio is also 
a poet.  Critics have failed to point out that his name bears a striking resemblance to 
Petrarch and thus to the Latin word, patricius, or “nobleman,” as well as to pater.  
Petruchio and Petrarch are both in their own way artists, creators, patriarchs.  Although 
we do not know what sort of life Petruchio had before journeying to Padua, we are 
seduced by his mellifluous rehearsal of his past exploits and his fearless attitude toward 
the challenge that lies before him:  
Think you a little din can daunt mine ears? 
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Have I not in my time heard lions roar? 
Have I not heard the sea, puffed up with winds, 
Rage like an angry boar, chafed with sweat? 
…………………………………………… 
Have I not in a pitched battle heard 
Loud ‘larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang? 
And do you tell me of a woman’s tongue?  (1.2.195-198, 201-03)         
If we do not believe or love Petruchio for the dangers he has passed, we can admire the 
way speaks of them.   
Petruchio therefore makes a striking contrast to those in the Minola household, 
whose heroine, we quickly sense, has been accustomed to either verbal abuse or apathetic 
silence.  When we first meet Katherine, in fact, she abashedly asks her father if he “plans 
to make a stale” of her “amongst these mates?” (1.1.58).  Significantly, Kate’s first 
emotion in the play is not anger, but embarrassment and shame, and she becomes 
“wonderful froward” (69) only after Hortensio tells her, with feigned incredulity, “Mates, 
maid, how mean you that?  No mates for you, / Unless you were of gentler, milder ol ” 
(59-60).  Kate’s mood understandably worsens after Hortensio casts her among “devils”
(66) and Gremio calls her a “fiend of hell” (88).  Reaching her breaking point, Kate by 
the opening of Act 2, has tied up the sister of “sobriety” (1.1.71), and “gentler, milder 
mold,” and dragged her onto the stage.  Charging Bianca to declare the identity of her 
suitor and ordering her to “dissemble not” (2.1.9), Kate is airing frustrations that tem 
from more than her treatment in the previous scene.  One senses that Bianca has alwys 
been deceitful and cunning, and that she has used her silence to manipulate and control 
Kate.  Corroborating this notion is the fact that Kate is subsequently ignored – not only 
by her sister, but also by her father.  Kate exits the scene dejected, her closing remark 
holding some clue about her complexity: “Talk not to me,” she tells her father, “I will go 
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sit and weep / Till I can find occasion of revenge” (35-36).  On the one hand, Kate’s“t lk 
not to me” is an imperative, a mark of her shrewishness; she angrily rejects her father 
because he prefers Bianca.  On the other hand, the opening clause could merely be a 
conditional phrase reflecting Kate’s present circumstances: If you do not speak to me, she 
suggests, I will weep until I find an opportunity to revenge. 
Although Petruchio is the man who brings in the noise, releasing Kate from the 
tyranny of silence and ignorance, his descent upon the Minola household does not 
initially look promising for Kate.  Even before she re-enters the scene, Petruchio begins 
verbally to convert his dark mistress into a fair lady, calling her a woman of “beauty” and 
“wit,” of “affability” and “bashful modesty” (2.1.47-48).  Playing an ironical rendition of 
a Petrarchan poet, Petruchio is what Rosalie Colie and Joel Fineman have describe a  
the poet of praise paradox.  Rather than admit to Kate’s intractability, roughness, and ill 
temper, her suitor celebrates her amiability and “mild behavior” (49).  Instead of running 
from a woman whom everyone pronounces to be awful, Petruchio persists in his 
courtship, declaring himself awestruck.  In the process of reinventing Kate, Petruchio 
reinvents himself as well.  Swept up by the musicality of his own poetry and enveloped in 
his egoism, he assures Baptista that he is “as peremptory as she proud-minded,” that 
“where two raging fires meet together, / They do consume the thing that feeds th ir fury,” 
and that he, too, is “rough” and will “woo not like a babe” (2.1.129-135).  To Baptista’s 
suggestion that Petruchio be “armed for some unhappy words,” Petruchio poetically 
responds, “Ay, to the proof, as mountains are for winds, / That shake not though they 
blow perpetually” (2.1.138-9).  As much a lyricist as suitor, Petruchio crafts his courtship 
in terms of fires and furies, of “mountains” and “winds.”  
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These are just a few passages in the play that suggest we are getting another 
version of the Sonnets’ poet setting out to create and tame his dark mistress.  In many
ways, Kate and Petruchio dramatize the implied action in the dark lady poems – 
Petruchio, like the poet, swearing Kate fair and Kate, like the dark mistress, refusing at 
first to play her artist’s game.  Appropriately, Petruchio’s first words to Kae h ve to do 
with her name, and he strews a mess of epithets before her as soon as she enters the 
room: “in faith, you are called plain Kate, / And bonny Kate, and sometimes Kate the 
curst. / But Kate, the prettiest Kate in Christendom, / Kate of Kate Hall, my super dainty 
Kate… / Kate of my consolation” (2.1.183-188).  By hurling multiple “Kates” in her 
wake, Petruchio challenges her identity, undermining her sense of self and attempting to 
mold her into a creature of his making.90  Reminiscent of the implied action in the 
sonnets, however, Kate tramples that pile of epithets, forcing her boisterous suitr into a 
verbal battle of wit that yields no winner.  Indeed, this is a fitting first meeting of two 
characters whose closing moments on stage are as delightfully ambiguous as this e rly 
conversation. 
Despite the rhetorical warfare, the couple eventually enters into some sort of 
truce, or a relationship of “mutual render,” when Petruchio (as poet, artist, and tamer)
brings Kate to a kind of freedom in language.  The more he plays creator, in other words, 
the larger his project becomes and the more he ensures that she not be contained by his 
handiwork.  And the more Petruchio becomes consumed by his roles – playing at turns 
the doting husband, the ambivalent patriarch, the shrewish man-wife – the greater 
                                                      
90 For a discussion of the connection between Kate and “cates,” or “commodities,” see Korda, “Household 
Kates.”  Korda, however, reads Petruchio’s repetition of Kate’s name as a failed attempt to “domesticate” 
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reference to Kate as ‘super-dainty’ refers to her not as a commodity or object of exchange but rather as a
consumer of commodities” (118).  My own reading of this scene somewhat complements Korda’s.  
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flexibility he builds into the marriage and especially into the role of Kate, who has 
observed her “master’s” play-acting and who quickly learns how to exploit the powerof 
theater.  However, drama, as we saw in the dark lady poems, involves tempering control 
with obedience.  If Kate wants to woo others with her performance, then she must, as 
Kahn points out, “affirm[] her husband’s superiority through outward conformity while 
questioning it ironically through words.”91  As for Petruchio, if he is intent on keeping his 
wife awake in order to break her, then he must stay awake himself.  If he expects to live a 
free man, then he must allow his wife the same freedom. 
When Petruchio tries to take from Kate her sense of identity, therefore, he also 
produces the drive in her to become something more than a shrew and eventually to gain 
more power than she has at the beginning of the play.  Before Kate can achieve that 
Pauline transfiguration on the road to Padua, she articulates a desire not only t speak, 
but to be listened to and respected:  
Why sir, I trust I have leave to speak,  
And speak I will.  I am no child, no babe.  
Your betters have endured me say my mind,  
And if you cannot, stop your ears. 
My tongue will tell the anger of my heart, 
Or else my heart concealing it will break, 
And rather than it shall, I will be free 
Even to the uttermost as I please in words.  (4.3.73-80)           
This marks the first phase of Kate’s progression toward the artist that her husband has, 
perhaps unintentionally, taught her to be.  As we know, however, Kate eventually moves 
beyond what she says here, for to be “free…/ in words” also involves speaking 
subversively: saying one thing while patently meaning another, speaking in such a way as 
to prevent her heart from breaking even as she assuages the crowd, and pleasing other as
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well as herself.  Kate, in other words, gradually embraces theater, learning to make 
compromises in her new role as wife in order to achieve the rhetorical upper-hand.  She 
sees possibilities for power that she can exploit, but the necessity of disguising, so as to 
preserve, that power.   
Significantly, by Act 5, Kate does not simply learn to mimic Petruchio; she alo 
becomes the Petrarchan poet, or rather the poet of praise paradox.  By pronouncing 
Vincentio to be a “[y]oung budding virgin, fair and fresh and sweet,” Kate does to the 
baffled old man what Petruchio does to her at the beginning of the play when he swears 
Kate fair.  The next time we see Kate and Petruchio, in the romantic street scen  outside 
Lucentio’s house (5.1.121-130), we become privy to an entirely new relationship whose 
very dynamism is built on the subtle interchange of power.  And, by the end of the play, 
Kate makes everyone “prisoners to her womanly persuasion” (5.2.120). 
 Everyone except, perhaps, the skeptics who still maintain that the play is merely a 
farce and that flat characters are flattened further when they star in a play within a play.  
Irony, some scholars have implied, depends on Kate’s having that within which passes 
show, and that, as a character in the Lord’s play, Kate must be taken at her word.  Is Kate,
however, really no different from the player queen in Hamlet?  As I have tried to 
demonstrate, the fact that rhetorical subversion is the substance of the taming plot makes 
irony the centerpiece of the whole play.  A farcical interpretation could arguably 
accommodate a subversive reading of Kate’s speech if critics were to consider that she is 
tamed only after she learns like Petruchio to swear against the truth so foul a lie.   
But many people want to see Kate as more than a character in the Lord’s play and 
one who transcends farce, and Shakespeare’s play allows for this flexibility, providing us 
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with a heroine who possesses the characteristics – and depth – for irony.  Often ignor d
are two brief lines in the Shrew that invite us to speculate that Kate’s interiority is 
perhaps more than, or different from, her public persona.  Early in the play, Petruchio 
assures his friends, “Be patient gentlemen, I choose her for myself, / If she and I be 
pleased, what’s that to you? / ‘Tis bargained ‘twixt us twain being alone, / That she shall 
still be curst in company” (2.1.293-96).  In private, Petruchio tells them, “She hung about 
my neck, and kiss on kiss / She vied so fast, protesting oath on oath, / That in a twink she 
won me to her love” (299-301).  Shakespeare could not have meant for us to forget such 
an affirmation and to wonder what would happen once Kate is obedient in company, once 
she publicly hangs about Petruchio’s neck, “protesting oath on oath.”  If Kate undergoes 
a public transformation in character, then what does the reversal do to her private self? 
 If we acknowledge the play’s persistent need to keep such a question unanswered, 
then we might also accept the fact that Petruchio has indeed cr ated a submissive wife 
that he cannot contain in that role.  Using precisely these terms to reflect on the ending of 
the play, Crocker contends that “Petruchio’s rhetorical agility can no longer manage 
Katharine’s body, because by adopting the model of feminine virtue that masculine 
discourse constructs, she occupies the place of reator which Petruchio covets.  By 
stepping into the role of submission, Katharine evades the categories that her passivity 
instates.”92  For Crocker, “performing passivity” not only allows Kate to rise above her 
purported submissiveness, but also to equal Petruchio as artist and creator.  “Exposing the 
implications of female subservience,” Crocker goes on to say, “reveals currents of 
feminine agency that cannot be contained by masculine discourse, desire, or 
                                                      
92 Crocker, 156 (my emphasis). 
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representation.”93  As we saw in the sonnets and as this play demonstrates, the male artist 
can only go so far in trying to represent his mistress before she forces the poet to ut 
down the pen, and, in this case, to take it up herself. 
 No sonnet more effectively captures the dramatic climax of The Taming of the 
Shrew than 138.  This poem not only reflects the triumph of theater at the end of the play 
– in which Kate points to the “gap between what one is and what one says”94 – but also 
the divided perspective surrounding her speech.  Even those who accept an ironical 
reading cannot fully agree.  Does Kate truly submit to Petruchio, finding freedom only in 
rhetorical games and linguistic subversion?  Or does Kate enter into a theatrical realm in 
which she becomes Petruchio’s mutual partner in deception and thus his equal?  In other 
words, does she submit to him only publicly?  When Petruchio says, “Why there’s a 
wench!  Come on, and kiss me Kate” (5.2.180), is he simply applauding her subversive 
performance or is he also trying to stop her ironical mouth? 
Although both versions of sonnet 138 were probably written after Th  Taming of 
the Shrew, the poem’s first appearance in the The Passionate Pilgrim (1599) and then its 
subsequent reemergence in the 1609 Quarto together encapsulate the ongoing debate 
surrounding the end of the Shrew.  In the first version of sonnet 138, the speaker’s 
celebration of action over knowledge culminates, paradoxically, in a stifling, choking 
love: “Therefore I’ll lie with Love and Love with me, / Since that our faults in Love thus 
smothered be.”  The “repressive” and “claustrophobic” quality of 1599’s closing couplet 
almost undermines the opening lines of the poem, in which the poet favors believing 
                                                      
93 Ibid. (my emphasis). 
94 Snow, 463. 
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rather than knowing.95  Similarly, one might be tempted to say that the irony of Kate’s 
final speech almost collapses under her performance of submission as Petruchio sands 
back to admire the woman he has worked so hard to tame.96   
In both the play and the poem, however, the smothering is mutual, and we could 
also ask if Kate, in submitting, has suffocated – and thus outstaged – her husband?  Has 
Petruchio gotten more than he bargained for and does their competition for power divide 
them? Are Kate and Petruchio, in other words, more like the speaker and beloved in the 
1599 version of the poem because they mutually undermine one another?  As Snow 
points out, the sonnet in The Passionate Pilgrim shows the poet’s “divided subjectivity 
… stress[ing] the gulf between what she [the beloved] thinks and what he [the speaker] 
knows, and between what he gives her to know of him and what he knows to be true of 
himself.”97  Arguably, one could see how the ending of the S rew emphasizes a similar 
gulf between a subversive wife who has distanced herself from her husband and an artist-
poet who nervously watches his creation take center stage before silencing her at the first 
opportunity.     
Admittedly, the 1599 sonnet casts a dark shadow over the ending of the play.  The 
1609 version, however (especially the closing couplet), encourages a positive 
interpretation of Kate’s speech: “Therefore I lie with her, and she with me, / And in our 
faults by lies we flattered be.”  According to Snow, this version of the “sonnet leaves us 
with the impression of the two lovers no longer laboring under but resting upon, even 
buoyed up by the deceptions they practice on each other….”98  Here the poet is not 
                                                      
95 Snow, 463. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Snow, 471. 
98 Snow, 479. 
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resigning himself to a relationship with a less-than-ideal-beloved (“Therefore I’ll  lie with 
her”); the poet willingly recreates the moment with that beloved as he writes (“Therefore 
I lie with her”) and in so doing makes it ideal.  Read against the backdrop of the revised 
sonnet, Petruchio’s “Come on, and kiss me Kate” registers admiration and approval 
rather than anxiety and discomfort.  He is not smothered or smothering; he flatters his 
























Praise, I have suggested, is the “paradigmatic genre” of literary skepticism.1  For 
not only does praise entail doubt, but an author’s expressions of doubt are best revealed 
in his praise.  If, however, this connection between skepticism and epideixis is natural
and intrinsic, one could of course rejoin that Shakespeare – innovative genius that he is – 
could hardly have anything new to say about such a rudimentary rhetorical mode.  But I 
have argued that Shakespeare do s have something new to say, partly because he is 
writing at the end of a long sonneteering tradition and partly because he is a post-
Reformation poet responding to, among other things, religious upheavals, the revival of 
skeptical texts, and the increased reliance on empirical inquiry.  These historical events 
and social changes led to an early modern expression of praise that is at once richer and 
more problematic than the traditional exercises in lauding and loathing.  The sixte nth 
century, that is, saw the poetics of praise transforming into a poetics of appraisl.           
To illustrate this transformation in detail, my first chapter divides Shakespeare’s 
epideictic skepticism into three interrelated features: his challenge and response to the 
Petrarchan tradition and to classical praise, his epistemological isolation, nd his impulse 
to wonder and inquire.  These features become the foundation for my study of the twin 
figures resting at the center of my project: the canker and the rose.  Inded, th  canker 
distinguishes Shakespeare’s Sonnets from the other major sequences of the period, for 
even if Donne, Spenser, and Sidney all in their own way exhibit aspects of what I have 
                                                      
1 For an elaboration on how this idea responds to Fineman’s insistence that praise is the “paradigmatic 
genre of poetical or literary language,” see my prefac . 
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called epideictic skepticism, only Shakespeare discovers the canker of blame, doubt, and 
satire in the rose of beauty and praise.   
In my exploration of Shakespeare’s satirical inquiry into the practice of praise (in 
which I combine formalism, historicism, rhetorical theory, and genre studies), I have tried 
to emphasize how Shakespeare exploits the inherent flexibility of the sonnet sequ nc .  
Indeed, I believe that his sequence endures because it wrestles (paradoxically) with the 
figure of ostensible decay and examines the assumptions underlying Petrarchan praise.  
The result is a collection of poems that takes on the heft and breadth and depth of 
tragedy.  In my comparative study of Hamlet and the young-man sonnets, I have shown 
how both poet and protagonist embark on a quest to understand the world around them – 
to make sense of a society that seems dangerously and vertiginously opaque – only to 
come to terms with their own vices, their own cankers, their own vicious moles of nature. 
In the young-man sonnets, the poet’s “tragic” recognition can be understood in 
terms of engrafting.  As the poems reveal, even if the beloved scion can take life from the 
poetry stock and his poetry can give life to the young man, the abrasion necessary to join 
each to the other will always leave the plant (the poems themselves) vulnerable to the 
canker.  For there is no such thing, the poet learns, as a perfectly mended plant and a 
perfectly unified poet and beloved; the cut that binds will never completely heal; and the 
poet is as much to blame as the beloved.  Similarly, in Hamlet, the prince struggles with 
another kind of graft binding him to the revenge drama, to his promise to the ghost, and 
thus to his father.  And yet, by meditating on the ethics of that connection – by making 
the most of his epideictic skepticism – Hamlet not only comes to terms with his own 
inherited evil, but he also manages heroically to separate himself from the “roots” that 
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enslave him.  Thus, while the prince by Act 5 remains hopeful that his wounded name 
may be repaired, and his status as “rose of the fair state” (perhaps) restored, the young-
man’s poet learns to embrace a new rose and so appreciate the doubt that enriced his 
poems. 
 Contrasting the poet’s “tragic” investigation of the poetics of praise, and all the 
rhetorical and philosophical problems attending it, are the sonnets to the dark lady.  This 
sequence takes on a comic dimension.  Instead of the protracted struggles with the canker 
and the rose, the poet negotiates anxiously, playfully, teasingly with a mistress who does 
not seem to want anything to do with praise.  And so, if the poet of the young-man 
sonnets can finally – and tragically – affirm the necessity of “mutual rende ” in a 
cankered world (125), the poet of the dark-lady sonnets dramatizes that mutual render, 
showing how one might live with the reality of the canker. 
 In considering how the poet-mistress dynamic plays out in one of Shakespeare’s 
early comedies, The Taming of the Shrew, I have of course ignored two of the most 
compelling dark ladies in his corpus: Lady Macbeth, who madly laments the “damned 
spot” that will not go away, and Cleopatra, who finds “joy of the worm.”2  Indeed, 
Cleopatra with remarkable sophistication presents in her final moments on stage athird 
way of confronting the canker.  Neither skeptically assessing the “worm” as a tragic 
problem, nor comically ignoring it, Cleopatra exploits the figure of death and decay to 
satisfy her “immortal longings” (5.2.281).3  Thus, she offers a feminine repudiation of 
                                                      
2 Macbeth, ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine (New York: Washington Square Press, 1992), 5.1.37; 
Antony and Cleopatra, ed. A.R. Braunmuller (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 5.2.260. 
3 While Cleopatra actually kills herself with an asp, Shakespeare chooses to use the word rm instead – 
and he does so repeatedly in the final scene.   
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what is perhaps male-centered epideictic skepticism.4  That is, for her, the “worm” 
becomes a necessary part of her epideictic display, her “noble act” which she laims 
inspires Antony’s “praise” (5.2.284).  On the one hand, then, the play indeed reinforces 
the notion that the canker (or worm) is inherent in the practice of lauding.  Similar to the 
poet of the Sonnets, Cleopatra’s effusive, exaggerated blazon of Antony – whose “face 
was as the heavens,” whose “legs bestrid the ocean,” whose “reared arm / Crested th  
world” (5.2.80-84) – finally leads her to embrace the worm in her death.  On the other 
hand, the “worm” reflects a woman’s certainty of reunion [“Husband, I come” (287)] 
instead of a Petrarchan poet’s isolating doubt.  Thus Cleopatra – a woman of both “fire 
and air” (289) and “marble-constan[cy]” (241) – reminds us that even if we read th  dark-
lady sonnets as a “comic epilogue” to the young-man poems, we must also remember that 
Shakespeare, as always, had more to say.   
   
 






                                                      
4 For one discussion of the relationship between skepticism and the male gender, see Anita Sherman, 
Skepticism and Memory in Shakespeare and Donne, 85-86.  Sherman explores the following “controversial 
comment” made by Stanley Cavell: “‘so far as skepticism is representable as the doubt whether your 
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